The uncivil war: Iraq's election frenzy

Shafaq News/ As Iraq nears its 2025 parliamentary elections, the country stands at a crossroads. Will this vote mark a turning point toward a long-overdue reform, or will it reinforce the entrenched forces that have shaped its political landscape for years? With deep divisions, economic uncertainty, and mounting public frustration, the stakes have never been higher.

In an exclusive interview with Shafaq News, former MP Kazem Al-Sayadi offers a stark assessment, warning that the elections will be dominated by “power struggles, public funds, smear campaigns, corruption allegations, and empty promises.” His words reflect the skepticism many Iraqis feel, raising a critical concern about the possibility of the country breaking free from its political paralysis, or is history doomed to repeat itself

Can the Political Mosaic Hold?

Powerhouse Cracked

At the heart of Iraq’s political landscape lies the Coordination Framework (CF), a coalition of Shiite political parties with strong ties to Iran. Emerging as the dominant faction in the 2021 parliamentary elections, the CF secured around 130 out of 329 seats, granting it a central role in shaping the country’s government. Yet, cracks within the CF have become increasingly visible, exposing tensions over power-sharing, foreign influence, and resource distribution.

Al-Sayadi argues that despite these internal rifts, the parties within the CF remain united by a single goal; maintaining their grip on power. “The upcoming election will not bring about real change but will focus on preserving the current political order,” he notes.

One of the most pressing points of contention within the CF is its reliance on Iran for political support. As Iraq’s relationship with Iran grows more complex, marked by rising economic and security concerns, some factions within the CF are questioning this dependency and advocating for greater political autonomy. With the 2025 elections looming, experts like Ali Al-Khalidi suggest that the growing internal divisions signal unease about Iran’s continued influence over Iraq’s political direction.

The CF’s internal power struggles are further reflected in differing visions for Iraq’s governance. Figures like Nouri al-Maliki, leader of the State of Law party, continue to champion a centralized government, while groups such as Asaib Ahl al-Haq led by Qais Al-Khazaali, push for more power for paramilitary forces.

Disputes over Iraq’s oil revenues have only intensified these tensions, with the 2023 allocation of $9.5 billion to the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) raising concerns about the increasing influence of these armed groups.

As political analyst Samir Al-Hashimi observes, “It’s hard to imagine any meaningful change when the same figures control both the state and the economy. The CF’s reliance on paramilitary groups like the PMF highlights how deeply entrenched the system has become.”

Unpredictable but Influential

Muqtada al-Sadr's Patriotic Shiite Movement, known as the Sadrists, remains one of Iraq’s most unpredictable and influential political forces. In the wake of the 2021 elections, the Sadrists secured 73 seats but withdrew from parliament in June 2022, frustrated by the political gridlock and pervasive corruption. Al-Sadr declared, “We cannot be part of a corrupt system that fails to serve the people of Iraq,” positioning his movement as an anti-establishment force. This move allowed the Coordination Framework (CF) to consolidate its grip on power and form the government.

However, the Sadrists' absence from parliament triggered intense rivalries within the CF, as various factions vied for control, further destabilizing Iraq's political system. This fragmentation created an opening for Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani to strengthen his influence.

Despite the CF’s dominance, uncertainty surrounds whether the Sadrists will re-enter the political scene in the 2025 elections. Traditionally, al-Sadr has used political boycotts to rally support, particularly among Iraq's urban poor and Shiite communities. If he chooses to return, his movement’s ability to mobilize these groups could dramatically shift the electoral balance.

Political commentator Mona Ibrahim notes, “The return of the Sadrist Movement will have a profound impact. Muqtada al-Sadr has proven his ability to rally millions of Iraqis, particularly youth and marginalized Shiite communities. Their participation could change everything.”

The Kurdish/Sunni Struggle

Sunni and Kurdish political factions are also facing significant hurdles as they prepare for the 2025 elections. The Sunni political landscape remains deeply fragmented, with no single leader able to unite the various factions under a cohesive vision.

Prominent figures such as former Speaker of Parliament Mohammed al-Halbousi and businessman Khamis al-Khanjar have pursued divergent paths, with Halbousi sometimes aligning with the Coordination Framework (CF), while Khanjar pushes for greater regional autonomy. This division, coupled with soaring unemployment rates in Sunni-majority provinces like Anbar and Nineveh, where jobless rates surpassed 25% in 2023, has fuelled growing public frustration.

Senior Sunni politician Ayad Al-Kuwaiti sums up the situation, “The Sunni political space is fragmented, and no leader has yet been able to unite the various factions under a common vision. This fragmentation presents a significant challenge as the election approaches.”

Similarly, Kurdish politics are marked by division, particularly between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The KDP’s strong showing in the 2024 regional elections, securing 39 seats compared to the PUK’s 23, reflects a sense of dissatisfaction within the Kurdish community. The rise of the New Generation Party (Al-Jeel Al-Jadeed) further underscores this shift, as younger Kurds demand action on key issues like unpaid salaries, corruption, and high unemployment.

Despite these internal tensions, Kurdish parties remain essential players in Iraq’s national politics, especially when it comes to the federal budget and oil revenues. Journalist Rami Salah observes, “The Kurdish leadership is at a crossroads. They must address their internal divisions if they hope to maintain relevance in Baghdad’s politics. The rise of the New Generation signals the younger generation’s demand for change.”

Reform on Board

One of Iraq’s notable developments is the rise of reformist movements, sparked by the 2019 Tishreen protests. These movements reflect widespread dissatisfaction with entrenched political elites and aim to address Iraq’s corruption, sectarianism, and mismanagement. Alongside the Tishreen Movement, groups like Ishraqat Kanoon and Emtidad have emerged, pushing for political reform, accountability, and a break from Iran-aligned factions.

Central to the reformist agenda is the call for electoral integrity and an end to political party corruption. The Tishreen Movement, for example, advocates for an independent electoral commission free from political influence and pushes for constitutional amendments, particularly in areas such as regional autonomy, economic governance, and individual rights. Tackling corruption is a top priority, as Iraq remains one of the world’s most corrupt nations, according to Transparency International. Reformists aim to strengthen institutions of accountability and increase the autonomy of anti-corruption agencies.

Economic diversification is another key issue. Iraq’s heavy reliance on oil leaves its economy vulnerable to global price fluctuations, and reformists propose expanding sectors like agriculture, manufacturing, and services to create jobs, especially for Iraq’s youth, who make up more than 60% of the population. Many of these young Iraqis, who were at the forefront of the Tishreen protests, see the reformist movements as a platform to reshape Iraq’s future, moving away from sectarianism and toward a unified nation.

Fadhil al-Jabouri, a leader of the Tishreen movement, emphasizes the commitment of young Iraqis to break free from sectarian politics and advocate for national unity. For them, the reformist agenda represents a chance to rebuild Iraq. However, the reformists face significant challenges in translating grassroots support into political power. They struggle with limited resources compared to well-funded traditional parties and lack the infrastructure to mount effective campaigns. Additionally, fragmentation within the reformist bloc, with no unified leadership or platform, weakens their ability to challenge the established political elites. Political analyst Mona Ibrahim points out that this fragmentation often leads to divided votes, hindering their representation in parliament.

Despite these hurdles, the reformist message resonates strongly, particularly among Iraq’s younger population. Success will depend on uniting under a cohesive platform and offering a compelling alternative to the status quo, both in terms of policy and leadership. Rami Salah, a journalist, notes that overcoming sectarian and tribal loyalties remains a major obstacle. Changing Iraq’s political culture will require not only political will but also careful navigation by reformist leaders.

Who Gets the Biggest Slice in Iraq?

The 2025 elections are shaping up to be a pivotal moment in Iraq’s political trajectory, with numerous potential outcomes that could reshape the nation’s future. Established political forces, such as those from the Coordination Framework (CF)—including figures like Haidar al-Abadi, Ammar al-Hakim, and Nouri al-Maliki—continue to maintain substantial support. Their experience, established networks, and backing from powerful regional and sectarian alliances help them retain influence. However, they face growing opposition from reformist movements and increasingly fragmented coalitions, potentially weakening their hold on power. Ahmad Al-Yasseri, head of the Arab-Australian Center for Strategic Studies, predicts a significant decline in the influence of traditional political factions by 2025, though he cautions that the elections may still be swayed by financial incentives and manipulation, much like in 2021, when nearly 75% of political parties used financial tactics to secure votes.

For reformist movements, the 2025 elections present both an opportunity and a challenge. Despite internal fragmentation, limited resources, and lack of organizational infrastructure, these groups, such as those emerging from the Tishreen protests, continue to draw support. They must overcome these hurdles to translate grassroots enthusiasm into political power. Al-Yasseri notes that the weakening of traditional factions may open the door for reformists to capitalize on growing public discontent with corruption, unemployment, and underperforming public services. In the 2021 elections, 26% of voters supported new reformist groups, indicating the potential for a larger share of seats in 2025 if they can unite and effectively address these pressing issues.

One of the most unpredictable factors in the 2025 elections is the potential return of Muqtada al-Sadr and his Sadrist movement. Having previously withdrawn from parliament in 2022, al-Sadr’s movement holds the ability to mobilize Iraq’s urban poor and Shiite communities, which make up more than half of the population. This could significantly increase voter turnout, particularly among younger Iraqis, many of whom are disillusioned by sectarian politics and seeking change. Political strategist Nabil Al-Hashimi suggests that the Sadrist movement’s outreach in economically struggling areas such as southern Iraq and Baghdad could boost voter engagement and potentially shift the political landscape.

A likely scenario is a highly fragmented parliament, as no single party or coalition is expected to secure an outright majority, continuing the trend seen in post-2003 Iraqi elections. This would force political factions to form coalitions, resulting in lengthy negotiations, political deadlock, and delays in vital reforms, exacerbating public frustration. Alternatively, if reformist groups succeed in uniting and gaining traction, they could secure a larger share of seats, potentially signaling a shift away from traditional political forces and introducing a wave of younger, progressive representatives into power. Given that 60% of Iraq’s population is under 30, a reformist campaign focused on youth could play a critical role in reshaping the political dynamics.

The Sadrist movement’s return could further complicate this landscape, as al-Sadr’s ability to galvanize support could disrupt the status quo. If he successfully channels the grievances of Iraq’s marginalized communities, the Sadrists could secure a larger share of seats and possibly form a coalition government centered around economic relief and anti-corruption reforms. In a more drastic scenario, Iraq could see the rise of a military-backed or technocratic government, especially if the security situation worsens or if the election is perceived as unfair. The military’s influence in Iraq’s political affairs remains significant, and a military-backed government could emerge through either a coup or the election of a technocrat with military support, potentially sacrificing democratic processes for short-term stability.

In the worst-case scenario, the elections could spark a post-election crisis if they are perceived as rigged or manipulated. With public trust in the government at an all-time low, only 28% of Iraqis believe the country is headed in the right direction, any signs of election fraud could lead to mass protests and violent clashes. This could mirror the unrest of 2019, requiring significant intervention to restore stability and ensure the will of the people is respected.

Foreign influence remains another key factor in the 2025 elections. Countries such as Iran, the US, and neighboring Arab states have long played a role in backing different political factions in Iraq, and increased foreign involvement could sway the election outcomes. This could exacerbate political instability, as external pressures might lead to a government dominated by factions aligned with foreign interests, undermining the electoral process and complicating Iraq’s political future.

Each of these potential scenarios underscores the complexity and volatility of Iraq’s political environment. The 2025 elections stand as a decisive moment in the country’s post-2003 history, offering both the possibility of significant change and the risk of further instability.