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    <title>Shafaq News | Latest breaking news in Iraq and the world</title>
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    <description>Shafaaq News Agency</description>
    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 17:14:25 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <link>https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Israeli-incursions-cut-Syrian-villagers-off-from-their-land</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Israeli-incursions-cut-Syrian-villagers-off-from-their-land</guid>
      <title>Israeli incursions cut Syrian villagers off from their land</title>
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      <category><![CDATA[In-Depth]]></category>
      <description><![CDATA[<?xml encoding="utf-8" ?><p><span><em>Shafaq News</em></span></p><p><span>In theSyrian villages along the edge of the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, whether afarmer can reach his olive grove or a shepherd his pasture now depends on whereIsraeli patrols and checkpoints happen to be that day. From Quneitra provinceto the Yarmouk Basin in western Daraa, Israeli incursions have disruptedfarming and herding, restricted movement, and tested Syria's ability to protectits citizens and reassert control.</span></p><p><span>Residentswho spoke to Shafaq News describe broad rejection of the Israeli militarypresence, and of the offers of aid that sometimes come with Israeli attempts toengage them, in communities where village elders, tribal ties and youngactivists all shape the response.</span></p><p><span>Israel saysits forward deployment is meant to stop threats from taking shape near theGolan, while Damascus insists any lasting security arrangement must begin withan Israeli withdrawal and respect for Syrian sovereignty.</span></p><p><span>The SijilCenter, which monitors Israeli operations in Syria, recorded 395 incidents inOctober, the highest monthly total this year and a 41.1% increase fromSeptember's 280. It documented another 163 violations between November 1 and 14alone, including ground incursions, checkpoints, raids, detentions, shelling,and overflights, most of them in Quneitra and <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Middle-East/Israeli-forces-raid-Daraa-village" target="_blank">Daraa</a>.</span></p><p><span>Shafaq Newsreporters have tracked Israeli movements around Maariya, Abdin, Jamla, Wadial-Raqad and villages across Quneitra, involving raids, detentions, checkpointsand searches, as well as artillery fire and engineering work. The patternpoints to an Israeli ability to watch roads and village entrances and to decidewho can pass and who can reach their land.</span></p><p><span><img src="https://media.shafaq.com/media/arcella/1794834625203.webp"></span></p><p><span><strong>Land out ofreach</strong></span></p><p><span>In Maariya,a village in western Daraa, the mukhtar, or village headman, counts the cost infields and livestock.</span></p><p><span>"About1,500 dunams* of farmland are now beyond our reach," Kamel Saleh Dawaratold Shafaq News. "People can no longer grow vegetables, look after theirolive trees or graze their sheep, goats and cows there."</span></p><p><span>Dawara addedthat around 120 goats have also been stolen, as herders struggle to reachpastures and care for their animals. </span></p><p><span>The villagehas turned down Israeli offers of food and services, including water andelectricity, Dawara said, crediting the community's social and tribal bonds."We refuse to deal with the Israeli forces or take anything from them,however hard life gets."</span></p><p><span>"Wesimply want to live in safety, go back to our land and work it freely, and seean end to the Israeli presence that is restricting our lives." Organizingprotests, he added, is difficult under the current circumstances.</span></p><p><span><img src="https://media.shafaq.com/media/arcella/1794834638117.webp"></span></p><p><span><strong>Olives, BeesAnd Pasture</strong></span></p><p><span>AmmarDamara, a farmer and beekeeper, said being cut off from land in the valley hadcost villagers dearly. When he spoke to Shafaq News, large areas of olives hadstill not been harvested.</span></p><p><span>The valley'srelative warmth makes it a winter refuge for beekeepers, who move their hivesthere during the cold months, he explained. "Beekeepers have lost abouthalf their hives, and grazing has been almost completely wiped out,"Damara said. "Some people have had to sell what they own just to getby."</span></p><p><span>Israelioffers of help have done nothing to soften local opposition, he said."People would rather put up with hardship than accept them."</span></p><p><span>His brotherwas detained one night and released the next day. "We hope it doesn'thappen again," Damara said.</span></p><p><span>Residentsstand with the Syrian state and will accept whatever solution the governmentsees fit, he said, calling for international action to stop the incursions andreopen the roads to the farmland and pastures.</span></p><p><span>Detentionshave become a regular feature of the raids. On November 1, Israeli forces<a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Middle-East/Olive-harvester-detained-by-Israeli-forces-in-Daraa" target="_blank">detained</a> Zaidan al-Hussein while he was harvesting olives in Wadi Koya in the<a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Middle-East/Israeli-forces-push-into-Syria-s-Yarmouk-Basin" target="_blank">Yarmouk </a>Basin, and his whereabouts remained unknown, Shafaq News reported atthe time. On Friday, they detained three people during an incursion into thetown of Jubata al-Khashab in northern Quneitra. </span></p><p><span>According toSyrian officials and UN-backed investigators cited by The Associated Press,Israel has detained 49 Syrians since December 2024 and released 16.</span></p><p><span><img src="https://media.shafaq.com/media/arcella/1794834651173.webp"></span></p><p><span><strong>No UnifiedLeadership</strong></span></p><p><span>Tribal andcommunity ties have not produced a single local leadership. Small residents'committees, usually of three or four people, handle contacts with governmentbodies and follow up on services, according to a Shafaq News reporter, whilecalls for <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Middle-East/Syrian-families-protest-at-UNDOF-over-Israeli-detentions" target="_blank">protest</a> tend to come from young people rather than from organizedvillage committees.</span></p><p><span>Damaradescribed meetings that bring together village elders, young people, teachersand intellectuals to discuss what is happening. But Ahmed Mousa Subaihi, alocal coordinator between residents and the UN Disengagement Observer Force(UNDOF), sees little organization behind them.</span></p><p><span>"Thereare no organized tribal meetings here, and no means to confront theseincursions," Subaihi said, noting that the area's many tribal and socialgroups do not necessarily act as one, even though opposition to the incursionsruns deep.</span></p><p><span>Fear hasbecome a constant, he said, recalling a night raid on the village of Jamla."The damage reaches people's property, their land, their beehives andtheir olive trees," he said, calling for civilians to be protected and theviolations to stop. Subaihi spoke in a local capacity, not on behalf of the UN.</span></p><p><span>In thebackground, sources told Shafaq News that individuals affiliated with Hizbut-Tahrir have been present in parts of southern Syria, the Yarmouk Basin andareas near the occupied Golan Heights since the Bashar al-Assad era. The scaleand structure of that presence, whether those individuals possess weapons, andthe nature of their current activities require further verification.</span></p><p><span><img src="https://media.shafaq.com/media/arcella/1794834660878.webp"></span></p><p><span><strong>The ShadowOf October 7</strong></span></p><p><span>Israelframes its presence in and around the buffer zone as necessary to protect itsnorthern border from Lebanon's Iran-backed Hezbollah, which fought alongsideAssad's forces during Syria's 13-year war, and to stop threats before theyreach the Golan. Its forces "question and detain individuals when there isreasonable suspicion of their involvement in terrorist activity," theIsraeli military says.</span></p><p><span>InSeptember, the military said it had carried out operations against armedinfrastructure inside Syria, detaining suspects and seizing anti-tank shells,mortar rounds and rifles. That account could not be independently verified, nordoes it show that the measures were limited to armed suspects rather than thecivilians caught up in the raids.</span></p><p><span>At a UNSecurity Council session on September 17, Israel's ambassador, Danny Danon,linked what Israel calls its security zone in southern Syria to preventing anOctober 7-style attack launched from Syrian territory, according to theSecurity Council Report. The Security Council has stressed that the 1974disengagement agreement must be respected and that there should be no militaryactivity in the separation zone.</span></p><p><span><img src="https://media.shafaq.com/media/arcella/1794834671411.webp"></span></p><p><span><strong>Damascus'sTerms</strong></span></p><p><span>Damascus isoffering a negotiating path that begins with Israel withdrawing from positionsit has taken since December 8, 2024, the day Bashar al-Assad's government fell,and returning to the 1974 disengagement lines. That could lead to a securityarrangement and, later, talks on a lasting peace.</span></p><p><span>Speaking atan Atlantic Council event in September, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa tiedpeace to guaranteeing Syria's rights and ending the occupation of its land,saying a successful security agreement could pave the way for longer-term talkson peace and the occupied Golan. He also criticized Israel for basing its Syriapolicy on its experience in Gaza and exaggerating its security fears.</span></p><p><span>Restoringthe 1974 arrangements is not the same as settling the question of the Golan,which Israel captured in 1967 and later annexed in a move most of theinternational community does not recognize. The first concerns separatingforces and where they are deployed, while the second concerns land,sovereignty, borders, and a final settlement.</span></p><p><span>Syrian-Israelinegotiations date back to the 1991 Madrid conference and continued through the1990s and into 2000. Disputes over the scope of an Israeli withdrawal, the June4, 1967 line, Syrian access to Lake Tiberias, and security arrangementsprevented an agreement. The sources reviewed for this report show no indicationthat current contacts have formally resumed from where those negotiationsended.</span></p><p><span><em>*1 hectare=10 dunams</em></span></p><p><span><em>Written andedited by Shafaq News staff.</em></span></p>]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 13:32:36 +0000</pubDate>
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      <link>https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Iraq-s-buried-mines-outlive-four-decades-of-war</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Iraq-s-buried-mines-outlive-four-decades-of-war</guid>
      <title>Iraq's buried mines outlive four decades of war</title>
      <enclosure url="https://media.shafaq.com/media/arcella/1794692847645.webp"/>
      <category><![CDATA[In-Depth]]></category>
      <description><![CDATA[<?xml encoding="utf-8" ?><p><em>Shafaq News</em></p><p>The Iran-Iraq <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/society/Iran-Iraq-war-landmines-still-threaten-Iraq-s-Maysan" target="_blank">War</a> that planted the mines around Al-Tayeb, inIraq&rsquo;s southern Maysan province, ended in 1988. Nearly four decades later, oneof them claimed a man's life in April 2026.</p><p>Al-Tayeb, a sub-district east of Al-Amarah along the Iranianfrontier, has continued to record deaths and injuries since the guns fellsilent. Raed Shamil, commissioner of Al-Amarah district, told Shafaq News thatnobody holds an accurate map of where every mine lies.</p><p>In Iraq, wars end, but their weapons stay. Landmines,unexploded shells, and cluster-munition remnants still lie beneath borderlands,deserts, farmland, and grazing routes. A shepherd looking for pasture, a farmercrossing an open field, or an oil worker driving through the southern desertcan still meet a weapon from a war fought before they were born.</p><p><strong>Each Conflict Left Its Own Layer </strong></p><p>The 1980-1988 war with Iran seeded legacy minefields,concentrated along the eastern frontier, while the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003US-led invasion added unexploded ordnance and cluster munitions, and the fightagainst ISIS scattered improvised mines and explosive devices across largeparts of northern and western Iraq.</p><p>Seasonal floods can uncover explosives buried for decades orcarry them into areas once considered safer, and shifting sand changes how deepthey lie and where.</p><p>According to Mustafa Hamid, media director at the IraqiEnvironment Ministry's Directorate for Mine Action, about 2,400 squarekilometers of Iraqi land remain contaminated with mines and other explosiveremnants of war. Teams are currently working across roughly 300 squarekilometers of it.</p><p>Basra holds the country's "largest concentration ofcontaminated land," Hamid told Shafaq News, much of it along frontierzones that served as battlefields in earlier wars. Minefields and war remnantsalso line Iraq's borders with Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia.</p><p>That national figure shifts constantly. Survey teams strikeareas from the suspected-contamination database, confirm new hazardous zonesand find explosives no one had recorded. In January 2026, the UN Mine ActionService (UNMAS) put the area still suspected of explosive-ordnancecontamination at about 2,583 square kilometers. The headline number, then,works less like a countdown than a moving target: clearance shrinks the knownproblem while fresh surveys expose sites that were never on the books.</p><p>Systematic long-term data collection has been inconsistent,so Iraq has no definitive cumulative casualty count. Available records point toat least 35,000 people killed or injured over the decades, and probablythousands more, according to the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor. TheMonitor recorded 166 casualties from mines and explosive remnants in 2024alone, 60 of them fatal.</p><p>UNMAS and UNICEF reported in April 2025 that at least 314children had been killed or injured by explosive ordnance over the previousfive years. Contamination also cuts families off from schools, livelihoods andland, the agencies warned, and can keep displaced people from returning homesafely.</p><p>Hamid sees some progress in the tools. Drones and othertechnologies are increasingly helping teams detect and map hazardous ground, hesaid, &ldquo;though they have yet to become a standard part of clearance operationsnationwide.&rdquo;</p><p>The response draws in the ministries of defense andinterior, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), along with nationalmine-action authorities, UN agencies, and local and international humanitarianorganizations.</p><p><a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Floods-unearth-Iraq-s-hidden-mines-reviving-a-wartime-threat-from-Kirkuk-to-the-Iran-border" target="_blank"><em>Read more: Floods unearth Iraq&rsquo;s hidden mines, reviving a wartime threat from Kirkuk to the Iran border</em></a></p><p><strong>Al-Muthanna's Desert Inheritance</strong></p><p>In the open desert of Al-Muthanna, in the southwest, most ofthe contamination traces back to 1991. Ahmed Al-Jashaami, a member of theEnvironmental Protection and Biodiversity Association, told Shafaq News thatlarge stretches of the province remain littered with unexploded rockets, bombs,mines and cluster-munition remnants from the Gulf War and the Iraqi army'swithdrawal from Kuwait.</p><p>By his estimate, these remnants have killed, injured ordisabled more than 4,500 people over the decades, though some of the statisticsbehind that figure date to 2021.</p><p>Roughly two decades of work by local environmental andcivil-defense bodies, alongside mine-action organizations, have still leftsignificant parts of the desert without a comprehensive survey or clearance,Al-Jashaami said. Some contaminated areas remain out of reach for governmentteams and humanitarian groups alike.</p><p>Mine Action Review estimated that about 228 squarekilometers of such contamination remained at the end of 2025, with the largestknown concentrations in Al-Muthanna at approximately 94.7 square kilometers,Basra at 74.3 and Dhi Qar at 37.4.</p><p>In Basiyah, a remote district of <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/society/Iraq-s-Al-Muthanna-removes-mines-from-180-square-kilometers" target="_blank">Al-Muthanna</a>, around 180square kilometers of contaminated land have been cleared after decades in whichmines and unexploded weapons menaced local communities, district director HayefSaleh Muzhir told Shafaq News.</p><p>Before clearance and awareness campaigns gathered pace, thedistrict recorded dozens of deaths and injuries linked to explosive remnants.That number has dropped sharply as land has been cleared, warning signs havegone up around ground that remains unsafe, and non-governmental organizationshave widened risk-awareness campaigns, he said.</p><p>The work now also runs through Iraq's economic ambitions.Some contaminated land falls inside oil-exploration zones, and energy companiesoperating there have had to clear explosives along access roads and operationalroutes before drilling can begin.</p><p><strong>Maysan's Wandering Minefields</strong></p><p>Back in Al-Tayeb, the explosives endanger residents as wellas border personnel, gravel-plant workers and staff of the state-owned MaysanOil Company, Shamil said. In some areas, minefields and other war remnants"extend for kilometers."</p><p>"Water descending from higher ground during winter candislodge mines and carry them away from their original locations," Shamilsaid, sometimes for tens of kilometers. The edges of a minefield, in other words,can move.</p><p>"International humanitarian organizations began workingin the area after 2003, but the scale of clearance remained small compared withthe territory believed to be contaminated," he added.</p><p>Large tracts therefore remain off limits. For farmers andshepherds, that means fertile land they cannot safely plant or graze, and forlocal authorities, it means development and tourism projects can stall beforethe first foundation is laid.</p><p><a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Report/War-remnants-haunt-Iraq-as-Basra-leads-in-contamination" target="_blank"><em>Read more: War remnants haunt Iraq as Basra leads in contamination</em></a></p><p><strong>Racing 2028 Deadlines</strong></p><p>Iraq faces two international deadlines. Under theAnti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, it has until February 1, 2028, to meetArticle 5 clearance obligations, following an extension granted by statesparties, and its deadline under the Convention on Cluster Munitions falls onNovember 1, 2028.</p><p>Mine Action Review assessed Iraq as off track for itsanti-personnel mine deadline and said in its August 2026 assessment that thescale of cluster-munition contamination would likely require further extensionsbeyond 2028.</p><p>International mine-action funding surged during the campaignto stabilize areas retaken from ISIS, then contracted. Donor funding channeledthrough UNMAS Iraq fell from about $77 million in 2019 to around $6 million in2024, according to Mine Action Review, while the number of donors dropped from21 to eight. Much of that earlier effort also went to the north and west, whilethe south holds most of Iraq's known cluster-munition contamination.</p><p>UNMAS said in January 2026 that Iraq remained among thecountries most heavily affected by explosive <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/society/Iraq-reports-30K-casualties-from-unexploded-ordnance" target="_blank">ordnance</a>, with contamination stillrestricting agriculture, infrastructure, and essential services more than fourdecades after successive wars.</p><p><a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Spoiled-by-the-coil-Iraq-s-mines-battles-take-their-toll" target="_blank"><em>Read more: Spoiled by the coil: Iraq's mines battles take their toll</em></a></p><p><em>Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.</em></p>]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 14 Nov 2026 22:30:19 +0000</pubDate>
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      <link>https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Iraq-s-annual-rains-expose-persistent-infrastructure-failures</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Iraq-s-annual-rains-expose-persistent-infrastructure-failures</guid>
      <title>Iraq's annual rains expose persistent infrastructure failures</title>
      <enclosure url="https://media.shafaq.com/media/arcella/1794574065971.webp"/>
      <category><![CDATA[In-Depth]]></category>
      <description><![CDATA[<?xml encoding="utf-8" ?><p><em>Shafaq News- Baghdad/ Najaf/ Babil </em></p><p>Recurring service disruptions and flooded streets acrossIraqi provinces during the rainy season reflect more than a lack of funding.According to MPs and experts, the disruptions expose years of shortcomings inplanning, project implementation, and oversight, despite annual governmentbudget allocations. Infrastructure projects continue to fall behind populationgrowth, urban expansion, and the needs of cities.</p><p><a href="https://api.shafaq.com/en/Kurdistan/Heavy-rain-and-floods-sever-Kirkuk-Erbil-highway" target="_blank">Rainfall</a> across several provinces over the past weekhighlighted the limited effectiveness of government spending on sewage andstormwater drainage projects, according to observers of public services.Long-delayed projects, deteriorating drainage networks, and a lack of roads andbasic services continue to affect many areas, compounded by funding delays,poor contractor performance, and inadequate accountability.</p><p><strong>Funding Shortages and Outstanding Debts</strong></p><p>Hassan Shaker Al-Kaabi, a member of parliament's FinanceCommittee representing Babil province, attributed the province's weakinfrastructure not only to limited budget allocations but also to fiscaluncertainty and delays in approving federal budgets.</p><p>Speaking to Shafaq News, Al-Kaabi explained that theseproblems have prevented the completion of public service projects, leaving somesuspended for years and allowing parts of them to deteriorate, furtherworsening residents' living conditions.</p><p>&ldquo;Recent rainfall exposed the extent of infrastructureproblems in several parts of Babil, where vehicles could not pass through someneighborhoods, and students struggled to reach their schools,&rdquo; he noted.</p><p><a href="https://shafaq.com/en/society/Floods-isolate-villages-fill-dams-as-heavy-rains-sweep-Iraq" target="_blank"><em>Read more: Floods isolate villages, fill dams as heavy rains sweep Iraq</em></a></p><p>Al-Kaabi stressed that limited financial resources haveprevented authorities from completing road paving and infrastructure projects,including in areas where technical work has already been completed but fundingremains an obstacle.</p><p>He also pointed to more than 4.5 trillion Iraqi dinars(approximately $2.96 billion) in outstanding payments owed to contractorsacross the provinces, including amounts associated with suspended or delayedprojects.</p><p>Securing funding, he argued, should involve more thanlaunching new projects. &ldquo;Authorities must also complete existing works, settleoutstanding debts, and address essential service needs.&rdquo;</p><p>The MP identified two main obstacles to approving thefederal budget: the lack of an agreement with the Kurdistan Region of Iraq(KRI) over financial issues and the existence of multiple financial fundsallocated to different sectors and provinces.</p><p>He proposed consolidating these allocations within thefederal budget and directing the funds to provincial administrations, withspending placed under the supervision of regulatory authorities.</p><p><strong>Impact on Public Services and Education</strong></p><p>The consequences of funding shortages and stalled projectsextend beyond drainage networks and roads to other sectors, particularlyeducation.</p><p>Schools and access roads in several provinces remain in poorcondition, despite rehabilitation projects launched years ago.</p><p>Shaymaa Abdul Sattar Al-Fatlawi, a member of parliament'sEducation Committee representing Najaf province, linked delays in approving thefederal budget to deteriorating conditions in public services, education, andhealthcare.</p><p>She stressed that the budget should be based on a detailedassessment of provincial needs and financial entitlements rather than rushedapproval at the expense of proper planning.</p><p>In comments to Shafaq News, Al-Fatlawi highlightedparticularly poor infrastructure in districts and subdistricts far fromprovincial city centers.</p><p>Unpaved dirt roads leading to schools make it difficult forstudents to attend classes during rainfall. Some areas also continue to rely onmud-built schools, prefabricated buildings, and unfinished steel-framestructures that were supposed to be replaced.</p><p>Najaf provides one example. Al-Fatlawi pointed to unfinishedstructures and prefabricated facilities associated with Project No. 1, launchedin 2010, which remain in place despite the years that have passed. &ldquo;These casesare evidence of the scale of stalled projects across central and southernIraq.&rdquo;</p><p>Al-Fatlawi called for the next federal budget to account forpopulation density, poverty levels, and the number of people relocating to orvisiting each province.</p><p>She singled out Najaf, where public services requireallocations that reflect both its resident population and the large influx ofreligious visitors, calling for addressing older stalled projects and providingthe necessary support for schools, roads, and other essential services.</p><p><strong>Government Plans to Address Drainage Problems</strong></p><p>The Iraqi Ministry of Construction, Housing and PublicMunicipalities, meanwhile, maintains that it is implementing strategic andservice projects to address bottlenecks in sewage and stormwater drainagenetworks.</p><p>Ministry spokesperson Nabil Al-Saffar told Shafaq News thatapproximately 80 projects are being implemented across the provinces, coveringpumping stations, drainage and treatment facilities, and stormwater and sewagenetworks.</p><p>He explained that authorities are prioritizing areasrepeatedly affected by water accumulation and localized flooding.</p><p>The ministry's investment plan includes completing 25service projects across eight provinces by March 2027, he noted. </p><p>In Nineveh province, the projects include completing theright-bank wastewater treatment plant in Mosul, transmission pipelines, pumpingstations, and sewage projects in Al-Hamdaniya and Bartella.</p><p>The plan also covers sewage and stormwater drainage projectsin Hit and southern Fallujah, as well as the Fallujah sewage project, which hasa planned capacity of 35,000 cubic meters per day.</p><p>Other projects include stormwater and sewage networks inRamadi, the capital of Al-Anbar province; completion of the second phase of thesewage project in Najaf; and the construction of residential sewage networks inKarbala.</p><p>In <a href="https://www.shafaq.com/en/society/Heavy-rains-trigger-collapse-near-Iraq-s-longest-bridge" target="_blank">Diyala</a> province, planned works include stormwater andwastewater networks, pumping stations, and the Al-Khalis treatment plant.</p><p>The investment plan also includes sewage networks inAl-Bashaer and infrastructure projects in Wasit province, alongside therehabilitation of several neighborhoods and residential areas in Diwaniyah.</p><p>According to Al-Saffar, &ldquo;the <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Iraq-enters-16th-month-without-budget-as-4-500-projects-stall" target="_blank">projects</a> aim to increase thecapacity of drainage networks, reduce standing water, and limit damage to roadsand private property.&rdquo;</p><p>He outlined a series of technical and oversight proceduresdesigned to ensure construction quality. These begin with reviews ofengineering designs and laboratory testing of construction materials, followedby on-site supervision from resident engineers and technical committees. Beforefinal handover, authorities inspect the networks, treatment facilities, andpumping stations. Their performance is also monitored after they enter service,he affirmed. </p><p>Addressing delays in project implementation, Al-Saffarcautioned against assigning responsibility to a single party, explaining thatthe causes vary from one project to another.</p><p>Some delays stem from poor contractor performance orviolations of approved designs and technical specifications. &ldquo;In such cases,the ministry can issue warnings, impose delay penalties, and investigate thereasons for underperformance.&rdquo;</p><p>Where legal and contractual requirements are met,authorities can ultimately terminate a contractor's involvement and reassignthe project to another company. However, Al-Saffar pointed to several factorsbeyond contractors' control, including insufficient financial allocations,conflicts with existing infrastructure and utility networks, and delays byproject-owning authorities in resolving these issues or providing therequirements needed for implementation.</p><p>He also identified delayed contractor payments and thefailure to provide sufficient funding as additional causes of project delays.</p><p><a href="https://shafaq.com/en/society/1-800-delayed-public-projects-slow-Iraq-s-infrastructure-development" target="_blank"><em>Read more: 1,800+ delayed public projects slow Iraq's infrastructure development</em></a></p>]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 21:57:35 +0000</pubDate>
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      <link>https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Al-Maliki-resistance-stalls-plan-to-institutionalize-Iraq-s-Coordination-Framework</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Al-Maliki-resistance-stalls-plan-to-institutionalize-Iraq-s-Coordination-Framework</guid>
      <title>Al-Maliki resistance stalls plan to institutionalize Iraq’s Coordination Framework</title>
      <enclosure url="https://media.shafaq.com/media/arcella/1794516378465.webp"/>
      <category><![CDATA[In-Depth]]></category>
      <description><![CDATA[<?xml encoding="utf-8" ?><p><span><em>Shafaq News- Baghdad</em></span></p><p><span>Leaders of Iraq'sCoordination Framework were due to meet at Humam Hamoudi's home in Baghdad onNovember 2, but so many stayed away that the regular session gave way to an informalconsultation. The main item on its agenda was Hamoudi's plan to turn the rulingShiite alliance into a formal institution with a leadership council, internalrules, and binding decisions, and it came out of the evening weaker than itwent in.</span></p><p><span>Most of theFramework's leaders had initially backed the idea, a source told Shafaq News atthe time. The holdout was Nouri al-Maliki, the former prime minister whoseState of Law Coalition holds 29 seats, second within the alliance only to the46 held by Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, Iraq's prime minister until May, and mostof the Framework has since come round to his view. </span></p><p><span>Politicians andresearchers inside and close to the alliance now doubt it will become a unifiedbody under a single leadership any time soon.</span></p><p><span>The decision reacheswell beyond the alliance's internal housekeeping. The Framework brings togetherShiite parties, several of them tied to Iran-aligned armed factions. It formedin 2021 in opposition to Muqtada al-Sadr, leader of the Patriotic Shiite Movement,formerly known as the Sadrist Movement, whose bloc won that year's electionoutright before he pulled his lawmakers out of parliament and sat out the 2025vote. Since 2022, the alliance has played the decisive role in governmentformation, and this spring it chose Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi as a compromisecandidate.</span></p><p><span><a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Explainer-Iraq-s-Coordination-Framework-and-Its-Rise-to-Power" target="_blank"><em>Read more: Explainer: Iraq&rsquo;s Coordination Framework and Its Rise to Power</em></a></span></p><p><span>Hamoudi, who headsthe Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, floated what he called a "stateleadership council" in August. Sources within the Framework told ShafaqNews that the body would oversee government work through the alliance's owncommittees and give its senior figures greater say over major state decisions,a role Iraq's constitution does not provide for, while some members, accordingto Shafaq News sources, see it as a way to keep the door shut to any return byal-Sadr. Hamoudi has described the division of labor bluntly: the Frameworksets "visions and policies," and al-Zaidi carries them out.</span></p><p><span>The idea is not new.In February, Ammar al-Hakim, who leads the Al-Hikma Movement, urged thealliance to move from ad hoc coordination to an organized, rules-based body,arguing that formal structure would protect its recent gains and sharpenaccountability.</span></p><p><span><a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Iraq-s-Coordination-Framework-is-weakening-but-no-rival-is-ready-to-replace-it" target="_blank"><em>Read more: Iraq's Coordination Framework is weakening, but no rival is ready to replace it</em></a></span></p><p><span>Al-Maliki'sargument, as the source relayed it, is that a fixed structure would open fightsover who leads, what powers the leadership holds and how votes are counted,while costing the alliance the flexibility that has carried it through repeatedcrises.</span></p><p><span>Hassan Fadaam, asenior figure in the movement, told Shafaq News that much of the debatemisreads the Framework, which he described as a meeting place for Shiiteparties that each keep their own ideology, program, and independentdecision-making, not a party or an alliance in the organizational sense. </span></p><p><span>&ldquo;Its members gatherunder its umbrella to reach understandings on shared issues and the running ofthe country, without merging into a single entity or giving up whatdistinguishes each of them,&rdquo; he said, comparing it to the State AdministrationCoalition, which brings the Framework together with Sunni and Kurdish partiesto settle national issues.</span></p><p><span>Abu Mithaqal-Masari, an independent politician, called the project ambitious but short ofconsensus. The Framework does not necessarily take up every dispute among itsmembers, he said, and much of its work involves coordinating positions agreedin advance, with a leadership of 12 figures deciding by majority vote. </span></p><p><span>He credits thatmechanism with helping settle major questions, including the choice of a primeminister, and warned that full institutionalization would load formalcorrespondence and bureaucratic routine onto a body whose strength is speed. Inhis reading, the harder issues concern how much authority a unified leadershipwould hold and how far parties would honor its decisions while each keeps itsown political weight and calculations.</span></p><p><span>The record ismessier than that account suggests. In April, with a constitutional deadlineapproaching, the Framework ended meeting after meeting without agreeing on acandidate for premiership or even on a way to choose one, at one pointsuspending formal sessions altogether until consensus emerged. Al-Zaidi'snomination finally came as a compromise between the al-Maliki and al-Sudanicamps rather than from a clean vote.</span></p><p><span><a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Report/The-Shiite-Coordination-Framework-Can-govern-Iraq-but-cannot-agree-on-a-prime-minister" target="_blank"><em>Read more: The Shiite Coordination Framework: Can govern Iraq, but cannot agree on a primeminister</em></a></span></p><p><span>That episode helpsexplain why some members see little point in formal rules, since the looser thearrangement, the easier it is to withhold consent without breaking ranks. Aqeelal-Rudaini is spokesman for the Al-Nasr (Victory) Coalition of former PrimeMinister Haider al-Abadi, one of the Framework's founding components. He saidthe current format lets each party voice its view, vote or abstain, skipmeetings or object to positions without bringing down the understandings thathold the alliance together. &ldquo;A single umbrella of around ten parties sparespartners, particularly Sunni forces, from negotiating with each Shiite partyseparately, and allows the alliance to agree on major issues, set generalpolicy and back the government and state institutions.&rdquo;</span></p><p><span>Al-Rudainiacknowledged there is still no merger or common internal code, thoughcommittees have been formed to develop the Framework's work and strengthen itssupport for the premiership, since the head of government emerges from withinits ranks.</span></p><p><span>For researcher andacademic Alaa Najah, the Framework has grown into a coalition umbrella ofparties and movements. &ldquo;Its members differ in interests as well as outlook;their leaders hold alliances and understandings elsewhere in Iraqi politics,and they still disagree over how influence, posts and the running of the stateshould be shared.&rdquo; </span></p><p><span>A leadership able toissue decisions binding on all would sooner or later collide with some member'sinterests or alliances, he argued, and several forces deliberately avoid firmpositions to protect their room for maneuver.</span></p><p><span>That pattern hasalready surfaced in the open. In May, as al-Zaidi's cabinet took shape, ShafaqNews reported that five influential Shiite leaders were in advanced talks on anew parliamentary alliance, a sign of the competition over the Framework'sfuture leadership. Najah explained that the core of the dispute is how muchindependence, influence, and outside connection each party is willing to surrenderto a single body.</span></p><p><span>The Framework hasnot needed a council to shape the government. Al-Zaidi took office in May withnine of 23 ministries vacant, and through the summer the alliance&rsquo;s leadersblocked any minister from resigning or being dismissed until those posts werefilled. When parliament finally completed the cabinet on October 15, it<a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq/Iraqi-parliament-approves-cabinet-nominees" target="_blank">approved 11</a> ministers alongside three newly created deputy prime ministerposts, one of them filled by Laith al-Khazali, a senior figure in theIran-aligned armed faction Asaib Ahl al-Haq, over objections from somelawmakers that the new positions were products of partisan quota-sharing. Thatbargaining ran through the Framework&rsquo;s informal channels, reinforcing theargument among some members that formal rules could constrain a system theyconsider more flexible.</span></p><p><span>Where the absence ofbinding authority does matter is on the issue Washington watches most closely.Al-Zaidi has set June 30, 2027, as the deadline for bringing weapons heldoutside state institutions under government control. Ramadan al-Badran, aWashington-based political analyst, told Shafaq News this month that theFramework negotiates with the armed factions on the government's behalf butholds no decisive authority over them.</span></p><p><span><a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Iraq-s-armed-factions-dispute-arms-deals-as-June-2027-deadline-looms" target="_blank"><em>Read more: Iraq's armed factions dispute arms deals as June 2027 deadline looms</em></a></span></p><p><span>The institutionalizationdebate and the disarmament file ultimately turn on a similar issue: how far theFramework&rsquo;s members are willing to accept collective decisions and bindthemselves to them.</span></p><p><span><em>Written and editedby Shafaq News staff.</em></span></p>]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 21:12:00 +0000</pubDate>
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      <link>https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Kurdistan-Parliament-deadlock-through-four-political-lenses</link>
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      <title>Kurdistan Parliament deadlock through four political lenses</title>
      <enclosure url="https://media.shafaq.com/media/arcella/1794435164617.webp"/>
      <category><![CDATA[In-Depth]]></category>
      <description><![CDATA[<?xml encoding="utf-8" ?><!--?xml encoding="utf-8" ?--><!--?xml encoding="utf-8" ?--><!--?xml encoding="utf-8" ?--><p><em>Shafaq News- OPINION</em></p><p><em>By Ali Hussein Feyli*</em></p><p>After nearly two years of paralysis, the Kurdistan Parliament has returned to session and elected its leadership, but its revival has not resolved the political disputes that disrupted its work, instead raising new questions over participation, boycotts, and the future of consensus among the Kurdistan Region&rsquo;s political forces.</p><p>Between those who view the move as the long-awaited restoration of a legislative institution and those who question the way the session was convened; the current scene can be examined from four perspectives in which past experience intersects with present-day political calculations.</p><p>The first is historical. Since 1992, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) have cooperated in keeping Parliament functioning and forming governments through consensus during four of the six legislative terms in the Kurdistan Parliament&rsquo;s history. At other stages, the Kurdistan Region was divided between two separate administrations or governed through broader coalition arrangements. Across these different configurations, the political equation has remained shaped by geographic divisions, balances of power and influence, and the realities of authority on the ground.</p><p><em><a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Kurdistan/PUK-to-withdraw-from-Kurdistan-Regional-Government" target="_blank">Read more: PUK quits Kurdistan government over parliament dispute</a></em></p><p>The Kurdistan Parliament itself has experienced four major periods of varying degrees of paralysis and political deadlock:</p><p><strong>1-	First Paralysis (1994&ndash;2002): Internal Conflict and Political Division</strong></p><p>Parliament was effectively paralyzed by armed conflict between the two main parties, the KDP and the PUK, and the division of the Kurdistan Region into two separate administrations: the &ldquo;Yellow Zone,&rdquo; controlled by the KDP in Erbil and Duhok, and the &ldquo;Green Zone,&rdquo; controlled by the PUK in Al-Sulaymaniyah, names derived from the colors associated with the two parties.</p><p>Even after the internal fighting ended, the institutional division persisted, and Parliament did not resume unified sessions until Oct. 4, 2002, nearly eight years after the crisis began, despite limited parliamentary activity during that period, which remains one of the longest and most difficult disruptions of legislative work in the Kurdistan Region&rsquo;s history.</p><p><strong>2-	Second Paralysis (2015&ndash;2017): The Parliamentary Presidency Crisis</strong></p><p>During Parliament&rsquo;s fourth legislative term, sessions stopped for nearly two years after then-Speaker Yousif Mohammed, a member of the Change Movement (Gorran), was prevented from entering Erbil in October 2015 amid political disputes with the KDP, before Parliament eventually resumed its sessions in September 2017.</p><p><strong>3-	Third Paralysis (2022&ndash;2024): The Extension Crisis And Legislative Vacuum</strong></p><p>After elections for the sixth parliamentary term could not be held as scheduled in 2022, lawmakers voted to extend the fifth term for another year. On May 30, 2023, however, Iraq&rsquo;s Federal Supreme Court ruled the extension unconstitutional and declared the parliamentary term expired at the end of its legal mandate.</p><p>The decision left the Kurdistan Region without an active legislature until new elections were held in October 2024.</p><p><strong>4-	Fourth Paralysis (2024&ndash;2026): The Parliamentary Presidency Formation Crisis</strong></p><p>Although elections for the sixth term were held on Oct. 20, 2024, followed by the inaugural session on Dec. 2 of that year, deep political disagreements prevented lawmakers from completing the election of Parliament&rsquo;s leadership. Its legislative and oversight functions consequently remained suspended for nearly two years, until the inaugural session resumed and a new leadership was elected on <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Kurdistan/Kurdistan-Parliament-elects-Vala-Fareed-as-speaker" target="_blank">Nov. 4</a>, 2026.</p><p>If two years of parliamentary paralysis are dismissed as insignificant when measured against more than three decades of the institution&rsquo;s history, a more fundamental question emerges: what future awaits a region whose legislature can be brought to a halt so easily?</p><p>More than three decades of political struggle, elections, heated debate, consideration and passage of numerous bills &mdash;including controversial legislation&mdash; annual budget reviews and extraordinary sessions helped establish an institutional arena for political engagement. The relationships that developed among lawmakers over successive terms and the understandings reached between parliamentary blocs, even when neither deep nor durable, provided at least a framework through which communication, political relationships and alliances could continue, contributing to the Kurdistan Region&rsquo;s stability.</p><p>How, then, did political forces with decades of experience in this arena reach a point where Parliament&rsquo;s doors were closed, only for the institution to return today in this manner while the underlying disagreements remain?</p><p>The second perspective requires looking at the scene through the concerns and fears of the opposition.</p><p>From the viewpoint of some parties that stayed away from the parliamentary session, their disagreements with the PUK or KDP and their absence from Parliament were neither passing positions nor simply acts of obstinacy. Their previous experiences have made drawing closer to the two dominant parties resemble touching a burning ember, carrying risks and complicated political calculations. It is a stark image, but one that, from the perspective of these parties, is not without foundation.</p><p>For the PUK, as one of the two principal parties sharing power in the Kurdistan Region, the boycott is also linked to its disputes with the KDP over the management of institutions, political understandings, and the distribution of responsibilities.</p><p>In a political environment where employment opportunities, friendships, alliances and even participation in festivals and public events can be shaped by particular conditions and calculations, such a boycott may reflect not only distrust of the political process but also fears of losing the confidence of party constituencies and supporters or facing fierce criticism and pressure from more hardline elements.</p><p>Understanding the nature of that fear and its political cost is therefore important. If such considerations reach the point where political parties prefer <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Kurdistan/PUK-starts-implementing-withdrawal-from-KRG" target="_blank">withdrawal</a> from Parliament or boycott even amid concerns over the future of the Kurdistan Region as a political entity and the stability of its institutions, the issue extends beyond party politics to questions of homeland and territory. The question then is no longer where they were during parliament&rsquo;s reopening, but why the people&rsquo;s house was left without its owners.</p><p>The third perspective is one of fairness. As the saying goes, if a candle cannot illuminate its immediate surroundings, how can it light the way for others?</p><p>Fairness also requires avoiding sweeping judgments, as it is difficult to know precisely how opposition parties reached their calculations or how prepared each was to take such a decision, with some potentially outside the political understandings that produced the current arrangement, unlike the PUK, which, as a central actor in the political equation, took a clear decision to boycott.</p><p>Apart from several lawmakers who attended despite the positions of their parties and whose participation helped secure the required quorum of 52 out of 100 members, the PUK, Kurdistan Islamic Union, Kurdistan Justice Group, New Generation Movement and National Stance Movement did not <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Kurdistan/Six-PUK-New-Generation-MPs-attend-Kurdistan-parliament-despite-boycott" target="_blank">formally</a> participate as blocs.</p><p>Yet there is a considerable difference between knowing that a party decided to boycott and claiming certainty about the motives behind that decision. Judging the intentions of political forces without accounting for the circumstances and experiences that shaped them is not straightforward. To some extent, their caution and silence may reflect the weight they give to previous experiences and political calculations, even in the context of reactivating parliament.</p><p>The fourth perspective concerns something that was never as dominant in previous political eras as it is today: the age of cameras and lenses.</p><p>A politician&rsquo;s absence from an event might have been noticed by only a limited number of people in the past, however, today, every absence is recorded and documented, just as every appearance is photographed and broadcast. Absence is no longer merely an individual decision to stay away from a session; it becomes a political issue that generates questions and draws public attention.</p><p>Empty seats therefore cease to represent simply an absence from Parliament and become a political message directed as much at the public as at political rivals.</p><p>At the center of the Kurdistan Region&rsquo;s domestic political scene, many disputes remain tied to struggles over balances of power, the distribution of political gains and the broader climate in which politics is conducted. Such conditions make national consensus a difficult and prolonged process.</p><p>Amid fear of political costs, concern over internal accusations and the constant calculation of seats and interests, political forces can become preoccupied with determining who should bear responsibility for what happened.</p><p><em><a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Kurdistan-s-10th-cabinet-Interlocking-alliances-and-persistent-political-differences" target="_blank">Read more: Kurdistan&rsquo;s 10th cabinet</a></em></p><p>When a house catches fire, it may matter who struck the match or who locked the exit, but limiting the debate to those questions without acting to save the house would amount to a historic failure that no price could repair.</p><p><em>* Ali Hussein Feyli, Chairman of the Shafaq Foundation for Culture and Media and former member of the Kurdistan Region Parliament.</em></p><p><em>This article was originally written in <a href="https://shafaq.com/ar/%D9%85%D9%82%D9%80%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA/%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B2%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86" target="_blank">Arabic</a>.</em></p>]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2026 22:18:54 +0000</pubDate>
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      <link>https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Iraq-s-crisis-response-faces-mounting-pressure-from-security-and-natural-disasters</link>
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      <title>Iraq’s crisis response faces mounting pressure from security and natural disasters</title>
      <enclosure url="https://media.shafaq.com/media/arcella/1794347199769.webp"/>
      <category><![CDATA[In-Depth]]></category>
      <description><![CDATA[<?xml encoding="utf-8" ?><p><em>Shafaq News&nbsp;</em></p><p>From political tensions and security threats to regionalinstability and natural disasters, recurring crises continue to measure Iraq&rsquo;sability to protect its people, sustain essential services, and prepareeffectively for emergencies.</p><p>Each new emergency puts the government&rsquo;s crisis managementcommittees, operations rooms, and field response centers into focus,highlighting whether these institutions can anticipate and prepare for crisesor remain largely focused on responding after damage has occurred.</p><p><strong>Political Divisions</strong></p><p>Strategic expert Ahmed Al-Sharifi supports forming crisismanagement committees, describing them as an established mechanism indemocratic countries for addressing military, security, economic, and naturaldisaster challenges. However, he stressed that their success depends on unifiedstate policies and political consensus over the management of strategic issues.</p><p>Speaking to Shafaq News, Al-Sharifi claimed that &ldquo;Iraq lacksa common political foundation among the forces and entities participating instate administration,&rdquo; resulting in divergent programs, visions and approachesto handling crises, particularly regional ones.</p><p>He cited tensions between the <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq/Al-Zaidi-tells-Trump-Iraq-won-t-be-attack-launchpad" target="_blank">United States</a> and Iran, whichhave exposed conflicting positions within Iraq's political system. Somepolitical forces consider Washington a strategic ally, while others view it asan occupying power and call for confrontation. Some also support the"resistance" using state resources, he added. </p><p>This contradiction affects not only political positions butalso the performance of crisis management committees themselves, Al-Sharifisaid, explaining that this leads to divergent visions and approaches that limittheir ability to deliver a unified response that can reassure public opinion.</p><p>Al-Sharifi cited Prime Minister Ali Al-Zaidi's visit to<a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq/Iraq-offers-diplomatic-initiative-to-bridge-US-Iran-differences" target="_blank">Tehran</a> last Friday as an example of the complexities involved in managingregional crises. &ldquo;A diplomatic engagement on an issue of this magnitude shouldhave been based on political and public authorization, alongside a unifiedvision conveying Iraq's position to the Iranian side,&rdquo; he said, criticizing the&ldquo;absence of a clear, unified political position, a factor, he argued, thatundermines public confidence in government initiatives.&rdquo; </p><p>He added that managing risks facing Iraq, including thepossibility of attacks on Iranian <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Security/Iraq-ready-for-nuclear-emergency-sees-limited-fallout-risk%20" target="_blank">nuclear</a> facilities, requires a sharednational position and a clear plan to address potential consequences.&nbsp;</p><p><a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Nuclear-strike-on-Iran-how-exposed-is-Iraq" target="_blank"><em>Read more: Nuclear strike on Iran: how exposed is Iraq? </em></a></p><p><strong>Institutional Preparedness</strong></p><p>Regarding natural disasters, Sarmad Saeed Al-Badri, directorof the relations and media department at Iraq's High Commission for HumanRights, said disaster management is directly linked to human rights,particularly the right to life and economic and social rights.</p><p>&ldquo;Preparedness is a fundamental responsibility of stateinstitutions,&rdquo; he affirmed. </p><p>In an interview with Shafaq News, Al-Badri stressed thatemergency plans cannot be developed within days or after a crisis begins.Instead, he indicated, they require years of planning, specialized committees,and trained teams, including volunteers.</p><p>He said the commission he represents is a member of theNational Commission for Disasters and Crises, chaired by the Interior Ministry.Its role includes training personnel, participating in emergency responses,monitoring developments and documenting violations and observations.</p><p>He recalled the successive crises Iraq has experienced, fromsecurity challenges following 2003 to waves of displacement, the COVID-19pandemic and climate-related disasters, including droughts and floods, notingthat the consequences extend beyond casualties to damage to public and privateproperty and violations of citizens' fundamental rights.</p><p><strong>Floods Expose Response Challenges</strong></p><p>The floods that struck <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Kurdistan/KDP-urges-Baghdad-to-compensate-Erbil-flood-victims" target="_blank">Erbil</a>, the capital of the KurdistanRegion of Iraq (KRI), last Saturday provided a recent example of the challengesposed by natural disasters.</p><p>At least two people died, while civil defense, police, andmunicipal teams evacuated more than 300 people trapped inside their homes andvehicles or on building rooftops. Floodwaters inundated residentialneighborhoods and major roads, disrupting traffic and causing material damage. </p><p>Iraq&rsquo;s National Center for Crisis and Disaster Managementopened a control headquarters in Tuz Khurmatu after flooding disrupted thedistrict&rsquo;s ring road.</p><p>&ldquo;Such disasters require extensive coordination amongsecurity and service institutions, the army, the Popular Mobilization Forces(PMF), volunteer teams and local governments,&rdquo; al-Badri said. However, hequestioned whether these efforts were sufficiently integrated to move beyondimmediate emergency responses and establish a sustainable system forpreparedness and prevention.</p><p>Every province should have a specialized crisis managementcommittee ready to intervene during emergencies, with trained personnel acrossministries and public institutions, he urged. </p><p>Preparedness should also include emergency medical teams,trained healthcare personnel, medical supplies, and relief equipment, Al-Badrisaid, adding that authorities must establish contingency plans for potentialdisplacement, migration and service disruptions, while securing importantdocuments, records, data and public and private property.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p><p><a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Security/Iraq-s-fire-risk-landscape-at-the-start-of-2026" target="_blank"><em>Read more: Iraq&rsquo;s fire risk landscape at the start of 2026</em></a></p><p><strong>Protecting Citizens' Basic Needs</strong></p><p>Nisan Al-Zayer, a former member of the parliamentary HumanRights Committee, said state security cannot be separated from public security,arguing that protecting sovereignty and implementing security plans &ldquo;lose partof their meaning if citizens remain worried about their daily livelihoods andbasic needs.&rdquo;</p><p>Al-Zayer told Shafaq News that the government'sresponsibilities extend beyond issuing reassuring statements to includecomprehensive emergency plans, adequate strategic reserves, and economic andservice alternatives capable of ensuring the continuity of essential suppliesregardless of how long a crisis lasts.</p><p>She called for clear mechanisms to prevent monopolies andprice manipulation and to guarantee the continued availability of food,medicine, fuel, electricity, and <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/society/Liquidity-squeeze-delays-Iraq-September-salaries" target="_blank">salaries</a>.</p><p>Al-Zayer also warned that exceptional circumstances shouldnot become a justification for undermining constitutional rights or violatingcitizens' dignity and freedoms.&nbsp;</p><p><em>Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.&nbsp;</em></p>]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2026 21:50:29 +0000</pubDate>
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      <link>https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Iraq-s-armed-factions-dispute-arms-deals-as-June-2027-deadline-looms</link>
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      <title>Iraq's armed factions dispute arms deals as June 2027 deadline looms</title>
      <enclosure url="https://media.shafaq.com/media/arcella/1794125264161.webp"/>
      <category><![CDATA[In-Depth]]></category>
      <description><![CDATA[<?xml encoding="utf-8" ?><p><em>Shafaq News</em></p><p>Hours after Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Husseinannounced on Saturday that Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada had agreed to controls onits weapons, the Iran-aligned faction called his account "inaccurate"and denied endorsing or signing any position on its arsenal. The group said itremained committed only to a separate "sovereignty agreement" it hadsigned with three other factions, the ruling Coordination Framework and PrimeMinister Ali al-Zaidi.</p><p>The exchange exposes the central flaw in Baghdad'seffort to bring weapons under state control. The government is tallyingagreements, and the factions say those agreements leave their weapons wherethey are. Washington has increasingly tied its pressure on Baghdad to visibleprogress before al-Zaidi's June 30, 2027 deadline. The two groups furthest fromany understanding, Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba, are also the onesmost closely bound to Tehran, so a renewed US-Iran war could settle the matterbefore Baghdad does.</p><p>Most of Iraq's Iran-aligned factions run brigadesinside the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), a state-funded, mostly Shiiteumbrella formed in 2014 to fight ISIS, while keeping their own chains ofcommand. Their political wings and allies are estimated to hold roughly 60 to70 of parliament's 329 seats, and several sit within the CoordinationFramework, the Shiite alliance that nominated al-Zaidi and dominatesgovernment. Kataib Hezbollah's political wing, the Hoqooq Movement, holds sixseats. Al-Nujaba has no registered political wing at all.</p><p>Al-Zaidi's plan began on October 1, a day after theUS-led Coalition ended its military mission in Iraq. It opened with a 90-dayde-escalation period in which <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq/Kataib-Hezbollah-reiterates-Iraq-operations-halt" target="_blank">factions halt</a> attacks in exchange for assurancesthey would not face US strikes. Weapons handovers are meant to follow andconclude by the end of June 2027. A Framework committee of Badr Organizationleader Hadi al-Amiri, former prime ministers Nouri al-Maliki and Mohammed Shiaal-Sudani, and Islamic Supreme Council leader Humam Hamoudi handles the talks.</p><p><strong>A Count That Keeps Changing</strong></p><p>Official tallies have shifted every time an officialhas spoken. In Washington, Hussein told reporters that three of sevennegotiating factions had accepted the plan. Al-Zaidi later said five had agreedand three had already surrendered weapons, without naming them. On Saturday,Hussein <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq/Iraqi-FM-US-requested-Iran-border-crossing-closures" target="_blank">spoke</a> of understandings with four factions: Asaib Ahl al-Haq and KataibSayyid al-Shuhada had accepted weapons controls, he said, while talks continuedwith al-Nujaba and Kataib Hezbollah.</p><p>Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada's <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq/Kataib-Sayyid-al-Shuhada-denies-signing-agreement-to-surrender-weapons" target="_blank">denial</a> came within the day.Ansar Allah al-Awfiya, another faction, said last week it had not handed overits weapons and would stay neutral unless Iraqi territory was used to attackIran. Framework leaders have deliberately described the process as"regulating" weapons rather than disarmament, a word chosen to softenfaction resistance. Critics argue the formula would legalize the arsenals itclaims to control.</p><p>Ramadan al-Badran, a Washington-based politicalanalyst, told Shafaq News that the Framework negotiates on the government'sbehalf but holds no decisive authority over the factions, despite carryingpolitical responsibility for backing them since their founding. That leaves itacting as a broker between the groups and the prime minister, and somefactions, he said, do not consider themselves bound by any deal with thegovernment. The committee has submitted proposals to al-Zaidi, who has yet toact on them, possibly because he is unsure Washington would accept them andwary of committing Iraq to groups the United States may target.</p><p>Al-Zaidi has also opened his own channel. A sourcefamiliar with the committee's work said on November 3 that his one-on-onemeetings with leaders of holdout groups had frustrated members, includingal-Amiri, who feared the parallel talks could backfire.</p><p>Mukhtar al-Mousawi, a lawmaker from the Badr bloc,told Shafaq News the talks had not reached a dead end and that al-Amiri waspersonally negotiating to absorb the factions into the army, the police and thePMF, though some groups were seeking privileges within state institutions inreturn. </p><p>Hassan Shaker al-Kaabi, another Badr official, saidthe dispute concerned mechanisms and timing, not principle, and called theexpectation of ending the file overnight unrealistic. Badr's support haslimits, however. On Sunday, its parliamentary bloc rejected what it called"<a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq/Iraqi-FM-US-requested-Iran-border-crossing-closures" target="_blank">American dictates</a>" after Hussein disclosed that Washington hadformally asked Baghdad to close all but two border crossings with Iran.</p><p><strong>Pressure On Two Fronts</strong></p><p>A government source close to al-Zaidi told Shafaq Newson Thursday that the talks had reached a <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq/Iraq-faction-disarmament-talks-near-deadlock-says-source" target="_blank">near-deadlock</a> because factions stillrefused to surrender their weapons, warning that the escalating rhetoric couldspill into the streets. The rhetoric has since turned personal. Only in thefirst week of November, Kataib Hezbollah security official Abu Mujahid al-Assafattacked the government and Framework leaders over oil sales contracts with theUAE's ADNOC, demanded a copy of the committee's agreement, and confirmed thatthe "Islamic Resistance in Iraq" had halted operations inside thecountry until further notice. In addition, after al-Zaidi cancelled three<a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq/Al-Zaidi-cancels-faction-linked-Mosul-airport-contracts-source-says" target="_blank">leases</a> at Mosul International Airport held by companies linked to armed groups,Kataib Hezbollah urged Iraq's Integrity Commission to investigate the wealth ofthe prime minister's <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq/Kataib-Hezbollah-questions-PM-s-brother-denies-airport-claims" target="_blank">brother</a>, Hassan al-Zaidi. Also this month, the securityforces south of Baghdad arrested three PMF members transporting <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Security/Three-PMF-members-arrested-with-35-rockets-near-Baghdad" target="_blank">35</a> rockets.</p><p>Political sources told Shafaq News that US Charg&eacute;d'Affaires Steven <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq/Sources-US-warns-Iraq-of-terrorism-designation-sanctions" target="_blank">Fagin</a> warned Iraqi officials that Washington could imposesanctions and treat Iraq as a state sponsor of terrorism unless Baghdad showedconcrete progress. He cited a lack of practical steps and an attempted droneattack on the US Embassy. </p><p>Two days later, according to informed sources,President Donald Trump told al-Zaidi by phone that Washington would strike thefactions and their leaders if they joined any new war in support of Iran, andthat further delay could lead the United States to reassess its backing for hisgovernment. Neither side disclosed those details. Al-Zaidi's office said onlythat he had assured Trump Iraqi territory would not serve as a launchpad forattacks on neighboring states before he met US envoy Tom Barrack.</p><p>Al-Badran said Baghdad informed Washington of the June2027 date without the United States agreeing to it as binding. &ldquo;What Washingtonwants is visible progress toward turning the factions into security forcesinside official institutions.&rdquo;</p><p>Emad al-Musafer, an analyst close to the Framework,described the period before the deadline as one of mutual wariness. &ldquo;Thefactions fear the United States or Israel will strike inside Iraq, while thegovernment wants assurances that Iraqi territory will not be used againstneighboring countries,&rdquo; he said, adding that for the factions, guaranteesremain the price of any handover.</p><p><strong>The Nearer Deadline</strong></p><p>Tehran's recent rhetoric has given the holdoutsfurther reason to wait. Iran's Supreme Leader <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Iran-calls-for-a-response-without-borders-Iraq-s-armed-factions-set-their-own-terms" target="_blank">Mojtaba</a> Khamenei last weekordered military commanders to respond immediately to any threat and praisedallied factions in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and the Palestinian territories,calling for the "unity of arenas" strategy that coordinates pressureon Israel and the United States across those fronts. Quds Force commanderEsmail <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/World/Qaani-Allies-pledge-loyalty-to-Unity-of-Arenas" target="_blank">Qaani</a> said Resistance Front commanders had declared their "absoluteloyalty" to Khamenei and were implementing his directive for responseswithout geographic limits.</p><p>Ali al-Fatlawi, a spokesman for Ansar Allah al-Awfiya,told Shafaq News earlier that if Iraqi territory were repeatedly used againstIran, the decision would pass to a "higher leadership of theresistance." Al-Badran also warned that some factions could enter aregional war under the banner of "religious duty."</p><p>The timetable that matters most may therefore end wellbefore June. The 90-day de-escalation period expires around the turn of theyear, and Washington has warned that faction participation in any renewed warin support of Iran could trigger US strikes on the groups and their leaders.Al-Zaidi can keep adding names to his list of understandings. The two holdoutgroups most capable of drawing Iraq deeper into such a conflict have signednone of them, while Tehran's regional allies were simultaneously being urged torespond without geographic limits.</p><p><a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Iran-calls-for-a-response-without-borders-Iraq-s-armed-factions-set-their-own-terms" target="_blank"><em>Read more:&nbsp;Iran calls for a response without borders; Iraq's armed factions set their own terms</em></a></p><p><em>Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.</em></p>]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 08 Nov 2026 14:30:41 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title>Nechirvan Barzani’s bridge-building diplomacy faces domestic challenges</title>
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      <description><![CDATA[<?xml encoding="utf-8" ?><p><span><em>Shafaq News- OPINION</em></span></p><p><span><em>By Ali Hussein Feyli*</em></span></p><p><span>With nearly 40officially registered political parties active in the Kurdistan Region andregional pressures continuing to shape its choices, President NechirvanBarzani&rsquo;s quiet diplomacy and &ldquo;strategic patience&rdquo; have been more thanpolitical luxuries. They have helped preserve the Kurdistan Region&rsquo;s delicatepolitical balance and guard against collapse.</span></p><p><span>From the perspectiveof decision-making centers in Baghdad, regional capitals and internationalpowers, this pragmatic approach has often been viewed as a reliable channel forbuilding dialogue and untangling difficult political disputes. At times when polarizationand entrenched positions have dominated the region, efforts to emphasizemoderation, reason and constitutional frameworks have helped reinforce theKurdistan Region&rsquo;s image, from the perspective of this approach, as a stableregion and an active partner in containing regional tensions.</span></p><p><span>The same method hasappeared historically in the handling of several sensitive periods, from easingthe consequences of difficult political crises to maintaining a balance amongcompeting forces and dealing pragmatically with external factors that threatenedthe Kurdistan Region&rsquo;s existence as a political entity. While other actors haveat times resorted to confrontational rhetoric and emotional reactions, thisapproach has sought to preserve a margin of safety capable of sustaining theKurdistan Region as a political entity.</span></p><p><span>Yet a closerexamination of governance and administration reveals a clear contrast betweenexternal and internal performance, reflecting the different environments inwhich the Kurdistan Region President operates. While the external arenaprovides greater room for political maneuvering, the domestic arena remainsconstrained by structural problems and entrenched party influence within stateinstitutions. The limits on President Nechirvan Barzani&rsquo;s effective authorityhave prevented him from fully exercising the presidency&rsquo;s legal powers,including those related to the general command of the armed forces and securityinstitutions, prompting him instead to assume a mediating role and work tocontain tensions to avoid further internal confrontation.</span></p><p><span>The existence ofmultiple centers of influence and competing interests among the main politicalforces has further complicated efforts to strengthen the presidency as aninstitution capable of bringing different sides together, while limiting theprospects for reconciliation and narrowing the space for bridging politicaldifferences.</span></p><p><span>Alongside thesepolitical challenges, the Kurdistan Region&rsquo;s unproductive rentier economyremains a deep structural problem. Heavy dependence on oil revenues, recurringfinancial crises, growing pressure on public employees and salary earners, anddelays in implementing fundamental reforms have imposed significant materialand psychological burdens on society and contributed to declining publicconfidence in institutions. </span></p><p><span>This reality haslargely confined the internal political process to temporary settlements andthe containment of crises rather than structural reforms capable of addressingthe causes of existing imbalances.</span></p><p><span>The paradox, however,is that the same strategic patience that has helped preserve the KurdistanRegion&rsquo;s external balances could become a factor in prolonging domestic crisesif it remains limited to de-escalation without reform. The constraints facing PresidentNechirvan Barzani cannot be separated from the shared political responsibilityof the forces governing the Kurdistan Region, as the problem is not whether oneindividual can contain disputes, but whether the political parties are preparedto overcome these obstacles, unify institutions and decision-making centers,and move from managing crises to addressing their underlying causes.</span></p><p><span>As the region entersanother period marked by uncertainty and risk, the diplomatic approach pursuedtoday by the Kurdistan Region President faces three immediate challenges thatraise questions over how far it can continue to operate effectively:</span></p><p><span>The first is ashrinking margin for political maneuvering amid sharper regional polarizationand external interference, which increasingly limits the Kurdistan Region&rsquo;sability to make independent decisions while maintaining balanced relations withcompeting powers.</span></p><p><span>The second iscontinued pressure from Baghdad through financial entitlements and the salaryand budget files, which are used as instruments of leverage and have leftconstitutional talks and negotiations moving in repeated cycles withoutproducing sustainable understandings.</span></p><p><span>The third is afundamental shift in domestic expectations, as moderate political discoursebecomes less aligned with the accelerating demands of younger generations andgrowing frustration over the slow pace of reform leads parts of society to viewprolonged strategic patience with increasing skepticism.</span></p><p><span>These conditions offerlessons from earlier experience. Diplomacy and strategic patience remainimportant tools for avoiding collapse in an environment marked by risk andsurrounded by centers of tension, while maintaining the role of a rationalmediator during crises can give the Kurdistan Region significant political andgeographic weight. Yet developing the mechanisms through which the KurdistanRegion manages its affairs, with all their political and partisan complexities,cannot rest on one individual regardless of his political or diplomaticabilities.</span></p><p><span>When administrativeand economic problems accumulate and institutions remain constrained bycompeting centers of influence and partisan calculations, the Kurdistan Regionfaces a decisive test between external pressures and the demands of internalreform. Here lies the importance of the equation President Nechirvan Barzanipresents in this context: however effective external diplomacy may be, itcannot substitute for strengthening domestic legitimacy and rebuilding publicconfidence in the Kurdistan Region&rsquo;s institutions.</span></p><p><span><em>* Ali Hussein Feyli,Chairman of the Shafaq Foundation for Culture and Media and former member ofthe Kurdistan Region Parliament.</em></span></p><p><span><em>This article wasoriginally written in <a href="https://www.shafaq.com/ar/%D9%85%D9%82%D9%80%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA/%D9%82%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85-%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AF%D8%A8%D9%84%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86" target="_blank">Arabic</a>.</em></span></p>]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2026 14:20:24 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title>Iran calls for a response without borders; Iraq's armed factions set their own terms</title>
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      <category><![CDATA[In-Depth]]></category>
      <description><![CDATA[<?xml encoding="utf-8" ?><p><em>Shafaq News</em></p><p>Iran's SupremeLeader <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Middle-East/Khamenei-warns-of-broader-response-if-US-strikes-again" target="_blank">Mojtaba</a> Khamenei warned on Wednesday that any new US attack would draw aresponse of "much broader dimensions," and the Quds Force commanderdeclared that Tehran's allies stood by the "unity of arenas." InIraq, where those allies are most deeply embedded in the state, the armedfactions are answering with conditions of their own, and analysts, who spoke toShafaq News, warn that their independence may prove as dangerous for Baghdad astheir restraint is reassuring.</p><p>The war that beganwith US-Israeli strikes on Iran on February 28 has settled into an uneasypause. American forces broke it on the eve of the November 3 midterm electionswith strikes on Iran's Qeshm Island in the Strait of Hormuz. Khamenei spoke aday after Republicans lost control of Congress. He counted the achievements ofIran-aligned groups from Palestine and Lebanon to Iraq and Yemen as part of asingle campaign. </p><p>Brig. Gen. Esmail<a href="https://www.shafaq.com/en/World/Qaani-Allies-pledge-loyalty-to-Unity-of-Arenas" target="_blank">Qaani</a>, whose Quds Force oversees the Revolutionary Guard's operations abroad,said Resistance Front commanders had declared their "absoluteloyalty" to Khamenei and were acting on his directive for responseswithout geographical limits, presenting this as evidence of the "unity ofarenas."</p><p>Analysts cannotagree on what the election means for the risk of war. Haitham Numaan, aprofessor of political science at the University of Exeter, said the Republicandefeat may push President Donald Trump to harden his line on Iran rather thanretreat. Backing down could be read at home as political failure, he argued,while a win against Iran could help his party before the next presidentialrace. </p><p>&ldquo;Whether he canachieve one remains unsettled. If that course holds, Iraq could become one ofthe conflict's main arenas, with political and economic damage alongside thesecurity risks.&rdquo;</p><p>Youssef Hazimeh, aLebanese researcher on regional and international affairs, said voters sent amessage against war on Iran, and Trump's threats in the two weeks before theballot may now give way to a recalculation of the war's political cost.</p><p><strong>The Iraqi Equation</strong></p><p>Iraq is where thedoctrine meets its hardest test. Iran-aligned factions there run brigadesinside the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), a state-funded umbrella of mostlyShiite armed groups formed in 2014 to fight ISIS, while keeping their ownchains of command. Their political wings and allies hold roughly 60 to 70 ofparliament's 329 seats. Since February, statements issued under the banner ofthe Islamic Resistance in Iraq, a name used by the most hardline groups, haveclaimed hundreds of attacks on US sites, and US and Israeli strikes have hitfaction positions in return.</p><p>Emad al-Musafer, apolitical analyst close to the Coordination Framework, recalled that Iraq sawno strikes on its facilities, military sites, or commanders during theTwelve-Day War between Iran and Israel in June 2025. The factions launched noattacks on US bases or Israel, even as Baghdad rejected the operations againstIran. </p><p>The picture changedonce PMF sites and commanders were targeted, he said, which pushed the factionsto respond. &ldquo;Their participation in any new round depends largely on whetherIraq or its armed formations are attacked again.&rdquo; </p><p>Al-Musafer stillcounts on the understandings between the government and the factions to containescalation, "especially as parties are seeking to push Iraq into theconflict."</p><p>After the US-ledCoalition ended its military mission on September 30, Prime Minister Alial-Zaidi opened a 90-day de-escalation period: the factions halt attacks andreceive guarantees that US forces will not strike them. It is the first stageof a plan to bring their weapons under state control by June 30, 2027. Noattacks on US sites have been reported since October 1.</p><p>However, agovernment source close to al-Zaidi told Shafaq News on Thursday thatnegotiations with the armed factions have reached a near-deadlock, warning thatescalating rhetoric could &ldquo;spill into the <a href="https://www.shafaq.com/en/Iraq/Iraq-faction-disarmament-talks-near-deadlock-says-source" target="_blank">streets</a>&rdquo; and threaten security.</p><p><strong>The conditions</strong></p><p>Ali al-Fatlawi,spokesman for Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya, one of the factions that acceptedthe plan, spelled out what the truce rests on. The factions and the governmenthave agreed to prevent Iraqi territory and airspace from being used to attackneighboring states, "foremost among them Iran," he said. </p><p>&ldquo;The factions willhonor those understandings as long as Iraq is not used to target Iran. Repeateduse of Iraqi territory to harm Iran could prompt a different position,&rdquo; hewarned, and the decision would then rest with a "higher leadership of theresistance." </p><p>He turned thequestion back on Washington and Baghdad alike: can the United States refrainfrom using Iraqi airspace in an attack on Iran, and can the government stop it?</p><p>Political analystHussein al-Kinani adds scale and duration to the calculation. &ldquo;A limitedconfrontation may not draw the factions into direct participation, but a widerwar, or attacks on PMF commanders and headquarters, could.&rdquo; He distinguishesbetween joining a regional war and responding to a direct attack, which thefactions may treat as grounds for self-defense.</p><p><strong>The Faction ThatMoves Alone</strong></p><p>Essam al-Faili, aprofessor of political science at Baghdad's Mustansiriyah University, saidKhamenei's speech carried a message to groups and cells bound to wilayatal-faqih, the doctrine of clerical rule underpinning Iran's political system,to prepare for a possible confrontation. &ldquo;Some of these factions may take localbattlefield decisions without instructions from Tehran at all,&rdquo; he said, addingthat Iran may also treat the next round as decisive, leaving its allies lessroom to wait.</p><p>The government hasreached understandings with a number of factions, according to al-Faili, thoughone or two may remain outside its authority. &ldquo;If they act independently, Iraqitself could become a target for outside powers.&rdquo; </p><p>He pointed tostatements from faction leaders, including within <a href="https://www.shafaq.com/en/Iraq/Kataib-Hezbollah-reiterates-Iraq-operations-halt" target="_blank">Kataib</a> Hezbollah, as evidencethat some still refuse to defer to the state.</p><p>Kataib Hezbollahreaffirmed on Tuesday that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) had suspendedmilitary operations inside the country until further notice.</p><p>Security expertSarmad al-Bayati frames the risk in reverse: the greater danger is a strike onthe factions that forces them to answer, more than any decision of theirs tojoin a regional war. &ldquo;They have threatened to act if Iran is endangered,&rdquo; henoted, though he expects no intervention under the current understandingsunless security conditions change, considering a US or Israeli strike couldbring retaliation against American sites and economic interests across Iraq,including the Kurdistan Region.</p><p><strong>Beyond Iraq</strong></p><p>Elsewhere in thealliance, the gap between Tehran's language and its allies' conduct is widerstill. In Lebanon, Saudi-owned Al Arabiya reported, citing sources close toHezbollah, that Iran has told the group not to join a renewed war. DeputyForeign Minister Saeed Khatibzadeh reportedly carried the message to Beirut. </p><p>Lebanese mediareported in October that Hezbollah had made a matching pledge to ParliamentSpeaker Nabih Berri, its closest ally. The precedent invites caution: the groupgave Berri a similar assurance before entering the war on March 2. </p><p>Iran's embassy hasreportedly denied the account, and Hezbollah has not commented. Itssecretary-general, Naim Qassem, has framed the group's fight as a defensive oneagainst Israel in recent speeches without invoking the unity of arenas. Hazimehsees insufficient signs that either Lebanese or Iraqi factions will enter aconfrontation, a prospect he says receded after the US vote.</p><p>Yemen is different.Hazimeh rates it the front most likely to escalate into a wider war, and theHouthis (Ansarallah) are already fighting one of their own choosing, withdrones and missiles aimed at Saudi airports and air bases. </p><p>The movement'spriority is "the confrontation with Saudi Arabia and the parties that backit, including the United States, Israel, and Britain," said Hamedal-Bukhaiti, head of the al-Huda Center for Strategic Studies in Yemen. </p><p>Abdullah al-Nuaimi,a member of the movement's political bureau, was more guarded, saying Yemen'spriority is to defend itself, though a wider war could impose differentcalculations.</p><p>Adel Rajeh, a memberof Yemen's Alliance of Parties Against Aggression, said that any attack on Irancould open several fronts at once, with Iran holding the Strait of Hormuz,Yemen positioned at the Bab al-Mandeb, and Iraqi factions able to strike USbases. &ldquo;The Yemeni leadership [Houthis] has declared it stands with Iran.&rdquo;</p><p>In Tehran, MohammadHossein Hashemi, a professor of international relations at the University ofTehran, pointed out that the allies are not instruments that move on Iranianorders, citing "the non-participation of the Houthis, Hezbollah inLebanon, and the Iraqi factions in some phases of the previousconfrontation." </p><p>Iran, he said, mayprefer to answer a new attack itself.</p><p><strong>Baghdad's Limits</strong></p><p>Iraqi politicalanalyst Mujashaa al-Tamimi described Khamenei's remarks as a test of whetherBaghdad can keep the US-Iran confrontation off its soil. The government'stools, he said, include reserving decisions of war and peace for the state, usingthe powers of the commander-in-chief, and keeping channels open to bothWashington and Tehran.</p><p>Each of those toolsdepends on others' choices. The 90-day de-escalation period announced byal-Zaidi, and the factions that signed it, tie their compliance to howWashington uses Iraqi airspace. Those that did not sign answer to their ownleadership. Tehran can call for a response without borders while reportedlyasking Hezbollah to sit it out. Baghdad has no comparable choice: itsneutrality holds only as long as the factions, Washington, and Tehran alldecline to break it.</p><p><a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Report/How-Iran-s-unity-of-fronts-strategy-is-changing-across-the-Middle-East" target="_blank"><em>Read more: How Iran&rsquo;s &lsquo;unity of fronts&rsquo; strategy is changing across the Middle East</em></a></p><p><em>Written and editedby Shafaq News staff.</em></p>]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 17:49:56 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title>Nuclear strike on Iran: how exposed is Iraq?</title>
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      <description><![CDATA[<?xml encoding="utf-8" ?><!--?xml encoding="utf-8" ?--><!--?xml encoding="utf-8" ?--><p><em>Shafaq News (Updated on Nov. 5, at 15:29)</em></p><p>Amid growingspeculation about a possible US nuclear strike on Iran, questions have emergedin Iraq over whether radioactive fallout could cross the border and contaminaterivers, soil and water supplies.</p><p>An Iraqi securityexpert warned that the risk cannot be ruled out if winds carry contaminationwest, while the country's nuclear regulator said distance, terrain and seasonalwinds would limit any impact on Iraq.</p><p>The concern grewafter Iranian state television on Tuesday broadcast guidance on what to do inthe event of a nuclear explosion, advising people to shelter indoors away fromwindows, rely on bottled water and packaged food, and stay put for at least 24hours until officials say it is safe to leave.</p><p>The broadcast cameafter US conservative commentator Tucker Carlson claimed that President DonaldTrump's administration could carry out a nuclear strike on Iran within days,under pressure from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.</p><p>On Saturday, Trumpsaid the United States still had to &ldquo;take care of&rdquo; one or two Iranian sites,including Pickaxe Mountain near Iran's Natanz nuclear complex, and could do soquickly.</p><p>The site lies about225 kilometers south of Tehran and is believed to extend deep underground. TheInternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has not been able to inspect it, andTehran says its nuclear program is peaceful.</p><p>If conventionalmunitions, including the GBU-57 bunker buster, the most powerful US bombdesigned for underground targets, failed to destroy the site, Washington couldturn to a tactical nuclear weapon, Iraqi security expert Ahmed al-Sharifi toldShafaq News.</p><p>Tactical nuclearweapons, unlike strategic ones, target a specific site, al-Sharifi said, but alimited blast does not mean limited effects, particularly if the facility holdsenriched uranium or centrifuges.</p><p>&ldquo;Damage to nuclearmaterial inside could spread radioactive contamination well beyond the blastsite.&rdquo;</p><p>A nuclear explosionthrows a column of dust and debris into the atmosphere, where its path dependson winds near the ground and at high altitudes, including the jet stream, hesaid. Contamination can also settle into soil and surface and groundwater,putting rivers, drinking water and farming at risk.</p><p>Distance alone doesnot rule out fallout reaching Iraq if weather conditions push it that way,al-Sharifi said. He urged people to keep stocks of water and packaged food,seal windows and vents if officials issue warnings, and stay indoors for threeto five days until specialist teams assess radiation levels, stressing that anyprecautions should follow official instructions.</p><p>Ahmed KhudairKadhim, spokesman for Iraq&rsquo;s National Commission for Nuclear, Radiological,Chemical and Biological Regulation, said Pickaxe Mountain and Natanz are about700 kilometers from Iraq's eastern border, while the <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Middle-East/US-Israeli-strikes-in-Bushehr-could-trigger-nuclear-disaster-Iran-warns" target="_blank">Bushehr</a> nuclear powerplant is more than 400 kilometers from the southern province of Basra.</p><p>He said the effectof nuclear dust declines sharply with distance and becomes much lower beyond 50to 100 kilometers.</p><p>The mountains alongthe Iraq-Iran border could slow winds and the spread of dust, Kadhim toldShafaq News, while prevailing autumn winds blow mostly from the northwest, fromIraq toward Iran.</p><p>&ldquo;Based on theweather data the commission relies on, any fallout would likely move away fromIraq over the next two weeks,&rdquo; he said.</p><p>Kadhim also said thefacility lies more than 100 meters inside the mountain and is surrounded bygranite, factors he said could help contain debris from any blast.</p><p>According to Kadhim,the commission's central emergency room for radiological and nuclear incidentshas prepared response plans for a range of scenarios, while an <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Security/Iraq-monitors-radiation-levels-as-Iran-Israel-war-escalates" target="_blank">early-warning</a>network along the border, linked to the IAEA, monitors for any change inbackground radiation.</p><p><span>On Thursday, the commission&rsquo;s head, Fadhel HawiMizban, <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Security/Iraq-ready-for-nuclear-emergency-sees-limited-fallout-risk" target="_blank">said</a> the regulator had taken the necessary precautions for any nuclearor radiological emergency in the region, adding that winds at higher altitudes,where fallout would travel, are also likely to carry it away from Iraq. Heurged Iraqis to rely on official sources and ignore rumors.</span></p><p>When Israel and theUnited States bombed Natanz, Fordow and Isfahan with conventional weapons in<a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq/Iraq-No-radioactive-contamination-detected-after-US-strikes-on-Iranian-nuclear-sites" target="_blank">June 2025</a>, the IAEA reported no increase in radiation levels outside the sites,saying the main concern was chemical toxicity inside them.</p><p>The agency's chief,Rafael <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/World/Grossi-renews-warnings-radiation-leak-risk-persists" target="_blank">Grossi</a>, warned at the time that the greatest danger lay elsewhere: astrike on the Bushehr power plant, he told the UN Security Council, couldtrigger a major radiation release across the region.</p><p>A nuclear weapon,however, would be an entirely different scenario from the conventional strikesof 2025.</p><p>Writer and Iranaffairs researcher Saleh al-Qazwini said the US threats could be either seriousor a way to pressure Iran into softening its negotiating demands, but he didnot rule out Trump carrying out a strike.</p><p>&ldquo;Any nuclear attackwould harm the whole region, not just Iran,&rdquo; he told Shafaq News, adding thatthe threats had revived debate inside Iran over whether the country shouldacquire a nuclear weapon.</p>]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2026 17:13:51 +0000</pubDate>
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      <link>https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Iraq-s-parliament-creates-two-ministries-reopening-the-quota-sharing-debate</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Iraq-s-parliament-creates-two-ministries-reopening-the-quota-sharing-debate</guid>
      <title>Iraq’s parliament creates two ministries, reopening the quota-sharing debate</title>
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      <description><![CDATA[<?xml encoding="utf-8" ?><p><em>Shafaq News- Baghdad</em></p><p>Iraq&rsquo;s parliamentvoted on October 15 to create a Ministry of Digital Economy, Governance,Science and Technology and give tourism its own cabinet seat, reversing part ofa 2015 drive to shrink the size of the federal government. The expansionrevives a debate that has followed every Iraqi cabinet since 2003: does the state&rsquo;sexecutive structure reflect administrative need, or the bargaining that holdscoalition governments together?</p><p>The same session<a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq/Iraqi-parliament-approves-cabinet-nominees" target="_blank">approved</a> three deputy prime ministers, out of four nominated, and filled mostof the portfolios left vacant since May. Mohammed Sahib al-Daraji took the newdigital economy ministry, Ali Abdul Hadi al-Dakhili became tourism minister,and Mohammed Samaan was named minister of state. Hours before the vote, a groupof lawmakers rejected the new posts, as &ldquo;products of partisan quota-sharing&rdquo; ata time when the state should be cutting spending. Shafaq News learned thatleaders of the Coordination Framework, the alliance of parties that formsparliament's largest bloc, had agreed to create a tourism ministry as part of acompromise over disputed cabinet seats.</p><p>Qassim al-Rubaie, aprofessor of political science at Dhi Qar University, sees the pattern asstructural rather than new. "The political factor was, in many cases, moreinfluential than long-term institutional planning," he told Shafaq News.As a result, he said, some changes looked more like responses to the demands ofgovernment formation than parts of an integrated reform of the executive.</p><p>The modern Iraqicabinet took shape in the first months after the US-led invasion. In November2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority, the American-run administration thatgoverned Iraq until mid-2004, created a Ministry of Environment by decree. WhenAyad Allawi's interim government took office in June 2004, its lineup includedportfolios with no precedent under Saddam Hussein, among them human rights anddisplacement and migration. Others were carried over from older institutionsunder new names, a distinction that matters when judging how much the stateactually changed.</p><p>Political analystAli Habib told Shafaq News that the state-building phase did require newinstitutions for files that had emerged or grown in importance, from humanrights to displacement. The difficulty came from the political system thoseinstitutions were built into.</p><p>Post-2003 Iraq runson <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq/PM-Al-Zaidi-to-lead-selection-of-disputed-cabinet-posts" target="_blank">muhasasa</a>, an informal arrangement that distributes senior posts amongShiite, Sunni and Kurdish parties according to their electoral weight. Underit, Rubaie said, ministries became "part of the negotiations over thedistribution of positions and political influence." The 2005 constitutionadded a second layer. It made Iraq a federal state, which forced Baghdad toredefine its relationship with the provinces and with the Kurdistan Region, theautonomous area in the north governed from Erbil.</p><p>In August 2015, withoil prices collapsing, the war against ISIS draining the treasury, andprotesters demanding electricity and an end to corruption, then Prime MinisterHaider al-Abadi announced a package of administrative reforms. He abolished theministries of human rights, state for women's affairs, and state for provincialand parliamentary affairs, along with several minister-of-state posts. He alsomerged science and technology into higher education, environment into health,and municipalities into construction and housing, and folded tourism andantiquities into the culture ministry.</p><p>Political analystRiyadh al-Wuhaili, who argues that the post-2003 cabinet was assembled withouta coherent plan and shaped by ethnic, sectarian, partisan and even personalconsiderations, called the consolidation "correct in principle."Accumulated costs, he told Shafaq News, had exposed how oversized the earlycabinets were.</p><p>This month's voteundoes two of those mergers. Science and technology now has a named portfolioagain, bundled with the digital economy, and tourism once more stands alone.</p><p>Al-Wuhaili arguesthat separating tourism and antiquities from culture could pay off, givenIraq's religious, archaeological and natural attractions, which he said could createjobs and bring new revenue into a federal budget almost entirely dependent onoil. That outcome depends on plans and investment that do not yet exist. Thetourism industry itself pressed for the split in May: the <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/society/Iraqi-Travel-and-Tourism-Association-calls-for-independent-tourism-authority-professional-minister" target="_blank">Association</a> of Traveland Tourism Agents in Iraq called for an independent tourism body led by aspecialist, and asked that the portfolio go to a professional rather thanthrough the quota system. The ministry was created through exactly that system.</p><p>Al-Wuhaili is lessoptimistic about the governance portfolio. New ministries, he warned, can addfinancial and administrative burdens when they lack a clear mandate,particularly given the country's current financial position.</p><p>Habib frames theissue as one of criteria rather than numbers. &ldquo;A decision to create or merge aministry is reformist when it rests on a clear study of actual need, cost andworkload, and when no existing body already performs the same function.&rdquo; Whenchanges stem from political understandings instead, "they may lead to inflatedspending and overlapping mandates rather than better state efficiency."</p><p>The deputy primeminister posts raise a separate legal question. Political analyst Talibal-Faili noted that Article 139 of the constitution provides for two deputyprime ministers in the first electoral term. Because it is a transitionalprovision, he said, it requires careful constitutional reading before anyonerules on the legality of later arrangements. </p><p>Shafaq News learnedduring the May negotiations that some deputy <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq/Al-Zaidi-proposes-October-15-vote-on-cabinet-completion" target="_blank">posts</a> were designed as consolationprizes for factions that lost out on larger portfolios. Al-Faili argued thatmultiple deputies become a problem when they produce overlapping powers,administrative cost, or blurred executive responsibility.</p><p>Al-Faili also offeredthe most practical test of the debate. Iraq has the data to judge thesechanges, he argued: administrative spending before and after restructuring,budget execution rates, the speed of public services, and reports from theFederal Board of Supreme Audit and the Integrity Commission, the state'santi-corruption body, on violations, recovered funds, and stalled projects.Appointment and promotion records could show whether merit governs hiring, andpublic opinion surveys could gauge trust in the state.</p><p>He cautioned thatany improvement or decline must be read in context, since security and economicconditions affect performance regardless of how the cabinet is organized. Healso drew a line that much of the Iraqi debate ignores: what can be proven withdata, and what is offered as a political explanation for why ministries arecreated or posts distributed.</p><p>The 2015 cuts cameunder protest pressure and a fiscal emergency, and the portfolios theyeliminated have now partly returned through coalition negotiation, not throughany published assessment of need. No government since 2003 has released thekind of before-and-after evaluation Al-Faili describes.</p><p>Iraq now has aminister whose title includes the word governance. His ministry will be amongthe first institutions the new government must justify against the standards ofneed, cost and performance that its critics say were missing from the publicdebate.</p><p><em><a href="https://www.shafaq.com/en/Report/Iraq-floats-an-AI-ministry-its-institutions-are-not-ready-to-use-it" target="_blank">Read more: Iraq floats an AI ministry; its institutions are not ready to use it</a></em></p><p><em>Written and editedby Shafaq News staff.</em></p>]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2026 14:37:37 +0000</pubDate>
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      <link>https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Why-Free-Palestine-and-not-also-Free-Kurdistan</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Why-Free-Palestine-and-not-also-Free-Kurdistan</guid>
      <title>Why “Free Palestine!” and not also “Free Kurdistan!”?</title>
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      <description><![CDATA[<?xml encoding="utf-8" ?><!--?xml encoding="utf-8" ?--><p><em>Shafaq News- OPINION</em></p><p><em>By Nick Kossovan</em></p><p>Whether you're walking through a major Western city, browsing social media, or on a university campus today, you can't miss it. Stenciled on brick walls, plastered on light poles, draped from balconies, or blasted through megaphones, the slogan is everywhere: &ldquo;Free Palestine!&rdquo; It's become the go-to move for self-proclaimed activists and armchair moralists to virtue-signal their support for Palestinians' right to statehood, self-determination, and fundamental human dignity.</p><p>What you won't see or hear during your walk or campus visit are flags, painted signs, or chanted slogans for the Kurds; that's assuming you're even aware they're stateless as well. While Western outrage rallies in support of Palestinian self-determination, over 40 million Kurds remain the largest ethnic group without a country of their own. Spread across Turkiye, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, they've spent more than a century fighting for the same rights as Palestinians: basic human rights and a homeland.</p><p>Why does the Palestinian plight provoke wall-to-wall outrage across the West, while the Kurds are treated as a geopolitical footnote?</p><p>It's certainly not for lack of human suffering. After the Ottoman Empire collapsed, the 1920 Treaty of S&egrave;vres promised the Kurds a state of their own, only for Western powers to renege three years later, carving up their homeland into four pieces to satisfy newly drawn borders, without consulting a single Kurd. What followed was a century of horror: Saddam Hussein's chemical attacks in Halabja, brutal military campaigns and language bans in Turkiye, execution squads in Iran, and forced displacement in Syria.</p><p>None of this horror moves the Western conscience. The silence isn't accidental; it&rsquo;s a calculated blend of geopolitical self-interest, media-driven algorithms, and an open secret: antisemitism rebranded as moral virtue.</p><p>Let's start with the geopolitical game: NATO's convenience. Turkiye, a key NATO ally guarding Europe's southern flank, treats any hint of Kurdish self-rule as a threat that must be crushed. When Western armies needed ground forces to fight the Islamic State (ISIS) in Syria, they armed Kurdish fighters and praised them as heroic defenders of democracy. Kurdish men and women died by the thousands doing the West's dirty work. But once ISIS was defeated, Western leaders discreetly withdrew their support, effectively turning their backs on the Kurds and handing the keys back to Turkiye.</p><p>Western outrage, as much as it may be virtue-signaling, is easy when there's no invoice attached. Condemning Israel carries almost no real cost; it's a low-risk, high-reward exercise in self-righteousness. Championing the Kurds, however, requires calling out allies, rattling NATO, and challenging borders drawn by Western powers. The sobering truth for the Kurds: they're useful on the battlefield but invisible at the negotiating table.</p><p>Second, the Kurdish struggle doesn't fit the cartoonish contrasts that pass for "Western activism." Today's protest culture thrives on oversimplified, black-and-white formulas: oppressor versus oppressed, white colonizer versus indigenous victim. Western media tends to narrate the Palestinian cause through this framework &mdash;casting Israel as a colonial outpost rather than a sovereign nation, a narrative that's then echoed on red carpets, social feeds, and concert stages. It's a convenient, off-the-rack story that requires neither fine distinctions nor historical literacy.</p><p>Applying an 'anti-colonial' lens to the Kurds' struggle quickly falls apart. The states oppressing the Kurds &mdash;Turks, Persians, and Arabs&mdash;are not 'Western colonizers.' They're native Middle Eastern groups whose right to govern is rarely challenged. Without the fuel of a Western proxy to blame, the outrage simply fails to ignite. Acknowledging that Middle Eastern regimes can be brutal imperialists would undermine the story the Western outrage system depends on.</p><p>The double standard is baked into the global diplomatic system. International law treats Palestinians as a population under foreign occupation, granting them the legal right to break away and build their own nation. The Kurds, however, are classified as "national minorities" trapped within existing sovereign borders. Under international doctrine, Kurds are entitled only to local cultural rights, not to full independence. Sovereign nations guard this legal loophole religiously, not out of principle but out of fear of encouraging their own minority groups to secede.</p><p>Recent history is littered with this hypocrisy. Spain still refuses to recognize Kosovo out of fear for Catalonia; Canada's Supreme Court legally restricted Quebec to internal autonomy in 1998; and when 93 percent of Iraqi Kurds voted for independence in 2017, neighboring regimes immediately deployed tanks to crush the vote. Protecting lines drawn on a map will always matter more to politicians than human beings' freedom to self-determination.</p><p>Third, 21st-century journalism has an undeniable self-interest: manufacturing rage-driven narratives to keep the lights on. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is media crack &mdash;reliable, high-octane engagement for newsrooms and algorithms alike. We saw this circus explode when American rapper Macklemore shouted, "Free Palestine!" on stage while opening for Ed Sheeran. After venue owners allegedly pressured Sheeran to drop Macklemore, Sheeran's entire lineup &mdash;including his long-time backing band, Beoga, and openers such as Finneas&mdash; quit the tour in protest.</p><p>Seeing a clear monetization opportunity, Macklemore immediately announced his "Free Palestine Tour," revealing everything you need to know about the rapper's moral compass. (Yes, I'm aware that Macklemore is calling it a "charitable tour.") The media eagerly turned the fallout into a viral feeding frenzy, amplifying every tweet, boycott, celebrity stance, and drop in Sheeran's concert attendance and Instagram followers as social proof of collective outrage.</p><p>Beneath newsrooms serving their self-interests lies a demographic reality. Advocacy for Palestinian self-determination commands a built-in global network of nearly two billion Muslims, whose shared identity drives emotional investment across every time zone. It's a ready-made, transnational megaphone. No such global alliance exists for the Kurds. Because their struggle is ethnic and regional rather than pan-religious, the Kurdish cause attracts no international bloc, no global movement, and no sympathy on the world stage, much as nobody outside Britons and ethnic Irish genuinely cared about the Northern Ireland conflict.</p><p>Here's where trading in comforting lies needs to stop, and an uncomfortable truth needs to be recognized: the core divide between pro-Palestinian advocacy and the Kurdish fight for self-determination boils down to a simple formula: who pays the price for statehood and who's allowed to monopolize the world's sympathy.</p><p>If Israel bequeaths an independent Palestine, Jews pay the price. If Turkiye, Syria, Iraq, and Iran bequeath an independent Kurdistan, Muslims pay the price. That's the entire equation. Western performative outrage explodes in the first scenario because demanding sacrifices from others costs nothing, but evaporates in the second because holding Muslim-majority regimes accountable disrupts their neat, selective anti-colonial script.</p><p>This divide exposes the selective morality that governs public commentary. While antisemitism remains an undeniable reality, anti-Israel sentiment provides a sanitized front for age-old prejudices. In a politically correct Western society, echoing overt anti-Jewish conspiracy theories, such as "Jews control the banks" or "Jews start wars for profit," rightly invites condemnation. Disguising those same attitudes as "anti-Zionist critique," however, earns applause in self-identified progressive circles. Israel has simply become a socially permissible surrogate for targeting Jews.</p><p>The Kurdish fight carries no repackaged malice to propel its narrative into the global spotlight. It's a localized struggle against neighboring Muslim states. For governments in Ankara, Damascus, Baghdad, and Tehran, surrendering territory for a Kurdish homeland would mean relinquishing land under Muslim control, a zero-sum compromise no regional power is willing to make. Furthermore, Kurds in Iraqi Kurdistan and Rojava have established notably secular, modernized systems centered on pluralism and women's rights. To traditionalist regimes, supporting Kurdish statehood means watching a progressive, egalitarian model thrive at the expense of traditional religious authority.</p><p>The final diplomatic nail in the coffin is a matter of regional perception: the Kurds are seen across the Middle East as far too cozy with Israel. In a region where anti-Israel animus is an entry requirement for political legitimacy, any group labelled friendly to the Jewish state is instantly radioactive to surrounding regimes and to Western ideological echo chambers.</p><p>Universal values such as self-determination, anti-imperialism, and basic human dignity lose meaning when applied selectively. Deciding who deserves a state based on geopolitical convenience, media hype, or hidden bias destroys the very concept of justice. Loudly demanding freedom for one group while looking away from forty million Kurds isn&rsquo;t moral courage. It is performative solidarity rooted in double standards.</p><p>It&rsquo;s time for Western governments, cultural icons, media pundits, and street-level marchers to hold their proclaimed moral convictions to a consistent standard. If &ldquo;Free Palestine!&rdquo; is the defining rallying cry of today&rsquo;s selective moral crusade, then moral consistency demands that the uncomfortable question be asked: Why not also &ldquo;Free Kurdistan!&rdquo;?</p><p><em>*Nick Kossovan, a self-described connoisseur of human psychology, writes about what's on his mind from Toronto.</em></p><p><em>Disclaimer: This article is a guest opinion. The views and opinions expressed are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or editorial position of Shafaq News.</em></p>]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 31 Oct 2026 20:56:19 +0000</pubDate>
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      <link>https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Iraq-s-Hormuz-reliance-exposed-as-regional-wars-drag-on</link>
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      <title>Iraq's Hormuz reliance exposed as regional wars drag on</title>
      <enclosure url="https://media.shafaq.com/media/arcella/1792999776149.webp"/>
      <category><![CDATA[In-Depth]]></category>
      <description><![CDATA[<?xml encoding="utf-8" ?><p><em>Shafaq News</em></p><p>Iraq's dependence ona single shipping lane for its oil revenue has left it among the countries mostexposed to a prolonged regional war, as analysts warn that the confrontationinvolving Iran is reshaping trade routes, alliances and the balance of global power.</p><p>For Iraq, thosecosts are concrete. Almost <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Economy/Iraq-oil-sales-exceed-533M-barrels-in-2026" target="_blank">90 percent</a> of its oil exports pass through theStrait of Hormuz, and oil accounts for about 90 percent of government revenue.Shipments slumped after tanker traffic was disrupted when the war began in February.They have since recovered: the oil minister said exports <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Economy/Oil-minister-presses-for-faster-Iraqi-tanker-purchases" target="_blank">exceeded 3.4</a> millionbarrels per day in October, moving through Hormuz, Turkiye's Ceyhan port andtanker trucks via Syria. An analysis reported by Shafaq News on October 25warned that a renewed closure of the strait could cut Iraq's oil revenues by <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Economy/Hormuz-shutdown-could-slash-Iraq-s-oil-revenues-80" target="_blank">up to 80 percent</a>, putting salaries, public services, and the dinar at risk.</p><p><strong>The Cost Of A LongWar</strong></p><p>Myles Caggins, aformer military spokesperson for the US-led Coalition, said that the war andeconomic crisis in Southwest Asia affect the entire world. Rising prices fordiesel, fertilizer and helium in the United States weigh on the Americaneconomy, he said, and the effect extends to Europe and Asia.</p><p>Ending the warquickly, Caggins argued, is the best way to limit both economic and humanlosses. He called on the leaders of the United States, Israel and Iran to worktoward a negotiated settlement. </p><p>&ldquo;A deal couldinclude sanctions relief for Iran under agreed terms,&rdquo; he said, allowing itsreintegration into the global economy and easing the hardship facing affectedfamilies. He noted, however, that talk of an agreement has recurred for monthswithout a clear outcome, and that ending the war depends on whether the partiesare genuinely ready to reach understandings.</p><p>Jordanian politicalanalyst Adel al-Ashram described the current period as one of the mostdangerous the world has faced, with conflicts running from the war in Ukraineto the Middle East, Sudan and Ethiopia. </p><p>&ldquo;These conflicts areno longer local because the interests of international and regional powers arenow entangled in them, carrying their effects into energy, trade and the pricesof basic goods,&rdquo; he said. </p><p>The war in Ukraine,followed by the confrontation in the Gulf, pushed up the prices of oil, diesel,gas and food, he said, placing pressure on economies far from any front line.</p><p>Al-Ashram warnedthat parties clinging to their goals and refusing concessions could turn tomore dangerous options if they come to believe defeat is near, particularlywith major nuclear powers involved. &ldquo;Without compromise, the risk of escalationrises, and the course of the conflict becomes harder to predict.&rdquo;</p><p><a href="https://www.shafaq.com/en/Report/Can-Iraq-s-economy-weather-a-wider-regional-shock-Experts-differ" target="_blank"><em>Read more: Can Iraq&rsquo;s economy weather a wider regional shock? Experts differ</em></a></p><p><strong>Corridors AndAlliances</strong></p><p>Turkish politicalanalyst Cevat G&ouml;k said that rivalry between global powers is increasingly aboutreshaping alliances and controlling the sea lanes and logistics routes thatlink production centers to markets. He pointed to the Strait of Hormuz, the Babel-Mandeb at the mouth of the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, as well as projectsdesigned to strengthen trade links between East and West.</p><p>The world isdividing into multiple blocs, G&ouml;k said, including NATO, the BRICS group ofemerging economies and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. &ldquo;Countries thatmaintain varied relationships rather than tying themselves to one camp, citingTurkiye, Brazil, India and the Gulf states, have more room to maneuver and maybenefit from the shifts under way.&rdquo; </p><p>He expects newagreements and broader regional cooperation as states seek to diversify theirpartnerships, though the direction of those alignments will depend on how theconflict develops.</p><p>That logic appliesdirectly to Iraq. Its Development Road project, a planned 1,200-kilometer railand highway corridor from the Grand Faw Port in Basra to the <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Economy/Baghdad-and-Ankara-push-road-and-rail-border-connection" target="_blank">Turkish border</a> andon toward Europe, was launched under an April 2024 agreement between Iraq,Turkiye, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. The first section near the port isalready in use, and the <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/society/Iraq-s-dangerous-roads-hinder-trade-challenge-development-plans" target="_blank">transport ministry </a>says the project remains a priority.Baghdad is also building a state tanker fleet: in early October, its statetanker company moved crude beyond Hormuz for the first time in decades, and theoil minister has pressed for faster purchases of supertankers.</p><p>Iraq's room todiversify is narrower on its eastern border. On October 21, Baghdad closed the<a href="https://shafaq.com/en/society/Al-Sheeb-crossing-with-Iran-to-shut-over-technical-issues" target="_blank">al-Sheeb crossing</a> with Iran until further notice, officially citing technicaland logistical shortcomings. The move came amid broader US pressure on Iraqover its economic ties with Tehran, while Iran said Iraqi officials hadthemselves referred to US pressure behind problems surrounding the crossing.</p><p><strong>Who Gains FromAttrition</strong></p><p>Ahmed Fouad, a CairoUniversity professor specializing in Zionist thought, said that the currentconfrontation exceeds the scale of the Cold War but has not reached the levelof a declared third world war. Conflicts stretching from Ukraine to West Africa,Libya, the Palestinian territories, Lebanon and Yemen reflect competitionbetween powers that keep backing their allies whenever fighting eases or thebalance shifts, he said.</p><p>The United Statesand Russia are carrying growing military and economic burdens, Fouad argued,while China watches without direct involvement. &ldquo;Continued attrition of itsrivals could shift the global balance, much as the United States strengthenedits position after entering the Second World War.&rdquo;</p><p>He linked thefailure to settle the confrontation with Iran quickly to political consequencesthat may extend beyond the battlefield, and urged Arab states to coordinatetheir positions, warning that the warring powers could eventually reachunderstandings that serve their own interests at the expense of the region'sstates, resources and strategic corridors.</p><p>Mahdi Azizi, anIranian affairs expert, said the current upheaval follows from the events afterthe October 7, 2023 attacks: the war in Gaza, the fighting in Lebanon,political change in Syria and the strikes on Iran. In his view, these form partof an effort to redraw the map of the region and of the Arab and Islamicworlds, with effects that reach regional balances and the future of alliances.</p><p>Azizi argued thatthe losses suffered by leaders and factions in the Iran-aligned "Axis ofResistance" do not mean the end of the axis, which he described as an ideanot bound to geography or individuals. &ldquo;Iran's endurance under US and Israelimilitary pressure pointed to a change in the balance of power, and China'sweight in the international system may grow while Iran remained an influentialregional actor.&rdquo;</p><p><strong>An Open Question ForBaghdad</strong></p><p>The analysts'assessments converge on one point: The longer the war continues, the more itscosts will be measured in shipping routes, commodity prices, and the alliancesstates are forced to choose. For Iraq, which earns almost all of its revenuethrough a single strait and is building a corridor meant to bypass it, theoutcome will shape more than its foreign policy.</p><p><a href="https://www.shafaq.com/en/Report/Iran-s-undersea-cable-threat-raises-risks-for-Iraq" target="_blank"><em>Read more: Iran&rsquo;s undersea cable threat raises risks for Iraq</em></a></p><p><em>Written and editedby Shafaq News staff.</em></p>]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 30 Oct 2026 06:22:58 +0000</pubDate>
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      <link>https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Iraq-absorbs-PKK-linked-YB-on-Mount-Sinjar-with-Erbil-left-out</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Iraq-absorbs-PKK-linked-YB-on-Mount-Sinjar-with-Erbil-left-out</guid>
      <title>YBŞ deal secures Sinjar’s mountain, leaves its administration unresolved</title>
      <enclosure url="https://media.shafaq.com/media/arcella/1793108287652.webp"/>
      <category><![CDATA[In-Depth]]></category>
      <description><![CDATA[<?xml encoding="utf-8" ?><!--?xml encoding="utf-8" ?--><!--?xml encoding="utf-8" ?--><!--?xml encoding="utf-8" ?--><!--?xml encoding="utf-8" ?--><!--?xml encoding="utf-8" ?--><!--?xml encoding="utf-8" ?--><p><em>Shafaq News (Updated on Oct. 28, at 16:37)</em></p><p>Iraq beganintegrating the Sinjar Resistance Units (YB&#350;), a Yazidi armed group linked tothe Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), into federal security forces on Monday,taking control of the highest point on Mount Sinjar. The handover delivers thesecurity half of the 2020 Sinjar Agreement, the half Turkiye demanded, whilethe accord&rsquo;s administrative terms remain stalled and Erbil, its co-signatory,says Baghdad acted without consulting it.</p><p>The mountain holds aparticular place in Yazidi memory. In August 2014, tens of thousands ofYazidis, followers of an ancient monotheistic faith whose heartland is Sinjar,<a href="https://shafaq.com/en/society/Over-110-000-Sinjar-residents-still-displaced-after-nearly-12-years" target="_blank">fled</a> up its slopes as ISIS overran the district. The group killed and enslavedthousands in a campaign the United Nations has recognized as genocide. The YB&#350;emerged from that siege as Yazidi volunteers defended civilians trapped on themountain, trained and supported by the PKK and by Syria's People's ProtectionUnits (YPG). It remained there for a decade outside the state's chain ofcommand, in a border district that links PKK strongholds in Iraq's northernmountains to northeast Syria. That location <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Kurdistan/CTG-Turkiye-attacks-PKK-YBS-sites-in-Mount-Sinjar" target="_blank">drew repeated</a> Turkish strikes onits commanders.</p><p>Haji Terash, thegroup's representative, told the ceremony that more than 4,000 men and womenhad joined federal forces. Giving up the YB&#350;'s status as an armed faction, hesaid, "honors the victims of the Yazidi genocide and strengthens Iraq'ssovereignty and stability." </p><p>Lt. Gen. SaadHarbiya, representing Prime Minister Ali Al-Zaidi, said taking up arms had beena temporary necessity, and that "weapons must now be held within thebounds of the law and the constitution." </p><p>Lt. Gen. Saad Maan,head of Iraq's Security Media Cell, said the process had moved "from negotiationto actual implementation." <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Security/Committees-to-begin-integrating-YB-fighters-into-Iraqi-forces">Committees</a> will assign fighters to the Interiorand Defense ministries, and federal forces are set to take over furtherpositions, including the Qal'a area.</p><p>The deal follows ashift that began outside Iraq. In 2025, the PKK announced its dissolution inresponse to an appeal by its jailed leader, Abdullah <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Middle-East/PKK-All-fighters-withdrawn-from-Turkiye" target="_blank">Ocalan</a>. The YB&#350; welcomedthe call and denied any affiliation with the group, yet it still refused tosurrender its weapons in September 2025, according to QasimShesho, then a Peshmerga commander in Sinjar. In February, Yazidi lawmaker Murad Ismael of the Yazidi Cause Allianceproposed folding the force into state institutions. Al-Zaidi announced thehandover after receiving Ismael and YB&#350; leaders on September 11.</p><p><strong>The Syrian Precedent</strong></p><p>The YPG connectionplaces Sinjar inside a wider regional pattern. In Syria, the YPG-led SyrianDemocratic Forces (SDF), which controlled the country's northeast, completedtheir <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Middle-East/Abdi-rejects-Kurdish-surrender-narrative-after-SDF-dissolution" target="_blank">integration</a> into the Syrian army on August 25, according to commanderMazloum Abdi. That deal absorbed SDF brigades as whole units and requirednon-Syrian fighters to leave. Even so, Kurdish politician <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Kurdistan/MERI-2026-Ilham-Ahmed-says-SDF-integration-remains-under-test" target="_blank">Ilham</a> Ahmed told aforum in Erbil this month that the process remains in a testing phase.</p><p>Thepublished terms in Sinjar are thinner. Baghdad has pledged to integrate "qualified" fighters without saying whether they will serve together in Sinjaror be dispersed, who will command them, what happens to those found ineligible,how heavy weapons will be handled, or whether the salaries they have long drawnthrough the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), the state-funded umbrella ofmostly Shiite armed groups, will follow them.</p><p>The Yazidi CauseAlliance has already staked out its reading. In a statement on Monday, it saidintegration does not mean dissolving the units or ending their members&rsquo; role, andinsisted that Sinjar&rsquo;s residents continue to share in securing their own areas,with respect for the district&rsquo;s particular character. The alliance creditedmediation by the Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution (NOREF) in reachingthe deal. Baghdad has yet to say if its terms will meet that expectation.</p><p>Security expertMukhalad Al-Darb told Shafaq News that the fighters' knowledge of the terraincould strengthen state control and help federal forces coordinate with thePeshmerga, the Kurdistan Region's armed forces, in the areas betweentheir zones of responsibility.</p><p><strong>Ankara's Conditions</strong></p><p>On September 23 in New York, Al-Zaidi and TurkishPresident Recep Tayyip Erdogan agreed to restore full state authority in Sinjarand end the presence of "proscribed foreign armed elements." Theagreement paired the gradual handover of Turkiye's Bashiqa-<a href="https://www.shafaq.com/en/Iraq/Baghdad-Ankara-agree-on-Bashiqa-Zilkan-Camp-transfer" target="_blank">Zilkan</a> camp nearMosul with that progress. Ankara has since said any broader reduction of itstroops in Iraq depends on dismantling the PKK and affiliated structures,particularly in Sinjar.</p><p>Ankara has signaled it is satisfied. On Wednesday, Turkiye&rsquo;sDefense Ministry <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq/Ankara-welcomes-Iraqi-takeover-of-Sinjar-security" target="_blank">welcomed</a> Baghdad&rsquo;s moves in Sinjar as serving the goal of a "terror-free region," and said security progress there had allowed arrangementsto move ahead for handing over Bashiqa-Zilkan under the agreed mechanism andtimetable.With the US-led coalition gone since September 30, Turkiyenow maintains the main foreign military presence left in Iraq.</p><p>For Al-Zaidi, Sinjaris the cleanest result of a disarmament drive that has moved slowly elsewhere.He has set June 30, 2027, as the deadline for armed factions, most of themIran-aligned groups within the PMF, to place their weapons under state control,and talks with them center on handing arms to the PMF Commission. The YB&#350; isheading the opposite way, out of the PMF's orbit and into the regularministries. A small minority force, isolated by the PKK's dissolution and undersustained Turkish pressure, settled first. The powerful factions are stillnegotiating terms.</p><p><strong>Erbil Outside TheRoom</strong></p><p>Erbil's absence cutsagainst the <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq/Text-of-Sinjar-agreement" target="_blank">Sinjar Agreement</a> itself. Signed by Baghdad and the KurdistanRegional Government (KRG) with UN backing, the accord required unofficial armedgroups to leave the district. It handed security to federal and local policeand the National Security Service, and called for an independent mayoracceptable to both sides.</p><p>Sinjar lies at thewestern end of an arc of disputed territories, running through Kirkuk toKhanaqin, that Baghdad and Erbil both claim. Article 140 of the constitutionset out normalization, a census and referendums to settle their status, andnone has taken place. Peshmerga forces held Sinjar until October 2017, whenfederal troops backed by the PMF took control after the Kurdistan Region'sindependence referendum.</p><p>Security acrossthose areas has since rested on overlapping forces. In 2021, Baghdad and Erbilagreed on a joint plan for four coordination centers in Kirkuk, Diyala, Makhmurand Mosul, to close the gaps between federal troops and the Peshmerga. The planis now suspended; each side blames the other, and ISIS has continued to exploitthose gaps. The YB&#350; itself called state control of weapons essential topreventing ISIS's return, while the mechanism designed to secure the groundbetween the two forces sits idle.</p><p>KRG InteriorMinister Reber Ahmed said on Tuesday that Baghdad&rsquo;s deal with Ankara overBashiqa is unlikely to succeed without Erbil, noting that the camp "lies behindPeshmerga lines.&rdquo; &ldquo;Experience has shown that such arrangements will not succeedwithout consulting and coordinating with the Kurdistan Regional Government," hesaid. </p><p>The objection concerns process rather than substance: Ahmed called the PKK&rsquo;spresence in the Kurdistan Region "unlawful from the outset" and backed itsdisarmament.His ministry went further in a statement,<a href="https://www.shafaq.com/en/Kurdistan/KRG-challenges-Baghdad-s-unilateral-Sinjar-security-arrangements" target="_blank">saying</a> Baghdad had imposed security arrangements in Sinjar unilaterally,without consulting Erbil, in violation of the 2020 agreement. Arrangementsimposed outside legitimate institutions and without local acceptance, itwarned, would further complicate the situation. It called full implementationof the accord the only viable solution.</p><p>Erbil&rsquo;s distance extends to the forces on the ground. HaidarShesho, commander of Peshmerga forces in Sinjar, told Shafaq News that hisunits were <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Kurdistan/Peshmerga-commander-Forces-not-party-to-YB-deal" target="_blank">not party</a> to the agreement. "Our forces took no part in thenegotiations, and we do not know to what extent the Peshmerga Ministry wasinvolved," he said. With Peshmerga and army positions overlapping in severalareas, securing the border and the district&rsquo;s troubled pockets depends oncoordination between the two forces. Haidar Shesho said the deal could benefit Sinjar ifit brings stability and Baghdad takes responsibility for protecting residents,and that no security or administrative arrangement should be imposed on themwithout their participation. He also urged Baghdad and the KRG to let theSinjar Peshmerga operate officially in coordination with federal forces,leaving the YB&#350; as only one of the district&rsquo;s armed forces whose status has yetto be resolved.</p><p>Lt. Gen. (ret.) Jabbar Yawar, former secretary-general ofthe KRG&rsquo;s Peshmerga Ministry, argued that only police should operate insideSinjar town. Brig. Gen. (ret.) Adnan Al-Kinani proposed a joint committee ofcommanders from both governments so the new arrangement doesn't remain aset of temporary field measures.</p><p><strong>A District Without ASettled Administration</strong></p><p>Within Nineveh, thefight over who runs Sinjar has frozen the administrative track. On theprovincial council, the Babylon Movement, a Christian party linked to a PMFbrigade, has faced off against the Unified Nineveh Alliance and the KurdistanDemocratic Party (KDP), the dominant party in Erbil, over the district's topposts. </p><p>On October 22, KDP council bloc head Ahmed Al-Kiki pushed for freshnominations and rejected any single figure's claim to speak for all Yazidis. Aday later, a parliamentary committee ordered the council to stop. It saidneither post was vacant because courts had upheld the incumbents' election, Sido Khairi and Dawood Jundi, and it opened a fact-finding inquiry. Haidar Shesho called for a competent administrator for Sinjar andits Sinuni subdistrict, chosen on merit rather than party quotas.</p><p>Baghdad has proposed its own way out.&nbsp;Sabah Al-Numan, spokesman for the commander-in-chief, saidonWednesday that the operations on the mountain had been conducted entirely underfederal authority, and that the government aims to end displacement and pavethe way for local elections in Sinjar, so residents can choose anadministration that represents them. The KRG&rsquo;s statement arrived at a similarend point from the opposite side: if the 2020 agreement proves difficult toimplement, it said, the decision should rest with Sinjar&rsquo;s residents, particularlyYazidis. Baghdad and Erbil disagree over how the handover was carried out, yetboth now name the same final arbiter.</p><p><strong>Return Remains TheMeasure</strong></p><p>For displacedYazidis, the test is return. About 110,000 Sinjar residents still live in campsin the Kurdistan Region's Duhok province, according to Duhok's displacementdepartment, and another 170,000 live displaced outside them. Fewer than 30percent of Sinjar's pre-2014 population had returned by last year. </p><p>Violence hasreversed past returns: after clashes between the army and the YB&#350; in March2025, families who had gone home moved back into the camps. The current returnprogram, run with the International Organization for Migration, gives eachfamily 1.5 million dinars (about $1,144) and transport for its belongings, withno money for home repairs.</p><p>"Even withreduced aid, camp life here is still more stable than returning to a place withno security, no schools, and no services," Dian Jafar, head of the Duhokdepartment, told Shafaq News last year.</p><p>Nineveh GovernorAbdul Qader Al-Dakhil told the ceremony that the province is preparing acomprehensive plan to rebuild Sinjar, warning that security will remainincomplete without reconstruction and basic services. Yawar listed the minimum:rebuilt roads, water and electricity networks, and restored hospitals, schoolsand homes.</p><p>Baghdad now holdsthe summit where Yazidis sought refuge in 2014. Governing the town belowrequires a mayor residents accept, police they trust and homes worth returningto. All three depend on a settlement with Erbil and within Nineveh thatMonday's ceremony left untouched.</p><p><a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Yazidis-struggle-to-return-home-a-decade-after-ISIS-atrocities-report" target="_blank"><em>Read more: Yazidis struggle to return home a decade after ISIS atrocities: report</em></a></p><p><em>Written and editedby Shafaq News staff.</em></p>]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 27 Oct 2026 14:45:40 +0000</pubDate>
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      <link>https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Waze-ban-debate-tests-Iraq-s-local-tech-ambitions</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Waze-ban-debate-tests-Iraq-s-local-tech-ambitions</guid>
      <title>Waze ban debate tests Iraq’s local tech ambitions</title>
      <enclosure url="https://media.shafaq.com/media/arcella/1792877490824.webp"/>
      <category><![CDATA[In-Depth]]></category>
      <description><![CDATA[<?xml encoding="utf-8" ?><p><em>Shafaq News- Baghdad</em></p><p>After weeks of debate over a proposed ban on Waze in Iraq, the Communications and Media Commission (CMC) has ruled out blocking the Google-owned navigation app, shifting attention to whether Iraqi developers can build local alternatives capable of competing for users rather than relying on government restrictions.</p><p>Waze has been used in Iraq for years for route planning and real-time traffic monitoring. Drivers, transport and delivery workers, as well as other users, rely on the application for their daily journeys.</p><p>Communications Minister Mustafa Sanad had announced plans to <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/society/Iraqi-minister-stands-by-plan-to-ban-Waze" target="_blank">ban</a> Waze because of its Israeli origins, initially setting the beginning of 2027 for the move before bringing the date forward to the end of December 2026.</p><p>On Thursday, October 22, however, Sanad said there was currently no ban, while maintaining his previous position and predicting that Waze use would decline as Iraqi alternatives entered the market.</p><p>A more definitive position came from Baligh Abu Kalal, head of the Executive Body of the CMC, who ruled <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/society/Media-regulator-chief-rules-out-Waze-ban-in-Iraq" target="_blank">out</a> banning the application, noting that Waze is now owned by Google, whose services are widely used in Iraq. At the same time, he called for the development of competing Iraqi applications while leaving users free to choose.</p><p>Speaking at the Internet Governance Forum in Baghdad, Abu Kalal said banning a Google application because of the nationality of its original developers was not under consideration.</p><p>He said the commission supports the Communications Ministry and Iraqi developers in efforts to create local alternatives, while acknowledging that developing competitive applications would not be easy.</p><p><strong>Iraqi Alternatives</strong></p><p>Amid the debate over Waze, Sanad told Shafaq News that several Iraqi programmers and local companies had approached the ministry with proposals for mapping and traffic-monitoring applications.</p><p>The ministry had received several proposals from local developers, he said, predicting that the emergence of such applications would reduce reliance on Waze and eventually leave it with only limited use.</p><p>The proposed ban has also drawn interest from Iraqi programmers, some of whom have presented local projects and applications on social media, prompting debate over whether such initiatives could be developed into products capable of meeting users' needs.</p><p>Software developer Muamal Tahseen Ali said the issue should be viewed from two perspectives: digital sovereignty and the interests of citizens, while distinguishing between building a strong national alternative and imposing one by banning existing applications.</p><p>&ldquo;Having a national mapping and geographic data system would be an important step toward building an independent digital sector,&rdquo; Ali told Shafaq News.</p><p>He called for support for Iraqi companies and programmers to develop applications capable of competing internationally rather than limiting their ambitions to alternatives designed only for the domestic market.</p><p>At the same time, Ali warned that banning an application used by citizens every day required prior technical assessment, particularly because any local alternative would first have to demonstrate that it could provide a reliable and secure service.</p><p>&ldquo;A local application is not necessarily safer or more efficient simply because it is local,&rdquo; he said, arguing that digital sovereignty cannot be reduced to banning a foreign application but requires an integrated national system for data protection and service development.</p><p>Ali said the best way to support Iraqi products was to provide reliable alternatives, publish the results of technical testing and allow local companies to compete under clear standards rather than directing users toward a single option.</p><p><strong>User Trust</strong></p><p>The challenges facing Iraqi navigation applications extend beyond map design and user interfaces to positioning accuracy, road and congestion updates, service reliability and the protection of personal data.</p><p>Programmer and game designer Mustafa Basil Mohammed told Shafaq News that the real measure of an Iraqi application's success was neither its designation as a national product nor the promotional campaigns accompanying its launch, but users' actual experience and the value the service provides.</p><p>Iraqi programmers are capable of developing competitive applications, Mohammed said, but their success would depend on demonstrating strong data protection, meeting security standards and ensuring system stability without problems that interfere with daily use.</p><p>A successful developer, he added, must offer a product that solves a genuine problem and provides a level of service comparable to established applications. New applications should be available free of charge and should not become platforms dominated by promotional advertising that provides little value to users.</p><p>Mohammed called on the government to give Iraqi developers room to present their ideas and allow several competing applications to enter the market, avoiding monopolies or forcing citizens to use a particular program.</p><p>The problem, he said, was not a lack of capability among Iraqi programmers but a weak support environment and insufficient investment in software development as a productive economic sector capable of generating jobs and creating scalable local services.</p><p><strong>National Digital Policy</strong></p><p>Dr. Roshna al-Jaf, an expert in programming and computer technology, said the Waze debate should provide an opportunity to reconsider policies supporting digital applications and help Iraqi developers turn their ideas into practical projects.</p><p>Al-Jaf told Shafaq News that the Communications Ministry should open the way for Iraqi programmers to submit credible local projects and applications. Implementing such projects, she added, &ldquo;did not necessarily have to be limited exclusively to local developers,&rdquo; as long as Iraqi ideas and initiatives contributed to building national services.</p><p>She stressed the importance of involving specialists in programming and cybersecurity in digital projects to &ldquo;ensure technical efficiency and protect user data.&rdquo;</p><p>Al-Jaf also called for a clear Iraqi policy to govern the internet and digital-services sector, saying she was prepared to provide studies, data and maps to the Communications Ministry &ldquo;free of charge&rdquo; if serious steps were taken toward establishing secure Iraqi digital infrastructure and developing the telecommunications sector.</p>]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 24 Oct 2026 21:35:51 +0000</pubDate>
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      <link>https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Asaib-Ahl-Al-Haq-joins-Iraq-s-cabinet-as-hardliners-reject-disarmament-deadline</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Asaib-Ahl-Al-Haq-joins-Iraq-s-cabinet-as-hardliners-reject-disarmament-deadline</guid>
      <title>Asaib Ahl Al-Haq joins Iraq's cabinet as hardliners reject disarmament deadline</title>
      <enclosure url="https://media.shafaq.com/media/arcella/1792853591356.webp"/>
      <category><![CDATA[In-Depth]]></category>
      <description><![CDATA[<?xml encoding="utf-8" ?><p><em>Shafaq News</em></p><p>Iraq's parliament appointed Laith al-Khazali, a seniorleader of the Iran-aligned armed faction Asaib Ahl Al-Haq, as deputy primeminister on October 15, three weeks into a government plan to bring all factionweapons under state control by June 30, 2027. The appointment illustrates whatappears to be a central feature of Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi's approach:factions that cooperate with the state's weapons-control plan gain greater roominside formal institutions, while the most heavily armed groups continue toreject deadlines they did not negotiate.</p><p>The factions are where Iraq is most exposed to theconfrontation between the United States and Iran. Most of them run brigadesinside the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), a state-funded umbrella of mostlyShiite armed groups formed in 2014 to fight ISIS, while keeping their ownchains of command. They are also a major force in parliament. Their politicalwings and allies hold roughly 60 to 70 of the chamber's 329 seats, according tocommon estimates, and up to 97 when broader faction-linked forces are counted. </p><p>Since the conflict between Iran on one side and the UnitedStates and Israel on the other began in February, statements issued under thebanner of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI), an umbrella name used by themost hardline factions, have claimed <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Iran-s-denial-vs-proxy-escalation-Iraq-caught-between-diplomacy-and-battlefield-reality" target="_blank">hundreds</a> of operations against US sites inIraq and the region. </p><p>Individual factions have generally not claimed attacks intheir own names. Washington and the Kurdistan Regional Government have <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq/US-calls-on-Iraq-to-dismantle-Iran-aligned-militias-after-attacks" target="_blank">accused</a>Iraqi factions of attacks on US forces and on the Kurdistan Region, whileIran's Revolutionary Guard has claimed some strikes on Iranian Kurdishopposition camps there. US and Israeli strikes have also hit faction positionson Iraqi soil.</p><p>For years, the factions tied the future of their weapons tothe presence of foreign troops. That argument lost its anchor on September 30,when the US-led Coalition ended its military mission in Iraq. The governmenthad first set the same date as its disarmament deadline, then separated thetwo. Al-Zaidi's staged plan opened on October 1 with a 90-day de-escalationperiod, during which the factions refrain from attacks and receive guaranteesthat US forces will not strike them. Weapons handovers follow, to be completedby the end of June.</p><p>The Coordination Framework, the alliance of Shiite partiesthat nominated al-Zaidi and holds a parliamentary majority, <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq/Iraq-s-CF-backs-arms-control-timeline" target="_blank">endorsed</a> thetimetable at an emergency meeting called by the prime minister on October 2.The alliance includes the political wings of several armed factions, and itsstatement welcomed "the armed factions' commitment to the agreement."</p><p>Three weeks in, the truce has held. No attacks on US sitesor facilities have been reported since October 1, and no Iraqi faction hasentered the wider regional conflict. Kataib Hezbollah, the most powerful of thehardline groups, announced on October 1 that it would <a href="https://www.shafaq.com/en/Iraq/Iraq-s-armed-factions-hail-end-of-US-military-mission" target="_blank">halt</a> military operationsin Iraq following the US withdrawal, and Sabah al-Numan, spokesman for thecommander-in-chief of the armed forces, said the factions had pledged to<a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Security/MERI-2026-Iraqi-military-vows-to-bring-arms-under-state-control" target="_blank">respect</a> the 90-day window. </p><p>Whether this reflects the plan's success is less clear. Theperiod has also coincided with a pause in military escalation across theregion, which has given the factions little reason to act.</p><p><a href="https://www.shafaq.com/en/Report/Iraq-s-second-US-troop-withdrawal-shifts-the-test-to-armed-factions" target="_blank"><em>Read more: Iraq's second US troop withdrawal shifts the test to armed factions</em></a></p><p><strong>Inside The State</strong></p><p>Al-Khazali's path into government shows how the plan worksin practice. He is the brother of Asaib Ahl Al-Haq's leader, Qais al-Khazali,and the group is designated by the United States as a terrorist organizationover its ties to Iran's Revolutionary Guard. The group sought the deputypremiership in May and pledged in June to <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq/Asaib-Ahl-Al-Haq-moves-to-sever-ties-with-PMF-orders-weapons-handed-to-state" target="_blank">cut</a> its ties with its three PMFbrigades. In August, it handed <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq/Asaib-Ahl-Al-Haq-hands-weapons-to-Iraqi-state" target="_blank">equipment</a> from two of them to a committee of theinterior and defense ministries, the National Security Advisory and the PMF ata base in Yusufiyah, south of Baghdad. </p><p>Sources told Shafaq News at the time that the transferincluded fewer than ten drones, none carrying munitions, and no missiles. Thecommittee's benchmark is the surrender of missiles with a range of 300kilometers or more.</p><p>Washington had objected to al-Khazali's nomination, asinitially had former prime minister <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq/PM-Al-Zaidi-cools-Al-Maliki-Al-Khazali-tensions" target="_blank">Nouri</a> al-Maliki's State of Law coalition, asenior partner in the Coordination Framework. According to Shafaq News sources,al-Zaidi secured tacit US acceptance during his September visit in exchange forcommitments on disarmament. </p><p>US sanctions on al-Khazali remain in force, and CongressmanJoe <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq/US-lawmaker-condemns-appointment-of-Iraq-s-deputy-PM" target="_blank">Wilson</a> condemned the appointment on the day of the vote. In a reportpublished on October 19, the Middle East Forum, a US think tank, argued thatthe American bet on al-Zaidi had failed once he agreed to bring Iran-alignedforces into the machinery of government.</p><p>The government's public account of progress remainsincomplete. Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein told reporters in Washington,including a Shafaq News correspondent, that three of the seven factionsnegotiating with the government had accepted the plan. Al-Zaidi later put thefigure higher, saying five factions had agreed and three had already handedover weapons. He did not name them, say what had been surrendered, or saywhether any transfer met the missile benchmark. </p><p>Asaib Ahl Al-Haq, Kataib al-Imam Ali and Saraya al-Salam,the armed wing that Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr separated from his <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq/Asaib-Ahl-Al-Haq-backs-limiting-weapons-to-Iraqi-state-after-Al-Sadr-move" target="_blank">Patriotic</a>Shiite Movement earlier this year, have each announced steps towardintegration.</p><p>Pressure is also building inside the ruling coalition. OnOctober 6, a political source told Shafaq News that al-Zaidi had <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq/SOURCE-PM-al-Zaidi-warns-CF-s-factions-on-disarmament" target="_blank">warned</a>Coordination Framework parties with armed wings against failing to meet theircommitments. A week later, at the Middle East Research Institute forum inErbil, al-Numan said the Coalition's withdrawal "had removed allpretexts" for refusing to place weapons under state control.</p><p><strong>The Holdouts</strong></p><p>On the day it announced the pause, Kataib Hezbollah deniedreaching any disarmament understanding with the government, saying its weapons"will remain as a trust in the hands of our mujahideen." JaafarAl-Husseini, the group's spokesperson, said the "resistance" was notbound by any timetable issued by a government or political body. The factions'price, he said, is "full sovereignty": the departure of every form offoreign military presence. </p><p>Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba now rejects any Americanpresence under any label, including military advisers and private securitycompanies. Kataib Hezbollah, whose political wing, the Hoqooq Movement, holdssix parliamentary seats, has gone further. On September 28, its security chief,Abu Mujahid al-Assafi, <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Iraq-s-Sovereignty-Days-Coalition-mission-ends-factions-keep-their-weapons" target="_blank">threatened</a> to work to bring down the government.</p><p>The group's secretary-general, Abu Hussein Al-Hamidawi, setout his own model of the state on the day the last Coalition troops left.Having "resistance" forces alongside the official security serviceswas nothing to be sensitive about, he said. "Many countries in the worldhave more than one army."</p><p>Even the refusals are formally conditional. Falehal-Khazali, head of the Montasiroun bloc, the political wing of Kataib Sayyidal-Shuhada, told Shafaq News that four factions, Kataib Hezbollah, KataibSayyid al-Shuhada, al-Nujaba and Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya, were <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq/Four-Iraqi-factions-set-conditions-for-weapons-control" target="_blank">prepared</a>to place their weapons under state control if their conditions were met,including the departure of foreign forces and foreign armed groups from Iraq. </p><p>Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada declared its adherence to the planon October 1, provided the other side honors its obligations, although itsspokesman, Kazem al-Fartousi, told Shafaq News that bringing weapons understate control <a href="https://www.shafaq.com/en/Iraq/Iraqi-armed-factions-tie-weapons-issue-to-full-sovereignty" target="_blank">cannot</a> be separated from achieving full sovereignty. </p><p>Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya made a similar pledge. Alial-Fatlawi, one of its leaders, told Shafaq News that the factions would handover their weapons voluntarily if Washington respects Iraqi sovereignty, andcould not do so if it does not. "The resistance is a reaction, not anaction," he said.</p><p>Jawad al-Dahlaki, a security expert, told Shafaq News thatevery faction had privately accepted the 90-day window and that the publicrefusals were aimed at a domestic audience. The record so far supports him onlyin part: the halt in operations has held, but the hardline arsenals remain inplace.</p><p>The factions' conditions also reach beyond Washington. Theydemanded the withdrawal of Turkish troops from northern Iraq, where Ankara haskept military positions for years in its campaign against the KurdistanWorkers' Party (PKK), the Kurdish militant group that has fought the Turkishstate since 1984 and is now in a peace process. That withdrawal has so far beenpartial. On September 23, al-Zaidi and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoganagreed that Turkish forces would gradually hand the <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Security/Turkiye-to-hand-over-Bashiqa-Zilkan-base-to-Iraq" target="_blank">Bashiqa-Zilkan</a> camp nearMosul to Baghdad, an arrangement limited to that base. Ankara has tied anythingbroader to the PKK. </p><p>Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan linked furtherreductions to Baghdad's plan to disarm the group and its affiliates in Sinjar,and on October 20 Defense Minister Yasar Guler said Turkiye would keep itsforces in Iraq, estimated at 800 to 1,000 troops, until its border security isfully guaranteed. The PKK said on October 8 that it had <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Middle-East/PKK-All-fighters-withdrawn-from-Turkiye" target="_blank">evacuated</a> fourpositions in Iraq's Metina area. The factions' demand that Turkish forces leavebefore they disarm now meets Ankara's demand that Baghdad disarm the PKK beforeTurkish forces leave.</p><p>Iran's position remains a decisive variable. Sources toldShafaq News in August that Esmail Qaani, commander of Iran's Quds Force, <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq/Kataib-Hezbollah-sets-conditions-on-Iraq-weapons-talks" target="_blank">urged</a>the factions not to disarm for now, while warning them against armedconfrontation with the government. </p><p>US analysts disagree on what Tehran wants from them next.Ross Harrison, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute and author ofDecoding Iran's Foreign Policy: Strategic Interests, Power and Influence, toldShafaq News that Iran now intends to project deterrence through its ownmilitary capabilities rather than relying mainly on regional allies. </p><p>Jason Campbell, also a senior fellow at the Middle EastInstitute, reads it the other way. With Lebanon's Hezbollah weakened, he said,Tehran is leaning more heavily on Yemen's Houthis and the Iraqi factions topreserve its influence. In this view, Iran has little reason to let itsstrongest Iraqi allies disarm.</p><p><a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Report/How-Iran-s-unity-of-fronts-strategy-is-changing-across-the-Middle-East" target="_blank"><em>Read more: How Iran&rsquo;s &lsquo;unity of fronts&rsquo; strategy is changing across the Middle East</em></a></p><p><strong>The Road To June</strong></p><p>Much of the substance will be settled in the legislationgoverning the PMF. On September 30, the cabinet approved a PMF <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq/Al-Zaidi-to-send-amended-PMF-bills-to-parliament-after-US-visit" target="_blank">bill</a> and sent itto parliament. Abu Turab al-Tamimi, a lawmaker from the Badr Organization, oneof the oldest Iran-aligned groups, with both a parliamentary bloc and brigadeswithin the PMF, told Shafaq News that talks run on two tracks: laws on thePMF's structure and its members' service, and a "sovereignty"<a href="https://www.shafaq.com/en/Iraq/Sovereignty-Law-gains-traction-within-Iraq-s-CF" target="_blank">proposal</a> under which factions would transfer their arsenals into the PMF ratherthan surrender them. </p><p>Senior Coordination Framework leaders have preferred todescribe the process as "regulating" <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq/Iraq-factions-near-weapons-deal-ahead-of-Sept-30" target="_blank">weapons</a> rather than disarmament,language intended to ease faction resistance. Critics say the formula wouldlegalize the weapons; supporters say it would bring them under state command.Abdul Qader al-Nayel, an Iraqi political researcher, warned that the bill couldentrench a dual structure in security decision-making, the arrangementAl-Hamidawi describes as normal.</p><p>The decisive date is therefore not June 2027 but the end ofthe truce, around the turn of the year. Until recently, it faced two risks: aUS strike or a faction attack. A third has since emerged. Concern over renewedUS-Iran fighting is growing, and on October 20, Baghdad ordered the Al-<a href="https://shafaq.com/en/society/Al-Sheeb-crossing-with-Iran-to-shut-over-technical-issues" target="_blank">Sheeb</a>crossing with Iran closed from the following morning until further notice,officially citing technical reasons.</p><p>Campbell described Washington's wider demand to seal theborder as unrealistic. Iraq serves as an economic outlet for Iran, he said, andclosing the frontier would require a complex military effort in areas whereIran-aligned factions hold influence on the ground. The border and thedisarmament plan now depend on the same actors. If war resumes, the factionswill not need to break the truce themselves to renew their case for keepingtheir weapons.</p><p><em>Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.</em></p>]]></description>
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      <title>Iraq’s Kurds confront a post-Coalition test</title>
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      <description><![CDATA[<?xml encoding="utf-8" ?><!--?xml encoding="utf-8" ?--><p><em>Shafaq News- OPINION</em></p><p><em>By Ali HusseinFeyli*</em></p><p>Kurdish concernsover Iraq&rsquo;s political and security landscape are not merely emotional ortemporary, but reflect a deeper sense of existential anxiety and a realisticassessment shaped by historical tragedy, the hard numbers, and harsh geographicrealities. Any observer viewing this equation from outside the Kurdistan Regionwill struggle to understand such concerns without examining the events thatcontinue to carry considerable weight in the Region&rsquo;s collective memory.</p><p>The politicalhistory of Iraq&rsquo;s Kurds is marked by a succession of broken promises andagreements that lacked effective guarantees. Kurdish experience has reinforceda belief that decision-making centers in Baghdad, regardless of the ideology ofthe ruling authority, tend to impose their dominance and retreat from previousunderstandings once they regain strength. </p><p>From the violationof the March 11, 1970 agreement to the 1975 Algiers Accord, followed by theAnfal campaign and the chemical attack on Halabja, these episodes have contributedto a political consciousness that views the absence of international guaranteesas a warning sign for Kurdish national gains. Written commitments, in thisview, remain vulnerable when they are not supported by a balance of power onthe ground.</p><p><a href="https://www.shafaq.com/en/Report/Kurdistan-Region-faces-air-defense-gap-as-US-troops-leave-Iraq" target="_blank"><em>Read more: Kurdistan Region faces air-defense gap as US troops leave Iraq</em></a></p><p>Despite thebitterness of this legacy, Kurdish leaders have continued to extend a handtoward peace and dialogue, particularly since 2003, when they helped build Iraq&rsquo;snew institutions and draft its Constitution, with figures such as KurdistanDemocratic Party (KDP) leader Masoud Barzani and former Iraqi President JalalTalabani playing central roles in bringing political forces together andbuilding national consensus.</p><p>Kurdistan RegionPresident Nechirvan Barzani&rsquo;s <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Kurdistan/President-Barzani-War-and-peace-decisions-belong-to-Iraqi-state" target="_blank">address</a> at Baghdad&rsquo;s &ldquo;Sovereignty Day&rdquo; ceremonyon Oct. 1, 2026, reflected the same approach, as he wore an Iraqi flag pin anddelivered a roughly seven-minute speech in Arabic aimed at Iraqis across thecountry rather than a specifically Kurdish audience.</p><p>On the securityfront, the departure of US-led Coalition forces could leave a vacuum throughwhich security threats may emerge. During the war against ISIS that began in2014, the Kurdistan Region lost more than 1,800 Peshmerga fighters and sawaround 10,000 others wounded along a frontline stretching more than 1,000kilometers.</p><p>Today, thosesecurity concerns overlap with continuing disputes over the Kurdistan Region&rsquo;sbudget and the deliberate obstruction of the full implementation of Article 140of the Iraqi Constitution. More than two decades after the Constitution wasadopted, leaving this obligation unresolved has reinforced Kurdish perceptionsthat a policy of imposing faits accomplis is taking precedence over legal andequitable solutions.</p><p>In the Kurdishpolitical consciousness, this obstruction goes beyond administrative failureand has become a threat that recalls policies of demographic change and theseizure of agricultural land, deepening doubts over commitment to the nationalsettlement on which post-2003 Iraq was built.</p><p><a href="https://www.shafaq.com/en/Report/The-evolution-of-Kurdish-power-in-Iraq-Governance-oil-and-constitutional-ambiguity" target="_blank"><em>Read more: The evolution of Kurdish power in Iraq</em></a></p><p>Another source ofconcern is the activity of armed groups operating outside the state and itsofficial chain of command. Such groups have targeted the Kurdistan Regiondozens of times as a means of military signaling and pressure, strikingeconomic infrastructure, airports and energy facilities with rockets anddrones, weakening the investment environment and disrupting Erbil&rsquo;s economicand political situation.</p><p>Internationalprotection therefore occupies an important place in Erbil&rsquo;s strategiccalculations as a security necessity at the current stage. Historically, suchinvolvement was not the result of a unilateral Kurdish decision: the policiesof Saddam Hussein&rsquo;s government prompted the international community toestablish a &ldquo;safe haven&rdquo; for the Kurds in 1991, while the Coalition formed in2014 entered Iraq at the formal request of the federal government in Baghdadand in partnership with Erbil. </p><p>Over the past twodecades, the international presence has also served as one factor in balancingexternal influence inside Iraq. As that military umbrella recedes, concerns aregrowing that internal pressure could converge with pressure from neighboringstates, particularly given the Kurdistan Region&rsquo;s geopolitical position as alandlocked territory.</p><p>Yet the experienceof international protection confronts the Kurdish leadership with a basicreality: external support shifts with changing interests and offers nopermanent guarantee, making its value dependent on the time it provides tobuild domestic safeguards, resolve disputes, and consolidate a constitutionalpartnership capable of enduring changes in international positions.</p><p>The other side ofthe dilemma is the transition of pressure from military threats to legal andfinancial restrictions, weakening the Kurdistan Region as a political entityand threatening to reduce it to a constrained local administration whilestripping Iraq&rsquo;s federal system of its constitutional substance. Such a coursewould undermine the principles of consensus and national partnership and openthe way for majority dominance.</p><p>At the same time,the Kurdistan Region bears responsibility for addressing its internal problemsand developing a more stable strategy for managing relations with Baghdad.Internal Kurdish divisions have weakened its ability to preserve the politicalweight it once held as a &ldquo;kingmaker&rdquo; and reduced its leverage in confronting anincreasingly uneven balance of power.</p><p>These concerns,however, do not amount to shirking national responsibility, nor are they a toolfor political maneuvering or an attempt to diminish Iraq&rsquo;s standing; rather, theyhighlight a test facing the country at a rare opportunity without external &ldquo;guardianship&rdquo;:whether sovereignty can become a guarantee for the security of all itscomponents and federalism can move from constitutional text to a genuinepartnership that protects rights and gives coexistence a stable foundation.</p><p><a href="https://www.shafaq.com/en/Report/Nearly-four-weeks-of-attacks-on-the-Kurdistan-Region-of-Iraq" target="_blank"><em>Read more: Nearly four weeks of attacks on the Kurdistan Region of Iraq</em></a></p><p><em>* Ali Hussein Feyli,Chairman of the Shafaq Foundation for Culture and Media and former member ofthe Kurdistan Region Parliament.</em></p><p><em>This article wasoriginally written in <a href="https://shafaq.com/ar/%D9%85%D9%82%D9%80%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81" target="_blank">Arabic</a>.</em></p>]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2026 06:59:18 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title>Exclusive: PJAK leader sets political terms for laying down arms</title>
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      <description><![CDATA[<?xml encoding="utf-8" ?><!--?xml encoding="utf-8" ?--><!--?xml encoding="utf-8" ?--><p><em>Shafaq News</em></p><p>Theco-leader of the Iranian Kurdish opposition Party of Free Life of Kurdistan(PJAK), Amir Karimi, has set no date for his party to give up its weapons, butsaid they would fall silent once Kurds in Iran can pursue their demands throughdemocratic politics and the law, within &ldquo;a decentralized, democratic andfederal Iran free of ethnic or religious domination.&rdquo;</p><p>In an exclusive interview with Shafaq News in Erbil, Karimi discussed Iran's future if the IslamicRepublic falls, the party's ties with foreign powers, the prospect of a newmilitary confrontation, and its relations with Baghdad and Erbil. He insistedthe party is independent and denied receiving support from the United States orany other foreign power, while saying it has the right to diplomatic relationswith any party.</p><p>His remarkscome at a sensitive time for Iranian Kurdish opposition groups, which face twoparallel challenges: securing a place in any change of power in Tehran, andmounting security pressure on their headquarters in the Kurdistan Region ofIraq, where their sites have come under repeated missile and drone attacks inrecent months.</p><p><strong>A FederalIran</strong></p><p>Karimi doesnot envision simply rebuilding a centralized state under different leadership."Our project for the Iran of the future is to establish a decentralizeddemocratic Republic of Iran," he said, with power distributed through afederal system based on the will of the population and direct democracy inlocal government.</p><p>He framedthe project as a matter of self-determination, a principle he said the partiesin the coalition of Iranian Kurdish groups had adopted unanimously. </p><p>Askedwhether that right could ultimately lead to independence, Karimi did not ruleout secession outright, but said the party was ready to accept a united Iran ifnational identity were redefined and the rights of its peoples guaranteed in anew constitution.</p><p>"Iranianidentity needs to be redefined so that all identities can find themselves init," he said, adding that the legitimacy of any future state would dependon the free participation of its communities and guarantees of self-government,women's rights, and freedom of organization and expression, without ethnic orreligious discrimination. &ldquo;An Iran that meets those conditions will be a commonhomeland for all the diversity within Iran's geography.&rdquo; </p><p>The visionis not limited to Kurds, Karimi said, but extends to Arabs, Baluch, Azeris andIran's other ethnic and religious communities, each sharing in running thecountry while keeping the right to govern itself. The Kurdish issue, in hisview, is less an ethnic conflict than the result of an absence of democracy andthe dominance of a centralized nation-state, and solving it depends on changingthe nature of Iran's political system.</p><p><a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Security/Baghdad-Tehran-step-up-coordination-on-Iranian-armed-groups-in-Kurdistan"><em>Read more:&nbsp;Baghdad, Tehran step up coordination on Iranian armed groups in Kurdistan</em></a></p><p><strong>Weapons AsSelf-Defense</strong></p><p>The futureof PJAK's armed wing has drawn new attention since the Kurdistan Workers' Party(PKK), with which it has historically shared ideological and organizationalties, announced in May 2025 that it was dissolving and ending its armedstruggle against Turkiye. Karimi rejected any automatic link. "The PKKmakes its own decisions, and PJAK's decisions are made by our leadership,"he said, stressing that his party does not adopt armed struggle as a strategyfor national liberation in the manner of 20th-century movements.</p><p>The Kurdishcause in Iran is political at its core and needs a political settlement, Karimisaid, but Iranian authorities treat Kurdish demands as a security and militarymatter, which he said makes self-defense necessary in the face of repression.</p><p>"Forus, weapons are not a strategy but a means of self-defense," he said. &ldquo;Thereal problem is not that Kurds carry arms, but the absence of political andlegal channels to address their demands.&rdquo;</p><p>"Wheneverdemocratic politics and the law become the main mechanism for resolving ourpeople's cause, the weapons will fall silent and will no longer beneeded," Karimi said, without offering a timetable or specific mechanismfor moving from armed activity to politics.</p><p><a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Kurdistan/Iranian-Kurdish-opposition-rejects-disarmament-in-Iraq"><em>Read more:&nbsp;Iranian Kurdish opposition rejects disarmament in Iraq</em></a></p><p><strong>WashingtonAnd Israel</strong></p><p>Karimidenied that his party had received aid or support from any party, including theUnited States. "We have the right to have diplomatic dealings with anypower or party," he said, but drew a line between political relations anddependence on outside powers. "We are an independent movement, and wemaintain that independence."</p><p>Any foreignrelations, he said, must be measured against the rights and interests of theKurdish people and the future of democracy in Iran. </p><p>Asked aboutpossible contacts with Israel, Karimi did not say directly whether any channelsexist, stressing only the party's right to deal diplomatically with variousparties out of &ldquo;political realism rather than ideology.&rdquo;</p><p>He alsodeclined to commit in advance to joining any new war between Iran and theUnited States or Israel. PJAK is present and active inside Iran and is notwaiting for any foreign power to open the way, he said. "We don't needanyone to make room for us. We create our own opportunity." The party willact "wherever and whenever it is needed for freedom and to protect theexistence of the people," he added, describing its fight as "a warthat is ours and for us."</p><p><strong>TestingKurdish Unity</strong></p><p>In <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Middle-East/Iranian-Kurdish-parties-form-new-political-alliance" target="_blank">February</a>2026, five Iranian Kurdish parties announced the Coalition of Political Forcesof Iranian Kurdistan: PJAK, the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI),the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK), the Khabat Organization of IranianKurdistan, and the Kurdistan Toilers Association (Komala)</p><p>Karimidescribed the coalition as the product of a shared reading of opportunities andrisks but said that was not enough to hold it together. "We should notunite only based on shared opportunities or risks," he said, calling for asolid political program and deep dialogue on the parties' roles and strategy.&ldquo;Their ideological and political differences should remain but serve as groundsfor dialogue rather than exclusion. &ldquo;</p><p>He calledthe coalition "a special experience and a training ground fordemocracy" that he hopes could serve as a model for Iran after anypolitical transition.</p><p><strong>Baghdad andErbil</strong></p><p>The presenceof Iranian Kurdish opposition groups in the Kurdistan Region has long been asensitive issue between Baghdad and Tehran. In March 2023, Iraq and Iran signeda security agreement on border control and preventing Iraqi territory frombeing used for attacks on neighboring countries. In September that year,Baghdad said it had moved the groups away from the border, ahead of treatingtheir members as civilians. Tehran has continued to demand that they bedisarmed, and a joint high-level security committee discussed the issue againin May 2026.</p><p>Severalheadquarters of Iranian Kurdish parties in Erbil and Al-Sulaymaniyah have beenattacked this year, and Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has<a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Middle-East/Iran-claims-responsibility-for-strikes-on-Kurdish-opposition-in-Iraqi-Kurdistan" target="_blank">claimed</a> some of the strikes. Political sources told Shafaq News on Wednesdaythat Iraqi leaders are discussing a proposal to move the groups out of theKurdistan Region to a center elsewhere in Iraq, with <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq/Source-Iraq-weighs-moving-Iranian-Kurdish-groups-to-Al-Muthanna" target="_blank">Al-Muthanna</a> province inthe south among the options.</p><p>Karimi saidthat his party has never used Iraqi territory for operations against Iran andhas had no disputes with either Iraqi authority. "Over 22 years of ourstruggle, we have had no problem with either the Kurdistan Regional Governmentor the Iraqi government," he said, adding that the party's forces andmembers are based and active inside Iran. "We have never used Iraqiterritory for activities against the Islamic Republic."</p><p><a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Iraqi-Iranian-Security-MoU-rekindles-a-decade-of-border-deals-and-old-controversies"><em>Read more:&nbsp;Iraqi&ndash;Iranian Security MoU rekindles a decade of border deals&mdash;and old controversies</em></a></p><p><strong>After theIslamic Republic</strong></p><p>Toppling theIslamic Republic of Iran alone is not enough, Karimi warned, if the rules ofgovernance are not rewritten, as a new government could reproduce political andethnic domination in a different form. "No group or identity should beallowed to impose its dominance for any reason," he said, calling forpublic and local administration to rest on councils and institutions so that noindividual or group can monopolize power.</p><p>He alsorejected what he called a "dictatorship of the majority," calling forconstitutional and legal guarantees to protect minorities even under ademocratic electoral system. In such a system, he said, his party would seeitself as part of the political process "whatever the electionresults."</p><p>Karimiacknowledged that his party also fears that rivalry between ethnic groups andarmed parties could turn into a new conflict if the Islamic Republic'sinstitutions collapse. &ldquo;Iran's ethnic and religious diversity is a source ofrichness, but could become a source of conflict if combined with extremenationalism, religious extremism and a weak culture of dialogue, especially ifforeign powers exploit the divisions.&rdquo;</p><p>For thatreason, he urged that a new social contract be negotiated before any transferof power rather than after the fall of the government, pointing to his party'srole in the Free Congress for Iran, a front with pro-democracy Iranian forcesthat &ldquo;allows such disputed questions to be discussed.&rdquo;</p><p>Founded in 2004, PJAK is one of the main IranianKurdish groups opposed to Tehran. It follows the doctrine of "democraticconfederalism" developed by PKK founder Abdullah Ocalan, and its armedwing has fought intermittent clashes with Iranian forces, particularly theRevolutionary Guards, from bases historically in the Qandil mountains on theIraq-Iran border. Tehran accuses it of armed activity against the state, andthe US Treasury designated PJAK in 2009 under</p><p><a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Kurdistan/Interior-Minister-Attacks-target-KRI-from-all-sides"><em>Read more: Interior Minister: Attacks target KRI from all sides</em></a></p>]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 21 Oct 2026 12:35:25 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title>ISIS attacks in Kirkuk test Iraq's post-coalition security</title>
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      <description><![CDATA[<?xml encoding="utf-8" ?><p><em>Shafaq News</em></p><p>A series of ISISattacks in and around Kirkuk between October 5 and 14 has renewed concern overthe ability of small cells to exploit rugged terrain and gaps between Iraqiforces, in the first weeks after the US-led Coalition ended its militarymission in Iraq.</p><p>The incidents rangedfrom armed attacks on security positions and surveillance equipment to roadsidebombings. On October 5, militants attacked a Federal Police position in Hawijadistrict, southwest of Kirkuk, killing <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Security/Kirkuk-ISIS-kills-Federal-Police-officer" target="_blank">one</a> officer and wounding four. The nextday, they hit a Popular Mobilization Forces (<a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Report/ISIS-hits-Iraqi-night-surveillance-twice-in-24-hours-in-Kirkuk-s-Hawija" target="_blank">PMF</a>) position in the same village.Both times, they went after thermal cameras.</p><p>The deadliest cameon <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Security/Kirkuk-roadside-bomb-kills-three-Iraqi-soldiers" target="_blank">October 14</a>, when a roadside bomb struck troops inspecting the site of anIraqi airstrike on ISIS hideouts in Wadi Zghaitoun, southern Kirkuk. It killedBrig. Gen. Ahat Yasser Khudair Hussein, communications chief of the army's 11thInfantry Division, and two soldiers. Iraqi forces have responded with searchoperations and airstrikes against suspected ISIS hideouts.</p><p><strong>Weakened, NotDefeated</strong></p><p>ISIS has not beenfully eliminated, but it is at its weakest since 2014 and lacks the militaryand financial means to seize territory or rebuild its so-called caliphate,according to Lt. Gen. Jabbar Yawar, the Kurdistan Region's adviser on militaryand security affairs and a former secretary-general of the Ministry ofPeshmerga Affairs.</p><p>Since 2017, mostISIS attacks have been concentrated in Diyala, Saladin and Kirkuk, Yawar toldShafaq News, carried out by small cells of three to five members who use theirknowledge of the area to stage ambushes, bombings and kidnappings beforedisappearing. &ldquo;Such attacks demand vigilance and stronger intelligence work,but do not show that the group can regain its former influence, given theimproved capabilities of Iraqi and Peshmerga forces and the changes in Iraq andSyria.&rdquo;</p><p><strong>Calls foraccountability</strong></p><p>Ahmed Dagheral-Moussawi, a member of the Iraqi parliament's security and defense committee,said the repeated attacks are "a serious security indicator" thatrequires a review of security and intelligence plans and of the performance ofmilitary commanders.</p><p>ISIS is trying tosend a message that it still exists, al-Moussawi told Shafaq News. He calledfor commanders to be held accountable for any breach that went undetected orthat exposed a misjudgment of the situation, and for the attacks to beinvestigated. Parliament, he said, should summon the commanders responsible,demand detailed reports on the breaches and set deadlines for carrying outsecurity recommendations.</p><p><strong>Where The CellsOperate</strong></p><p>Most of the attackshave been concentrated in specific areas, particularly southwest of Kirkuk,where ISIS has been active before, according to security expert Sarmadal-Bayati. Their proximity to the lines dividing federal and Kurdistan Regionforces (Peshmerga) lets the group exploit the complexity of the securitydeployment, he said, while rugged and wooded terrain offers places to hide andmove.</p><p>ISIS's remainingnumbers are too small to hold ground but large enough to inflict harm on forcesdeployed there, al-Bayati said. He called for more search operations and dronesurveillance, especially over valleys, reed beds and high ground that are hardto watch continuously.</p><p><strong>A Battle OfIntelligence</strong></p><p>Security expertMukhled al-Darb said ISIS remnants near Kirkuk were exploiting "weakspots" in areas that, according to him, had previously benefited fromCoalition aerial surveillance before the military mission ended on September30. He warned against reading the attacks as a return to the group's formerstrength, saying its &ldquo;era of controlling territory is over.&rdquo;</p><p>Iraq now needs toreorganize its intelligence work after the coalition's exit, expanding itssources, stepping up surveillance and setting ambushes to detect militantsbefore they reach their targets, al-Darb said, adding that the Iraqi forceshave plans to pursue ISIS and their ground readiness is high, but the currentfight "is a battle of intelligence and security, not a militaryconfrontation" in the traditional sense. </p><p>&ldquo;Iraqi aircraftcould partly make up for the US-led Coalition's surveillance, though the airforce's readiness still needs to be completed.&rdquo;</p><p><strong>Testing The Response</strong></p><p>Retired Maj. Gen.Jawad al-Dahlaki said Kirkuk, areas north of the Hamrin Mountains and Al-Azim,and the routes linking them to border areas give ISIS room to move and maintainsupply lines. He explained that cells travel along the Zab, near Kirkuk andErbil, through the al-Dibis and Kuwair junctions and along the Kirkuk&ndash;Azimaxis, taking advantage of difficult terrain and areas too vast to garrisonpermanently.</p><p>Iraq has not eliminatedall ISIS cells since 2017, al-Dahlaki said, and their members' knowledge of theareas where they operate remains one of the biggest challenges. &ldquo;Some of therecent attacks may be attempts to test how quickly Iraqi forces respond andwith what firepower, ahead of a change in tactics or targets,&rdquo; he said, warningthat attacks could increase in the coming period as the group takes advantageof weather and hard-to-reach terrain.</p><p>He called for betterintelligence-gathering, including surveillance and interception, to locatecells and track their routes before they reach their targets.</p><p><a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Discover-Iraq-Kirkuk-a-city-of-oil-culture-and-conflict" target="_blank"><em>Read more:&nbsp;Discover Iraq: Kirkuk, a city of oil, culture, and conflict</em></a></p>]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 21 Oct 2026 09:31:41 +0000</pubDate>
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      <link>https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Discover-Iraq-Nineveh-rebuilds-its-heritage-and-future</link>
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      <title>Discover Iraq: Nineveh rebuilds its heritage and future</title>
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      <description><![CDATA[<?xml encoding="utf-8" ?><p><em>Shafaq News</em></p><p>From ancient Assyrian heritage and Mosul's post-ISISreconstruction to Sinjar's displaced communities and a recovering economy,Nineveh embodies both Iraq's extraordinary past and the challenges shaping itsfuture.</p><p>Nineveh has long stood at the crossroads of Iraq's history,culture, and identity. The province takes its name from the ancient city ofNineveh, which became the capital of the Neo-Assyrian Empire and ranked amongthe largest cities of the ancient world.</p><p>Today, the province presents striking contrasts. <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/society/Mosul-Municipality-prepares-to-raemove-ISIS-era-barrier" target="_blank">Mosul</a>, itscapital and one of Iraq's largest cities, has regained much of its urban lifedespite the scars of war, while the surrounding plains remain among thecountry's important agricultural areas. To the west, Sinjar continues tostruggle with the legacy of the ISIS genocide against the Yazidis and years ofdisplacement, political disputes, and slow reconstruction.</p><p>Across the province, ancient heritage exists alongside thecontinuing effort to rebuild communities devastated by conflict.<img src="https://media.shafaq.com/media/arcella/1792414087634.webp"></p><p><strong>Legacy and People</strong></p><p>Ancient Nineveh reached its height as the capital of theNeo-Assyrian Empire in the seventh century BCE. Archaeological sites includingKuyunjik and the remains of royal palaces associated with rulers such asSennacherib and Ashurbanipal testify to a civilization known for itsadministrative organization, military power, monumental architecture, andcultural achievements.</p><p>The remains of the ancient city's walls and gates stillstand alongside modern Mosul, connecting the contemporary provincial capital toa history stretching back thousands of years.</p><p>That heritage suffered another destructive chapter afterISIS seized Mosul and large parts of Nineveh in 2014. The occupation andsubsequent military campaign caused mass displacement, widespread destruction,and extensive damage to religious, cultural, and archaeological sites. Iraqiforces declared Mosul liberated in July 2017, but reconstruction and the returnof displaced communities have continued for years.</p><p>Nineveh remains one of Iraq's most ethnically andreligiously diverse provinces. Its population includes Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen,Shabak, Yazidis, Assyrians and other Christian communities, alongside smallerminorities. The province also includes Sunni and Shia Muslim communities aswell as Christians, Yazidis and other religious minorities, with manycommunities concentrated in particular towns and districts.</p><p>Arabic is widely spoken, alongside Kurdish, Syriac, Turkmen,and <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq/Shabak-raise-home-demolition-fears-in-Nineveh-amid-enforcement-hurdles" target="_blank">Shabaki</a>, reflecting a social landscape shaped by centuries of migration,coexistence and conflict.</p><p>Dr. Layla Salih, head of the Nineveh Antiquities Section,told Shafaq News that the province's diversity remains central to its identity."The diversity of Nineveh is both its strength and its challenge. It iswhat allows the province to survive and rebuild, even after devastatingconflicts," she said.</p><p><a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Nineveh-Council-lifts-building-restrictions-on-Mosul-outskirts-amid-demographic-dispute" target="_blank"><em>Read more: Nineveh Council lifts building restrictions on Mosul outskirts amid demographic dispute.</em></a></p><p><strong>Land and Lifelines</strong></p><p>Nineveh stretches from the Tigris River valley and theNineveh Plains to the Sinjar Mountains in the west. It borders the KurdistanRegion and Syria and has for centuries served as a corridor for trade,migration and cultural exchange.</p><p>Its geography also shapes its economy. The plains producewheat, barley, vegetables, and other crops, while livestock farming remainsimportant in rural areas. Successive years of <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/society/Desertification-swallows-55-of-Iraq-s-territory%20" target="_blank">drought</a>, declining rainfall andwider water shortages across Iraq have placed increasing pressure onagricultural communities and forced farmers to adapt to more difficultconditions.</p><p>The province also contains significant energy and mineralresources. The Qayyarah oil field south of Mosul returned to production aftersuffering extensive damage during the war against ISIS, while limestone, gypsumand sulfur deposits support construction and other industries.</p><p>The Mosul Dam on the Tigris, Iraq's largest dam, remainsvital to water management, irrigation and electricity generation. Its operationrequires continued monitoring and maintenance because of longstandinggeological challenges beneath its foundations.</p><p><strong>Work and Recovery</strong></p><p>Agriculture remains an important source of employment andincome across Nineveh, particularly in the fertile plains surrounding Mosul.Wheat and barley dominate much of the cultivated land, alongside vegetables,orchards, and livestock.</p><p>Industry is another part of the province's recovery. TheQayyarah oil field remains an important energy asset, while cement, foodprocessing and other industries provide employment. In Mosul's Old City,workshops and small businesses have also returned as neighborhoods damagedduring the fighting are rebuilt.</p><p>Trade has gradually recovered as markets and commercialactivity have returned across Mosul. New roads, rebuilt bridges and therestoration of Mosul International Airport have improved connectivity afteryears of war-related disruption.</p><p>The airport was formally inaugurated after reconstruction inJuly 2025, and domestic commercial flights resumed that November. Its firstinternational flight since reopening departed for Medina, Saudi Arabia, inJanuary 2026. Full operations, however, have continued to face licensing andtechnical requirements.</p><p><a href="https://shafaq.com/en/society/Iraq-unemployment-surpasses-15-in-2025" target="_blank">Unemployment</a>, particularly among young people and returnees,continues to challenge a province where years of conflict destroyed businesses,disrupted education and displaced large parts of the workforce.</p><p>"Jobs are still scarce, and the scars of the pastoccupation linger. Sustainable diversification is essential to prevent renewedinstability," Mosul-based economist Jamal Shafiq told Shafaq News.<img src="https://media.shafaq.com/media/arcella/1792414087221.webp"></p><p><strong>Sinjar's Unfinished Recovery</strong></p><p>No account of Nineveh's recovery is complete without Sinjar.</p><p>In August 2014, ISIS attacked the predominantly Yazididistrict, carrying out mass killings, abductions, and enslavement in atrocitiesrecognized by the United Nations and several governments as genocide. More thana decade later, thousands of families remain displaced, and many Yazidis arestill searching for relatives who disappeared during the assault.</p><p>Return efforts have continued. In 2026, hundreds of familiesregistered or prepared to leave displacement camps in Duhok and return toSinjar with assistance from Iraqi authorities and the InternationalOrganization for Migration. But homes and infrastructure still requirereconstruction, while security and administrative disputes have complicatedefforts to restore normal life. The 2020 Sinjar Agreement between Baghdad andthe Kurdistan Regional Government was intended to address security,administration, and reconstruction, but its implementation remains incomplete.</p><p>The result is one of Nineveh's sharpest contrasts: whileMosul has seen visible reconstruction and the restoration of major landmarks,many families from Sinjar are still waiting for the conditions that would allowthem to return permanently.</p><p><a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Report/The-long-shadow-of-Sinjar-Twelve-years-after-the-ISIS-genocide" target="_blank"><em>Read more: The long shadow of Sinjar: Twelve years after the ISIS genocide<img src="https://media.shafaq.com/media/arcella/1792414086577.webp"></em></a></p><p><strong>Spirit and Heritage</strong></p><p>Mosul's Old City offers one of the clearest signs ofNineveh's recovery.</p><p>Much of the historic district was devastated during ISIS'soccupation and the battle to retake the city. Since 2018, UNESCO's Revive theSpirit of Mosul initiative, supported by Iraq and international partners, hasundertaken one of the largest cultural reconstruction programs in the city'smodern history.</p><p>The Al-Nouri Mosque and its Al-Hadba Minaret, the Convent ofOur Lady of the Hour, and Al-Tahera Church were rebuilt, while the projectrehabilitated 124 heritage houses. UNESCO also rehabilitated 404 classrooms andsupported cultural, educational, and vocational programs as part of theinitiative.</p><p>UNESCO has framed the initiative as more than physicalreconstruction, linking the restoration of heritage to cultural recovery,education, and social cohesion.<img src="https://media.shafaq.com/media/arcella/1792414086948.webp"></p><p>Music, poetry, visual arts and traditional crafts, includingweaving, woodwork and metalwork, have returned to public life as Mosul'scultural scene recovers. Religious and cultural observances, including theYazidi New Year in Lalish, Christian Easter celebrations and Islamic Eidholidays, remain important markers of Nineveh's diverse social life.</p><p>Meanwhile, education is both a casualty of war and afoundation for recovery. The University of Mosul has also continued itsrecovery, with damaged facilities restored and academic life revived. UNESCOhas supported the rehabilitation and modernization of its Central Library,providing digital equipment, preservation systems, and training for librarystaff.</p><p>Yet resources are still tight, and many students bearpsychological wounds. Wafaa al-Zubaidi, a primary school teacher in the OldCity, told Shafaq News, "It is not just about teaching; it is abouthealing the minds of children who have lived through destruction."</p><p><a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Beyond-the-ruins-Rediscovering-Mosul-s-spirit" target="_blank"><em>Read more: Beyond the ruins: Rediscovering Mosul&rsquo;s spirit</em></a></p><p><em>Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.<img src="https://media.shafaq.com/media/arcella/1792414087185.webp"></em></p>]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 19 Oct 2026 13:26:43 +0000</pubDate>
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      <link>https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Nechirvan-Barzani-and-the-challenges-of-political-dialogue</link>
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      <title>Nechirvan Barzani and the challenges of political dialogue</title>
      <enclosure url="https://media.shafaq.com/media/arcella/1726153937501.jpeg"/>
      <category><![CDATA[In-Depth]]></category>
      <description><![CDATA[<?xml encoding="utf-8" ?><!--?xml encoding="utf-8" ?--><!--?xml encoding="utf-8" ?--><p><em>Shafaq News</em></p><p><em>By Bakhtiar Sadjadi, University Professor and Cultural Critic</em></p><p>Nechirvan Barzani&rsquo;s political career is often cited through the language of stability, development, negotiation, and regional diplomacy. These themes are in close association and thoroughly connected. Economic development requires a measure of security; security is difficult to sustain without political understanding; and political understanding becomes harder to achieve when communication gives way to confrontation. In a region marked by numerous conflicts, competing national projects, and the concerns of powerful external actors, Barzani has built much of his public identity around the belief that political problems must be addressed through communication and practical compromise.</p><p>This approach should not be understood as a claim that dialogue can resolve every dispute or that Barzani&rsquo;s political record is beyond criticism. Relations between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the federal government in Baghdad remain complicated, regional tensions continue to shape Kurdish politics, and questions about governance, party influence, and democratic accountability remain important. Supporters argue that Barzani&rsquo;s willingness to maintain channels of communication, including with actors with whom he might disagree, has helped preserve opportunities for political solutions. This emphasis on dialogue is also reflected in Barzani&rsquo;s own words: &ldquo;Iraq&rsquo;s strength lies in addressing issues through dialogue and understanding&rdquo; (Presidency of the Kurdistan Region, 2026a). Critics, however, ask whether diplomacy has produced enough concrete progress and whether the same commitment to dialogue is always reflected in domestic political life.</p><p>The controversy that followed the MERI Forum provides a significant reason to further examine these questions. The discussion was not simply about one event or its guest list; it raised a wider issue about representation and inclusion. If dialogue is presented as a central political principle, how should that principle be applied when Kurdish parties or political voices believe they have been overlooked? This essay considers Barzani&rsquo;s central role in Kurdish diplomatic affairs while treating the MERI Forum episode as a turning point for examining the relationship between dialogue abroad and inclusion at home.</p><p><strong>1. Nechirvan Barzani&rsquo;s Approach to Diplomacy</strong></p><p>Dialogue is sometimes portrayed as a soft alternative to political power. In a region as complex as the Middle East, however, it can be a demanding form of political work. It requires leaders to keep channels open when public opinion is angry, to recognize that opponents have interests that cannot simply be dismissed, and to seek agreements that may not satisfy every constituency. Barzani&rsquo;s diplomatic style rests on the premise that political differences are rarely resolved by refusing to speak to those who hold opposing positions. Even when negotiations do not produce a complete settlement, continued contact can reduce misunderstandings and leave room for future agreement.</p><p>His relationships with political leaders in Baghdad, Ankara, Tehran, Western capitals, and the Persian Gulf countries have helped him present the Kurdistan Region as a place capable of communicating across competing interests. Such relationships can be useful to a region whose geography and political circumstances make isolation difficult. They can create opportunities to explain Kurdish concerns, seek support, and manage tensions before they develop into larger crises. Yet diplomatic access should not be confused with mediation in every dispute, nor should the ability to meet influential figures automatically be treated as proof of successful conflict resolution.</p><p>The strongest case for Barzani&rsquo;s method is therefore not that conversation alone can overcome every conflict, but that sustained engagement gives political actors a better chance of managing disagreements without violence or permanent rupture. Barzani expressed this principle directly in August 2026, stating that &ldquo;peace and dialogue are the best options, and that the era for arms and military solutions has come to an end&rdquo; (Presidency of the Kurdistan Region, 2026b). Its limitations are equally important. Dialogue must be accompanied by clear commitments, institutional follow-through, and accountability. Without these, it can become a performance rather than a means of resolving problems. The relevant question is not simply whether meetings take place, but whether they help produce practical outcomes and whether the people affected by political decisions have a meaningful voice in the process.</p><p>This distinction is central to assessing Barzani&rsquo;s diplomacy. Maintaining relations with different governments is a strategic necessity; however, the credibility of a dialogue-based approach also depends on how it faces disagreements within Kurdish society. Recognizing that tension makes it possible to assess his diplomatic record without either idealizing it or dismissing its potential value.</p><p><strong>2. Baghdad and the Significance of Political Partnership</strong></p><p>Relations between Baghdad and Erbil have long been among the most difficult challenges facing Iraqi politics. Disputes over the federal budget, oil and gas, disputed territories, border administration, security, and the interpretation of the Iraqi Constitution have repeatedly strained relations between the Kurdistan Region and the federal government. Nechirvan Barzani has generally sought to address these disagreements through negotiation rather than confrontation. His approach reflects the understanding that neither side can secure lasting political stability by ignoring the other&rsquo;s interests.</p><p>A significant recent moment in this relationship came with Barzani&rsquo;s presence in Baghdad at a ceremony marking the conclusion of the Coalition&rsquo;s military mission in Iraq, where he delivered a speech in Arabic. The appearance carried significance beyond the occasion itself. It was for the first time in a formal event that he presented his ideas in Arabic. His remarks were framed around the importance of Iraq strengthening its sovereignty and developing confidence in its own institutions. The broader point was that Iraq should be able to manage its affairs and determine its future through its own political institutions, while continuing to engage constructively with international partners where necessary.</p><p><em><a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Report/The-mediator-in-the-room-President-Barzani-comes-to-Baghdad-with-more-than-Erbil-s-demands" target="_blank">Read more: The mediator in the room: President Barzani</a></em></p><p>This perspective has direct implications for relations between Baghdad and Erbil. A stable Iraq requires a workable partnership between the federal government and the Kurdistan Region, grounded in the Constitution, mutual respect, and a willingness to negotiate unresolved questions. At the MERI Forum in 2023, he put the point succinctly: &ldquo;The solution to our problems is in Baghdad and nowhere else&rdquo; (Presidency of the Kurdistan Region, 2023). Strengthening Iraq as a whole need not come at the expense of Kurdish rights or the Kurdistan Region&rsquo;s constitutional status. On the contrary, cooperation between Baghdad and Erbil is essential to the country&rsquo;s long-term stability, particularly when disagreements over resources, authority, and security are handled through political engagement rather than threats or unilateral action.</p><p>At the same time, dialogue alone cannot resolve disputes when commitments are not followed by practical measures. Critics may reasonably ask whether negotiations have delivered sufficient progress on budget payments, the management of natural resources, and other longstanding questions. The alternative including allowing disagreements to deepen without sustained communication, carries further serious risks. Barzani&rsquo;s continued engagement with Baghdad is best understood not as evidence that all differences have been overcome, but as a conviction that negotiation remains indispensable to a more stable relationship between the Kurdistan Region and the Iraqi state.</p><p><strong>3. Turkey: Supporting a Political Settlement</strong></p><p>Turkey represents one of the most sensitive dimensions of Barzani&rsquo;s regional diplomacy. The conflict involving the Kurdistan Workers&rsquo; Party (PKK) has shaped Kurdish politics and regional security for decades. It has affected communities on both sides of the border, influenced relations between Ankara and Kurdish political actors, and complicated the position of the Kurdistan Region. For leaders in Erbil, the challenge has been to protect the region&rsquo;s interests while avoiding a wider confrontation with Turkey, an important neighbor and economic partner.</p><p>Barzani&rsquo;s approach has generally emphasized communication, restraint, and support for political efforts that could reduce the human and security costs of conflict. In a meeting with an Imrali delegation in February 2025, he reiterated that &ldquo;we have consistently advocated for the peace process and the resolution of issues through dialogue,&rdquo; adding that history shows &ldquo;conflict and violence do not resolve disputes&rdquo; (Presidency of the Kurdistan Region, 2025a). Backing dialogue does not erase the difficult questions surrounding the PKK, Turkey&rsquo;s security concerns, or the rights and political aspirations of Kurdish communities. Nor does it guarantee that negotiations will succeed. Peace processes can stall, trust can be lost, and political leaders may face pressure from constituencies that regard compromise as a concession. Nevertheless, a negotiated process offers a possibility that military confrontation alone cannot provide: a way to address underlying political grievances and reduce the likelihood of further suffering.</p><p><em><a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Nechirvan-Barzani-The-Man-with-the-Map" target="_blank">Read more: Nechirvan Barzani: The Man with the Map</a></em></p><p>The Kurdistan Region must also navigate its own security and economic interests. Its relationship with Turkey has been significant for trade, investment, and energy exports, while military operations connected to the conflict have imposed costs on border communities. A policy of dialogue is therefore both a political principle and a practical necessity. It seeks to preserve relations with a powerful neighbour without treating security concerns as the only questions that matter. Its success, however, depends on whether the parties involved are prepared to move beyond statements and take verifiable steps toward a more durable settlement.</p><p>Turkey has a decisive level in Nechirvan Barzani&rsquo;s diplomatic practice. Maintaining communication can help prevent misunderstandings and preserve opportunities for negotiation; however, constructive relations with Ankara do not automatically resolve the underlying Kurdish question. The measure of diplomacy is not simply whether relations remain cordial, but whether political engagement contributes to a reduction in violence and creates space for a more lasting settlement.</p><p><strong>4. Syria: The Challenge of Kurdish Representation</strong></p><p>Syria presents a different but equally important test for Kurdish diplomacy. The conflict has displaced millions of people, weakened state institutions, and drawn regional and international powers into overlapping struggles. Kurdish political actors in Syria have sought recognition, security, and a meaningful role in the country&rsquo;s future, while neighboring states have viewed some developments through the lens of their own security concerns. In this environment, a durable political settlement will require more than a military balance. It will depend on constitutional arrangements, protection for communities, and a political process capable of accommodating Syria&rsquo;s diversity.</p><p>Barzani&rsquo;s public emphasis on dialogue and political inclusion provides a framework for approaching this challenge. His position and relationships in the Kurdistan Region give him opportunities to encourage communication among Syrian Kurdish actors and to support efforts to ensure that Kurdish concerns are heard in discussions about Syria&rsquo;s future. Such engagement matters because questions of decentralization, constitutional protection, political participation, and the future governance of Kurdish-populated areas cannot be resolved sustainably if relevant political constituencies are excluded. At the same time, Syria&rsquo;s circumstances differ from those of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, and its future cannot simply be modelled on the Iraqi Kurdish experience.</p><p>An important part of this discussion concerns the Kurdish National Council in Syria, commonly known by its Kurdish acronym ENKS, a Kurdish political umbrella representing a distinct current within Syrian Kurdish politics. Its political identity and relationships differ from those of other Kurdish forces, and its participation matters because Syrian Kurdish society is not politically uniform. Any serious effort to develop a broadly accepted Kurdish position on Syria&rsquo;s future must recognize these differences and provide room for competing political organizations to take part.</p><p>Barzani&rsquo;s efforts to encourage dialogue among Syrian Kurdish actors should therefore be assessed in terms of whether they help create conditions for meaningful participation. This emphasis also appears in the Presidency&rsquo;s account of his June 2026 meeting with ENKS, which said that he &ldquo;highlighted the influential role of ENKS&rdquo; and stressed &ldquo;the importance of ongoing dialogue and understanding among all Kurdish factions&rdquo; (Presidency of the Kurdistan Region, 2026c). The objective should not merely be to bring representatives together for meetings, but to make dialogue substantial enough that disagreements can be addressed and common positions can emerge where possible. Such efforts are especially important when divisions among Kurdish parties risk weakening their ability to influence discussions about Syria&rsquo;s future. Dialogue among Kurdish actors and dialogue with Damascus are connected: a representative Kurdish position is more likely to carry weight when it reflects a genuine process of consultation and debate.</p><p>At the same time, critics argue that ENKS has been neglected or has not received sufficient inclusion in the political discourse surrounding the Syrian Kurds. This concern deserves consideration rather than dismissal. If a process is presented as an effort to promote Kurdish dialogue but an important political organization believes its voice has been marginalized, questions naturally arise about the breadth of representation and the steadiness of the process. The existence of dialogue initiatives alone does not establish that all relevant parties have been included on equal or satisfactory terms.</p><p>It is important to distinguish between encouraging dialogue in principle and ensuring inclusive representation in practice. Barzani&rsquo;s efforts to promote communication among Syrian Kurdish actors may contribute to a more constructive political environment, but their effectiveness must also be evaluated. The broader lesson is that Kurdish political unity cannot be established simply by asking different organizations to cooperate. It requires recognition of their distinct political identities, a willingness to address disagreements, and a process that participants regard as sufficiently fair and representative. For Barzani, the challenge is not only to encourage dialogue between Syrian Kurdish actors and Damascus, but also to help create the conditions for dialogue among the Syrian Kurds themselves. The credibility of this effort will depend in part on whether ENKS can participate meaningfully in shaping the outcome.</p><p><strong>5. Iran: The Difficult Test of Barzani&rsquo;s Diplomacy</strong></p><p>Relations with Iran present a particularly delicate challenge for the Kurdistan Region. Geography, trade, shared borders, and long-standing political connections make engagement with Tehran unavoidable, while regional rivalries and security concerns can place Erbil in a difficult position. The Kurdistan Region must maintain workable relations with Iran without losing the ability to pursue its own interests or preserve its relationships with Baghdad, the United States, and other international partners. This requires a careful balance rather than automatic alignment with any one external power.</p><p>Iran is not simply another neighboring state in the region&rsquo;s diplomatic landscape. It has significant political, economic, and security influence in Iraq, and developments in the wider confrontation between Iran and the United States does have direct consequences for Iraqi territory and Kurdish security. The Kurdistan Region may find itself exposed to pressures that it did not create. Its leaders must therefore consider how to preserve channels of communication with Tehran while avoiding actions that could unnecessarily intensify tensions or compromise the region&rsquo;s constitutional position within Iraq.</p><p>Barzani&rsquo;s diplomatic approach has generally favored maintaining communication even when the regional atmosphere is tense. Speaking about Iran in 2023, he described it as &ldquo;an important neighbor&rdquo; and said that he wanted concerns arising from the shared border &ldquo;to be resolved through dialogue&rdquo; (Presidency of the Kurdistan Region, 2023). Such engagement can help reduce the risk of misunderstanding and protect channels that may be needed during a crisis. The value of diplomacy lies in creating room for the Kurdistan Region to explain its position, protect its interests, and avoid becoming a battleground for wider rivalries. Simultaneously, Barzani has called for the resolution of the Kurdish question in Iran. At the MERI forum, he clearly said &ldquo;the Kurdish question in Iran is not resolved through the refusal of the question.&rdquo;</p><p>A diplomacy of dialogue in relation to Iran must also be judged by its practical results. Maintaining communication can be valuable, but it cannot substitute for clear principles, effective institutions, or a realistic assessment of power. The Kurdistan Region needs to protect its security, economic interests, and constitutional rights while avoiding unnecessary escalation. The wider challenge is to preserve the Kurdistan Region&rsquo;s room for manoeuvre. Its security and prosperity depend on relationships that cross political divides. Barzani&rsquo;s approach can be understood as an attempt to preserve options in a dangerous regional environment. Iran is perhaps the clearest example of why dialogue is necessary, and why dialogue, on its own, is never enough.</p><p><strong>6. The MERI Forum: Representation and Inclusion</strong></p><p>The controversy surrounding the MERI Forum is central to the questions explored in this essay. The issue raised by the event and the subsequent response from Barzani&rsquo;s headquarters was not only about the organization of a forum; it touched on the broader question of which Kurdish party is represented in political discussions about Syria and Iran, and whose voices are given space. The statement from Barzani&rsquo;s headquarters disapproving of the forum&rsquo;s treatment of other parts and political parties of Kurdistan brought the question of inclusion into sharper focus.</p><p>Supporters of the forum may argue that diplomatic gatherings operate within political and organizational constraints, and that no event can be comprehensive. Critics, however, may see exclusions as evidence that the language of dialogue is applied selectively, especially when political groups believe that their views or constituencies have been overlooked. Whie we should pay attention to the practical limits of event organization, we should also ask whether the process was sufficiently representative. Therefore, the wider significance of the MERI episode lies in the relationship between diplomatic openness and domestic political inclusion. These are not identical tasks, but they are connected by a common principle: dialogue is most credible when those affected by decisions have a meaningful opportunity to express their views.</p><p>In its statement on the forum, ENKS argued that invitations to discussions on Kurdish affairs &ldquo;should include all political sides&rdquo; and called for participation &ldquo;without discrimination or exclusion&rdquo; (Rudaw, 2026). The statement should be read as a concern about the forum&rsquo;s arrangements. At the MERI Forum, Barzani again emphasized cooperation between Syria and Kurdish parties on strategic questions. The significance of such discussions depends not only on their subject matter, but also on whether they allow meaningful disagreement and contribute to practical outcomes. Dialogue should not be measured solely by the number of meetings held or by the visibility of the participants. It should also be judged by whether competing views and political engagements help build trust rather than deepen perceptions of exclusion.</p><p><strong>7. Political Responsibility and Kurdish Unity</strong></p><p>Nechirvan Barzani&rsquo;s political identity is marked with his long experience of developing KRI and constructive diplomacy. His political legacy too is closely associated with the Kurdistan Democratic Party and particularly that of President Masoud Barzani, to whom he is a deputy in in KDP. These features have helped provide him with an established political base and relations with influential regional and international political figures.</p><p>A balanced assessment must recognize both the practical value of his diplomatic approach and the limitations of the regional framework in which he acts. Supporters point to his ability to maintain relationships across competing interests, seek dialogue during periods of tension, and present the Kurdistan Region as a partner in regional stability. Critics ask whether these efforts have translated into stronger democratic context and lasting solutions to constitutional disputes.</p><p>Political unity is often invoked as a necessary goal for the Kurds, particularly when regional decisions may shape their future. A similar principle appears in Barzani&rsquo;s comments on Iraqi political participation: &ldquo;All Iraqi communities must consider themselves as participants in the political process in the country&rdquo; (Presidency of the Kurdistan Region, 2022). The future of Barzani&rsquo;s diplomacy will depend on whether dialogue can be converted into durable results. The Kurdistan Region&rsquo;s interests will be better served if diplomacy is supported by stronger domestic governance and a political environment in which criticism can be freely expressed.</p><p><strong>Conclusion: Kurdistan as a Bridge, Not a Battlefield</strong></p><p>Nechirvan Barzani&rsquo;s political approach is built around a clear proposition: in a region shaped by conflict and competing interests, dialogue is a necessary instrument of political survival and progress. His engagement with Baghdad, his approach to the Turkey&ndash;PKK question, his interest in Kurdish participation in Syria, and his efforts to maintain relations with Iran while addressing the Kurish question in Iran all reflect an attempt to preserve room for negotiation in circumstances that often reward confrontation.</p><p>His approach should not be romanticized. Dialogue can be slow, compromise can disappoint supporters, and diplomatic visibility does not by itself resolve disputes over rights, resources, or accountability. The strongest assessment of Barzani&rsquo;s record must therefore consider both his willingness to maintain channels of communication and the concrete results those channels produce. It must also consider the quality of inclusion in political processes, including the questions raised by the recent MERI Forum concerning Syrian an Ianian Kurdish discourse.</p><p>The Kurdistan Region has often found itself at the intersection of larger regional struggles. In his October 2026 speech in Baghdad, Barzani described the aspiration as a constitutional, federal, stable, and fully sovereign Iraq that serves &ldquo;not as an arena for regional tensions but as a platform for constructive dialogue&rdquo; (Presidency of the Kurdistan Region, 2026a). Barzani&rsquo;s vision presents it instead as a potential bridge between political actors who need ways to communicate despite their disagreements. Lasting security is more likely to emerge from negotiation, mutual recognition, and accountable governance than from a permanent cycle of confrontation. The challenge is to turn that principle into practical political achievements.</p><p><em>This article was originally <a href="https://www.kurdpress.com/en/news/2800853/Nechirvan-Barzani-and-the-Challenges-of-Political-Dialogue-gv4fro2s">published</a> by Kurd Press</em></p><p><em>Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or editorial position of Shafaq News.</em></p>]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 17 Oct 2026 13:02:19 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title>Iran’s undersea cable threat raises risks for Iraq</title>
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      <description><![CDATA[<?xml encoding="utf-8" ?><p><span><em>Shafaq News</em></span></p><p><span>Iran&rsquo;s threat to target undersea internet cables inthe Gulf signals a push to widen its leverage in any renewed war with theUnited States, four experts told Shafaq News. They warned that a fight overdigital infrastructure could inflict economic and security damage well beyondthe warring parties, including on Iraq.</span></p><p><span>Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran&rsquo;s Supreme NationalSecurity Council, warned last Sunday in an interview with state-run Press TVthat communications cables, data centers and artificial intelligence facilitiesacross the region could be destroyed if war resumes. A day later, HosseinShariatmadari, editor of the hardline Kayhan newspaper and the supreme leader&rsquo;srepresentative there, backed the threat, calling attacks on fiber-optic cablesin the Gulf a &ldquo;legitimate right&rdquo; for Iran. He claimed that about seven majorcable systems run along the Gulf seabed and through the Strait of Hormuz, andthat even limited damage could <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/World/Escalating-tensions-in-Red-Sea-Undersea-cable-disruption-adds-to-maritime-navigation-crisis" target="_blank">disrupt</a> more than 80% of commercial, banking andmilitary communications.</span></p><p><span>Saleh al-Qazwini, a writer and researcher on Iranianaffairs, said the threats fit a &ldquo;like-for-like&rdquo; approach in the event of afull-scale war against Iran. Tehran could widen its target list if it comesunder full-scale attack, prioritizing US interests, bases and companies in theregion, he told Shafaq News, adding that the scale of any response would dependon Washington&rsquo;s actions.</span></p><p><span>Firas Elias, an academic specializing in Iranianaffairs, said the threats point to a shift in modern warfare, withcommunications networks and data flows joining military sites and energyresources as strategic targets.</span></p><p><span>&ldquo;Iran is trying to use its position near vital sealanes, as it has with the Strait of Hormuz and oil markets,&rdquo; Elias said. Hewarned that hitting several cable routes at once could disrupt internationalcommunications, banking and e-commerce, as well as government institutions andcompanies that rely on digital services. But the real impact would depend onwhich targets are hit and whether alternative routes exist, he said, notingthat damage to a single cable would not necessarily cause a wider outage.</span></p><p><span>Regarding Iraq, Elias said the country would not bespared despite its overland links with neighboring states, as connectionquality, banking services and electronic transfers could suffer if disruptionspreads to more than one regional route. &ldquo;Communications security should now betreated as part of national and economic security, not merely a technicalmatter,&rdquo; he said.</span></p><p><span>Haitham Numan, a lecturer at the University of Exeterin Britain, said Tehran sees the Gulf as a &ldquo;front line&rdquo; in its confrontationwith Washington, while pressure on Gulf states may be intended to raise doubtsabout US protection. &ldquo;Such threats could also push Gulf governments to warnWashington of the risks of a wider US-Iran conflict,&rdquo; he told Shafaq News,describing the digital threats as a warning that Iran could reach foralternative pressure points, given its limited ability to strike US territorydirectly, and linked them to US threats to cut Iran off digitally afterisolating it economically.</span></p><p><span>Strategic expert Ahmed al-Sharifi said the threat addsa new dimension to pressure in any new confrontation between Iran, the UnitedStates and Israel, with effects reaching well beyond the telecommunicationssector. Disruption could hit financial markets, bank transfers and theelectronic systems used to manage oil exports, he warned. </span></p><p><span>According to Al-Sharifi, Iraq is exposed because itsfinancial, administrative and economic services rely on digital connectivity,and wider disruption could strain cash transactions, transfers andenergy-sector services.</span></p><p><span>Iraq signed an agreement in September with <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/society/Iraq-expands-digital-transit-with-Qatar-agreement" target="_blank">Qatar&rsquo;s</a>Ooredoo to carry data from Gulf countries to Europe across its territory. InSeptember 2025, two cables were cut near Jeddah, slowing internet access acrossthe Middle East and South Asia.</span></p>]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 16 Oct 2026 14:30:51 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title>Iraqi traders count losses after dinar devaluation</title>
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      <description><![CDATA[<?xml encoding="utf-8" ?><p><em>Shafaq News</em></p><p>For Iraqi trader Saleh Salam, a single government decisioncame with a staggering price tag. He lost 300 million dinars (about $197,400)in just one day after Iraq devalued its currency, as importers face a newfinancial reality in which securing dollars through official banks can come atextra costs.</p><p>Iraq <a href="https://www.shafaq.com/en/Economy/Iraq-raises-official-dollar-rate-to-1-520-IQD" target="_blank">raised</a> the official dollar selling rate for the publicfrom 1,320 to 1,520 dinars on October 7. Prime Minister Ali Al-Zaidi defendedthe adjustment as a response to mounting fiscal pressures and said speculatorshad benefited from the previous exchange-rate gap, but traders interviewed byShafaq News argued that the decision had increased their costs withoutresolving difficulties in obtaining dollars through official banks.</p><p><strong>Higher Costs and Banking Delays</strong></p><p>Trader Ali Al-Uqayli said that buying $100 through a bankcosts 152,000 dinars at the new rate, but an additional 12,000 dinars (about$7.90), which he attributed to government requirements, brings the effectivecost to 164,000 dinars per $100.</p><p>Bank transfers could take three days or longer, exposingtraders to additional costs, while the Dubai market charges $400 for each dayof delay, he said, reporting an additional burden of 12 million dinars (around$7,895) per kilogram of gold.</p><p>Al-Uqayli accused the government of failing to supporttraders and importers, arguing that the additional costs and transfer delaysencouraged businesses to obtain dollars through the parallel market. He warnedthat greater demand outside official banking channels could push the dollarhigher and benefit currency speculators.</p><p><strong>Disputed Transfers and Financial Losses</strong></p><p>The devaluation also triggered a dispute over paymentsarranged before the exchange-rate change.</p><p>Importers and gold company owners protested outside theCentral Bank of Iraq (CBI) in Baghdad over demands for additional payments ontransfers that had received preliminary approval at the previous rate of132,000 dinars per $100. They warned that applying the new rate to earliertransactions could expose businesses to substantial financial losses and calledfor government intervention.</p><p>The CBI had clarified on October 10 that traders <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Economy/CBI-protects-pre-devaluation-import-transfers" target="_blank">should not bear</a> exchange-rate differences on transfers purchased and covered at theprevious rate before October 7, adding that it had provided financialinstitutions with funds for eligible transfers and urging traders facingadditional charges or unjustified delays to file complaints through itsofficial platform.</p><p>Salam told Shafaq News that the CBI had previously requiredtraders and gold companies to provide additional funds at the new exchangerate. He said those demands stopped after the protest but argued that endingthem was insufficient to protect businesses from losses caused by the suddenadjustment.</p><p>Some traders and importers had suffered losses worth&ldquo;hundreds of millions of dinars,&rdquo; he said, warning that abrupt governmentdecisions could disrupt businesses supplying food and other goods to Iraqimarkets.</p><p><a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Economy/Why-Iraq-s-dinar-keeps-sliding-despite-fresh-US-cash" target="_blank"><em>Read more: Why Iraq's dinar keeps sliding despite fresh US cash</em></a></p><p><strong>Fiscal Relief, Economic Risks</strong></p><p>The devaluation came as Iraq faced mounting pressure on itsoil-dependent finances. Finance Ministry figures showed oil revenues <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Economy/Iraq-oil-revenues-plunge-53-through-July" target="_blank">falling</a>53% year-on-year during the first seven months of 2026, contributing to a 45.7%decline in total federal revenue.</p><p><a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq/PM-Al-Zaidi-explains-1-500-dinar-dollar-rate-to-parliament" target="_blank">Addressing parliament</a> on October 8, Al-Zaidi saiddisruptions to oil exports had strained government finances, leaving his administrationfacing alternatives including compulsory savings, paying salaries every 45days, or further borrowing.</p><p>The CBI defended the adjustment as a response to pressure onforeign reserves. On October 13, its director general of statistics and research,Samir Fakhri Nima, said Iraq retained sufficient reserves to cover at least ayear of imports despite the oil revenue shock.</p><p>Meanwhile, academic Abdul Razzaq Al-Bahadli told Shafaq Newsthat the devaluation primarily aimed to offset the budget deficit by generatingmore dinars from oil revenues earned in dollars. The additional local-currencyrevenue will &ldquo;help&rdquo; finance government operations and public-sector salariesbut he described the measure as temporary fiscal relief rather than sustainableeconomic growth.</p><p>The weaker dinar, Al-Bahadli cautioned, would reduce thepurchasing power of public- and private-sector employees, leading consumers tolimit or postpone purchases as prices rise. Lower demand could also slowcommercial activity and force producers, factories, and businesses to cut jobs,increasing unemployment and creating wider economic and social pressures.</p><p>Shafaq News market checks on October 8 further recordedprice increases of up to 15.4% for selected food staples. The government subsequentlyexempted imported food and medicines from customs duties and reopened importsof potatoes, tomatoes, and onions to ease pressure on household costs.</p><p><em>Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.</em></p>]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 15 Oct 2026 07:56:40 +0000</pubDate>
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      <link>https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Iraq-floats-an-AI-ministry-its-institutions-are-not-ready-to-use-it</link>
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      <title>Iraq floats an AI ministry; its institutions are not ready to use it</title>
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      <description><![CDATA[<?xml encoding="utf-8" ?><p><em>Shafaq News- Baghdad</em></p><p>Political blocs in Baghdad are discussing a new ministry for artificialintelligence, yet Iraq's own National Artificial Intelligence Center reportsthat only 19 of the 64 state institutions it assessed have clear plans toprepare for the technology. The issue points to a recurring dilemma in Iraqigovernance: whether new institutions are built to deliver services or todistribute posts.</p><p>The idea entered public debate this week when former lawmaker Amiral-Maamouri told Shafaq News that blocs had reached understandings to add newportfolios to Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi's unfinished cabinet. They include aministry for artificial intelligence or digital investment and the division ofthe Ministry of Culture, Tourism and Antiquities into two. Nine of al-Zaidi's23 ministries, Planning among them, are still run by acting officials fivemonths after he took office.</p><p>In Iraq, cabinet portfolios are traded under muhasasa, an informalpower-sharing system that divides the state among sectarian and ethnic partiesaccording to their parliamentary weight. Each new ministry adds posts to thatmarket. That is why critics read the AI proposal as a question of politicalbargaining as much as technology policy.</p><p><a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Iraq-weighs-new-ministries-two-days-after-dinar-devaluation" target="_blank"><em>Read more: Iraq weighs new ministries two days after dinar devaluation </em></a></p><p><strong>A Proposal Without A Sponsor</strong></p><p>No one has yet put the ministry forward formally. Hassan Wraiwishal-Asadi, head of the Al-Nahj Al-Watani parliamentary bloc and a member of theparliamentary Electricity and Energy Committee, told Shafaq News that the ideahas not been formally submitted to parliament, arguing that austerity and thecurrent economic conditions weigh against creating new ministries or splittingexisting ones. AI policy, he said, could sit within the Ministry ofCommunications or the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research.</p><p>A government source, speaking on condition of anonymity because he wasnot authorized to comment, said some political figures had raised the idea tokeep pace with global developments. The source said it is not an approvedgovernment project, and there is no current intention to name a minister. Itcould return under a future government.</p><p>Government spokesman Haidar al-Aboudi did not respond to Shafaq News'request for comment. The National Artificial Intelligence Center, which isattached to the Prime Minister's Office, also had not responded by the time ofpublication.</p><p><strong>What The State's Own Data Shows</strong></p><p>The strongest case against moving quickly comes from the government'sown figures. According to data published by the National AI Center and cited byresearcher and academic Saif al-Karawi, most institutions covered by itsreadiness assessment have no clear plan for adopting AI. The updated nationalAI strategy has been prepared for circulation to ministries only afterrevisions to meet Ministry of Planning requirements. That ministry currentlyhas no confirmed minister.</p><p>The strategy's history shows how slowly Iraq moves from intention toimplementation. Baghdad began developing its first national AI strategy inAugust 2024 under a supreme committee chaired by the prime minister. Two yearsand one change of government later, the document is still being refined.</p><p>International benchmarks show the same picture. Iraq ranked 107th of 188countries in Oxford Insights' 2024 Government AI Readiness Index, scoring 40.91out of 100, up from 133rd globally in 2023. </p><p>The breakdown in the 2024 index was particularly revealing. Iraq scored32.60 on the government pillar, which covered strategy, regulation, andinstitutional capacity, and 35.87 on technology. Its strongest score, 54.25,came in data and infrastructure. The figures suggested that government capacitywas a greater weakness than physical and data infrastructure &mdash;precisely theinstitutional gap a new ministry would be expected to address.</p><p>In the latest edition, Iraq ranked 128th in Oxford Insights' 2025Government AI Readiness Index, with an overall score of 29.37. Oxford Insightsrevised the index's methodology that year, meaning the 2024 and 2025 scores arenot directly comparable.</p><p>Al-Asadi pointed to a constraint that no institutional chart can solve.Iraq's chronic electricity shortages, he said, pose an additional obstacle torunning the computing systems AI requires. Data centers need stable power, andmuch of Iraq still lives with daily outages.</p><p><a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Brainpower-and-bytes-Iraq-s-race-for-AI-supremacy" target="_blank"><em>Read more: Brainpower and bytes: Iraq's race for AI supremacy</em></a></p><p><strong>The Case For An Institution</strong></p><p>Former lawmaker Hussein Arab told Shafaq News that an e-governance or AIministry could serve a practical purpose, because "Iraq still lacks anintegrated electronic system linking its ministries, and most currentconnections are partial." He proposed staffing it with existing civilservants rather than building a new bureaucracy.</p><p>Haidar Shalal Mutab, an academic specializing in media andcommunication, said a national AI institution could help Iraq keep pace withglobal change, but only after a realistic assessment of the country'sinfrastructure, telecommunications, education and data integration. </p><p>He told Shafaq News that a phased approach drawing on universities andresearch centers was more likely to succeed. &ldquo;A ministry would be judged bywhether it turns plans into working applications backed by sustainable funding,national expertise and measurable targets, not by the fact that it exists.&rdquo;</p><p><strong>No Single Regional Model</strong></p><p>Al-Karawi noted that governments have organized AI policy in verydifferent ways. Kazakhstan has a Ministry of Artificial Intelligence andDigital Development, combining AI with e-government, data management,telecommunications, and information security. The UAE assigns the file to aminister of state for artificial intelligence, the digital economy, and remotework applications rather than a standalone ministry. Lebanon took a similarroute in 2025, appointing a minister of state for information technology andartificial intelligence affairs rather than creating a standalone ministry.</p><p>Saudi Arabia chose a different path. It built its effort around anational strategy for data and AI with quantified goals: investment of roughly75 billion riyals, training more than 20,000 specialists and supporting morethan 300 startups. A dedicated authority implements the strategy.</p><p>According to al-Karawi, these experiences show that what matters is anintegrated system of data, research and digital transformation, not a ministrycarrying the technology's name. The debate in Baghdad, he said, should movefrom what to call the institution to how its budget would be spent. &ldquo;The realchoice is whether money goes into technical and research capacity, or into anew administrative structure with posts, directorates and operating allowances.&rdquo;</p><p><strong>Regulation Without A Ministry</strong></p><p>Part of the work a new ministry would claim is already underwayelsewhere in the state. Iraq's Communications and Media Commission (CMC), thefederal regulator for broadcasting and telecommunications, has said it ispreparing regulations to govern AI applications. In July, CMC spokesman Haidar Najmal-Allaq told Shafaq News that investment in data centers, cloud computing andcommunications networks should come first, alongside training national staffand bringing AI into education.</p><p><strong>Posts before capacity</strong></p><p>Parliament is expected to meet on <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq/Iraq-parliament-to-vote-on-completing-cabinet-lineup" target="_blank">Thursday</a> to fill the vacantportfolios, and disputes over several of them persist. If politicalnegotiations create demand for additional cabinet posts, a digital or AIportfolio could become one option. If al-Zaidi holds to his stated interest inmerging ministries to cut costs, the idea is likely to return to the drawerwhere the 2024 proposal ended up.</p><p>Either outcome leaves the underlying problem untouched. Iraq already hasa national AI center, a strategy still in draft, and a regulator writing rules.Fewer than a third of the state institutions surveyed know how they would usethe technology. So, would a fourth body succeed where the first three have notyet finished their work?</p><p><a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Digital-leap-analog-floor-Iraq-traverses-the-AI-divide" target="_blank"><em>Read more: Digital leap, analog floor: Iraq traverses the AI divide</em></a></p><p><em>Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.</em></p>]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 14 Oct 2026 13:01:03 +0000</pubDate>
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      <link>https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Iraq-weighs-new-ministries-two-days-after-dinar-devaluation</link>
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      <title>Iraq weighs new ministries two days after dinar devaluation</title>
      <enclosure url="https://media.shafaq.com/media/arcella/1791301510462.webp"/>
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      <description><![CDATA[<?xml encoding="utf-8" ?><!--?xml encoding="utf-8" ?--><p><em>Shafaq News- Baghdad</em></p><p>Two days after Iraq devalued the dinar amid mountingpressure to keep public salaries flowing, former lawmaker Amir al-Maamourirevealed that political blocs had reached understandings to add new ministriesto Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi's unfinished cabinet.</p><p>According to al-Maamouri, the plans include a ministry forartificial intelligence or digital investment, and splitting the Ministry ofCulture, Tourism and Antiquities into separate culture and tourism portfolios.&ldquo;The new posts would be shared out under the quota system to satisfy theparties.&rdquo; Separately, Al-Zaidi considered&nbsp;<a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq/PM-Al-Zaidi-weighs-ministry-mergers-to-cut-spending" target="_blank">merging</a> ministries to cut costs.</p><p>The talks come at a moment of acute fiscal strain. OnOctober 6, the Council of Ministers raised the official end-user rate from1,320 to 1,520 dinars per dollar. Iraq earns nearly all its revenue in dollarsfrom oil, so a weaker dinar gives the treasury more local currency for everybarrel sold. The same change raises the cost of imports for a population whosesalaries, pensions and savings are held in dinars.</p><p><strong>The Cost Of Keeping Salaries Paid</strong></p><p>Finance Ministry data on budget execution through the end ofJuly put total revenue at 39.1 trillion dinars. Oil supplied 30.4 trillion ofthat, or 78%. Spending reached 65.4 trillion dinars over the same period,leaving a deficit of 26.3 trillion, about $17 billion at the new official rate.Central bank reserves fell from $97.4 billion at the end of 2025 to $80.6billion by the end of July. Over the same months, the US war with Irandisrupted the Strait of Hormuz, the main route for Iraqi crude.</p><p>Al-Zaidi defended the devaluation before parliament onOctober 8. He said his government faced three alternatives: compulsory savingsthat would leave employees waiting on promises of future payment, payingsalaries every 45 days, or borrowing on top of a public debt already above 208trillion dinars. The state needs about 10 trillion dinars a month to function.</p><p><a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Iraqi-dinar-devaluation-sparks-backlash-from-blocs-inside-the-cabinet" target="_blank"><em>Read more: Iraqi dinar devaluation sparks backlash from blocs inside the cabinet</em></a></p><p>The 2027 draft budget, due in parliament by October 15, setsspending at 217 trillion dinars against a projected 50 trillion deficit. Itassumes oil at $58 a barrel and fixes the exchange rate at 1,500.</p><p>A government source told Shafaq News that party leaders hadendorsed the rate change in meetings with al-Zaidi before it was announced.Many of the political blocs are now negotiating the size of his cabinet.</p><p><strong>How Ministries Become Currency</strong></p><p>Iraq allocates cabinet posts through muhasasa, an informalpower-sharing system that divides the state among sectarian and ethnic parties.Each bloc earns points according to its parliamentary seats and spends them onportfolios. Legal researcher Saif al-Saadi said that a "sovereign"ministry such as Interior or Defense can cost 15 to 20 points, and a serviceministry 10 to 12. Every new portfolio adds supply to that market, givingnegotiators more posts to trade.</p><p>Al-Zaidi, a businessman with no party of his own, tookoffice on May 14 as the nominee of the Coordination Framework, the alliance ofShiite parties that won the most seats in the November 2025 election.Parliament confirmed 14 of his 23 ministers. Nine portfolios, includingDefense, Interior and Planning, are still run by acting officials five monthslater.</p><p>The vacancies have drawn in other demands. Several partiesback four new deputy prime minister posts, and a broad agreement provided thedeputies hold no ministry. The candidates include Laith al-Khazali, brother ofAsaib Ahl al-Haq leader Qais al-Khazali, whose nomination drew US <a href="https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq/US-objections-complicate-Iraqi-deputy-premier-picks" target="_blank">objections</a>. </p><p>The disarmament talks have also fed into the bargaining. Asource told Shafaq News on October 1 that one armed faction, negotiating withthe four-member committee charged with bringing weapons under state control,had asked for a new ministry to support the security ministries.</p><p><strong>The Cost Beyond The Minister</strong></p><p>Nouri al-Dulaimi, a former planning minister, told ShafaqNews that Iraq needs to restructure the institutions it already has. A newministry, he said, brings deputy ministers, advisers, directorates, offices,buildings, security details and operating budgets, far more than oneministerial salary. &ldquo;New bodies without clear mandates and measurable targetsdeepen disguised unemployment.&rdquo;</p><p><a href="https://www.shafaq.com/en/Report/45B-deficit-looms-over-Iraq-s-draft-2027-budget" target="_blank"><em>Read more: $45B deficit looms over Iraq&rsquo;s draft 2027 budget</em></a></p><p>He also pointed to2015, when Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi abolished the posts of vice presidentand deputy prime minister and cut protection details after protests againstwaste and corruption.</p><p>Political analyst Mujasha al-Tamimi also said thatadditional ministries &ldquo;mean new positions, allowances, guards and buildingswith no guarantee of results, at a time when Iraq should prioritize austerityand the efficiency of existing institutions.&rdquo;</p><p>Former lawmaker Hussein Arab said a ministry fore-governance or artificial intelligence could serve a real administrativepurpose, because &ldquo;Iraq still lacks an integrated electronic system linking itsministries, and most current connections are partial.&rdquo; He proposed staffing itwith existing government employees rather than building a new apparatus. </p><p>Former lawmaker Mahma Khalil added a differentconsideration. He doubted any new ministry was urgent and warned that disputesover the vacant posts could open the door to extra portfolios created toplacate rival parties. He has, however, called for a ministry for Iraq'sminority communities, including Yazidis, Christians, Sabean-Mandaeans and FeyliKurds, &ldquo;as a statement of respect for the country's historical diversity.&rdquo;</p><p><strong>What comes next</strong></p><p>A source told Shafaq News that parliament is expected tohold a session next week to complete the cabinet. Disputes persist over theLabor, Youth and Sports, Planning, and Construction and Housing portfolios.Nouri al-Maliki's State of Law Coalition has formally nominated Yasser Sukhailfor Interior. For Higher Education, it has put forward Haider Bahaa, dean ofthe College of Pharmacy at Al-Nahrain University.</p><p>In parallel, the Hoqooq bloc, affiliated with the armedfaction Kataib Hezbollah, has asked the Federal Supreme Court to overturn thedevaluation.</p><p>Iraq has adjusted its currency repeatedly in recent years.It devalued in 2020, partially reversed course in 2023, and has now devaluedagain, each time citing fiscal necessity. The last time Baghdad trimmed the toptier of government, in 2015, it acted under pressure from protesters. Thistime, the expansion is being negotiated while the cost of a weaker dinar isonly beginning to reach Iraqi households.</p><p><em>Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.</em></p>]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 12 Oct 2026 20:50:40 +0000</pubDate>
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