Shafaq News (Updated on June 29, at 13:29)

Iraqi securityforces detained 67 officials, lawmakers, and businessmen across Baghdad andseveral provinces on Sunday in one of the country's largest anti-corruptionoperations in years, according to security and judicial sources. The arrests,which began before dawn on June 28 and were carried out under the direct supervision ofthe prime minister, Ali al-Zaidi, form the first phase of a wider campaign thatofficials say could reach more than 200 senior figures in the state within 72 hours.

Who WasDetained, Who Is Next?

The officialstate news agency (INA) named those held, led by Muthanna al-Samarrai, head ofthe al-Azm Alliance and a member of parliament. The list also included sittinglawmakers Ziyad al-Janabi, Bahaa al-Nouri, Mohammed al-Karbouli, Aliya Nasif,Mohammed Jamil al-Mayahi, Hassan al-Khafaji, Abdul Rahman al-Luwaizi, Mudaral-Karaawi, Hind al-Abbasi, Mohammed Furman al-Jubouri, and Bushra al-Qaisi.

Also named wereformer lawmaker Mohammed al-Sayhoud, Oil Ministry Undersecretary forDistribution Affairs Ali Maarij, and former government adviser Ibrahimal-Sumaidaie.

The detaineesalso included civil servants, directors general, politicians, and businessmen.According to Shafaq News sources, a second planned phase would reach politicalbodies, lawmakers, directors general, and businessmen described as"first-degree" figures.

On Monday, Government Spokesman Haider al-Aboudi stated that 21individuals have been arrested in connection with the Dawn Crackdown, without providingthe names of those arrested or specifying charges. 

How theOperation Unfolded

A securitysource told Shafaq News that the security forces sealed off the entrances tothe Green Zone, Baghdad's fortified government district, in the early hours ofSunday. Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS) units set up dense checkpoints andscreened anyone leaving, with the only exemption granted to students carryingexamination cards.

The SpecialDivision detained more than eight people at dawn, among them members ofparliament, on judicial warrants tied to financial and administrativecorruption, the same source said, adding that a CTS unit pushed into theal-Shaab district north of the capital to carry out similar warrants.

The raidsextended beyond the Green Zone and al-Shaab to several Baghdad districts,including Sadr City, Zayouna, al-Yarmouk, al-Mansour, and the al-Qadisiyahresidential complex, as well as several provinces, including Babil, Maysan, al-Anbar, and Erbil. Asecond security source said the operation also reached the Midland Oil Companyover allegations that staff were involved in financial corruption, while travelbans were imposed on several politicians and businessmen until theinvestigations are completed.

The operationpassed without any security breaches, friction, resistance, or exchange of gunfire, another informed source told Shafaq News, adding that armored vehicles were moved only to close the entrances to the Green Zone as a precaution.

“Several wanted individuals have either fled or gone into hiding inside Iraq, but tightened border and internal security measures have prevented any confirmed exits from the country,” the source added, noting that the number of arrests will “definitely increase.”

All detaineeswere handed to the Integrity Commission, and large sums of cash were seized atthe homes and offices of those held, to be announced once final accounting iscomplete, the same source said.

The inquirydrew in part on the testimony of detained officials, including former Oil Ministry Undersecretary for Refining Affairs Adnan al-Jumaili, whose confessions are believed to have opened new files and led to arrest warrantsagainst others linked to government contracts and deals, according to securityand judicial sources. Some of those sought managed to leave their officesbefore the raids, prompting forces to tighten measures, the sources said, withofficials remaining silent on the final number of detainees and the nature ofthe files.

Reactions AndSupport

Anti-corruptionsits at the top of the agenda for the new government of Prime Minister Alial-Zaidi, whose program commits to institutional reform across ministries,digital transformation to cut bureaucracy, financial investigation mechanismsrunning alongside legal proceedings, decentralization of authority to theprovinces, and a national anti-corruption framework.

During a cabinet session today, al-Zadi framedthe ongoing campaign as the initial phase of wider efforts to recover publicfunds and strengthen oversight across state bodies.

“The situation surrounding corruption andfinancial mismanagement can no longer be tolerated and ignored,” he added,citing the need for stronger monitoring tools and closer scrutiny ofperformance across ministries and public agencies.

The arrests arecontinuing as part of that plan, and the approach will persist as a pillar ofstate sovereignty, government spokesman al-Aboudi told media outlets,adding that the campaign had drawn praise for being conducted transparently toprotect public funds.

The FederalIntegrity Commission, Iraq's main anti-corruption body, described the operationas the fruit of joint and complementary efforts among the judicial, executive,and legislative authorities alongside its own work.

Support camefrom many political parties and figures, including the head of State of Law coalition, Nouri al-Maliki, and a former prime minister of Iraq, who congratulated al-Zaidi on thepursuit of those accused of corruption and affirmed his backing for the effort.Muqtada al-Sadr, head of the Patriotic Shiite Movement, also voiced support,urging al-Zaidi to press ahead with corruption cases regardless of thesuspects' political affiliation.

TheReconstruction and Development Coalition, led by former Prime Minister MohammedShia al-Sudani, voiced support for the government's campaign, warning against“misinformation” spread by those implicated in corruption cases. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) parliamentary bloc called for the government’s drive to be sustained, with investigations and enforcement expanded beyond Baghdad to all Iraqi provinces.

The head of the Al-HikmaMovement, Ammar al-Hakim, welcomed the recent measures as "an importantmove toward consolidating the rule of law, protecting public funds, andstrengthening citizens' confidence in state institutions."

In parliament,Hamed al-Fatlawi, a member of the Integrity Committee, told Shafaq News thatthe drive marked a fundamental shift because it was the first to reachhigh-ranking political figures, adding that the inquiry remained confidentialand that further suspects had yet to be named. He urged that the campaign beexpanded nationwide to prosecute any governor, director general, or officialfound guilty, regardless of political affiliation.

Iraq's BarAssociation declined to provide legal defense for those detained in thecampaign. In a statement, it welcomed “the serious and practical steps toconfront corruption.” The association described the campaign as a potentialturning point that could open a new window for Iraqis, provided it was matchedby sustained political will to recover state assets, enforce accountability,and strengthen institutions.

The Leading Tribal Councils in Babil and Dhi Qar, the mostinfluential tribal bodies in the provinces, declared their support for al-Zaidi andpressed for a tougher line against corruption across state institutions.

The head of the Integrity Committee in the Dhi Qar Provincial Council, Abdul-Baqi Al-Omari, called for stricter anti-corruption measures and a "night of anger" similar to the campaign underway in Baghdad.

Al-Azm Alliance defended its leader, Al-Samarrai, and several alliance lawmakers facing corruption-relatedcharges, urging political actors and media outlets not to prejudge the casewhile expressing confidence in the country's judiciary. The Alliance called for the proceedings to be handled inaccordance with constitutional and legal guarantees, maintaining that dueprocess and fair trial protections should be respected throughout theinvestigation.

The WiderContext

Iraq stillranks low on international transparency measures, placing 136th out of 182countries in the 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index. Various estimates indicatethe country lost hundreds of billions of dollars over the past two decades tocorruption and mismanagement, with some official sources putting the wastedsums at between 150 and 300 billion dollars. The arrests also follow a broadercampaign in recent weeks that led to the dismissal of a number of officialsover corruption, negligence, and the waste of public funds, including at theMinistry of Electricity.

The campaignalso revives Iraq's long-stalled "Where Did You Get This?"initiative, a national anti-corruption effort first launched in 2023 by theFederal Commission of Integrity in cooperation with state oversight bodies that scrutinize whether officials' wealth matches their declared income. Accordingto judiciary source, the file had been shelved under political pressure but wasreopened with judicial backing as Iraq's financial position worsened.

It unfolds after Iraq's most notorious graft case, known as the Theft Of The Century, the embezzlement of roughly 2.5–3.7trillion dinars ($1.9–$2.8B), from the General Commission of Taxes throughhundreds of forged checks cashed between 2021 and 2022. Thirteen people wereconvicted over that theft in 2024, and the case resurfaced in May 2026, daysafter parliament approved al-Zaidi's government, with a recovery committeeciting a far higher estimated value of about 5 billion dollars.

What ExpertsSay

The campaignmarks an important beginning, according to Mohammed al-Rubaie, head of theAl-Nahrain Foundation for Supporting Transparency and Integrity (NFTI), whotold Shafaq News that holding suspects accountable could recover large sums,ease financial pressure on the state, and restore public confidence inreopening files frozen for years.

Iraq's judicial cooperation agreements withseveral countries, he added, could open the way to pursuing suspects abroad andrecovering smuggled funds, particularly if those funds were tied tocross-border activity.

Academic andpolitical researcher Khaled al-Ardawi said corruption had become a leadingfactor weakening state institutions since 2003 and had grown into aninterlinked network spanning sectors, describing the investigations as “asnowball in which confessions lead to new files and widen the circle ofsuspects.” Success, he said, would depend on judicial independence and theresolve of law enforcement to reach everyone involved, current and formerofficials alike.

Files of thisscale could not have been opened without clear resolve from the judiciary andthe Federal Integrity Commission, said Issam al-Faili, a political scienceprofessor at Mustansiriyah University. “Corruption had embedded itself in stateinstitutions under political and administrative cover, and reviewing high-valuegovernment contracts could expose more complex cases.”

He warned thatentrenched corruption threatened the stability of the state much as unregulatedweapons threatened its security, noting that some networks cut across politicaland sectarian lines and rested on shared financial interests.

What is Next

Iraq's anti-corruption campaign will target more than 200 officials, politicians, former and current deputy ministers, and business owners during its initial 72-hour phase as part of a six-month operation, two of the sources confirmed, and would extend beyond Iraq's borders, with authorities preparing arrest warrants and coordinating with Interpol to pursue suspects abroad and recover assets acquired through the misuse of public funds and state institutions for personal gain.

Authorities are also working to lift parliamentary immunity for suspects named in legal case files to enable judicial proceedings, a step one source said could help recover millions of dollars during the campaign's first phase.

Al-Aboudi added that PM al-Zaidi has instructed the Ministry of Financeto establish a dedicated account to deposit funds recovered from thoseconvicted in embezzlement cases and that anti-corruption enforcement under thecurrent government “differs substantially from previous administrations.”

Read more: A guide to Ali Al-Zaidi's ministerial program

Shafaq News

When Iraq's formal banking system fails its poorestcitizens, the market finds its own solution, and the credit it provides comeswithout contracts, consumer protection, or legal recourse.

In the Shorja and Jamila markets of Baghdad, the mostefficient lending institution in Iraq operates without a license, a balancesheet, or a regulator. It requires no collateral form, no guarantor signature,and no waiting period. A phone call to the right intermediary, or a word from atrusted neighbor, is enough to access cash within hours. The interest rate isnot disclosed upfront. It compounds monthly. And by the time the borrowerunderstands what they have agreed to, the principal has often doubled.

This is Iraq's parallel credit market —what economicresearcher Ahmed Eid, speaking to Shafaq News, calls the "popular creditmarket": an informal financial system that has grown not despite Iraq'sformal banking sector but because of it. "The gap between what banks offerand what citizens need has become a business."

A Rate For Borrowers Already Trusted

Iraq's formal lending system offers rates that comparefavorably across the region, but only to the borrowers it already knows. TheCentral Bank of Iraq reduced its benchmark rate from 7.5% to 5.5% in late 2024,a move the CBI Governor described as a response to declining inflation. Theaverage weighted lending rate stood at 6.51% annually in Iraqi dinars as of theCBI's most recent monetary policy report, making Iraqi bank loans cheaper thanEgypt's and comparable to Jordan's. Those rates reach borrowers' trusted banks.

The IMF's 2025 Article IV report explains why they have notreached anyone else: excess liquidity in Iraq's banking system stood at around31% as of early 2025, a level the IMF said weakens the transmission of monetarypolicy, making interest rate adjustments less effective in influencing credit,as evidenced by the absence of reaction of deposit and lending rates to changesin the policy rate. Cutting the benchmark rate produces no correspondingreduction in borrowing costs for citizens outside the formal system.

Iraq's financial inclusion rate rose from less than 10% toover 40% within two years, according to the IMF's assessment, driven by therestructuring of state-owned banks and the expansion of digital paymentsystems. The gains, however, rest on a definitional distortion: progress isdriven almost entirely by public sector payroll digitization rather thanprivate sector credit access. A civil servant with a salary card is counted asfinancially included. A day laborer in Shorja who needs 500,000 dinars (approximately$381) to cover his child's surgery is not, and the metric does not register hisabsence.

In May 2025, the CBI launched Iraq's first NationalFinancial Inclusion Strategy for 2025–2029, developed with the World Bank, ArabMonetary Fund, and Germany's GIZ, and established Masraf al-Riyada, a newdevelopment bank mandated to finance small and micro-enterprises. Theinstitution represents a belated official acknowledgment that the formal systemwas not reaching the borrowers the informal market had been serving for years,but its mandate remains narrow, its capitalization unproven, and its reach untestedagainst the scale of exclusion it is meant to address. The moneylenders ofShorja reached the same conclusion earlier and acted on it without waiting fora strategy document.

The Arithmetic Of Entrapment

The informal lenders of Baghdad's popular markets do notquote annual rates; they quote monthly ones. The going rate documented bysocial activists typically runs between 10 and 20% per month on the outstandingbalance, meaning a citizen who borrows one million dinars in January will owebetween 3.1 and 8.9 million dinars by the end of the year —the principal morethan tripling at the lower end and nearly octupling at the higher.

Eid told Shafaq News that this market operates on networksof loans outside official oversight, offering fast cash against steep termsparticularly in commercial districts, and that its danger extends beyond theeconomic dimension: debt has become in many cases a source of psychologicalpressure, family breakdown, and legal and tribal disputes, particularly whenborrowers cannot repay because of falling incomes and the absence of legalprotection.

Social researcher Ruqayya Salman, speaking to Shafaq News,frames the mechanism precisely: borrowers begin with a small loan to cover anemergency —a hospital bill, a rent payment, a wedding expense— and findthemselves forced to borrow again to cover the accumulated interest, entering acycle in which the original emergency is long resolved but the debt compounds.The debt becomes an emergency.

Designed Not To Reach Them

The Ministry of Planning placed it at 13% in May 2026; theWorld Bank records 13.5%, with labor force participation at 38% —well below theregional average. Neither figure captures what the informal economy actuallycontains. The day laborers, seasonal workers, and market vendors who form theprimary clientele of Shorja's moneylenders appear in no official register asunemployed, because they are not: they work, intermittently, without contracts,protections, or the documented income that would make them legible to a bank.The barriers most cited by unbanked Iraqis are not interest rates butprocedural guarantor requirements, administrative complexity, documentationdemands, and institutional distrust built over decades of state failure. Asystem that requires a guarantor from someone with no formal employment, nodocumented income, and no prior banking relationship has not failed theseborrowers. It was never designed to reach them.

The informal credit market did not create itself, it wasassembled, borrower by borrower, in the space the formal system chose not tooccupy, leaving millions to find their own terms in the markets of Shorja andJamila, where the rates are always higher, the contracts are always absent, andthe emergency that started the loan is rarely the last one.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News- Washington

Lebanon and Israel signed a US-mediated framework agreement in Washington on Friday that, for the first time, sets out a phased path toward an eventual Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, while tying any pullback to the disarmament of Hezbollah. The accord, formally a trilateral document, was signed by the two countries' ambassadors and a US official and announced by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who called it the "beginning of the beginning."

What Was Signed

The agreement capped four days of talks at the State Department, the fifth round of US-mediated negotiations between two states that hold no diplomatic relations and remain formally at war. It was signed by Israeli Ambassador Yechiel Leiter, Lebanese Ambassador Nada Hamadeh Moawad, and US State Department Counselor Daniel Holler, making Washington a party to the deal. Hezbollah, the Iran-backed Lebanese armed movement at the center of the conflict, was not involved and has rejected the talks.

No full text of the operational terms has been published. The most authoritative source is the framework released by the US State Department, supplemented by details briefed separately by Israeli, US, and Lebanese officials.

Read more: Lebanon's main parties reject US-brokered framework

The Mechanism: Disarmament First

Under the State Department text, the two governments committed to a sequenced process in which the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) would restore state authority across Lebanese territory, pending the verified disarmament of non-state armed groups, before the Israeli Army progressively redeploying out of the country. The order is the crux: disarmament precedes withdrawal.

At the center are two initial pilot zones, to be handed to the Lebanese army once armed groups are disarmed and their infrastructure dismantled, after which reconstruction would begin and residents could return, according to the State Department.

Read more: US-Iran ceasefire deal leaves Lebanon without guarantees

The two zones were set on the Israeli Army's recommendation. PM Benjamin Netanyahu and US Ambassador Yechiel Leiter said, one south of the Litani River and one to its north, part of the latter inside a belt Israel seized in the final weeks of fighting and now says it does not need. Lebanese authorities did not comment on the issue.

Israeli officials said the agreement carries no fixed timetable. The framework also provides for mutual recognition of sovereignty, a US-supported military coordination group, and a declaration by Israel that it holds no territorial ambitions in Lebanon, per the State Department text. The Trump administration committed to releasing $100 million in humanitarian aid right away, in coordination with the United Nations, and to reimbursing the Lebanese Armed Forces $30 million to support what it called an "enduring peace."

Where Israel Stands On The Ground

The framework leaves Israel in place for now. In mid-April, the army declared a Gaza-style "Yellow Line" buffer across the south, bringing 55 villages into a closed zone off-limits to returning residents, with five divisions and naval forces deployed; Israel occupies roughly one-fifth of Lebanon, all in the south, and has pushed in places toward the Litani, about 30 kilometers from the border. Israeli Defense Minister and other far-right officials, such as Security Minister Itmar Bin Gvir, and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, stressed that there would be no withdrawal from the Yellow Line until Hezbollah is disarmed, and that the military would keep freedom of action inside the zone.

The Three-Way Reaction

Netanyahu called the deal a major achievement and said that Israel would remain in its security zone until Hezbollah disarms.

Lebanese President Joseph Aoun thanked the US administration and framed it as a step toward restoring full sovereignty and the return of residents; Prime Minister Nawaf Salam said it aims to secure an Israeli withdrawal from all Lebanese territory and to extend state authority through the army.

Hezbollah rejected it outright, with Secretary-General Naim Qassem demanding an unconditional Israeli withdrawal and ruling out normalization, while the group’s lawmaker Hassan Fadlallah warned that enforcing the deal could push Lebanon toward "civil war." The group maintains it is obliged to disarm only south of the Litani under the November 2024 agreement.

The Parallel Iran Track

Running alongside is a separate US–Iran channel. President Donald Trump and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signed a 14-point memorandum of understanding electronically on June 17, committing both sides to end hostilities on all fronts, including Lebanon, and to respect Lebanese sovereignty. At talks in Switzerland on June 21–22, the two agreed on a 60-day roadmap and created a Lebanon de-confliction cell facilitated by Qatar and Pakistan. Tehran had made a ceasefire in Lebanon one of its red lines, according to Iranian officials. Beirut insists the two tracks are separate and that Lebanon alone negotiates with Israel, but welcomed the initiative.

The Human Toll And The Reconstruction Lever

The Lebanon front opened on March 2, when Hezbollah fired rockets at Israel after the United States and Israel killed Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on February 28; Israeli ground operations followed on March 16, displacing more than one million Lebanese from southern Lebanon, Beqaa, and Beirut suburbs according to the UN estimates.

Read more: Beirut’s southern suburb empties overnight: Stories of displacement under fire

The Lebanese Ministry of Public Health put the cumulative toll of the war at 4,230 people killed and 12,179 wounded between March 2 and June 25. The same data showed that Israeli operations also crippled much of the south's medical infrastructure, with 17 hospitals and 39 health centers out of service, damaged 175 ambulances, and recorded 176 attacks on healthcare and first-response teams. Medical and nursing personnel were among those killed and wounded. The damage extended to the education sector, where Israeli operations destroyed and damaged educational institutions across the south, according to Lebanese authorities.

Read more: Israel's war fell on Christians and Shiites in Southern Lebanon with no distinction

At least 37 Israeli soldiers have been killed, and some 60,000 residents of northern Israel were displaced in the earlier phase of the conflict. At least eight Lebanese have been detained by Israeli troops since March, according to Lebanese media; the Israeli Army says they were suspected of militant activity.

Reconstruction is both a promise and a pressure point. The framework conditions are rebuilding on verified disarmament and bars funds from reaching armed groups; a UNDP and CNRS assessment put direct building damage in the south at about $1.38 billion, with more than 11,000 buildings destroyed, a figure that predates the latest weeks of fighting. The United States and Saudi Arabia have signaled they will not allow or finance reconstruction before Hezbollah disarms, a shift from 2006, when Gulf states rebuilt southern towns.

What Remains Unsettled

Based on the agreement, which is not officially released yet, there is no timetable, no map or date for a full withdrawal, and no signature from Hezbollah, whose disarmament the entire sequence depends on. The Israeli army assesses that the group still holds thousands of rockets, and Hezbollah has vowed to keep its arms and block implementation.

Read more: How Lebanon's fragmented power blocks a peace with Israel

Verification and enforcement are to be detailed in a forthcoming security annex. Rubio framed the agreement as a first step, but on the same day, Israeli strikes in the south killed at least two people, a reminder of how fragile the arrangement remains.

Shafaq News

As the mourningmonth of Muharram opens across Iraq, processions of men will once again striketheir heads with swords and blades until the blood runs, a ritual known astatbir. What sets the practice apart from any other act in Shiite devotionallife is not that clerics dispute it, but that they cannot agree on what kind ofact it is: for some of Shiism's most senior jurists, it earns divine reward,for others it is an outright sin, and for at least one it is a question onwhich religious authority deliberately refuses to rule.

Most contestedreligious practices divide opinion into two ways: permitted (halal) orforbidden (haram). Tatbir occupies almost the entire span of Islamic legalcategories at once, and understanding why requires a knowledge of how authorityworks in Shiism.

Ordinarybelievers do not interpret religious law for themselves; they choose a seniorjurist —a marja’a, or source of emulation, usually a grand ayatollah— andfollow his rulings on matters of practice. This relationship, called taqlid,means that two Iraqis standing in the same procession can be acting on directlyopposing verdicts, each one religiously valid for the person holding it. Oneman's act of worship is, for the man beside him, a transgression. Both areobeying the rules.

The ritualitself is comparatively recent in the long history of Shiite mourning.Researchers trace organized self-cutting to roughly the tenth Islamic century,far later than the older expressions of grief for Imam Hussein bin Ali, thethird Shia Imam and Prophet Muhammad's grandson, killed at Karbala in 680, suchas weeping and the recitation of elegies.

Jassamal-Saeedi, a researcher who studies the development of the rites, explained toShafaq News that the oldest Husseini practice is simply weeping, and that manyof the more physical rituals, including tatbir, absorbed influences from localmourning customs over centuries, some of them predating Islam.

At thepermissive end of the spectrum sit some of the towering names of the Najafseminary. The doctrinal anchor is an early twentieth-century ruling by MirzaMuhammad Hussein al-Naini, who held that drawing blood from the head withblades is permissible so long as the harm remains safe. A generation of leadingjurists endorsed that position, among them Muhsin al-Hakim and, mostconsequentially, Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei, the most influential Najaf authority ofthe late twentieth century and the teacher of many clerics who lead the fieldtoday. In his manual Sirat al-Najat, al-Khoei treated tatbir as a legitimateexpression of mourning, permitted on the condition that the participant is safefrom serious self-harm.

Beyond merepermission, a further camp actively recommends it. The Shirazi school, ledtoday by Grand Ayatollah Sadiq al-Shirazi and institutionally the mostorganized promoter of the ritual worldwide, holds tatbir to be not just allowedbut meritorious, framing the shed blood as a display of the injustice done toHussein that draws sympathy to the oppressed. Grand Ayatollah Wahidal-Khorasani, among the most senior living jurists, has defended the rites insimilarly forceful terms. A small number of clerics have gone as far asdescribing tatbir as a collective obligation.

The opposingpole is just as authoritative, because the two best-known opponents arrive atprohibition by different routes. The late Lebanese authority Sayyed MuhammadHussein Fadlullah forbade tatbir absolutely. His office's published rulingstreat the cutting as intrinsically prohibited because harming the body isforbidden in itself: forbidden, in his framing, whether or not it leads tograve injury, and therefore disqualified from counting as a religious rite atall.

"A groupcame and invented the striking of the head with the sword. This [phenomenon]did not reach us from earlier scholars, nor from an Imam or a Prophet. Rather,some of the believers were seized by fervor and struck their heads with knives,and people were taken with the act and so followed it," Fadlallah saidduring a Friday speech (Khutbah).

Iran's formerSupreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, also prohibits the practice, urgingfollowers to abandon it. “It is wrongful that some people hit themselves on thehead with daggers to break blood. What are they in search of? How can this beconsidered an act of mourning?” he said in a speech in 2016.

Grand AyatollahAli al-Sistani, the most followed authority in Iraq, whose position is the mostcarefully constructed of all, issues no ruling. His office's consistent answerto questions on tatbir is that he expresses no opinion and refers thequestioner to another qualified jurist.

Islamicresearcher Sheikh Haidar al-Tamimi argues that some current practices give anegative impression in international media and have drawn criticism even fromwithin the mourning milieu itself. “The clerics who prohibit on these groundshave promoted an engineered alternative, such as mass blood-donation drivesheld on Ashura, recasting the impulse to give blood for Hussein into a formthat reads to outside observers as charity rather than self-harm.”

None of this isheading toward resolution, and the reason is circumstantial, because taqlidmakes each believer answerable only to his own chosen jurist; the rulings donot compete to displace one another the way a court's precedents would; theycoexist permanently, each binding on its own followers. The blood drives willrun in one neighborhood, and the blades will come out in the next, a fewstreets apart, both performed in the name of the same grief.

Read more: Muharram in Iraq: New year becomes a season of mourning

Shafaq News

More than a decade after Iraqiforces recaptured Jurf Al-Nasr (formerly Jurf Al-Sakhar), north of Babilprovince, from ISIS in October 2014, the return of its displaced residentsremains stalled due to security complications, political disagreements, and theentrenched influence of armed forces, making it one of Iraq’s most enduringdisplacement cases since 2003.

Political and parliamentaryestimates put the number of displaced from the district and nearby communitiesat more than 120,000, predominantly from the Sunni Al-Janabi tribe, most ofwhom have been away from their homes since the 2014 offensive. According to AliAbbas Jahakir, spokesperson for the Ministry of Migration and DisplacedPersons, around 6,000 displaced families from Jurf Al-Sakhar still reside inAl-Musayyib, Ameriya Al-Fallujah, and Al-Sulaymaniyah in the Kurdistan Region,with no clear pathway to return yet established.

The area holds significant strategicimportance due to its location between Baghdad and Iraq’s southern provinces—Basra, Al-Muthanna, Maysan, and Dhi Qar— as well as the continued presence ofPopular Mobilization Forces (PMF) formations.

Jurf Al-Nasr returned to thesecurity spotlight in 2026 after a series of airstrikes targeted locationsinside the district. The strikes, attributed to US drones, hit PMF sites andstorage facilities linked to Iran-aligned armed factions. The incidents killedat least two and injured dozens, underscoring the area's continuing role as asensitive security and military zone within broader regional tensions involvingthe United States, Iran, and Tehran-backed armed factions in Iraq.

The political dimension surfacedsharply in June 2026, when Babil Governor Ali Turki Al-Jamali ruled out thedisplaced residents' return in a public message, arguing that the land theyleft was held under expired state agricultural leases rather than privatetitle.

The statement drew swiftcondemnation. The Head of Al-Siyada Party, Khamis Al-Khanjar, one of the mostinfluential Sunni political figures in Iraq, described the governor's remarksas “an open declaration of a sectarian demographic-change project in the province.”

Tribal sheikhs from Al-Anbarconvened a gathering to demand that Jurf Al-Sakhar's residents be allowed toreturn, attributing the unresolved issue to "political reasons."Sheikh Abdul Rahim Muhammad Ajaj Al-Asafi told Shafaq News that the displacedhold the same right of return as any other Iraqis, and rejected any attempt tobend their cause to a sectarian narrative or to exploit the displacement filefor political ends.

Muhammad Al-Asafi, a notable fromRamadi, told Shafaq News that displaced families from Jurf Al-Sakhar, amongthem the elderly, the sick, women, and children, endure harsh conditions,calling on the federal government to shoulder their responsibility toward thefile, and tribal sheikhs “to resist any rhetoric that threatens civil peace,”warning that the moment demands a unified stance rather than division.

Read more: Iraq to place armed factions' weapons under state control

The debate surrounding the districtalso extends to its name. Iraqi authorities renamed Jurf Al-Sakhar to JurfAl-Nasr after recapturing the area from ISIS in late 2014. However, the newdesignation remains contested, and many Iraqis and media outlets continue touse the historical name, Jurf Al-Sakhar.

Following large-scale militaryoperations that concluded in 2014, Iraqi authorities announced the recapture ofJurf Al-Nasr, opening a new phase of debate over control of the area.

The district gradually became aclosed military zone, with conflicting accounts regarding access and civilianreturn. In 2017, Babil’s Provincial Council sparked controversy after approvinga decision, endorsed by the State of Law Coalition (SLC), the Shia bloc led byformer Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki, to pursue legal action against any partycalling for the return of displaced residents. Sunni political groups at thetime viewed the move as evidence of the issue's growing complexity, while theUnited Nations criticized it as a restriction on the discussion of displacedpersons' rights. “The ability to return to one’s own home is a fundamentalright that must be respected,” said the Deputy Special Representative of theUnited Nations Secretary-General for Iraq, Gyorgy Busztin, at that time.

Since 2019, the district hasincreasingly been viewed as a closed military enclave with strategicsignificance.

Researcher and academic ZiadAl-Arrar divided the reasons behind the continued displacement into three mainfactors: security procedures on the ground, opposition from Iran-aligned armedfactions to residents’ return, and plans to relocate some displaced people toother areas.

Speaking to Shafaq News, Al-Arraraccused some Sunni political forces of “remaining largely silent” on the issue,saying only a limited number continue to advocate for residents’ return.

He noted that the process depends ona political decision and high-level agreements among Iraq’s leadership, arguingthat the continued deadlock is linked to political disputes and the presence ofarmed actors that oppose the return of residents.

“The current government may have anopportunity to reopen the file and address the suffering of more than 120,000displaced people, although there are no decisive indications of progress sofar.”

Read more: Iraq stands to gain most from US-Iran deal

Kamel Nawaf Al-Ghariri,secretary-general of the Iraq Is Our Identity Party (Iraq Hawiyyatuna) and aformer member of parliament, said successive Iraqi governments had engaged withpolitical forces on the issue but failed to achieve the return of displacedresidents.

In an interview with Shafaq News,Al-Ghariri noted that the reasons behind the continued displacement “remainunclear,” and called on the government to provide greater transparency. Heexpressed hope that authorities would facilitate the return of residents underthe supervision of Iraq’s army and police forces.

Al-Ghariri also held previousgovernments responsible for the prolonged displacement, arguing that the defeatof ISIS in Iraq “removes any justification for keeping the file unresolved.”

Former Babil lawmaker Hassan Fadhamdescribed the Jurf Al-Nasr issue as complex and difficult, citing the absenceof political consensus and the lack of a clear security arrangement formanaging the area after residents return.

Fadham indicated that tens ofthousands of landmines and improvised explosive devices remain uncleared,posing risks to civilians and security forces alike. “The district’sinfrastructure has been destroyed and requires extensive reconstruction effortsbefore large-scale returns can take place.”

According to Fadham, the area'ssensitive location near Baghdad, Karbala, and Babil means that “any returnprocess must be tied to a comprehensive security and reconstruction plan.”

Political researcher MujashaAl-Tamimi stressed that the issue has evolved beyond its immediate humanitariandimension and is now “tied to broader security and political arrangementsestablished after 2014.”

Al-Tamimi told Shafaq News that themain obstacles include persistent security concerns, the absence of fullpolitical consensus, the involvement of multiple influential actors, and theneed for extensive security and administrative vetting.

He also proposed the formation of ajoint high-level committee comprising government officials, security agencies,and representatives of displaced residents “to develop a publicly announcedroadmap for return, reconstruction, and security guarantees.”

Read more: Jurf Al-Sakhr displacement saga: political struggles and security concerns

Written and edited by Shafaq NewsAgency staff.

Shafaq News

Kirkuk's railway station has not seen a train in morethan a decade. The platforms are empty, the schedules obsolete, and thewhistles that once marked the city's rhythm have been absent since 2014. Whatremains is a building that locals describe as thicker with memory thanmovement, and a provincial council that wants to change that.

For Ali Al-Hamzali, a Kirkuk resident whose family haslived beside the station for generations, the building holds a record of thecity's twentieth century that no archive quite captures.

Speaking to Shafaq News, Al-Hamzali said the originalstation once stood in the Al-Hamzali district near the air base before beingrelocated to its current site, and recalls that among the events fixing it inlocal memory was the passage of the late Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)founder Mullah Mustafa Barzani through Kirkuk in 1970, in the period thatfollowed the March 11 autonomy agreement between the Kurdish movement and theIraqi government.

Read more: Mullah Mustafa Barzani and other Barzanis released from Ottoman prison

The station went beyond a transit point to a meetingground for families, travelers, and merchants, a daily public space whoserhythm shaped the markets around it. Older residents still remember the longjourneys to Baghdad and Mosul, and the way the station’s traffic fed thesurrounding economy, particularly as the oil sector expanded and the railwaycarried workers, equipment, and freight through the province.

A Line’s Revival

The latest attempt to bring the station back intonational life was announced from inside the building itself. At the opening ofKirkuk's second Investment and Real Estate Exhibition, held on the stationgrounds, provincial council head Mohammed Ibrahim Al-Hafez revealed a proposalto link Kirkuk's railway with neighboring countries, describing it as astrategic step to reposition the city as a logistics hub connecting Iraq to itsregional surroundings.

No timeline, financing plan, or named bilateralagreements have been announced in connection with the proposal.

The picture on the ground is more specific, if stillconditional. Iraqi Republic Railways completed its assessment of theKirkuk–Baiji line in late April 2026, including structural evaluations of theAl-Fatha bridge, the main link between the two lines, and the Canal bridge. Thedeputy director general of Iraqi Republic Railways, engineer Ali Oudeh, saidduring a visit to the station on April 30 that rehabilitation of the Al-Fathabridge is estimated at around 60 billion dinars, while the Canal bridge wouldrequire approximately 1.5 billion dinars.

The station itself, he said, is technically ready toreceive trains. What it is waiting for is the bridges and the money to fixthem. That money depends on a federal budget that Iraq has not passed in 16consecutive months. Oudeh said that if budget allocations are secured, the linecould be restored to service within a year and a half.

The Line That Reached Aleppo

Kirkuk's railway story begins in the first decades ofthe twentieth century, as the Iraqi state worked to tie its main cities into amodern transport network. The city's geographic position and economic weight,particularly in oil, gave the station exceptional importance from the start.

Service to Kirkuk commenced in August 1925, extendingthe wartime line pushed northeast from Baghdad through Diyala. By 1930,foundations were being laid for a more ambitious Kirkuk–Baghdad–Haifa route,though the Haifa section was abandoned when the 1948 Arab–Israeli war renderedthat terminus inaccessible. A 105-kilometer extension toward Erbil followed,with the first train arriving there in 1950.

Regional historian Ahmed Al-Bayati told Shafaq Newsthat the line connected Kirkuk southward to Saladin, Diyala, and Baghdad, andnorthward through Nineveh as far as the Syrian city of Aleppo. With thecompletion of the Mosul–Tel Kotchek section of the Berlin–Baghdad railway inJuly 1940, the Taurus Express ran its first uninterrupted Istanbul–Baghdadservice, drawing Kirkuk into a corridor that linked the Bosphorus to the Gulf.

The station's slow eclipse began in the 1980s, whenBaghdad used railway policy as an instrument of political geography. A newstandard-gauge line running from Haditha through Baiji to Kirkuk, opened in1988 at a cost of around 960 million dollars, tied the city more closely toSunni Arab areas in western Iraq while deliberately severing rail access to theKurdish region that had been granted nominal autonomy in 1970, a physicalexpression of Saddam Hussein's Arabization policy. The meter-gauge line to Erbilwas wound down between 1984 and 1988.

Read more: Iraq’s railway network: Glorious past vs. troubled present

The line absorbed successive shocks over the followingdecades. A US Air Force strike during the 1991 Gulf War damaged keyinfrastructure along the Transversal Line between Baiji and Kirkuk. The 2003invasion brought further disruption to a network already stretched by years ofsanctions and neglect. Then ISIS swept through northern Iraq in 2014, and whatremained of rail movement through Kirkuk stopped entirely —the western branchtoward Haditha closed after militant vandalism, and the whistles familiar tothe city's residents fell silent.

They have not returned since.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News-Baghdad

For decades,Iraq's economic model has rested on a simple assumption: the Strait of Hormuzwould remain open. That assumption collapsed on February 28, 2026, when Iranshut the strategic waterway in response to the US-Israeli attacks that killedSupreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, exposing the extent to which Iraq's fiscalstability, trade flows, and energy sector remain dependent on a single maritimecorridor.

According toofficial government data, between 96% and 97% of Iraq's crude exports passthrough the Strait of Hormuz, while oil revenues account for roughly 90% of thestate's income. More than 70% of the country's imports, including food,medicine, and industrial goods, arrive through southern Gulf ports.

The closure ofthe strait, therefore, directly challenges the foundations of an economy that,despite repeated warnings over several decades, has yet to develop meaningfulalternatives for either exports or imports.

The scale ofthe impact became apparent within weeks. Oil Minister Basim Mohammed announcedon May 16 that Iraq exported just 10 million barrels of crude in April,compared with a pre-crisis monthly average of approximately 93 million barrels,marking an 89% decline in a single month. According to estimates from the EcoIraq Observatory, Iraq has lost approximately 350 million barrels of exportvolume since the closure began, equivalent to nearly $37.7 billion in foregonerevenue.

Read more: Iraq's rentier economy: Risks and reforms

Economicresearcher Ahmed Eid told Shafaq News that any restrictions on tanker movementsor disruptions to maritime navigation immediately translate into lower exportvolumes and reduced government revenues, placing pressure on public spending,development projects, and essential services.

The financialimpact extends beyond lost exports. Economic expert Safwan Qassi estimatedIraq's daily losses at no less than $30 million, even after accounting foralternative routes, due to rising transportation and insurance costs anddeclining trade efficiency. He noted that more than 70% of the country'simports enter through southern ports, particularly Umm Qasr, leaving supplychains highly exposed to any disruption in Gulf shipping lanes.

Redirectingcargo from Asian markets through Jordan's Aqaba port adds more than two weeksto delivery times while significantly increasing freight costs, insurancepremiums, and logistical risks.

Read more: Iraq's energy vulnerability: When a petro-state has no buffer

The consequencesquickly spread beyond trade balances and government finances. On March 3, Iraqbegan reducing operations at the Rumaila oil field because storage facilitieswere approaching capacity as tankers remained unable to transit the strait.Higher oil prices offered little relief. Although crude prices surged above$120 per barrel following the closure, according to data from the InternationalEnergy Agency (IEA), international energy expert Nawar Al-Saadi told ShafaqNews that Iraq was unable to capitalize on the increase because it lacked thecapacity to move sufficient export volumes. "The rise in prices did notoffset the decline in exports," Al-Saadi said, noting that higher priceshave limited value when production cannot reach international markets.

The Strait ofHormuz crisis exposed Iraq's dependence; the country's largest producing fields—including Rumaila, West Qurna, and Majnoon— remain overwhelmingly reliant onsouthern export terminals linked to the Gulf. While Iraq possesses analternative route through the northern pipeline network to Turkiye's Ceyhanterminal, that corridor accounts for only a fraction of the country's exportcapacity.

For years, theKirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline remained largely inactive because of unresolved disputesbetween Baghdad and Erbil over revenue-sharing mechanisms. An agreement reachedearlier this year enabled the resumption of flows at approximately 200,000barrels per day, representing an important political breakthrough but offeringonly limited relief when compared with the nearly 3.1 million barrels Iraqexported daily before the closure.

Al-Saadi warnedthat the crisis could have lasting consequences for public finances,investment, employment, and monetary stability if export disruptions persist.

According to projectionsby S&P Global, Iraq's real GDP could contract by as much as 15% under aprolonged export shock, while the budget deficit could widen well beyond thegovernment's projected baseline of 7.5%, potentially forcing spending cuts,delaying public-sector salaries, and increasing pressure on the Iraqi dinar.

Despiterepeated warnings dating back to the Iran-Iraq "Tanker War" of the1980s, successive governments have failed to develop alternative export routescapable of reducing Iraq's dependence on Hormuz.

Read more: Energy war nears Iraq: Oil infrastructure faces rising threat

The expertsinterviewed by Shafaq News agree that diversifying export and import corridorsis no longer a long-term ambition but an immediate strategic necessity. Qassiwarned that disruptions linked to the strait could continue depending on theoutcome of ongoing negotiations in Switzerland and broader securitydevelopments across the Gulf.

The Eco IraqObservatory has urged the government to accelerate the proposed "NewLevant" pipeline project, which would connect Basra's southern oil fieldsto Haditha in western Iraq with a planned capacity of up to 2.25 millionbarrels per day, providing an alternative outlet independent of the Gulf.

For Ahmed Eid,however, the challenge extends beyond infrastructure. He argued that reducingIraq's vulnerability will require broader structural reforms, includingmodernizing the banking sector, expanding financial inclusion, strengtheningaccess to credit, and tightening oversight of informal financial networks thatoperate outside the state's regulatory framework.

For decades,every regional crisis has reinforced the need for diversification. Yet astensions subside, reform efforts have repeatedly been deferred, and the closureof Hormuz has demonstrated the cost of that delay.

Read more: Iraq’s oil bottleneck: Abundance trapped by dependency

Written andedited by Shafaq News Agency staff.

Shafaq News

Iraq’s Councilof Representatives closed its first legislative term on June 1, having approvedalmost no substantive legislation, ending a period in which political deadlockover cabinet formation consumed the chamber’s first months and left a longqueue of strategic laws untouched. Nine ministerial portfolios remain vacant,and the parliament will not reconvene until July 1.

Laws governingfederal oil revenue, electoral reform, and public finance have been pending formonths, in some cases for years, and the brief window between the end of recessand the close of the fiscal year leaves limited time for meaningful legislativeaction.

Iraq’s November2025 elections produced a fragmented parliament anchored by the CoordinationFramework, a broad alliance of Shia political parties with varying ties to Iranthat collectively form the largest parliamentary bloc. Under Iraq’s post-2003power-sharing system, known as muhasasa, state positions are distributed acrossthe country’s main ethnic and sectarian communities. The arrangement wasdesigned to prevent majoritarian exclusion; its cost is a government formationprocess that is structurally slow and frequently hostage to intra-coalitiondisputes.

From theinaugural session on December 29, 2025, through mid-May 2026, the government of Mohammed Shia al-Sudani continued in a caretaker capacity,without a mandate to pursue new policy. The parliament that sat alongside itwas not idle, but it was not legislating.

Speaker Haibetal-Halbousi, a Sunni politician from the Taqaddum party who won 208 votes inthe opening session, presided over a chamber that spent the bulk of its firstfifteen sittings on the procedural work of constituting its own committees, aprocess that in previous cycles moved considerably faster.

Parliamentfinally granted a confidence vote to Prime Minister Ali Faleh al-Zaidi on May14, approving 14 of 23 ministerial nominees in a session described by multipleattendees as contentious. Nominees for the interior, higher education, andplanning portfolios failed to secure approval; votes on defense, labor,housing, and culture were deferred with no date set. Al-Zaidi, a 41-year-oldbusinessman with no prior political office, was nominated by the CoordinationFramework as a consensus candidate after the United States effectively vetoedformer Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s return. He took the constitutional oathwith a partial cabinet and has governed with acting ministers filling thevacant posts since.

The confidencevote came barely two weeks before the mandatory June 1 recess, leaving noviable legislative window. Calls from within the Coordination Framework for anemergency session during the recess to resolve the remaining nine portfolioshave not produced results.

Read more: What does Iraq's new government promise? A guide to Ali Al-Zaidi's ministerial program

A PatrioticUnion of Kurdistan lawmaker, Harem Kamal Agha, confirmed at a press conferencethat the vacancies will be addressed only after parliament reconvenes in July.Coordination Framework MP Amer al-Fayez stated separately that political blocshad yet to submit nominees, making any session before July 1 unlikely.

Lawmaker HassanWarioush, of the al-Nahj al-Watani bloc, traced the legislative shortfalldirectly to the incomplete executive. “The parliament has not yet taken itsreal role,” he told Shafaq News, adding that nine ministries remain withoutconfirmed ministers.

Warioushexplained that most parliamentary committees lack permanent chairs and arebeing managed temporarily by their most senior members, noting thatchairmanship allocations follow the same sectarian and ethnic balance thatgoverns cabinet formation. “The selection of committee chairs is waiting forthe ministers to be decided,” he said. “If a minister comes from one community,the committee chair goes to another to achieve political balance.” The resultis a legislature whose internal architecture remains provisional.

Yazidi MP MahmaKhalil called the current session is weaker even than the fifth,” citing theelectoral system, the absence of centralized decision-making within politicalblocs, and the compounding pressures of a prolonged formation period.

Read more: Ali al-Zaidi named Iraq's prime minister: Easy nomination, harder road ahead

After more thansix months since the first sitting, Khalil argued, the parliament has exercisedneither its legislative nor its oversight function in any meaningful sense. Thelegislation Iraqis most urgently need, he said, from a federal budget to thelong-delayed oil and gas law, to revenue maximization and privatizationframeworks, has not been touched. “The parliament does not yet have a clearlegislative program or a roadmap for addressing the major issues.”

Former MPRaheem al-Darraji, who served in previous parliamentary terms and has observedthe chamber’s accountability function over time, told Shafaq News that thecapacity for genuine executive scrutiny has been eroding for years. “Oversightduring recent years has not been at the level it was ten or fifteen years ago,the executive authority has exerted pressure on some oversight bodies, and thishas been reflected in the level of scrutiny applied to corruption files andgovernment contracts.”

Al-Darrajicalled on parliament to summon the head of the Board of Supreme Audit and otheraccountability officials to account publicly for the constraints on their work.Individual legislators are pursuing corruption dossiers, he acknowledged, buttheir efforts remain disconnected from any institutional framework. “Theoverall performance of the parliament in legislation and oversight remainsbelow expectations, despite the slogans raised about fighting corruption.”

The integrityand electricity committees have conducted field visits to governmentinstitutions since the term began, but the lawmakers have assessed these asinsufficient given the scale of financial irregularities under activediscussion. The federal budget itself requires structural revision before itcan be presented for a vote, with Kurdish lawmaker from the PUK, SirwaMohammed, indicating that prospects for passing a comprehensive budget law in 2026are slim. The government is expected to submit spending allocations forsalaries and public expenditures as an interim measure.

Compounding thepressure is the oil and gas law, a piece of legislation whose absence has leftthe legal relationship between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Region’s energy sectorin a state of managed ambiguity for nearly two decades. Electoral lawamendments that will govern the next cycle must also clear parliament withenough lead time for the Independent High Electoral Commission to implementthem. None of these files will move before July.

A parliamentthat spent six months forming itself now has to govern, and the files waitingafter July 1 are problems that previous chambers deferred, and this oneinherited alongside everything else. The budget has no vote, nine ministrieshave acting ministers, and the oil and gas law, pending since 2007, will test acoalition that has not yet demonstrated it can agree on anything harder than aconfidence motion.

Baghdad hasseen reform agendas announced with similar urgency before, and most of themsettled quietly into the same backlog they were meant to clear. The al-Zaidigovernment has a program, the chamber behind it is still finding its shape, andJuly arrives in ten days.

Read more: 2026 budget: Iraq confronts unprecedented fiscal strain

Written and editedby Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

On February 28, US-Israeli military operations against Iranforced a de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz, cutting Iraq's oil exportvolumes to below 800,000 barrels per day and costing the country an estimated$128 million daily, according to the Eco Iraq Observatory. For an economy thatdepends on oil for between 90 and 95 percent of state revenues, the shock wassevere in that it arrived while Iraq was operating without an approved budgetmade it structural.

Six months into 2026, and the government of Prime MinisterAli Al-Zaidi continues administering a $280 billion economy through emergencyspending provisions designed for temporary shortfalls rather than sustaineddisruption. Oil income had already fallen 16 percent in 2025, against abreak-even price of $84 per barrel and a market rate hovering near $67.Parliament has failed to pass a budget on schedule for the fourth time since2003, leaving the government with no fiscal instrument to absorb the pressure,and, as of February, no margin to absorb the shock.

The International Monetary Fund, in a warning issued lastweek, ranked Iraq among the economies most exposed to regional disruptions in2026, flagging serious repercussions for inflation, external accounts, andpublic finances. What amplifies the damage is that Iraq arrived at this momentalready weakened. The three-year budget framework covering 2023, 2024, and2025, the government's last comprehensive financial roadmap, expired at the endof last year. Parliament has not approved a 2026 spending plan, and indicationsnow suggest it will not. The government is instead operating under Article 13of the Federal Financial Management Law No. 6 of 2019, which authorizes monthlyexpenditures equivalent to one-twelfth of the previous year's approved budget.

Read more: Recession alert: 2025 budget deadlock threatens Iraq

Mudhhir Mohammed Saleh, the financial adviser to the primeminister, described the mechanism to Shafaq News as a safeguard for continuity,one that protects salaries, wages, pensions, and social welfare payments whileenabling financing of essential investment expenditures based on theimplementation rates and available liquidity. But this framing omits what theone-twelfth rule cannot do: it cannot launch new projects, respond to changingpriorities, or provide the fiscal flexibility that economic management in acrisis requires.

Iraq has now spent roughly 16 months without approved budgetschedules. More than 4,500 projects across the country have already stalled—some for years, according to parliamentary data— and specialists warn thatcontinued budget paralysis will add further initiatives to that list.

Economic expert Dhiaa Al-Mohsen, speaking to Shafaq News,argued that the budget is not merely a financial instrument but the centralmechanism through which the state manages its economic and investment activity.

"The ministries and provincial administrations willgradually lose their medium- and long-term planning capacity," Al-Mohsenwarned, adding that reduced government spending weakens economic momentumacross construction, manufacturing, transportation, and services. "Thestate can be managed, but development cannot."

Economic researcher Ahmed Eid explained to Shafaq News thatthe one-twelfth rule deepens financial uncertainty and restricts thegovernment's ability to execute economic plans efficiently. It also “underminesconfidence among state contractors and investors, domestic and foreign, whocannot plan around a future that has not been legislated.”

Read more: Iraq enters 16th month without budget as 4,500 projects stall

The employment dimension compounds the pressure. Governmenthiring has historically served as the primary channel through which Iraqigraduates enter the labor market. Under temporary spending rules, Al-Mohsenwarned that recruitment opportunities will become "extremelylimited," with exceptions concentrated in healthcare, education, andsecurity. He cautioned that such restrictions risk intensifying socialpressures in a country where youth unemployment already runs at persistentlyhigh levels.

According to financial expert Mahmoud Dagher, Iraq's publicfinances have evolved since 2004 into a "salary economy,” which alonerequires approximately nine trillion Iraqi dinars (roughly $6.8 billion) eachmonth, and any disruption to oil exports, however brief, carries the potentialto push public finances into paralysis.

"If crises persist for a prolonged period, thegovernment may resort to temporary austerity measures," Dagher told ShafaqNews, citing potential steps including improved collection of electricity andwater fees, deferrals of payments owed to farmers and contractors, restrictionson non-essential imports, and freezes on allowances, promotions, and bonuses.

“The priority is spending efficiency and expenditure control,preserving foreign currency reserves, which constitute the primary defense ofthe Iraqi dinar and the financing of imports,” he added.

Dagher identified a technical and legal complication thatdistinguishes the current episode from previous budget delays. Parliamentfailed to approve spending and revenue schedules during 2025, meaning thebaseline from which the one-twelfth rule calculates monthly allocations carriesits own irregularities. That detail, which might appear procedural, carriesmaterial implications for how the rule is applied and what counts as anauthorized expenditure.

Ahmed Eid warned that the government may be compelled toexpand its reliance on domestic financing mechanisms, including taxes, fees,and borrowing from local banks, cautioning that this path raises medium-termfinancial risks if not accompanied by genuine structural reform.

For now, the Central Bank remains the primary backstop. Thegovernment's ability to secure liquidity through deficit financing, including,in extremis, discounting treasury transfers through the Central Bank, is thelast line of defense in a scenario where oil revenues fall sharply and do notrecover quickly. Dagher described a "zero oil revenue" scenario asone that would confront Iraq with difficult economic and political choices amidrising financial obligations and growing social pressures.

Read more: Iraq’s private banks: Capital Growth and the structural credit gap

Economic expert Safwan Qusay pointed out that the governmentshould pursue alternative financing mechanisms for investment projects outsidethe traditional budget framework. Continued reliance on the one-twelfth rule,he told Shafaq News, effectively confines expenditures to operational needs,making it necessary to establish a special framework for financing investmentthrough borrowing legislation or public-private partnerships.

He proposed expanding the role of investment portfolios andauthorities “by offering infrastructure and service projects to investors inexchange for opportunities in commercial, tourism, and real estate sectors,”thereby sustaining project financing independent of the annual budget cycle.

Into this landscape, the government has pointed to its Iraq2035 economic vision as a structural response to the underlyingvulnerabilities. Saleh described it as a roadmap for fiscal and economicdiversification, targeting a rise in non-oil revenues to 46 percent of totalstate income and an increase in the private sector's contribution to GDP from37 percent currently to 53 percent by 2035. The Market Development Council, headded, would play a central role in attracting investment and advancing Iraq'stransition toward a more diversified and sustainable economy.

What is less clear is the path from the present moment, astate running on emergency provisions, with 4,500 stalled projects, constrainedhiring, and an oil revenue base that a regional conflict can halve in weeks, toan economy capable of generating half its income from non-oil sources within adecade.

Iraq's policymakers have produced visions before, but withoutthe legislative and institutional foundations to deliver them. The budgetprocess itself illustrates a gap between parliament, which routinely fails toapprove spending plans on time, and its position to enact the structuralreforms that economic diversification requires.

Read more: Deficit soars, projects freeze: Iraq heads into 2026 with NO BUDGET

Iraq 2035 may be a sound framework on paper. The institutionsresponsible for delivering it have spent 16 months unable to pass a budget, andthe oil revenues that must finance any meaningful transition remain exposed tothe kind of regional disruption that closes a strait before a ministry canconvene.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

Stretchingacross Iraq’s western horizon, where paved roads fade into vast expanses of barrenland, the country’s western desert plateau remains one of its most challengingand strategically sensitive regions.

The area, whichcovers roughly 168,000 square kilometers, nearly 40% of Iraq’s territory, haslong posed a complex security and geographic challenge for successive Iraqigovernments. It extends from Al-Anbar province to Nineveh province and acrossthe deserts of Karbala and Najaf to the borders with Saudi Arabia, Syria, andJordan. The region’s rugged terrain, deep valleys, natural caves, and sparsepopulation have historically provided favorable conditions for militant groups,smuggling networks, and other illicit activities.

Locations suchas Wadi Horan, Wadi Al-Abyadh, Al-Nukhaib, and Wadi Humair have becomesynonymous in Iraq’s security landscape with insurgent activity andcross-border smuggling. More recently, the region drew renewed attentionfollowing international reports alleging the existence of secret military sitesdeep inside the western desert during the recent Israel-Iran conflict.

A PersistentSecurity Burden

The westerndesert has never been merely an uninhabited expanse. In 2017, even if Iraqiforces recaptured territory from ISIS, Wadi Horan in Al-Anbar remained one ofthe group’s most significant strongholds.

Militaryofficials at the time noticed that ISIS fighters used the interconnectedvalleys and cave systems near the Iraqi-Syrian-Jordanian border triangle tolaunch attacks on highways, military positions, and tribal communities.

Although Iraqdeclared military victory over ISIS at the end of 2017, the threat did notdisappear. Instead, the group adapted its tactics, shifting from territorialcontrol to what Iraqi security authorities describe as “flexible cells,” small,mobile units capable of operating across remote desert terrain.

The continuingthreat became evident during truffle harvesting seasons in Al-Anbar andAl-Nukhaib, when several kidnappings and killings targeted civilians searchingfor desert truffles in isolated areas. The Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service saysthat ISIS remnants increasingly relied on kidnapping for ransom after losingcontrol of their former territories.

The issueresurfaced in March 2023 when ISIS militants reportedly burned two civilians todeath and abducted three others in the Al-Nukhaib desert southwest of al-Anbar,renewing concerns about the existence of militant hideouts and logistical basesin remote desert areas.

The DesertDilemma

Securityconcerns in Iraq’s western desert have expanded beyond ISIS activity.

In recentmonths, domestic debate intensified after American and Israeli media reportsalleged that secret military facilities inside Iraq’s western desert had beenused during the conflict between Israel and Iran.

While Baghdaddenied the presence of any unauthorized foreign military bases or forces onIraqi territory, the reports prompted security agencies to launch one of thelargest military deployments and search operations in the region in recentyears.

On May 18,2026, Iraqi armed forces launched a large-scale operation covering the desertsof Al-Anbar, Najaf, Karbala, and western Nineveh, involving airborne specialforces, army aviation units, and the Iraqi Air Force.

Officials toldShafaq News that the operation was intended to pursue remaining terrorist elements,secure remote areas, and prevent potential security breaches; however, theyviewed it as carrying a broader message about Iraqi sovereignty amid growingscrutiny over alleged undeclared military activities in the western desert.

Technology ReshapesDesert Security

Faced withevolving threats, Iraq’s Ministry of Defense stresses that it has adopted a newsecurity approach toward desert operations.

Major GeneralTahseen Al-Khafaji, director of media and moral guidance at the ministry, toldShafaq News that Iraq’s vast desert regions, particularly in Al-Anbar, Nineveh,Karbala, Najaf, and areas extending toward Al-Muthanna province, remaingeographically challenging and can serve as havens for smugglers and terroristnetworks.

“To addressthose risks, the ministry has established specialized desert-combat regimentsdeployed under the Al-Jazira, Al-Anbar, Western Nineveh, and Karbala OperationsCommands, supported by intelligence-gathering capabilities and continuousaerial surveillance.”

Al-Khafaji statedthat military and security intelligence agencies, special forces units, armyaviation, and airborne formations now operate within an integrated framework tomonitor suspicious activity. “The deployment of thermal cameras and advancedsurveillance systems has provided an almost complete picture of movementsacross the desert.”

Network of 950Surveillance Cameras

SaqrAl-Muhammadawi, a member of Iraq’s parliamentary Security and DefenseCommittee, observed that the country has significantly expanded itsborder-monitoring infrastructure in recent years.

Speaking toShafaq News, Al-Muhammadawi said more than 950 thermal and smart surveillancecameras have been installed along Iraq’s borders with neighboring countries,covering more than 90% of sensitive border areas and linking them tocommand-and-control centers that monitor activity in real time.

Proactivesecurity operations now extend well beyond border zones into the deserts ofAl-Anbar, western Nineveh, Najaf, Karbala, and the desert triangle connectingNineveh, Saladin, and al-Anbar provinces.

“Theseoperations focus on searching valleys, caves, and abandoned shelters,destroying weapons caches, and disrupting supply routes used by extremistcells.”

“The threat haschanged fundamentally,” Al-Muhammadawi stressed, adding that ISIS is no longerattempting to control cities or territory. “The danger now comes from smallcells of three or four individuals exploiting valleys and open terrain tooperate.”

Security andDevelopment

Alaa Al-Nashou,a security and strategic affairs expert, told Shafaq News that protecting thewestern desert requires a comprehensive strategy combining military deployment,intelligence capabilities, regional cooperation, and engagement with localcommunities and nomadic tribes, whose knowledge of desert routes can beinvaluable.

He alsoemphasized the importance of transforming the desert into a productive economicspace through agricultural, industrial, and investment projects, arguing thatdevelopment can help reduce the security vacuum that has historically enabledillegal activities.

Security expertAdnan Al-Kinani noted to Shafaq News that border and desert regions have longserved as operational zones for armed groups, warning that without sustainedeconomic development, these remote areas will remain vulnerable to exploitationby militant organizations, smuggling networks, and other actors seeking to takeadvantage of the region’s vast and difficult terrain.

Read more: Israel's secret base in Iraq: what happened in the western desert

Shafaq News

Iraq's newprime minister, Ali Falih al-Zaidi, is preparing for an official visit toWashington in mid-July, his first face-to-face engagement with the Trumpadministration since taking office on May 14, with a bilateral agenda thatplaces energy investment and economic partnership at its center, while leavingthe harder issue of Iran-backed armed factions to negotiate in the margins.

In Washingtonpolicy circles, the reception has been broadly positive, though calibrated.Al-Zaidi is the youngest prime minister in Iraq's modern history, a formerbanker and businessman with no prior cabinet experience and no deep factionalpatron inside the Coordination Framework that backed his nomination. Thatprofile, untested but untarnished, is precisely what makes him legible to anadministration that prizes transactional relationships over ideologicalalignment.

William Lawrence,senior fellow at the National Council on US-Arab Relations and a former USdiplomat, described Washington's posture toward al-Zaidi as broadly positive,driven in part by the novelty of his profile and his emergence as a consensusfigure acceptable to Iraq's competing political blocs.

Lawrence notedthat despite the fundamental differences between al-Zaidi and Ahmad al-Sharaa,Syria's post-Assad leader, Washington is applying a similar playbook to both:extend early engagement, set an informal probationary window, and measure therelationship against outcomes rather than commitments. “It’s almost likethey’re going to wait and see,” he said.

The July visitwas organized by US Special Envoy Tom Barack and reflects an American interestin anchoring Iraq's new government to the bilateral relationship beforeregional dynamics reassert themselves. Lawrence said that Washington had beenacutely worried during the recent Iran-Israel conflict, using Iraqi territoryto launch missiles and drones toward Saudi Arabia —an episode that exposed thelimits of Baghdad's control over factions operating within its borders."That could have really caused problems in Iraq if the war had beensustained and if Saudi Arabia had been hit more and more by projectiles coming fromIraq, but now that the war looks like it's ending, that's going to helpal-Zaidi."

What Washingtonwants from the visit, in practical terms, is less a strategic declaration thana commercial opening. Todd L. Belt, director of the Political Managementprogram at George Washington University's Graduate School of PoliticalManagement, detailed the US administration's hierarchy of concerns: "Itseems to be a significant effort at providing stability in the area. Also,Donald Trump is very concerned about energy and would like to have some newdeals. I think the militia groups and disarming them are also a secondaryconcern, but Donald Trump's concerns are always about business first."

Al-Zaidi's ownpriorities align closely enough to make the visit viable, as he officiallyannounced he will travel to Washington, accompanied by Iraqi businesspeople,framing the trip around investment and economic partnership. A $10 billionCentral Bank contribution to a private sector development fund is part of thegovernment's program.

The prizeproject on the bilateral agenda is an oil pipeline that would run from southernIraq to Jordan's Aqaba Port, a route that would give Iraqi crude direct Red Seaaccess and, for Washington, represents exactly the kind of infrastructure dealthe current administration finds compelling.

The energydimension carries an uncomfortable backstory. Since March 2025 and until now,the Trump administration has declined to renew the sanctions waiver that hadpreviously exempted Baghdad from penalties for purchasing Iranian gas, a waiverthat had allowed Iran to deliver roughly 30 million cubic meters of gas dailyto Iraq, supporting nearly a third of the country's power generation capacity.After the waiver lapsed in March 2025, Iranian gas flows to Iraq dropped byapproximately 40 percent. Iraq now faces peak summer demand of around 40gigawatts against production capacity of approximately 29 gigawatts, a gap thatdomestic alternatives have not bridged. The new government's program commits toending Iranian energy dependency through accelerated domestic gas capture, acommitment made under structural pressure Washington helped create.

Read more: 40-GW electricity gap forces Iraq to back private generators

On that basis,the factions file is the most politically sensitive and the most diplomaticallyobscured item on the bilateral agenda. Al-Zaidi's ministerial program commitsto consolidating all weapons under exclusive state authority but does notdissolve the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF-Al-Hashd al-Shaabi) —the umbrellaof predominantly Shiite armed factions with deep ties to Tehran. Politicalsources told Shafaq News that Washington's categorical rejection of anycandidate perceived as close to armed factions was the principal obstacle tofilling the Defense and Interior ministries after the May 14 confidence vote.Those portfolios remain vacant.

Heba Abdal-Wahhab, a Washington-based researcher specializing in Middle East affairs,cautioned against reading American enthusiasm as confidence. Theadministration, she told Shafaq News, views the al-Zaidi government withconsiderable caution and is attempting a fundamental reset in the bilateralrelationship, one made urgent by what the Iran-Israel confrontation revealedabout Iraq's inability to restrain Iran-aligned factions on its soil.

Read more: The end of a waiver: Iraq's struggle for energy independence

"Washingtonis seeking through this government to build a different foundation for therelationship," she said, "particularly given the complications thatemerged during the recent Iran-Israel confrontation and what it exposed aboutthe fragility of the Iraqi state's capacity to restrain the Iran-backed armedfactions."

She noted thatWashington is also fully aware that al-Zaidi emerged from a complex andconstrained political process, and that his room for maneuver is limited. TheAmerican approach, she argued, is deliberately focused on practical resultsrather than political statements.

Lawrencedescribed the factions file as Washington's central preoccupation, distinctfrom al-Zaidi's own immediate priorities. "Washington's biggest issue isthe Al-Hashd al-Shaabi…Whereas al-Zaidi's biggest issue probably is getting theeconomy flowing, this pipeline project to Jordan's Aqaba Port and other thingsto get the Iraqi economy humming with American assistance."

Asked whetherreducing armed forces influence formed part of the broader US-Iranunderstanding, Lawrence said, "It's not explicitly included.”

“Al-Zaidi woulddo well to try to calm things down within Iraq so that there's no tit-for-tatinvolving PMF. That's sort of his job. And that will be one of the things thathe will be measured by as the Trump administration views his leadership inIraq, if he can get things under control vis-à-vis the militias."

In this regard,Abd al-Wahhab noted that the factional problem encompasses political networks,economic interests, and institutional penetrations built inside the Iraqi stateover more than a decade. Dismantling or even constraining that architecturecannot be accomplished by a single government in a single term, let alone inthe months between now and a White House meeting.

“The general impression [of the US] is that he[al-Zaidi] is good, he’s a businessman, he’s transactional like Trump, andhopefully, if things go well and he doesn’t get too close to Iran, things willwork out fine,” Lawrence concluded.

Read more: How the US pushed Iraq's armed factions toward disarmament

Written andedited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

When the Czech Ambassador to Baghdad, Jan Snaidauf, spoke about Iraq, he didn’t begin with oil or trade, but rather with an old weapon that remains etched in the Iraqi memory.

During his years in Iraq, the European diplomat was surprised to find that the name of Brno was still in use among Iraqis, not as a Czech city or company, but as a rifle associated with entire generations of Iraqi soldiers and hunters.

For Snaidauf, this is an evidence of the deep relationship that bound the two countries for decades, a relationship that Prague is now trying to revive through trade, investment, energy, and defense cooperation.

Behind that memory lies a long history of Czech involvement in Iraq. In an interview with Shafaq News, Snaidauf said Czech companies were among the foreign entities that contributed to building and developing Iraqi oil refineries over the past decades. They also participated in water projects, pumping and treatment plants, dam construction, and electricity projects.

The Czech Republic, accord to Snaidauf also supplied Iraq with heavy military transport vehicles, while Czech aircraft manufacturer Aero exported 12 training and combat aircraft to the Iraqi Air Force nearly a decade ago. Discussions are ongoing over maintaining the aircraft and the possibility of exporting a newer generation in the future.

Today, however, economic relations still fall short of the potential of both countries. Snaidauf noted that the volume of Czech exports to Iraq ranges annually between $200 and $300 million, including machinery, industrial equipment, transportation vehicles, foodstuffs, chemical products, and various consumer goods.

“We hope exports will be even higher. We have competitive Czech companies whose prices are suitable for the Iraqi market.”

The other side of the trade balance, however, is almost empty. According to the Ambassador, Iraqi exports to the Czech Republic are “very low, almost zero,” a reality Prague hopes to change in the coming years.

He stressed that the Czech Republic remains interested in Iraqi oil. “This doesn't mean we don't buy Iraqi oil. In 2023, a Czech company purchased millions of dollars' worth of Iraqi oil. However, we still import oil from other sources, and the issue of purchasing Iraqi oil remains under discussion.”

Snaidauf believed this historical experience provides both countries with a solid foundation for expanding economic cooperation in the future, adding, “Trade relations between Iraq and the Czech Republic have a long and rich history.”

The Ambassador, however, does not hide the fact that European investors still view Iraq with caution. While acknowledging that the Iraqi economy has improved in recent years, he emphasized that investors do not base their decisions solely on opportunities. “An investor brings capital, employs workers, and expects to make profits. But at the same time, they are looking for a suitable investment environment and a low level of risk.”

Foreign companies, he added, believe that investing in Iraq requires additional guarantees, clarifying that Baghdad “is required to provide more assurances to investors.”

“Iraq has significant and attractive opportunities for Czech companies and foreign investors, but many still feel uneasy due to some existing conditions, and this is a topic we constantly discuss with Iraqi officials.”

The ambassador believed another important step toward changing investors' perceptions lies in agreements still under negotiation between the two countries. Following a visit by former Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani to Prague, the two sides signed several MoUs covering civil aviation transport and cooperation between the ministries of Interior, Energy, Oil, and Environment.

However, the two agreements most anticipated by investors concern the avoidance of double taxation and the protection of investments.

Snaidauf said negotiations on both agreements went through two rounds last year, noting that discussions with the Iraqi side were “positive and intensive.” He expressed hope that the agreements would be finalized and signed later this year.

The Czech Republic has also donated healthcare equipment to a dozen Iraqi hospitals over the past two decades, helping them provide effective and high-quality treatment to patients. According to Snaidauf, these contributions have laid the groundwork for broader cooperation in the healthcare sector in the years ahead.

Shafaq News- Baghdad

A power gap of nearly 40,000 megawatts is forcing Iraq tolean more heavily on private generators this summer, with demand exceeding60,000 MW and protests spreading over worsening cuts in several provinces.

The government has moved to support the private generatornetwork, now a daily lifeline for millions of Iraqis, after Prime Minister AliAl-Zaidi received a delegation representing generator owners in the presence ofthe electricity minister and directed authorities to ease procedures forsecuring fuel. The Oil Ministry has also approved supplying generators withsubsidized fuel for three months at around $0.15 per liter instead of $0.31, ina bid to stabilize ampere prices and reduce pressure on households alreadypaying for power outside the national grid.

Ahmad Mousa Al-Abadi, an electricity and energy specialistand former spokesperson for the Ministry of Electricity, told Shafaq News thatthe decision is an attempt to ease pressure on the grid and prevent generatorsubscription prices from rising, but its success depends on steady fuelsupplies and field monitoring.

The ministry had warned early that the current summer wouldbe among the hardest for the power system because of shortages in fuel and gasfeeding power stations, he added. Shortages in local and imported gas havedirectly reduced production, while alternatives such as liquefied gas platformsand electricity interconnection lines have slowed because of regionalconditions and financial pressure.

The deficit extends to transmission and distribution, wherelosses still reach about 60%, alongside “aging grid sections and rising loads”caused by urban expansion and new residential areas.

In Al-Anbar, the local government announced that theprovince receives only 600 to 650 MW, although its actual need ranges between2,700 and 3,000 MW, leaving residents with no more than six to eight hours ofpublic supply a day.

Basra, Iraq’s main oil province, has entered scheduled cutsfor the first time in years, with four hours of supply followed by two hours ofoutage after production fell to about 3,150 MW against demand exceeding 5,500MW this summer. According to operating data from the Southern Control Center,gas supplies feeding Basra’s power stations have dropped from about 28 millioncubic meters per day in summer 2025 to nearly 9 million now, alongside thesuspension of some import lines.

Protesters in Al-Diwaniyah’s Ghammas district also blockedthe Al-Diwaniyah-Najaf road to demand a higher electricity share, arguing thatcuts had exceeded five hours for every one hour of supply.

The Ministry of Electricity says power is distributedaccording to ratios approved by the Higher Committee for Coordination amongProvinces, with Baghdad receiving 27.07% of the energy allocated to provinces,followed by Dhi Qar at 9.02% and Nineveh at 8.47%. However, residents, whospoke to Shafaq News, countered that the capital’s larger electricity share hasnot been reflected in residential neighborhoods, where transformers remainoverloaded, outages last for hours, and generator subscriptions rise monthafter month.

The core problem lies in the lack of balance between Iraq’selectricity sectors, explained lawmaker Uday Al-Zamili, a member ofparliament’s Oil, Gas, and Natural Resources Committee. Distribution networkshave improved in recent years, but transmission still needs major expansionbecause high-voltage lines and substations were designed for older demandlevels and no longer match current consumption.

The expansion of gas-fired power stations without parallelinvestment in associated gas capture, he said, is one of Iraq’s “main strategicmistakes,” as it kept the country dependent on imported gas to run asignificant part of its power plants.

Read more: Iraq power 2026: war on Iran collapses the grid's last defenses ahead of peak summer

Shafaq News-Baghdad

For much of theworld, a new year carries connotations of celebration and renewal. In Iraq, theopening of the Islamic Hijri New Year, marked by the arrival of Muharram, thefirst month of the lunar calendar, unfolds in a different register entirely.

Markets shifttheir displays to black fabric and mourning banners. Kitchens begin preparingcommunal meals for the needy. Husseiniyas, the dedicated halls where ShiaMuslim communities hold religious and commemorative gatherings, open theirdoors and arrange their halls for weeks of mourning councils. Volunteers begincollecting donations. The country, in measured but visible ways, prepares forone of the most consequential religious seasons on earth.

A CountryShaped By Faith

Iraq'spopulation is approximately 95 to 98 percent Muslim. Of that majority, anestimated 64 to 69 percent are Shia Muslims, with Sunni Muslims comprising 29to 34 percent. The remainder includes Christians, Yazidis, Mandaeans, and othercommunities who have inhabited this land for centuries. Iraq is, in short, acountry where Islam, and specifically Shia Islam, shapes the religious lifecalendar, commerce, and public space.

Globally, ShiaMuslims number between 320 and 400 million, representing roughly 20 percent ofthe world's Muslim population. The majority are concentrated in four countries:Iran, Pakistan, India, and Iraq. Iraq holds a singular place among them becauseit is home to the event that defines the Shia calendar, Karbala.

What KarbalaMeans

In 680 CE,Hussein bin Ali, the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad and the third Imam(spiritual leader) recognized by Shia Muslims, was killed alongside his familyand companions at a site in central Iraq, then as now called Karbala, afterrefusing to pledge allegiance to the Umayyad Caliph Yazid ibn Muawiya. For ShiaMuslims across fourteen centuries, it represents the definitive act ofsacrifice in the face of injustice, a moral compass that continues to governreligious identity, political expression, and communal life.

Karbala, a citytwo hours south of Baghdad, is home today to the shrines of Imam Hussein andhis brother Al-Abbas, and to a living tradition of pilgrimage that has grownsteadily each year.

The Scale OfObservance

In 2024, theArbaeen pilgrimage —held forty days after Ashura to mark the end of themourning cycle— drew more than 22 million visitors to Karbala, according toIraq's Ministry of Interior, making it the largest annual religious gatheringon earth, surpassing even the Hajj, the annual Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca.Attendance figures have grown steadily: from 11.2 million in 2016 to 16.3million in 2021 to over 22 million in recent years.

Ashura itself—the tenth day of Muharram and the climax of the mourning period— drawsmillions to Karbala from across Iraq and from Iran, Lebanon, the Gulf states,Pakistan, and beyond. In 2024, over 3.4 million foreign pilgrims entered Iraqspecifically for the Arbaeen pilgrimage alone.

What MuharramLooks Like On The Ground

The seasonbegins to take shape before the first day of Muharram arrives. In Baghdad'shistoric commercial districts, Al-Shorja, Al-Kadhimiya, Al-Sadr City, andAl-Kifah, shop displays shift. Black clothing, mourning banners, flags, andceremonial fabric move to the front. Demand for black garments, particularlyfor women and children, rises sharply and, according to traders, exceedscommercial activity during the Eid holidays.

Food becomespart of the same mobilization. Mobile mourning caravans, known in Arabic asmawkib (singular: mawkib— a procession or organized group that provides food,water, and service to pilgrims and mourners), begin preparing communal mealsfunded by year-round donations. Free distribution of food, such as bread, tea,rice dishes, and prepared meals, is a defining feature of the season, rooted ina tradition of public service tied directly to the memory of Karbala.

In Al-Hilla, acity south of Baghdad with deep artisanal heritage, blacksmiths' workshopsreturn to activity before Muharram begins, producing drums, flags, andceremonial blades for Husseini processions. The month ties inherited crafttraditions as firmly to religious observance as it ties ritual to commerce.

Across Iraq,Husseiniyas prepare their halls, sound systems, and seating for nightlycouncils of mourning, where reciters —religious poets and chanters trained inthe oral tradition of commemorating Karbala— lead congregations in lamentationand reflection. These councils run for ten days through Ashura and, in manycommunities, for forty days until Arbaeen.

Who Observes —And How

Muharram is notexclusively a Shia affair. Sunni Muslims also observe Ashura, the tenth day ofMuharram, as a day of optional fasting that commemorates separate events inIslamic and biblical history, including, according to tradition, the day theProphet Muhammad himself fasted. Both Sunni and Shia Muslims regard Ashura as aday of deep importance and reflection, though they observe it through distincttheological and historical frameworks.

In Iraq, whereSunni and Shia communities have historically coexisted across the same citiesand regions, most Sunni Muslims also mourn Hussein's death, though lesspublicly and with less ceremonial elaboration than their Shia neighbors. IraqiChristians and members of other minority communities observe the season'ssocial norms, abstaining from celebratory events, respecting the sombercharacter of the period, as a matter of civic and neighborly custom.

What this meansin practice for visitors, diplomats, and foreign officials is straightforward:weddings, public celebrations, and festive social events are considered deeplyinappropriate during Muharram, particularly in the ten days leading to Ashura.Music in public spaces recedes. Storefronts reflect the season. The socialatmosphere is one of collective mourning and public service, not festivity.

Tourism AndStrategic Importance

Iraq hasinvested substantially in the infrastructure surrounding these religiousseasons. Thousands of doctors and nurses from Iraq and abroad serve pilgrimsduring the period. Security deployments, crowd management systems, missingpersons units, and multilingual guidance materials are coordinated acrossprovinces and border crossings.

For foreigngovernments, Muharram is a period during which diplomatic scheduling,commercial delegations, and public engagements in Iraq require awareness of thecalendar's significance. Events that conflict with the ten days of Muharram, orthat fail to acknowledge the season, risk misreading the social and politicalenvironment in which they are operating.

Karbala's PlaceIn The World

Whatdistinguishes Iraq from other countries with significant Shia populations isthat the event being commemorated happened here, on Iraqi soil, and the shrinesthat embody it remain here. Pilgrims do not travel to Iraq to observe Karbalafrom a distance. They travel to Karbala itself: to stand at the tomb of ImamHussein, to walk the same ground, to participate in a tradition that, for ShiaMuslims worldwide, constitutes one of the most direct acts of faith availableto them.

By the timeMuharram arrives each year, Iraq is doing what it has done for more thanthirteen centuries: hosting the world's largest act of collective mourning, onthe ground where that mourning began.

Read more: Discover Iraq: Karbala, where memory breathes and future beckons

Written andedited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

Political actors in Baghdad and across the region areracing to assess the potential implications of the recently announced US-Iranunderstanding, but the outlook in Baghdad remains mixed, balancing hopes ofbenefiting from a possible easing of tensions against caution over whether theagreement will endure or face challenges at the first regional test.

The uncertainty is compounded by Iraq’s own complexpolitical, security, and economic landscape. The country remains deeplyaffected by shifts in relations between Washington and Tehran, as overlapping regional and international interests shape its stability,power dynamics, energy sector, and trade routes.

Read more: Iran and Israel exchange of missiles: What was achieved in the latest confrontation?

According to preliminary announcements, the US-Iranagreement, brokered by Pakistan, includes a halt to military operations acrossthe region, including in Lebanon, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz tointernational shipping, the lifting of Iran’s maritime blockade, and the launchof nuclear negotiations within 60 days.

Although implementation details remain incomplete, theannouncement has already begun shaping market expectations and regionalcalculations, signaling that its impact is likely to extend beyond Washingtonand Tehran to countries such as Iraq.

Imad Al-Musafir, a political analyst close to Iraq’sCoordination Framework, a coalition of mainly Shiite political parties, saidany escalation or stability in the region directly affects Iraq because of itsextensive political and economic ties with neighboring countries.

“The Iraqi political decision-maker needs a clear visionregarding developments in the region,”Al-Musafir told Shafaq News, adding that Iraq must employ it in a waythat serves its interests without compromising national principles andconstants.

In an interview with Shafaq News, Ihsan Al-Shammari,professor of strategic and international studies at the University of Baghdadand head of the Political Thinking Center, noted that Iraq could be among thecountries that benefit most from an end to hostilities between Washington andTehran.

Al-Shammari emphasized that Iraq had suffered significantlyfrom the military confrontation and its political, diplomatic, and economicconsequences. The agreement, he argued, represents an opportunity for PrimeMinister Ali Al-Zaidi’s government to reorganize priorities, particularly onthe political level, through a roadmap for state reform, institutionaldevelopment, and a national project.

Economically, Al-Shammari noted that previous tensions,particularly those involving the Strait of Hormuz, affected Iraq’s oilrevenues. However, he observed that Iraq should take broader advantage of thecurrent easing of tensions by diversifying export routes through Saudi Arabia,Jordan, Syria, and Turkiye.

“Such measures could enable Iraq to export an additional1.4 million to 1.5 million barrels of oil per day. The issue is not only aboutincreasing revenues but also restructuring the economy in response to thelessons of the recent conflict.”

Read more: Iraq to place armed factions' weapons under state control: What we know so far

On the security front, Al-Shammari said the agreement couldstrengthen efforts to place all weapons under state control. “There is nojustification for the existence of weapons outside the state framework,” heindicated, suggesting that the government may be encouraged to address theissue of armed factions within broader understandings involving Tehran.

Al-Shammari also explained that Iraq should move “beyondtraditional approaches” if it wants to maximize the benefits of the agreementand rebuild relations with both the United States and Gulf countries.

Despite the positive atmosphere surrounding theannouncement, Haitham Numaan, a professor of political science at theUniversity of Exeter in the United Kingdom, urged caution in assessing itsimplications. He told Shafaq News that it remains unclear how durable theagreement will be or whether it can be transformed into a lasting reality,adding that “the agreement remains fragile and lacks clarity.”

Al-Heeti pointed out that it is too early to draw firmconclusions about its impact on Iraq, whether positive or negative, clarifyingthat the next phase will be shaped not only by US-Iran relations, “but also bythe American role inside Iraq and the response of Iraqi political forces tothese changes amid ongoing economic pressures.”

The US agenda overseen by the US Presidential Envoy toSyria and Iraq, Tom Barrack, could prove more influential than the broaderUS-Iran relationship, with future developments depending largely onWashington’s policies and Barrack’s plans.

Political writer and analyst Ali Al-Baydar assessed thatthe agreement could provide Iraq with an opportunity that may evolve into alasting advantage if managed effectively, and Baghdad could be among theregional countries most positively affected by the agreement because of itsgeopolitical position and its relations with all parties involved.

Read more: Trump's new Iraq-Syria envoy faces an Iran test Syria never posed

He estimated that developments since October 7, 2023, hadsubjected Iraq to simultaneous pressure from both the United States and Iran,creating political uncertainty and competing loyalties. “Any reduction intensions could help ease domestic polarization and political divisions.”

Economically, the political analyst expected greaterstability to improve the investment climate and strengthen confidence in Iraq’seconomy. From a security perspective, he predicted that the agreement couldreduce reciprocal attacks and limit the use of Iraqi territory as an arena forregional confrontation, “allowing security forces to focus more on prioritiessuch as counterterrorism.”

Shafaq News (Updated at 12:41)

Lebanon did not negotiate the agreement that nowgoverns its fate. On June 14, the United States and Iran announced separatestatements —Trump posting on Truth Social, Iran's Supreme National SecurityCouncil issuing a formal communiqué— each claiming to have reached a memorandumof understanding ending the war.

The two texts shared three facts and little else. Oneof those facts mattered enormously to Beirut: Tehran's statement named Lebanonexplicitly as a front where hostilities would end immediately and permanently.Washington said the deal “will bring Peace and Security to the whole Region,”without mentioning Lebanon by name.

Beirut was not consulted, and its government did notwelcome the announcement so far. That silence, in the political grammar ofLebanese statecraft, was a precise and deliberate response to being writteninto a deal authored entirely over its head.

The Lebanon clause may prove among the agreement'smost consequential and difficult-to-enforce provisions. It names a front thatneither Washington nor Tehran can control on the ground, binds a party, Israel,that is not a signatory and has publicly rejected the clause's authority, andoffers a Lebanese state protection it lacks the domestic capacity to guarantee.The disconnect between what the clause promises and can deliver is thedocument's defining structural weakness, and Lebanon is where that weaknesswill be felt first.

A Party to the Outcome, Not the Negotiation

Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Parliament Speaker NabihBerri on Monday welcomed the US-Iran memorandum of understanding. Aoun said he valued the agreement'sacknowledgment of Lebanon's particular circumstances, and called on all partiesto translate the understanding into practical steps that would end the cycle ofviolence and open a path toward recovery and reconstruction. Aoun also thankedthe states and parties, without naming them, that worked to ensure Lebanon was included in thede-escalation efforts, citing the scale of suffering Lebanese communities hadendured in recent months.

Berri, for his part, said thememorandum preserves Lebanon's full sovereignty without compromising thecountry's independence or freedom of national decision-making.

Aoun had stated earlier that the problem was plain before the MoU was announced. In exchanges with a UN Security Councildelegation, he told visiting officials that Iran was "using Lebanon as abargaining chip in their negotiations with the US. It is unacceptable."The accusation described something precise: Lebanon has functioned throughoutthis conflict as a theater of Iranian deterrence and Israeli military pressure,with Beirut possessing neither the capacity to control its own territory northe diplomatic leverage to shape the frameworks purporting to govern it.

Nothing in the June 14 text changes that. But thetext's silences raise questions more consequential than its stated provisions.There is no clause explicitly prohibiting Israeli forces from issuingevacuation orders to southern Lebanese villages under the cover of a ceasefire,a tactic that would render the agreement's protection theoretical for thecommunities it nominally covers.

The language barring Israel from consolidating themilitary positions it currently holds in southern Lebanese territory was alsoabsent, meaning a ceasefire could freeze an occupation in place rather thanreverse it. And no monitoring mechanism, credible reference body empowered toinvestigate violations, or agreed standard for the definition of a breach werealso announced, which means the party most likely to invoke pretexts forrenewed hostilities faces no institutional obstacle in doing so.

These hypothetical concerns imported from outside thetext follow directly from what the document does not say.

Israel's Position: Outside The Framework, InsideLebanon

No party has been more direct about the MoU's Lebanonclause than Israel, and its directness has taken military as well as diplomaticform. On the evening of June 14, hours before the memorandum was announced,Israeli strikes killed at least three people in Beirut's southern suburbs.Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz issued ajoint statement the same day: "Israel will not tolerate firing at itsterritory."

Netanyahu informed President Trump that Israel doesnot consider itself bound by the Lebanon provisions of the emerging agreement.According to Israeli officials cited by Yedioth Ahronoth, he communicated thatIsraeli forces will not withdraw from Lebanese territory, will maintain currentpositions, and will continue operations against Hezbollah infrastructure—responding to any attack regardless of any framework's provisions.

The Israeli Security Cabinet also convened andexpressed broad support for that posture, but divided on the degree of forceand the diplomatic cost of rupturing ties with Washington.

Operations on the ground continued the following day.Lebanon's National News Agency reported Israeli artillery shelling on Mansouri,Kfar Tibnit, and Nabatiyeh al-Fawqa. The army detonated a remote-controlledarmored vehicle on the Haris-Tibnin road. A drone struck a vehicle in KfarTibnit with reported casualties. Explosions were reported in Khiam. The MoU'sink had not dried before its primary prohibition was being tested militarily.

Read more:Israel's war fell on Christians and Shiites in Southern Lebanon

Israel's underlying logic is consistent with itsstated position throughout the conflict. Finance Minister Bezalel Smotricharticulated it within the cabinet: Lebanon falls within Israel's directsecurity sphere; Iran is the domain of US-led diplomacy. The distinction, inIsraeli strategic terms, means the MoU's Lebanon clause addresses a categoryIsrael simply does not accept as applicable to its ongoing operations. Absentany text explicitly prohibiting Israeli freedom of military and securitymovement inside Lebanese territory —language the MoU does not contain— thatlogic carries no legal counterweight within the agreement itself.

Hezbollah's Veto, And The State's Paralysis

The clause also collides with a domestic reality thatBeirut cannot resolve by political will alone. Hezbollah's leader Naim Kassemrejected the June 4 Israel-Lebanon ceasefire framework, characterizing anydemand for the group's fighters to withdraw from southern Lebanon as"surrender and defeat." That rejection preceded the MoU and wasunaddressed by it.

Lebanon has maintained a separate, US-mediatednegotiating track with Israel, but Hezbollah has consistently insisted onlinking both tracks, conditioning any movement on the Lebanese-Israeli front tothe broader US-Iran framework. The MoU now provides that framework. WhetherHezbollah treats it as sufficient political cover to de-escalate, or as adiplomatic instrument that constrains Israeli action while preserving its ownposture intact, will determine whether the Lebanon clause has any operational meaningon the ground. The Lebanese state has no power to compel an answer in eitherdirection.

That powerlessness extends further. There is noguarantee, inside or outside the MoU, that Beirut will deploy the LebaneseArmed Forces to the south independently of any arrangement with Israel. ALebanese government that was excluded from the negotiations producing thisceasefire has limited political incentive, and arguably limited legaljustification, to implement its provisions unilaterally.

If Beirut concludes that it is not a party to theagreement, it may equally conclude that the agreement creates no obligation onits part to act. The possibility that the Lebanese government withholds adeployment order, from institutional caution, factional pressure, or the logicthat a non-party bears no implementation burden, is precisely the kind ofpre-emptive failure the MoU's drafters appear not to have considered.

There is also the subtler risk that Lebanese politicalauthority, as it has at various points historically, accommodates Israeliframing on Hezbollah rather than resisting it, not through explicitcollaboration but through the language of its public positions and thesequencing of its decisions. The MoU contains no text that functions as astructural obstacle to that drift. Whether those responsible for theagreement's implementation are attending to these possibilities is a questionthe document itself does not answer.

Read more:Lebanon's fragmented power blocks peace with Israel

Diplomatic Recognition Without Enforcement

The Lebanon provision establishes, within a US-Iranbilateral framework, that Lebanon is a covered front, a position Beirut caninvoke in Security Council deliberations, in its dealings with Washington, andin any future negotiations over a permanent agreement. For a government thathas spent months being acted upon rather than consulted, that is a marginal butreal diplomatic foothold.

What the clause cannot deliver is enforcement. It doesnot bind Israel. It does not address Hezbollah's weapons or territorialpresence. It creates no monitoring body, no timeline for Israeli withdrawal,and no consequence for violations. A ceasefire without a verification frameworkis, in the experience of previous Lebanese agreements —the 1989 Taif, the 2006UN Security Council Resolution 1701— a political statement rather than asecurity guarantee. Resolution 1701 prohibited offensive operations in southernLebanon and mandated Israeli withdrawal; nearly two decades later, neitherprovision had been fully implemented when this war began.

The broader unresolved problem of the June 14agreement compounds Lebanon's exposure. Iran's nuclear file, the Hormuzmine-clearance timeline, and the sequencing of a permanent deal each representpotential points of collapse —any one of which could reopen the militarydimension of the conflict and render the Lebanon clause irrelevant before it isever tested. Iran has stated explicitly that permanent negotiations areconditional on prior US compliance with the MoU. Washington has made noequivalent acknowledgment. If that divergence produces a breakdown before theJune 19 signing, or within the 60-day window the agreement reportedlyestablishes for final negotiations, Lebanon will find itself once again insidea conflict it did not choose, operating under a framework it did not negotiate,with no mechanism to absorb the consequences.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

After years of drought described as the worst in more than nine decades,the Euphrates River is bringing Iraq something it has not seen in a long time:an abundance of water.

With around 70% of Iraq’s surface water originating outside its borders,according to the Ministry of Water Resources, the country once again findsitself at the mercy of shifts beyond its control —this time not because ofscarcity alone, but because of a sudden influx moving downstream.

Reversing the Drain

“Iraq possesses irrigation systems capable of absorbing any volume ofwater arriving through the Euphrates without causing floods.”

This assessment from Turhan al-Mufti, adviser to the Iraqi primeminister on water affairs, reflects cautious confidence in Baghdad as theincoming wave approaches. He pointed to an extensive storage network thatincludes Lake Haditha, which still has considerable unused capacity, alongsideHabbaniyah and Razzaza, with additional diversion possible toward ThartharDepression and the southern marshes.

Calling it “a wet year, not a flood year,” al-Mufti portrayed Iraq’sability to cope in simple terms; “any quantity of water, regardless of howlarge.” The additional volumes, he added, could help revive marsh ecosystemsthat have endured years of decline.

The optimism follows a prolonged period of strain. During recent droughtyears, inflows from the Euphrates dropped by more than 50%, according to the Ministryof Water Resources, forcing major adjustments in farming practices and resourceplanning across the country.

Still, al-Mufti cautioned that climate change leaves little room forcomplacency and requires “a measured use” of available supplies.

River levels are only part of the challenge. Iraq’s population hassurpassed 46 million, according to 2024 World Bank data, placing ever-greaterdemands on already strained supplies. International estimates suggest thecountry may require more than $233 billion by 2040 to restore water andenvironmental infrastructure, while nearly 30% of agricultural land hasdisappeared over the past three decades.

In some provinces, agricultural activity has fallen by as much as 50%during severe dry spells, according to the Ministry of Agriculture —a reminderof how quickly changes in river flow can ripple through the wider economy.

As Iraq prepares to capture the incoming water, communities fartherupstream have already experienced its destructive side.

Euphrates flood wave approaches Iraq: Water lifeline or emerging threat?

Breaking Point Across

“The water flooded bridges and major facilities, forcing authorities tocarry out urgent evacuations using local warning systems.”

That was the reality in eastern Syria, where Ali al-Hamad of theMinistry of Local Administration and Environment described emergency operationsstretching across more than 200 kilometers of the Euphrates. Response teams, herecalled, faced “unprecedented challenges.”

Floodwaters swept through Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor before reaching Iraq,inundating farmland and disrupting daily life. Pumping stations stoppedoperating, while residents in several low-lying areas were forced from theirhomes.

Sixty water stations went out of service in the Shamiyah and Jaziraregions. Key crossings, including al-Mayadeen and al-Asharah bridges, sustained damage, and ferry traffic along the river came to a halt.

Syria’s Deputy Energy Minister Osama Abu Zeid linked the rise in waterlevels to a combination of snowmelt in the Turkish upstream basin and growingpressure on reservoirs that prompted the opening of dam spillways.

Warning that conditions “could lead to flash floods and dangerouserosion,” he urged residents to stay away from riverbanks, avoid swimming, andsuspend all activity near the water.

At the Euphrates Dam Institution, Haitham Bakour reported thatoperational teams remained on alert and maintained “operational readiness” toregulate releases and safeguard infrastructure.

Although the immediate danger phase was declared over, the damageremained evident. More than 5,000 dunams of farmland were flooded, affectingaround 2,400 families.

Counting the Drops

The same flow is now being monitored closely in Iraq, where specialistsare tracking both its volume and arrival time.

Water expert Tahseen al-Moussawi noted that releases from Syria “havenot exceeded 2,000 cubic meters per second,” attributing part of thedestruction in eastern Syria to “encroachments and fragile infrastructure leftbehind by years of war.”

The wave is expected to enter Iraq through al-Qaim before reachingHaditha Dam within four days. Described by al-Moussawi as “the first line ofdefense,” the facility can hold more than 10 billion cubic meters, whilecurrent reserves stand at roughly 2 billion.

Farther downstream lies an interconnected chain of storage facilitiesstretching across Habbaniyah, Razzaza, Tharthar, and the southern marshes—enough to accommodate billions of cubic meters. Yet despite that advantage,al-Moussawi argued that water administration continues to suffer from“significant waste and chronic poor planning.”

He estimated that Iraq requires around 20 billion cubic meters of water,while nearly 17 billion cubic meters are expected to arrive from Syria in thecoming days.

The developments upstream have also renewed scrutiny of Iraq’snegotiations with neighboring countries. Pointing to the rapid filling ofTurkish reservoirs, al-Moussawi argued that the situation “raises questionsabout the management of Iraq’s negotiating file,” urging renewed implementationof water-sharing arrangements.

Authorities are already focusing on storage. Bayez al-Zarari ofparliament’s Agriculture, Water and Marshlands Committee described the responseas being handled “in a scientific and carefully planned manner.”

Agricultural releases have been postponed until mid-June to maximizereserves, prioritizing retention over distribution. Monitoring efforts now relyheavily on satellite imagery and international tracking systems.

For al-Zarari, the influx represents a “narrow window, an opportunity tostrengthen water security if it is used properly.”

Read more: A century of promises: Iraq’s water diplomacy with Turkiye and Iran

The Great Reset

The Ministry of Water Resources has also sought to reassure the public.The country, it confirmed, “has the full technical capacity to absorb anyincrease in water releases,” while current indicators, it added, “do not callfor concern.”

The contrast with recent years is stark.

Iraq has just emerged from one of its harshest drought periods since1933. During that stretch, inflows fell to 27% of previous levels and reservesdropped to only 8% of total storage capacity, according to ministry figures.

Climate pressures have intensified that volatility. Average temperaturesin Iraq and northeastern Syria have risen by around 1–2°C since the mid-20thcentury, according to recent World Bank data, while rainfall has declined byroughly 18 millimeters per month in some areas.

Infrastructure damage from years of conflict has further reduced watersupply capacity by nearly 40%, forcing reliance on alternative and often lesssecure sources during periods of scarcity.

As releases from Syrian dams gradually subside, attention is turning toIraq’s ability to capture and distribute the incoming volumes across a networkstretching from Haditha to the southern marshes.

Specialists caution that the challenge lies not in the presence ofwater, but in its timing and distribution. Mismanagement, they warn, could turna regional surge into localized flooding rather than a national gain.

For now, the Euphrates is undergoing a rare reversal. After yearsdefined by drought, the river is carrying an unexpected surplus, leaving Iraqand Syria to adapt once again to conditions shaped by climate pressures anddecisions made upstream.

Read more: Iraq’s water crisis: A structural rewrite of agricultural governance

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

Recent deadly traffic accidents on Iraqi highways have pushed road safety back to the forefront of public concern. Major roads continue to witness recurring human tragedies despite government efforts to modernize traffic enforcement and reduce accident rates.

Despite authorities expanding the use of speed cameras, radar systems, and smart monitoring technologies, the accidents continue to rise. The latest incident was the devastating bus fire on the international highway linking Basra and Dhi Qar, which killed 21 people and injured 19 others as religious pilgrims were returning from Karbala. The accident occurred less than 24 hours after another crash on the same route.

Alarming Numbers, Several Indicators

Official data show that Iraq records around 2,700 traffic-related deaths and more than 11,000 injuries annually. At the same time, the number of registered vehicles has surpassed seven million, a growth rate that increasingly exceeds the capacity of the country’s transport infrastructure.

According to Miqdad Miri, Director of Relations and Media at the Interior Ministry, the deployment of modern radar systems and surveillance cameras has helped reduce traffic accidents by 50% on several key routes, particularly the Baghdad–Karbala, Babil–Karbala, and Najaf–Karbala highways.

The General Traffic Directorate has also reported more than 45,000 traffic violations detected through electronic monitoring systems, with over 41,000 confirmed after review. Yet the recurrence of mass-casualty accidents suggests that the problem extends beyond enforcement alone. Experts argue that Iraq’s road safety crisis is rooted in a combination of human behavior, infrastructure shortcomings, and administrative weaknesses.

Human Error Remains the Dominant Factor

Former Iraqi Transport Minister Salam al-Maliki believes drivers remain the single most significant contributor to road accidents.

Speaking to Shafaq News, al-Maliki said motorists are responsible for more than three-quarters of traffic accidents, with excessive speed remaining the leading cause of fatal crashes, particularly on highways and intercity roads.

He pointed to a range of risky behaviors that continue to endanger road users, including failure to comply with traffic regulations, unsafe overtaking, disregard for right-of-way rules, and the widespread use of mobile phones while driving.

“Driver fatigue is another major concern, especially among bus and taxi operators who travel long distances between provinces,” he stressed, noting that the problem becomes more pronounced during religious pilgrimage seasons, when transport activity intensifies, and drivers often spend extended hours behind the wheel.

Recent Interior Ministry data recorded 157 cases of driving under the influence of alcohol during the first half of 2026, while campaigns targeting mobile phone use behind the wheel remain ongoing.

Roads Fall Short of Safety Standards

While human behavior plays a central role, al-Maliki cautioned against reducing the crisis solely to driver conduct.

He argued that Iraq’s infrastructure problems are equally significant, observing that many roads suffer from potholes, subsidence, and surface distortions caused by inadequate maintenance, conditions that can cause drivers to lose control of their vehicles without warning.

A lack of adequate lighting, road markings, and traffic signs on numerous highways further increases risks, particularly at night. “Poorly engineered diversions and road closures on some highways have become a constant source of unexpected hazards and accidents,” he said.

According to Transportation specialists who spoke to Shafaq News, Iraq’s road network has expanded considerably in recent years, but maintenance and modernization programs have not kept pace. The result is a widening gap between actual traffic demand and the technical readiness of the infrastructure designed to support it.

This imbalance becomes particularly visible during peak travel periods, when roads carry volumes of traffic beyond what they were originally designed to accommodate.

Safety Challenges

Al-Maliki also highlighted concerns over licensing procedures, arguing that lax standards in issuing driving licenses contribute to unsafe road conditions. He further pointed to the importation of vehicles that fail to meet essential safety requirements and to weak oversight of vehicle safety specifications.

These issues suggest that road safety cannot be improved simply by increasing fines or installing additional cameras. Rather, experts indicate that “Iraq requires a comprehensive review of its transportation and traffic management systems.”

Technology Delivers Limited Results

Despite the continuing fatalities, traffic authorities maintain that recent technological measures have produced measurable improvements.

Haider Shaker, head of the Media Division at the General Traffic Directorate, said accident rates have declined noticeably due to the use of modern technologies, stressing that accident trends ultimately depend on the extent to which citizens comply with traffic laws and regulations.

Authorities continue to expand the use of technological tools with the goal of reducing accidents to the lowest possible level. However, most advanced monitoring systems remain concentrated in Baghdad and provincial urban centers.

Large sections of Iraq’s external highways still lack continuous electronic surveillance, limiting the deterrent effect of enforcement measures on roads that frequently record the highest number of fatal crashes.

Read more: $1.2B traffic fix fails: Iraq seeks radical solution

This disparity helps explain why accident reductions in some monitored corridors have not translated into a broader nationwide decline in deadly incidents.

The Root Causes

For lawmakers, the scale of recent losses underscores the need for a deeper reassessment of Iraq’s traffic management policies. Ali Sheikh Khalis al-Barzanji, a member of the Parliamentary Committee on Transport, Communications, and Governance, told Shafaq News that “the first step toward solving the problem is accurately identifying its causes.”

Al-Barzanji said the committee is examining accidents from multiple angles, including road engineering standards, speeding, traffic organization, and the effectiveness of traffic signals and control systems.

“Reaching an accurate diagnosis of the problem will enable the legislative authority to exercise its oversight role”, he stressed, adding that it will also direct the government toward addressing “the real weaknesses behind the repeated accidents.”

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

On the western bank of the Tigris, where Saddam Hussein's former presidential palaces once projected the permanence of his rule, a different kind of permanence has settled. The ruins are quiet now, but they hold, in the soil beneath them and in the water that runs past them, the remains of some of the youngest soldiers Iraq ever lost, young men who walked out of a military base on a summer morning in 2014 and were dead before nightfall.

June 12 marks twelve years since the Camp Speicher massacre, the single deadliest act of terrorism in Iraq's modern history. On that day, ISIS descended on a military air base in Saladin province, about 170 kilometers north of Baghdad, and executed an estimated 1,700 predominantly Shia cadets in a killing operation that spanned multiple sites along the Tigris.

The victims were not combatants. They were Air Force recruits, most of them in their early twenties, in the middle of their training. Some were ordered to leave the base as ISIS closed in. Many were told they would be given safe passage, according to subsequent survivor testimony. They were not.

ISIS documented the killings as propaganda, releasing footage that showed groups of men being marched to riverbanks and ravines before being shot. Bodies were pushed into the Tigris. Others were buried in mass graves around the palace complex. The videos circulated globally and became, for many Iraqis, their first visceral encounter with what ISIS intended to do to their country.

In the days before June 12, the Iraqi military had effectively disintegrated across large parts of the north and west. Mosul, Iraq's second-largest city, had fallen to ISIS on June 10 after government divisions abandoned their posts. The command structure for military installations in the region broke down almost immediately. Cadets at Camp Speicher received conflicting orders and, in many cases, no orders at all.

Security researcher Ahmed Omar, speaking to Shafaq News, described the massacre as the direct product of a total security failure. What occurred, he said, was not simply a mass killing but the consequence of institutional collapse on a scale that left thousands of unarmed young men without protection or direction at the moment they needed it most.

Camp Speicher, named after American pilot Scott Speicher whose plane was shot down during the 1991 Gulf War and whose remains were later recovered there, sat in Saladin province —the heartland of Iraq's Sunni Arab population and the birthplace of Saddam Hussein. The cadets who died were overwhelmingly from Iraq's Shia-majority provinces in the center and south; therefore, according to survivors who spoke to Shafaq News anonymously, the sectarian dimension of the killing was explicit: “ISIS chose its victims by religion, separating Shia recruits from Sunni ones before carrying out the executions.”

Um Diyaa, 65, sits every June in front of a photograph of her son, who was 24 years old when he was killed. In an account shared with Shafaq News, she described their last phone call, days before the massacre. "He said, ' Do not be afraid, I will come home soon." He did not come home. She later recognized him in one of the ISIS videos, among the men lined up at the river.

Abbas al-Mohammadawi lost two brothers at Speicher. He told Shafaq News that the grief of losing them was compounded by years of not knowing. "The real pain," he said, "was not just the news of their deaths. It was the years of waiting, before their remains were found and their identities confirmed."

After Iraqi forces retook Tikrit in 2015, forensic teams began excavating mass graves around the presidential palace complex. Dozens of burial sites were identified. DNA testing continued for years. By the tenth anniversary in June 2024, Iraqi authorities had recovered the remains of approximately 1,200 victims, according to statements by lawmaker Moeen al-Kadhimi, who heads the Tikrit Massacre Commemoration Committee. Al-Kadhimi called at that ceremony for the massacre site to be designated a federal sanctuary and for memorials to be constructed in every province.

The legal record of the massacre has accumulated slowly but with growing weight.

By August 2016, Iraqi courts had sentenced more than 50 individuals to death for their participation in the killings. Thirty-six of them were executed by hanging at Nasiriyah prison, with the Justice Minister present to oversee the proceedings. Iraqi judicial authorities have continued prosecuting additional suspects in the years since, though some cases remain open.

Read more: Amnesty Law does not cover inmates convicted in Speicher massacre

The most significant international legal assessment came in June 2024, when the UN Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh/ISIL (UNITAD) handed a milestone report to Iraq's Supreme Judicial Council. The report, titled "Camp Speicher: A Pattern of Mass Killing and Genocidal Intent," concluded that there are reasonable grounds to believe the killings were carried out with genocidal intent, in the context of a broader ISIS policy of genocide against Shia Muslims in Iraq. UNITAD also found grounds to believe the acts constituted crimes against humanity and war crimes under international law.

The findings were submitted alongside evidence packages collected by UNITAD's investigative unit.

For some families, the legal proceedings have not provided a measure of acknowledgment. Relatives of victims who have not yet had their remains recovered told Shafaq News that justice remains incomplete as long as the fate of missing individuals is unknown.

In Tikrit itself, where the killings took place, Hassan Ali, a resident, told Shafaq News that the execution sites have become symbols of grief that the city has not been able to set aside. "What happened was too large to be forgotten. Local residents joined the search operations after liberation and assisted forensic teams working to identify victims.”

Lawyer Adnan al-Jubouri, speaking in the context of the eleventh anniversary, told Shafaq News that Speicher must remain in the collective memory not as a sectarian wound but as a rejection of both sectarianism and political violence. "The Speicher crime is not just a local tragedy — it is a national one," he said.

Twelve years on, more than 800 victims remain unaccounted for, according to the International Organization for Migration, which has worked alongside Iraqi forensic authorities and the victims' families. The search continues.

Shafaq News

Long before the opening whistle of the FIFA World Cupsounded in distant stadiums, Baghdad had already begun its own celebration.Iraqi flags appeared on restaurant facades and café terraces, players’ imagesspread across screens and billboards, and businesses rushed to capitalize on arare moment as the national team returned to the tournament after a 40-yearabsence.

In a city where football often shapes the public mood, theWorld Cup has become more than a sporting event. It has evolved into a socialand commercial season, with fans searching for large screens andair-conditioned venues to escape the summer heat, while businesses compete toattract customers through football-themed promotions and viewing experiences.

Restaurants and cafes across Baghdad say they are preparingfor large crowds during Iraq’s matches. With soaring temperatures and limitedaccess to some broadcasts due to subscription costs, many supporters are optingto watch games in public venues rather than at home.

A Long-Awaited Return

For many Iraqis, the national team’s participation carriessignificance beyond football.

“It is a source of pride to see the Iraqi flag raised atthis international event and to have representation at the World Cup,” MustafaHassan, a player in a local amateur team, told Shafaq News.

Like many in his generation, Hassan views the tournament asan opportunity to reconnect with a sense of national pride that has been absentfor decades.

Iraq will compete in a challenging group alongside Norway,France, and Senegal in its first World Cup appearance since the 1986 tournamentin Mexico.

Hassan said he and his teammates have already arrangedgatherings with friends to watch the matches on giant screens and support thenational side. Yet he also noted another side of the World Cup atmosphere inBaghdad. “Most of these advertisements are purely promotional andcommercial and have little to do with the tournament itself,” he explained,adding that the businesses see it as a good opportunity for marketing andprofit because the competition attracts huge interest among Iraqis. 

Read more: Iraq prepare for historic World Cup return against Norway

Brands Join the World Cup Wave

The blend of national enthusiasm and commercial activity isvisible throughout the capital.

Soft drink companies have redesigned packaging with Iraqinational colors and football-themed imagery. Restaurants have introduced WorldCup-branded meal packaging and promotional slogans, while shops have decoratedstorefronts with football-themed displays. Even everyday consumer products,from canned goods to potato chips, have incorporated tournament-relatedbranding.

Twenty-year-old Rana, who does not usually follow football,said Iraq’s qualification has changed her attitude toward the competition. Thistime is different because the Iraqi team is participating, she told Shafaq News,adding, “I am excited to watch the matches with my family.” However, she believes many advertising campaigns surroundingthe national team's participation are driven primarily by commercial interests.“They do not provide real support to the team. They are mainly trying to markettheir products and make profits.”

Read more:Golden Boot or Golden Ball? World Cup 2026 stars chase history

Marketing Opportunity

Ali Al-Lami, a marketing expert, stated that some of thecampaigns fall under “ambush marketing,” where businesses seek to benefit froma major public event without necessarily being official sponsors.

“The World Cup, especially with Iraq’s return, has become apowerful attraction,” Al-Lami told Shafaq News, explaining that Companies,restaurants, and cafes “see it as an opportunity to advertise, attractcustomers, and increase revenue.” He also pointed to “opportunistic marketing,” in whichbusinesses capitalize on major local or international events for commercialgain. Many companies are less concerned with the tournament itself than withfilling seats and attracting customers, regardless of whether Iraq wins orloses. “Such campaigns reflect a broader reality of modern markets,” he said, indicating that brands constantly seek moments that unite people around a shared emotionand "attempt to transform that sentiment into consumer demand."

Divided Opinions

Baghdad residents remain divided over the growing commercialpresence surrounding the tournament.

Muaid Abdul Hussein, 33, said businesses exploiting majorevents is a global phenomenon rather than a uniquely Iraqi one. “Big eventsalways encourage companies to advertise through campaigns that spread acrossstreets, stores, and social media.” While acknowledging that such marketing often seeks tobenefit from public emotions, he said it is not entirely negative. “Theseadvertisements keep people connected to the event and remind them of itconstantly.”

Others take a different view. Abdul Qader Abdul Rahmanbelieves excessive advertising detracts from the spirit of the tournament.

“The World Cup is an event everyone knows and follows everyfour years,” he stressed, noting that the Iraqi public already knows where andhow to watch the matches, “so it does not need this volume of advertising.” He argued that some campaigns are intrusive and focus moreon promoting businesses than on celebrating the tournament or supporting thenational team. “For me, football is a beautiful game that should be enjoyedaway from attempts to turn every moment into a sales opportunity.”

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

Iran's Kurds have occupied a unique position in the MiddleEast's Kurdish landscape for decades. Unlike neighboring Iraq, where Kurdishself-rule evolved into a recognized autonomous Region, Iran's Kurdishpopulation remains part of a highly centralized state. Yet Kurdish identitycontinues to shape political debate inside the country, with Kurdishcommunities participating in elections, public institutions, and national lifewhile pressing for greater recognition, cultural rights, and a stronger voice inlocal governance.

Stretching across Iran's western frontier, Kurdishcommunities have preserved a distinct language, culture, and identity. Theirrelationship with Tehran, however, has rarely been static; it has shiftedthrough periods of cooperation and confrontation, political participation, andarmed resistance, often reflecting broader transformations within the IslamicRepublic itself.

Fourteen Percent Fractured

Although Iran does not conduct an official ethnic census,most international estimates place the country's Kurdish population between 12million and 15 million people —around 14% of the total population— making theKurds one of Iran's largest non-Persian communities.

What is often referred to as Iranian Kurdistan is not anofficial administrative unit but a broad geographic and cultural regionencompassing the provinces of Kurdistan, Kermanshah, West Azerbaijan, and Ilam.Major cities, including Sanandaj, Mahabad, Saqqez, Bukan, and Piranshahr, havelong served as centers of Kurdish political, economic, and cultural life.

The region's mountainous landscape has played a definingrole in its development. Stretching across the Zagros Mountains and borderingboth Iraq and Turkiye, much of Iranian Kurdistan has historically remainedconnected to neighboring Kurdish regions through trade, migration, and socialties, while the rugged terrain helped preserve strong local identities.

At the same time, decades of internal migration haveexpanded the Kurdish presence far beyond the country's western provinces. LargeKurdish communities can now be found in Tehran, Karaj, Isfahan, and Mashhad,giving the community a growing presence in many of Iran's major urban centers.

Yet Iran's Kurds are far from a single, uniform group.Sorani, Kurmanji, Southern Kurdish, and Gorani are spoken across differentregions, reflecting significant linguistic diversity. Religious affiliationsare equally varied. While Sunni Muslims constitute the majority in many Kurdishareas, particularly in Kurdistan Province, large Shia Kurdish populations(known as Feylis) live in Kermanshah and Ilam. Smaller Yarsani (Ahl-e Haqq)communities, along with limited Christian populations, add further layers tothe region's social and cultural mosaic.

Integration without Autonomy

Few issues illustrate the Kurdish experience in Iran moreclearly than the gap between participation and recognition.

Kurds vote, run for office, and serve across the state'sinstitutions. Kurdish candidates regularly win seats in the Majles (Iranianparliament), while Kurdish citizens work throughout local administrations,universities, government agencies, and the private sector.

Yet political participation has not translated intocollective rights. Unlike Iran's recognized religious minorities, Kurds receiveno constitutionally guaranteed representation. Five of the parliament's 290seats are reserved for Armenians, Assyrians, Jews, and Zoroastrians, but nocomparable provisions exist for the country's ethnic communities. Kurdishlawmakers, therefore, reach parliament through electoral victories inKurdish-majority constituencies rather than through a quota system.

For many Kurdish activists, that distinction lies at theheart of the debate. Tehran frequently points to Kurdish participation inelections and public institutions as evidence of inclusion. Kurdish politiciansand activists argue that individual representation does not amount torecognition of Kurdish political identity or collective rights. The dispute hasresurfaced repeatedly in debates over language rights, political appointments,and unfulfilled promises to Kurdish voters. Former Kurdish lawmaker AbdullahSuhrabi voiced that frustration after filing a lawsuit against former PresidentHassan Rouhani over commitments he contended were "never honored,"remarking that Kurdish voters had backed him "for the sake of obtainingour rights."

The same divide appears at the administrative level. UnlikeIraq's Kurdistan Region, which has its own parliament, government, and securityforces, Iran's Kurdish-majority provinces remain fully integrated into thecountry's centralized structure. Successive governments have categoricallyrejected proposals that could open the door to territorial autonomy, arguingthat centralized governance and national unity are essential to preservingstability.

Mistrust Deeply Rooted

Many of the dynamics shaping Kurdish politics in today'sIran trace back to the turbulent years surrounding the fall of the Pahlavimonarchy and the establishment of the Islamic Republic.

Under the Shah, political activity in Kurdish regions facedtight restrictions, driving much of it underground. In that environment, two ofthe most influential Kurdish organizations in Iran —the Kurdistan DemocraticParty of Iran (KDPI) and Komala— consolidated their political identities andexpanded their networks.

The 1979 Islamic Revolution initially raised expectationsamong many Kurdish activists that the collapse of the monarchy would open spacefor greater political freedoms, cultural rights, and local authority. Thoseexpectations quickly collided with the priorities of the new leadership inTehran.

Disputes over governance, autonomy, and the structure of thestate soon escalated into armed confrontations across Kurdish provinces. Citiesincluding Sanandaj and Mahabad became centers of conflict as IslamicRevolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) units launched operations against Kurdishgroups, which mobilized armed supporters in response.

The fighting is estimated to have claimed between 10,000 and20,000 lives, according to data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP).Although large-scale clashes gradually subsided during the 1980s, their legacyendured, reinforcing cycles of militarization and mistrust that continue toshape Kurdish-state relations decades later.

Read more: Iran’s protests between economic crisis and political contestation

Reimagining the Resistance

The organizations that have defined Kurdish politics in Iranfor decades now operate largely beyond the country's borders, primarily frombases in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region. While they differ in ideology, strategy, andlong-term vision, most share a common objective: expanded rights,representation, and self-governance for Kurdish communities.

At the center of this landscape stands the KDPI. Founded inMahabad in 1945, it is widely regarded as the oldest and most influentialKurdish party in the country. Its platform calls for a federal and democraticIran in which Kurdish-majority areas hold broad authority over local affairswhile remaining within the state.

A broadly similar objective has long guided Komala, thoughits history has been marked by ideological debates, internal splits, andshifting factions. Rooted in leftist student and labor movements, it hasevolved but remains a major force in Iranian Kurdish politics, advocatingdemocratic reform, decentralization, and expanded political freedoms.

Neither KDPI nor Komala participates in Iran’s electoralsystem or holds seats in the Majles. Both are banned by Iranian authorities andhave operated for decades from Iraqi Kurdistan. Their influence rests less onformal representation and more on their historical role in Kurdishmobilization, along with sustained ties to communities inside Iran and acrossthe diaspora.

A different model is advanced by the Kurdistan Free LifeParty (PJAK), which emerged in the early 2000s. Drawing on the ideas ofAbdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK),PJAK promotes democratic confederalism —a system centered on grassrootsgovernance, local councils, gender equality, and decentralized decision-making.It also maintains an armed presence in border areas, placing it among theKurdish groups most closely monitored by Iranian security institutions.

Beyond these larger actors, smaller organizations such asthe Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK), the Khabat Organization of IranianKurdistan, and the Kurdistan Hardworking Group remain active in Kurdishpolitical life. None matches the influence of KDPI, Komala, or PJAK, buttogether they reflect the fragmentation that has long defined the politicallandscape.

Efforts to narrow those divisions have surfacedperiodically. In 2025, PAK, PJAK, Khabat, and the Kurdistan Hardworking Groupjoined KDPI in a new alliance aimed at improving coordination among Kurdishopposition groups in Iran.

Speaking to Shafaq News, Karim Parwizi, a senior KDPImember, described the initiative as part of a “historic responsibility” todefend Kurdish rights and advance “a democratic system that upholds justice andequality.”

Read more: 650 Strikes in Iraqi Kurdistan: How deniability became a weapon

Slogans and Shrapnel

If there is one external arena that has shaped contemporaryKurdish politics in Iran more than any other, it is Iraq’s Kurdistan Region.

For decades, the Kurdistan Region has functioned as both arefuge and an operational base for Iranian Kurdish opposition groups. Thatreality remains a persistent source of tension with Tehran, which accusesseveral of those organizations of supporting unrest and engaging in activitiesit views as threats to national security.

The issue returned to the spotlight following the death ofMahsa Amini in September 2022. A 22-year-old Kurdish woman from Saqqez, MahsaAmini, died in the custody of Iran’s morality police in Tehran, triggeringnationwide demonstrations that became one of the most serious politicalchallenges faced by the Islamic Republic in recent years.

Kurdish cities quickly emerged among the most active protestcenters. Demonstrations repeatedly erupted in Saqqez, Sanandaj, Mahabad, andBukan, while the slogan “Woman, Life, Freedom” —rooted in the Kurdish phraseJin, Jiyan, Azadi— became the movement’s defining rallying cry.

As unrest spread, Iranian officials increasingly turnedtheir focus to Kurdish opposition groups, accusing them of amplifying proteststhrough messaging networks and cross-border influence.

Iranian lawmaker and former IRGC commander Mohammad EsmailKowsari stated that “Kurdish separatist groups, especially the PDKI, Komala,and PJAK, sought to take control over some areas in Iran’s Kordestan province,”adding that their presence contributed to the deployment of IRGC forces inwestern Iran.

The organizations named in those accusations rejected theclaims. Komala described Kowsari’s remarks as “unfounded” and “politicallydriven,” arguing they were intended to justify possible cross-border strikesagainst its positions.

The unrest sparked by Amini’s death marked only one layer ofa broader shift surrounding Iran’s Kurdish opposition movements. As tensionsbetween Iran, the United States, and Israel escalated in subsequent years,Kurdish groups increasingly appeared in discussions over possible regionalescalation scenarios.

Reports cited by international media outlets, includingReuters and Axios, suggested Kurdish factions had been included in contingencyplanning tied to Western and Israeli intelligence assessments in the event of apossible confrontation with Iran. The debate intensified further afterpolitical remarks, including comments attributed to US President Donald Trump,indicating openness to Kurdish participation in a potential strike on Iran.

For Kurdish opposition groups, the discussion reinforced alongstanding reality: political visibility does not automatically translateinto operational capacity.

Speaking to Shafaq News, Khalil Kanisanani, spokesperson forthe Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK), noted that any meaningful involvement in amilitary campaign would depend heavily on external support. Such a role, heargued, would require “a real US military and logistical support, not merelypolitical backing or media statements.”

Kanisanani also pointed to a “major vulnerability” forIraq’s Kurdistan Region itself. “Kurdistan remains largely without effectiveair defense protection,” he noted.

While acknowledging the presence of limited US defensivecapabilities in Erbil, he added that no clear guarantees exist for broaderprotection should a large-scale regional war erupt.

Ultimately, Kurdish factions were not drawn into the jointUS-Israeli war on Iran that began on February 28. Even so, several groupspublicly signaled readiness to become involved if what they described as“favorable conditions and an enabling environment " emerged.

The conflict nevertheless carried direct consequences forKurdish opposition movements.

Following the outbreak of the war, Iranian forces carriedout repeated strikes inside Iraqi Kurdistan, targeting “oppositioninfrastructure.” According to Community Peacemaker Teams–Iraqi Kurdistan(CPT-IK), the Kurdistan Region recorded 809 drone and missile attacks betweenFebruary 28 and April 20, 2026. The strikes left 20 people dead and 123injured, with roughly 31% of the assaults targeted at facilities used byIranian Kurdish opposition groups.

The campaign continued even after the April 8 US-Iranceasefire.

Shafaq News reported at least 15 additional attacks onopposition-related sites following the truce. Komala recently indicated thattwo Iranian missiles struck one of its sites in Erbil, adding that Iranianforces have carried out more than 82 missile and drone strikes against itsheadquarters and military positions since regional tensions escalated.

Those developments underscore the complex position Kurdishgroups from Iran continue to occupy. Despite their demographic weight and longpolitical history, their movements have often struggled to translate influenceinto unified action. Differences in ideology, strategy, and priorities continueto shape the Kurdish political landscape, even as many groups pursue similardemands. How those movements navigate those divisions may prove as important totheir future as their relationship with Tehran itself.

Read more: Caught between war and neutrality: Kurdistan navigates escalating US-Iran confrontation

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

The man in the ward does not look like someone undersentence. His day begins with exercise, then classes and vocational training,before he returns at night to a room with no bars on the door, in a buildingwhere no one is watching to make sure he does not leave.

Not long ago, someone in his position would have ended up inan overcrowded cell, sharing space with dealers and leaving with more contactsthan when he entered. A senior officer in Basra, separate from the officialscited later in this report, described the dynamic bluntly when he told ShafaqNews that prison turned users into dealers.

Iraq has begun shifting its approach to drug addiction bydirecting users into rehabilitation centers instead of prison, expanding asystem that has already handled about 8,000 cases nationwide. At the Al-RusafaRehabilitation Center in Baghdad, that shift is visible on the ground, even ifits outcome remains uncertain.

Law and Rollout

The change is rooted in Article 32 of Iraq's Drug andPsychotropic Substances Law No. 50 of 2017, which allows courts to replaceprison sentences with placement in rehabilitation centers. For years, theprovision existed largely on paper, as the country lacked the capacity toenforce it. That gap has narrowed. The Interior Ministry's General Directoratefor Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances has established 16 rehabilitationcenters across Iraq —three in Baghdad and the rest distributed across the provinces.

Brigadier General Ziyad Al-Qaisi, a senior official at thedirectorate, told Shafaq News the shift reflects lessons learned from years ofenforcement. Treating users and traffickers as a single category, he said,often produced repeat offenders and in some cases fed the same networksauthorities were trying to dismantle. “The alternative is to treat users aspatients, particularly those drawn into addiction through social pressure andunstable economic conditions.”

More than 6,800 people have completed treatment and returnedto their communities, while roughly 1,200 remain in care, according toAl-Qaisi.

At Al-Rusafa, treatment follows a structured model developedjointly by the ministries of Interior and Health, known internally as the"four-plus-one" program. Dr. Mohammed Abdul Karim, the center'sphysician, described a progression from detoxification through psychologicalsupport, physical rehabilitation, and vocational training. The fifth stagecontinues after discharge, with trades such as carpentry, tailoring, andmetalwork offered to address a gap that medical care alone cannot fill.

The man who lost his government job is in the final weeks ofthat program. He speaks about returning to work, rebuilding his routine, andavoiding the same circles that led him into addiction, aware that those circleshave not disappeared, but that what has changed is his distance from them.

After leaving the center, former residents remain in contactwith community police units under a framework described as "halfwayhouses," a model in which former residents remain under light supervisionwhile reintegrating into their communities, aimed at reducing relapse. Thesystem remains limited in reach but marks a clear break from earlierapproaches, where intervention ended at the prison gate.

Read more: Iraq fights back against synthetic drug flood engulfing the Middle East

Supply and Circumstance

A second resident, who arrived by court order six monthsearlier, described his path more simply: unemployment, environment, and thepull of friends. He speaks about recovery with caution and without definingwhat comes next.

Youth unemployment in Iraq is about 32 percent, according toWorld Bank data from 2025, limiting options for those leaving structuredprograms. In Basra, appellate court figures show that around 90 percent ofarrested drug offenders were unemployed at the time of their arrest.

Psychotherapist Ahmed Mohammed Shaker links the problem todeeper disruptions in Iraq's social fabric after 2003, weakened familystructures, and prolonged instability that left many without consistent supportsystems. Addiction, in his framing, emerges less as an isolated choice and moreas a condition shaped by environment.

Supply meanwhile remains active. The United Nations Officeon Drugs and Crime (UNODC) describes Iraq as both a growing consumption marketand an emerging production point. Authorities seized more than 4.1 tons ofCaptagon —a synthetic amphetamine widely trafficked across the Middle East— in2023 alone, while investigations uncovered a production laboratory inAl-Muthanna province and suspected sites near several northern cities.

Trafficking routes run through three main corridors: thenorth through the Kurdistan Region, the west through Al-Anbar and the Syrianborder, and the south through Basra. Those routes are sustained, according tothe UNODC, by weak border control and, in some alleged cases, by armed groupswith commercial interests in the trade.

The Open Question

Rehabilitation centers address individuals who enter thesystem, but they do not dismantle supply networks or eliminate the economicpressures that make addiction more likely. Inas Karim, head of the civilsociety organization A Drug Free Iraq, has warned that stigma and fear of legalconsequences still prevent many families from seeking help, leaving asignificant share of cases outside formal treatment entirely. Data shows thenumber of Iraqis receiving treatment for drug use disorders more than doubled between2017 and 2021 —a figure that exposes rising demand as much as it reflectsexpanding capacity.

Iraq's rehabilitation system marks a clear shift, replacingincarceration with treatment and offering a path that did not previously exist.Centers function, and people return to their communities. What thosecommunities offer in return remains the open question.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

Any sense of calm following the latest exchange of strikesbetween Iran and Israel quickly dissipated as tensions shifted to a new frontinvolving Tehran and Washington.

The United States launched airstrikes on several Iraniantargets after an American Apache helicopter was downed over the Strait ofHormuz, an incident Washington blamed on Iran. Tehran, in turn, pledged aresponse, casting doubt over the durability of the fragile de-escalation andraising questions about whether the confrontation will remain limited orjeopardize the negotiations currently taking place between the two sides underPakistani mediation.

A brief but intense round of direct military confrontationbetween Iran and Israel ended with a mutual halt to air and missile attacksless than 24 hours after the escalation began, returning the region to thefragile calm that has largely held since the April 8 agreement.

The rapid de-escalation followed a night of cross-borderstrikes that underscored both the risks of a wider regional war and theconstraints facing the main actors involved. While military operations stoppedalmost as quickly as they started, analysts interviewed by Shafaq News suggestthe confrontation reflected broader struggles over deterrence, regionalinfluence, and the future of ongoing US-Iran negotiations.

Escalation Followed by Swift Restraint

The latest exchange began after Iran’s Islamic RevolutionaryGuard Corps launched around 30 ballistic missiles and drones targeting areas innorthern and central Israel, including the Ramat David Airbase. Tehran describedthe operation as retaliation for an Israeli strike on Beirut’s southern suburbsthat killed two people and wounded 11 others.

Israel responded with airstrikes against 20 targets inTehran, Isfahan, and Tabriz, as well as the Bandar Mahshahr petrochemicalcomplex in southern Iran. The strikes also targeted strategic air defensesystems that Iranian authorities had deployed to rebuild capabilities damagedduring previous operations.

The confrontation ended after Iran’s Khatam al-AnbiyaCentral Headquarters announced the conclusion of military operations followingwhat it called a “painful response.” Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahusubsequently confirmed a temporary halt to Israeli strikes while warning thatany renewed Iranian attack would trigger a forceful response.

At the same time, Israel’s Defense Ministry emphasized thatmilitary operations in Lebanon would continue independently of anyunderstanding reached with Tehran, highlighting the compartmentalized nature ofregional conflicts.

Many observers view the latest escalation through the lensof negotiations that have been underway for two months between Washington andTehran in an effort to end the conflict that began on February 28.

According to Egyptian military strategist Samir Farag, thetalks had already made significant progress on two major disputes before thelatest exchange of fire.

The first concerns Iran’s nuclear program, particularly thefate of approximately 450 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent. Faragtold Shafaq News that negotiators had moved close to an arrangement that wouldreduce enrichment levels within Iranian facilities to 3.67 percent, thethreshold generally associated with civilian uses such as electricitygeneration and water desalination.

The second major issue involves frozen Iranian assets.According to Farag, Tehran has insisted that the release of those funds remainsa top priority, reflecting mounting economic pressures at home.

Negotiators, he said, appeared to have reached a frameworkallowing the funds to be directed toward humanitarian needs, includingmedicine, essential goods, and social assistance, while ensuring they would notbe diverted to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or to Hezbollah.

Farag indicated that most aspects of the proposedarrangement had already received preliminary approval and that momentum wasbuilding toward a possible formal announcement as early as next Thursday,coinciding with the opening of the 2026 FIFA World Cup.

Nevertheless, Farag believes both Washington and Tehranremain committed to a diplomatic solution, while Israel continues to displaygreater willingness to sustain military pressure.

New Deterrence Rules

From Tehran’s perspective, the confrontation served abroader strategic objective than simple retaliation.

Iranian affairs specialist Mahdi Azizi argued that theoperation was designed to establish new rules of engagement by signaling thatfuture attacks on Beirut’s southern suburbs would provoke a direct Iranianresponse.

Azizi told Shafaq News that Iran remains committed tosupporting its regional allies in Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, and Palestine and seesthe protection of those partners as part of its wider deterrence strategy.

The US administration faces multiple constraints, includingpreparations for midterm elections, the approaching World Cup, and growingconcerns that Yemen could expand the confrontation by threatening shippingroutes through the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Red Sea, Azizi explained.

Netanyahu has political incentives to prolong confrontation,linking the prime minister’s calculations to efforts to remain in power andavoid legal challenges stemming from corruption cases that have repeatedlydelayed his trial.

Azizi attributed the rapid de-escalation to three mainfactors: US pressure on Israel to avoid a wider regional war, Washington’sefforts to limit the scope of military operations despite approving a limitedresponse, and Netanyahu’s decision to reject calls from hardline ministersBezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir to strike Iranian energy facilities,citing the potential international fallout of such a move.

Yemen’s Role: A Broader Regional Strategy

The latest crisis also marked the return of Yemen’s Houthimovement to direct military action since the April ceasefire.

Yahya Saree, the group’s military spokesman, announced acomplete ban on Israeli-linked maritime traffic in the Red Sea and revealedthat two missiles had been launched toward the Tel Aviv area. Israeli airdefenses intercepted one projectile, while the second landed in an open area.

For Yemeni politician Salah Al-Sayyadi, the latestdevelopments place the next move squarely in Washington’s hands.

In an interview with Shafaq News, he said the United Statesmust now decide whether to accept the current balance of deterrence andpreserve opportunities for diplomacy or pursue further escalation that couldundermine ongoing negotiations.

He stressed that Yemen remains in a state of ceasefire withWashington but warned that any direct US military intervention alongside Israelwould carry consequences.

More broadly, Al-Sayyadi indicated that the so-called “Axisof Resistance” has succeeded in reversing a long-standing strategic challenge.Rather than allowing the United States and Israel to isolate and confrontindividual fronts separately, he said, the alliance has increasingly fragmentedAmerican and Israeli priorities, forcing them to manage multiple arenassimultaneously.

Read more: Israel reshapes southern Lebanon: Displacementand settlement fears

Fragile Calm, Unresolved Questions

The speed with which the latest confrontation ended suggeststhat neither Iran nor Israel currently seeks a full-scale regional war. Yet theepisode also demonstrated how quickly localized incidents can escalate intodirect interstate conflict.

Behind the temporary calm lies a larger contest involvingnuclear diplomacy, regional deterrence, domestic political calculations, andthe role of allied non-state actors across the Middle East.

For now, the ceasefire has restored a measure of stability.Whether that stability endures depend on battlefield developments more than onthe outcome of negotiations between Washington and Tehran, and on thewillingness of regional actors to accept emerging rules of engagement thatremain far from settled.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

The Peshmergaoccupied a unique place in the Kurdistan Region's political consciousness longbefore becoming part of Iraq’s federal framework after 2005. For the vastmajority of Kurds, the force represents far more than a military institution.Its name, commonly translated as “those who face death”, emerged from decadesof struggle between the Kurdish national movement and central governments inIraq and the wider region.

Today, thathistorical legacy stands at the center of a growing political dispute. As Iraqrevisits the issue of restricting weapons to state control, concerns havesurfaced over whether the Peshmerga should also fall within the scope of thosediscussions. The debate has exposed deeper disagreements over federalism,constitutional authority, and the balance of power between Baghdad and Erbil.

A Force Rootedin History

The origins ofthe modern Peshmerga trace back to the early twentieth century, before takingshape as a more organized force through successive Kurdish uprisings andpolitical movements that intensified during the 1950s and 1960s.

Following theKurdish uprising of 1991 and the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003, thePeshmerga gradually evolved into the Kurdistan Region’s official securityinstitution. Their position gained further recognition with the adoption ofIraq’s Constitution in 2005, which established a broader frameworkacknowledging the Region and its governing institutions, including its securityapparatus.

For thisreason, Kurdish leaders maintain that the Peshmerga cannot be treated as amilitary force subject to political bargaining. In Kurdish collective memory,the force embodies experiences ranging from the Anfal genocide, chemicalattacks, displacement, and internal conflicts to the fight against ISIS, whenlarge sections of Iraq’s defense lines collapsed while the Kurdistan Regionremained largely under the protection of its own forces.

That symbolismfeatured prominently in recent remarks by the head of the Kurdistan DemocraticParty (KDP) leader Masoud Barzani. Widely regarded by many Kurds as acontinuation of the Peshmerga’s political and military legacy, Barzaniportrayed the force’s weapons as more than a conventional arsenal, underscoringtheir role as a symbol of sacrifice, dignity, and historical securityguarantees.

Read more: Kurdistan’s 10th cabinet: Interlocking alliances and persistent political differences

How thePeshmerga Entered the Disarmament Discussion?

The backdrop tothe current controversy lies in renewed efforts to address the issue of weaponsoutside direct state control. The debate returned to the forefront as theUnited States and regional actors intensified pressure on Shiite armed factionsallied with Iran.

Initiallycentered on the future of groups operating beyond state institutions, thediscussion gradually expanded in some political circles to encompass theposition of the Peshmerga.

Politicalfigures in Iraq have circulated reports of a proposal attributed to TomBarrack, the US ambassador to Turkiye and presidential envoy for Iraq andSyria, suggesting that all armed formations, including certain Shiite factionsand the Peshmerga, should be brought under the umbrella of Iraq’s armed forcesand the authority of Baghdad. The proposal, however, has yet to emerge as anofficially declared US position.

Nevertheless,the concept gained traction in domestic political discussions. According toofficial statements and experts interviewed by Shafaq News, some Shiitefactions opposed to disarmament, or reluctant to place their militarycapabilities entirely under Baghdad’s control, have sought to include thePeshmerga in the same framework.

Their argumentcenters on a seemingly straightforward question: if all weapons are to beplaced under state authority, why should the Kurdistan Region’s forces beexempt?

Kurdishofficials, legal specialists, and security experts reject that comparison. Theyargue that it overlooks the distinction between a regional force whoselegitimacy derives from constitutional provisions within a federal system andarmed factions that emerged or expanded under exceptional political andsecurity circumstances after 2003 and during the campaign against ISIS. Many ofthose groups, they note, continue to face scrutiny regarding politicalloyalties, military chains of command, and links to regional conflictsextending beyond Iraq’s official decision-making structures.

Statementsissued by some factions have reinforced perceptions that efforts are underwayto shift the debate from the dilemma of armed groups to a broader comparisoninvolving both the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and the Peshmerga.

Nazem Al-Saidi,head of the executive council of the US-sanctioned Harakat Al-Nujaba, toldShafaq News that the Iraqi “resistance” does not impose red lines regardingdiscussions on surrendering weapons. He nonetheless tied any such process tothe withdrawal of foreign military bases from Iraq, an end to “financial andeconomic dependency, and distancing the country from political decisionsdictated by the US Embassy.”

Al-Saidifurther stated that factions which had relinquished their weapons may havechosen to move from the “resistance project” toward participation in thepolitical process, stressing that Harakat Al-Nujaba believes weapons should notbe surrendered “except to Imam Mahdi,”* given what he characterized as thedangers and challenges surrounding Iraq.

He alsoquestioned why pressure remains concentrated on factional and PMF weaponswhile, in his view, no equivalent attention is directed toward “the weapons ofextremist groups or the Peshmerga forces.”

Kurdistan’sConstitutional Position

For Kurdishofficials, this is precisely where the Peshmerga became part of a debate notinitiated by Erbil. They interpret references to the force as an attempt eitherto broaden the discussion or to portray American and governmental pressure asselective. In Erbil’s view, the comparison deliberately conflates twofundamentally different issues in law, politics, and history.

Security expertJabar Yawar, a former senior official in the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs anda prominent observer of security relations between Baghdad and Erbil, dismisseddiscussions about dissolving or disarming the Peshmerga as lacking any legal orpractical basis.

Speaking toShafaq News, Yawar stated that neither Iraqi nor international officials haveissued formal or informal calls for such measures, emphasizing that currentdiscussions focus on specific factions, including Asaib Ahl Al-Haq, KataibHezbollah Iraq, Harakat Al-Nujaba, Kataib Sayyid Al-Shuhada, and Kataib ImamAli— not the Peshmerga.

Yawar pointedto Article 121 of the Iraqi Constitution, which grants regions the right toestablish and organize internal security forces, including police, securityservices, and regional guards. On that basis, he argued that the Peshmergaconstitute the Kurdistan Region Guard, operating within a constitutionalframework rather than outside state authority.

Consequently,any attempt to alter the force’s status could not be accomplished throughpolitical agreements, external pressure, or arrangements between Baghdad andarmed factions. Such a move, according to this interpretation, would require acomplex constitutional and legislative process because the Peshmerga are notgoverned by an ordinary federal law that can be amended in the same manner aslegislation regulating other formations.

At thelegislative level, Iraqi lawmaker Sarwa Mohammed likewise asserted that anyeffort to dissolve the Peshmerga would violate the Constitution and contradictthe principles of Iraq’s federal system, which guarantees the Kurdistan Regionthe right to maintain its own security institutions.

She describedthe Peshmerga as a constitutional and professional force responsible forprotecting the Kurdistan Region’s borders, security, and stability, affirmingthat it should not be included in debates concerning weapons outside stateinstitutions.

“Confusing thePeshmerga with armed factions does not resolve the weapons issue,” Mohammedsaid, “It opens the door to a constitutional crisis between Baghdad and Erbil.”

At the sametime, she disclosed the existence of an initiative proposed by the State of LawCoalition, led by Nouri al-Maliki, aimed at addressing the status of certainarmed factions through integration into Iraq’s official military and securityinstitutions. Noting the ongoing discussions between the Iraqi government andseveral factions regarding mechanisms for surrendering weapons or incorporatingfighters into formal structures, she stressed concern that armed groupsoperating outside official institutions do not involve the Peshmerga.

Read more: Opinion: KDP, PUK, and the fracturing of Kurdish political partnership in Iraq

Washington’sPerspective

FromWashington, Kurdish affairs and US foreign policy researcher Delovan Barwarisaid the Peshmerga cannot be viewed as a temporary force or an armed groupestablished outside the state. Instead, he described it as a recognizedregional guard force fulfilling an acknowledged security role.

In remarks toShafaq News, Barwari characterized proposals advocating the dissolution of thePeshmerga as both unconstitutional and irrational because they conflict withthe constitutional framework through which Iraq recognized the Kurdistan Regionand its right to maintain regional security forces within a federal system.

He recalled theperiod following the fall of Saddam Hussein, when the Kurdistan Regionpreserved a degree of stability while much of Iraq experienced violence andinstitutional breakdown. Barwari also highlighted the Peshmerga’s role inconfronting extremist organizations ranging from Al-Qaeda to ISIS andcooperating with international coalition partners to safeguard Iraq and thebroader region.

Regarding theAmerican position, Barwari dismissed the notion that decision-makers inWashington are pursuing a serious effort to dismantle the Peshmerga.

“I do not seecredible evidence of a US effort in that direction,” he said, describing such proposalsas political messaging linked to internal Iraqi dynamics that tend to surfaceduring periods of tension between Baghdad and Erbil.

Similarassessments have come from American military figures who worked alongside thePeshmerga during the campaign against ISIS. Retired US Army Colonel MylesCaggins, former spokesman for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, went beyondrejecting calls to dissolve the force, portraying it as a valuable securitypartner whose capabilities should be strengthened rather than reduced.

Caggins, nowfounder & CEO of Words Warriors, a consulting and government relationsfirm, described the Peshmerga as “a long-standing security force fullyauthorized under the Iraqi Constitution.” He emphasized its role in maintaininginternal security in the Kurdistan Region and its record as a dependable USpartner during key military campaigns, from the period following SaddamHussein’s fall to the fight against ISIS.

He argued thatlocally established security forces recognized by the federal system reflectIraq’s geography, history, language, and social realities. Caggins also calledon the United States and allied countries to deepen cooperation with thePeshmerga and expand support in areas such as technology, training, andcounter-drone capabilities.

PoliticalBalancing or State Consolidation?

Lahib Higel,Senior Iraq Analyst at the International Crisis Group, rejected suggestionsthat Washington is actively pressing for the dissolution of the Peshmerga orits integration into federal forces. Instead, she viewed the discussion as adomestic political maneuver linked to Baghdad’s internal balance of power.

Speaking toShafaq News, Higel observed that the proposal may represent an attempt byfederal authorities to reassure Iran-aligned factions facing pressure overtheir weapons by presenting the issue as one affecting all forces operatingoutside Baghdad’s direct control.

She cautioned,however, that such an approach could have significant repercussions forrelations between Baghdad and Erbil while also intensifying divisions withinKurdish politics, particularly between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and thePatriotic Union of Kurdistan, given existing disputes over Peshmerga reform andunification.

That internaldimension introduces another layer of sensitivity. Some researchers contendthat divisions within the Peshmerga’s military structure provide politicalopponents in Baghdad with additional opportunities to use the issue asleverage.

Yasser Kuoti, aMiddle East analyst and doctoral student in political science at BostonUniversity, pointed to signs of a broader US inclination toward strengtheningthe authority of the federal government. At the same time, he stated that thePeshmerga’s organizational structure remains partially influenced by thehistoric division between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the PatrioticUnion of Kurdistan (PUK).

Although Erbiland its western partners have spent years pursuing reforms aimed at unifyingforces under the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs, Kuoti noted that “the issuecontinues to supply some actors with arguments for bringing the force underfederal authority.”

He alsosuggested that calls for integration may stem from pressure exerted by Iraqipolitical groups seeking a parallel arrangement. In that context, factionsfacing demands to submit to state authority may insist that any effort toregulate weapons should apply equally to all armed forces.

RegionalDynamics and the Weapons

Iraqi strategicaffairs researcher Kazem Yawar noted that restricting weapons to state controlremains one of the key objectives included in the government’s program. Whilethe issue is not new, he said, recent regional developments and the ongoingconfrontation involving the United States, Israel, and Iran have pushed it backto the forefront of political and media discourse.

According toYawar, Washington has publicly advocated implementation of the principle thatweapons should remain under state authority, prompting extensive discussionacross official, media, and public spheres. The issue has also attractedattention from both the United States and Gulf states because of concerns overarmed faction activity and its potential impact on American and Gulf interests.

Yawar notedthat the Kurdistan Parliament enacted the Ministry of Peshmerga Law No. 19 of2007, and provided a clear legal framework for the Region Guard. He alsocontrasted the Peshmerga’s legal status with that of the PMF. The PMF emergedunder exceptional circumstances and was later regulated through legislationadopted in 2016, a law that can be revised through federal constitutionalmechanisms. The Peshmerga, by contrast, derive their status from constitutionalprovisions and regional authorities, making dissolution or full integrationimpossible without constitutional amendments or legislation issued by theKurdistan Parliament.

Kurdish Syrianpolitical analyst Shvan Ibrahim remarked that attempts to include the Peshmergain disarmament initiatives reflect a perception among some actors of Kurds as apermanent adversary or threat to the state.

Speaking toShafaq News, Ibrahim described comparisons between the Peshmerga and factionsthat he said “spread corruption, destruction, and devastation in Iraq andneighboring countries” as historically and politically unjust.

“The Peshmergadid not threaten neighboring states, did not attack Gulf countries, and did notharm civilians or politicians,” he said, adding that “Instead, they protectedKurdistan and millions of displaced people and refugees, including Iraqi andSyrian Arabs who fled ISIS, armed factions, and militias.”

He furtherindicated that the Peshmerga protected Iraqi political leaders during the earlystages of the Iraqi Governing Council, the provisional government of Iraq from13 July 2003 to 1 June 2004, and parliament, contributed to the defense ofMosul and other areas, and played a major role in the war against ISIS. Anyeffort to dissolve the force, he warned, “would trigger one of Iraq’s mostserious national crises by reviving a centralized model of governance thatconcentrates power in federal institutions and risks reproducing authoritarianpractices.”

Ibrahim alsoaddressed comparisons with Syria, where debates continue over the futureintegration of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into state institutions. Inhis view, “the parallel is flawed.” The SDF emerged during a civil war and amidthe collapse of central authority, whereas the Kurdistan Region of Iraq is aconstitutionally recognized federal entity with elected institutions, locallegislation, and security forces whose existence is explicitly protected underIraqi law.

Read more: Iraq to place armed factions' weapons under state control: What we know so far

A Test ofIraq’s Post-2003 Order

The disputeover the Peshmerga’s place in Iraq’s weapons debate extends far beyond technicaldiscussions about security arrangements. It has become a political andconstitutional test of the state established after 2003.

Efforts toinclude the Kurdistan Region’s forces in disarmament discussions may appear, onthe surface, to be attempts to distribute pressure more evenly or createnegotiating balance. Yet such efforts collide with a fundamental distinctionbetween a regional force grounded in constitutional authority and historicalexperience, and armed formations whose relationship with the state remainscontested.

As Baghdadseeks to reinforce centralized security decision-making under both domestic andinternational pressure, Erbil regards any challenge to the Peshmerga as achallenge to the foundations of federal partnership itself.

In that sense,many observers believe that any approach failing to recognize this distinctionmay not advance the goal of regulating weapons. Instead, it could open the doorto a new constitutional confrontation between Baghdad and the KurdistanRegion—an outcome few actors appear willing to risk.

*In TwelverShiite doctrine, Imam Al-Mahdi is the hidden twelfth Imam who is believed toremain in occultation until his return at the end of times. His reappearance isexpected to usher in an era of justice and righteousness after a period ofturmoil and oppression.

Written andedited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

Iraq’s legal framework forregulating digital content was written for a different era. Decades-old penalprovisions and a media regulator conceived under post-invasion occupation lawnow constitute the primary tools available to a state confronting TikTokalgorithms, viral music videos, and an online population that isoverwhelmingly, irreversibly young.

A wave of fast-paced songs featuringsexually suggestive lyrics and nightclub imagery has spread rapidly acrossIraqi social media, drawing condemnation from parents, educators, and religiousvoices. The controversy focused on content, and that Iraq lacks the regulatoryframework to govern the platforms carrying that content, and every monthwithout legislative reform is a month the gap grows.

More than half of Iraq’s populationis under 25, according to the Ministry of Planning and United Nationsdemographic estimates. That demographic reality is the foundation of the story.A 2023 UNICEF survey found that 78 percent of children aged 10 to 14 access theinternet daily via smartphones, the majority without supervision or contentboundaries; 40 percent reported encountering harassment or inappropriatematerial. A 2024 study by Iraq’s Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs sharpenedthat picture further, testing smartphones and tablets purchased from Baghdadand Basra markets under typical family conditions —fresh out of the box,default settings intact. Most devices arrived with disabled filters,unrestricted browsers, and open app stores.

Platforms popular among Iraqichildren, such as TikTok and Snapchat, require multiple steps to enable safetyfeatures that most parents do not know exist. These are the predictableconsequences of a regulatory system that was never designed to address them.

Abdul Hussein Al-Ghazi, a Baghdadresident, told Shafaq News he had restricted his children’s smartphone accessentirely, “not as a precaution, but as a necessity.” Explicit content, he said,had entered schools and public spaces “through songs containing wordsunsuitable for their age and upbringing.” What Al-Ghazi describes as a parentaldecision is, in effect, a governance failure displaced onto households.

Educational supervisor Abdul AlimKhalid identified the institutional dimension of that failure. The classroom,he told Shafaq News, is increasingly in competition with the algorithm andlosing. The vulgarity pervasive in social media content directly affectschildren’s behavior, he argued, pointing to a contradiction no curriculumadjustment can resolve: “schools teach one set of values while the platformschildren inhabit for hours each day reinforce another.”

Social researcher Manhal Al-Salehsaid the consequences are moral and psychological at the same time, "Thiscontent does not just offend, it distorts. Adolescents are forming theirunderstanding of human relationships through what they watch, and thosedistortions do not disappear when the video ends."

She called for coordinated actionacross religious, educational, and media institutions, alongside stricterdigital monitoring and stronger enforcement of child protection law.

Al-Saleh's prescription isreasonable; however, the enforcement apparatus to deliver it does not yetexist.

Iraq’s Communications and MediaCommission (CMC) holds nominal regulatory authority over digital content.Established in 2004 under an executive order issued by Paul Bremer, thenadministrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority that governed Iraq afterthe US-led invasion, the CMC was designed for a broadcasting landscape oftelevision licenses and print publishers. It was not built for platforms whosemoderation decisions are made by engineers in California and whose algorithmsoperate entirely outside Iraqi jurisdiction. Since 2022, its board has comeunder the effective control of political blocs aligned with the CoordinationFramework, the dominant parliamentary coalition, meaning enforcement decisionsare also politically inflected.

Iraq’s Penal Code —Law No. 111 of1969— includes provisions criminalizing the publication of materials deemedcontrary to public morals, and the CMC has moved, at least on paper, to draft aregulation on digital platforms that would require social media companies toappoint a liaison officer, establish content take-down processes, and notifythe CMC before launching services in Iraq. On the ground, a source within theInterior Ministry told Shafaq News that authorities intervene only aftercomplaints are filed. Videos may lead to account monitoring, suspension, or thedetention of content creators. The Ministry acts in an enforcement capacity;responsibility for blocking content sits with the CMC. What is absent is aunified digital content law that defines harmful material with precision,establishes age-verification requirements with technical force, and createsmechanisms for holding platforms, rather than individual accounts, accountable.

The human cost of that absence isnot abstract. In April 2024, TikTok creator Ghufran Mahdi Sawadi, also known asUmm Fahad, 28, was shot dead by a motorcyclist outside her home in Baghdad’sZayouna district. She had previously been sentenced to six months in prison forposting videos a court deemed indecent. She was not the first Iraqi socialmedia personality to be killed; TikToker Noor Alsaffar had been fatally shot inthe city the year before. The pattern illustrates something that no regulatorybriefing captures cleanly: in Iraq, the space between legal prosecution andstreet-level violence against content creators is unregulated and, for some,deadly. Any discussion of digital governance that omits this context isincomplete.

Technical expert Ammar Al-Luhaibiidentified the operational limits of what currently exists. Platforms nominallyrequire parental consent for users under 16, he told Shafaq News. In practice,verification mechanisms are trivially bypassed. "Authorities can act onindividual accounts, but the problem is structural. You cannot treat a systemicfailure one account at a time.”

TikTok’s reach in Iraq now surpassesthat of every other platform; the app added 2.35 million users in 2024 alone,bringing total social media penetration in the country to 73.8 percent of thepopulation, according to the Digital Media Center. A regulatory frameworkoperating outside the jurisdiction of the platform, most rapidly expanding itsfootprint among Iraqi youth, is, by definition, insufficient.

Iraq is not the only country in theregion confronting this challenge, but it is conspicuously behind its neighborsin legislative response. Egypt’s parliament is actively drafting legislation torestrict children’s social media access, following a direct call from PresidentAbdel-Fattah al-Sissi. Morocco is debating similar measures. The UAE hasenacted a Child Digital Safety Law with enforceable age-based restrictions.These approaches carry their own risks —UNICEF warned in December 2025 thatoutright bans may backfire, pushing children toward less regulated platforms —but they represent legislative engagement with the problem. Iraq has not yetreached that threshold.

Read more: Children in chains: How Iraq’s digital safety fails the ‘Online Generation’

Periodic campaigns have recurred foryears in Iraq, generating the same cycle: viral content, public backlash,selective enforcement, renewed debate, and no structural change. Critics haveconsistently warned that without clear legal definitions and transparentstandards, crackdowns risk inconsistency and selective targeting rather thangenuine child protection. Conservative groups, meanwhile, continue pressing forstronger action and framing the issue as one of moral preservation. Betweenthose positions, the actual policy work —legislative modernization, technicalcapacity-building, sustained platform engagement— tends not to happen.

The digital economy complicates thepicture further, as Iraq’s growing influencer culture and the nightlifeentertainment content at the center of this controversy are not marginalphenomena. They represent, according to observers, an economic activity, audiencemarkets, and for women who dominate that space, professional livelihoodspursued at considerable personal risk. Purely prohibitionist approaches cannotaccount for that reality, and Iraqi regulators have so far declined to engagewith it directly.

Iraq’s demographic trajectoryensures this problem does not resolve itself. The problem facing lawmakers nowis whether to pursue structural reform —clarified regulatory authority, legallyprecise definitions of harmful content, investment in technical enforcementcapacity, and direct engagement with global platforms— or to continue managingeach cycle of outrage as it arrives.

Written and edited by Shafaq Newsstaff.