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A weapons-free Srifa: Southern Lebanese return home without feeling safe

Sat, 15 Aug 2026 19:33:48 +0000

Shafaq News

In one of three southern Lebanese villages chosen to test expanded statecontrol, residents share a respect for the Army, and little else about whatsecurity should now mean.

Ibrahim came home to Srifa after the latest ceasefire in a car weigheddown with everything his family had carried into displacement. The southernLebanese village was not the one they had left. His two-story house had beenleveled during the war. "I came back with my family and everything weowned, but there was no home to come back to," Ibrahim told Shafaq News.

He cleared what he could from the rubble and began looking for somewhereelse for his family to live. It was not easy. Thousands of residents werereturning at once, and the wartime destruction had sharply cut the village'shousing stock. Compensation had reached no one, he said, and he saw little signthat help was near. "Now, all I am thinking about is how I can get my homeback. Who will pay me?"

His uncertainty runs through everything unfolding in Srifa, a village inthe Tyre district that has become one of three pilot zones in southern Lebanon,alongside Froun in the Bint Jbeil district and Zawtar al-Gharbiyeh in theNabatieh district. The arrangement is meant to strengthen the authority of theLebanese state and to ensure the designated areas are free of weapons held byHezbollah, the Lebanese Shiite movement that operates both as a political partyand an armed force.

On Srifa's streets, where a municipal official says roughly 90 percentof an estimated 8,000 residents have come back, the experiment has opened aharder debate than the one it was designed to settle. Residents respect theLebanese Army without exception. What they cannot agree on is what the Army isthere to do.

A Pilot Zone Where Little Has Changed

Srifa was never occupied by Israeli forces, and the Army did not arrivefor the first time under the new arrangement. Soldiers were in the villagebefore it was designated a pilot zone, and little has changed since, amunicipal official told Shafaq News.

At least two Army checkpoints operate in Srifa now, and patrols movethrough the streets. Soldiers sometimes stop vehicles and ask foridentification, but residents interviewed by Shafaq News said no private homeshad been searched.

Hassan, 18, displaced to Mount Lebanon during the war, sees the Army'spresence as protection. "I hate war. We got nothing from it. I want theArmy here because I want the village to be safe," he said. His friendJawad measures security differently. "It is our duty to stay here anddefend our land. Instead of guarding Israel, the Army should cooperate with theresistance so Israel withdraws from our villages."

Asked whether they would let soldiers into their homes if a searchbecame necessary, the two friends answered without hesitation and in oppositedirections. "Yes. I have no problem with that," Hassan said. Jawad:"Absolutely not. I would never accept anyone entering my house to searchit."

Respect Army, Disagree Over Mission

That divide cuts across generations. Ali, around 21 and displaced tonorthern Lebanon during the fighting, welcomed the Army's expanded presencewhen he returned, saying it made him feel safer and drew him closer to theLebanese state.

Hanaa, 44, sees it almost inversely. "The Army should be defendingLebanon, not guarding Israel's interests," she said. Hanaa lost her sonduring the war, after he stayed in Srifa rather than leaving with otherdisplaced residents.

For Abu Hussein, state authority and Hezbollah are not necessarily atodds. "We respect the Lebanese Army, but there must be cooperation betweenthe Army and the resistance so Israel leaves our land," he said.

The split runs even between siblings. "The Army should not juststay here," said Zainab. "Either it acts, or it should leave."Her sister Khadija answered her directly: "No, the Army should stay.Others should leave." She praised how the soldiers treat residents andrespect their privacy.

Taken together, the interviews resist any tidy reading of Srifa as avillage that simply accepts or rejects the pilot-zone model. Among those whospoke to Shafaq News, respect for the Army was close to universal. Thedisagreement lay in the harder questions beneath it: who should providedeterrence, what the Army should be expected to do, and how far state authorityshould extend in the drive to make the village weapons-free.

Shafaq News asked Hezbollah for its position on the pilot-zonearrangements in Srifa; the group declined to comment. Residents seen assympathetic to Hezbollah nonetheless spoke of respecting the Army andcooperating with soldiers. There is no visible armed Hezbollah presence onSrifa's streets.

Weapons-Free, But Safe?

Strip weapons from the village, and a further problem remains, one thatmay decide whether residents judge the experiment a success. What does aweapons-free village get in return?

Those interviewed doubted that the arrangement, on its own, could keepfuture Israeli attacks away. The doubt matters more in Srifa precisely becausethe village was never occupied. In places where an Israeli withdrawal offers animmediate, visible measure of progress, residents have something concrete topoint to. Srifa has no such marker, and it is testing whether expanded Lebanesestate control can, by itself, become long-term security.

The stakes extend beyond the village. Israeli officials have tied widerpullbacks from positions in southern Lebanon to progress on disarmingHezbollah, while the United States has backed both the pilot-zone mechanism andthe expansion of Lebanese military authority. For Srifa's residents, thediplomacy comes down to a plainer worry about whether they can rebuild withoutlosing everything a second time.

Home, But Not Rebuilt

The war is hard to leave behind when its wreckage is still the view fromthe window. A municipal official told Shafaq News that the war damaged around550 buildings in Srifa, with 350 destroyed and another 200 partially damaged.

Some families whose houses were destroyed are sheltering in schools.Others remain displaced elsewhere in Lebanon or abroad. In some cases, severalfamilies share a single home because they have nowhere else to go. Electricityand water, according to the official, run only part of the time. Much of thedebris has been cleared, but damaged buildings are still part of the landscape.

The economic ground is no steadier. Mustafa,54, once ran a shop in thevillage; it was destroyed. For now, he will not reopen it. "Why would Irebuild if another war could come and destroy everything again?" he said.Reconstruction takes money, and confidence that what is rebuilt will still bestanding next year. Residents say compensation has yet to reach those who losthomes, and few expect it soon. Families are physically back in Srifa, butwithout the homes and businesses they left with, and without much certaintyabout what comes next.

Whether They Can Stay

The residents disagreed about Hezbollah's weapons, the Army's mission,the prospect of searches, and what a real defense of southern Lebanon wouldlook like. On one point, their answers converged. "I don't believe thiswas the last time," one resident said of the possibility of another war, afear that every resident interviewed by Shafaq News expressed, whatever theirpolitical differences.

That shared doubt may be the most consequential test the pilot-zoneexperiment faces. The state can set up checkpoints, widen patrols, and pushweapons out of public view, and still not answer the thing residents actuallyuse to measure security, which is whether they can stay.

For Ibrahim, that begins in the ruins of his house. For Mustafa, itdecides whether a shop is worth reopening. Hassan and Jawad have already turnedit into rival ideas of how their village should be defended.

Srifa may be one of three villages chosen to test a new security orderfor southern Lebanon. For the people who have come back to it, the concern ismore immediate: whether coming home this time can finally mean staying.

*Lebanon and Israel signed the “Framework Agreement” on June 26,establishing pilot zones where the Lebanese Army would assume control afterarmed groups are disarmed and their infrastructure dismantled.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Iraq and the Mecca Defense Pact: Strategic neutrality or growing isolation?

Fri, 14 Aug 2026 09:40:29 +0000

Shafaq News

As a newsecurity order takes shape across the Middle East, Iraq has stayed outside theMecca Joint Defense Agreement signed on August 7 by Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, andPakistan, despite sitting at the geographic center of the region the pact ismeant to defend. Baghdad's absence raises a question its own divided politicalclass has yet to answer: is this deliberate neutrality, or the drift of a stateno longer able to act as a reliable partner?

The pact didnot emerge in a vacuum. It is a direct product of the war that erupted when theUnited States and Israel struck Iran on February 28, and of the retaliationthat followed: Sauditerritory was hit repeatedly by Iran, by the Houthis in Yemen, and byShia armed groups operating from Iraqi soil. That last detail moves Iraq fromthe margins of this story to its center: the territory of a state professingneutrality has already been used to strike one of the pact's architects.

What thethree signatories built in response is a mutual-defense guarantee of unusualweight. The agreement commits them to treat an armed attack on any one as anattack on all —a NATO-style clause binding a top oil exporter, NATO'ssecond-largest military, and the only nuclear-armed Muslim state. Together theyfield roughly 1.4 million active personnel, some 3,400 aircraft, 6,000 tanks,and more than 340 naval assets, according to the 2026 Global Firepower Index.Nor is the pact a one-off: it builds on the Saudi–Pakistan strategic defenseagreement signed in Riyadh in September 2025, the product of nearly a year ofnegotiation.

Riyadh hasseparately backed a multinational maritime initiative to protect shippingthrough the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb. Iraqicrude does not travel those routes; its exports leave through the Gulf and theStrait of Hormuz, but the distinction only sharpens Baghdad's exposure: theHormuz corridor sits squarely inside the Iran confrontation, and disruptionalong any of these waterways moves the global oil price that funds theoverwhelming majority of Iraq's budget. On none of the arrangements now formingto protect them does Iraq hold a seat.

Iraqconfronts these arrangements from a position of institutional fragility that ismore than rhetorical. The government of Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi was swornin on May 14 as the youngest premier in Iraq's history and the firstnon-politician to hold the office. It took power with only a partial cabinet:parliament could not agree on the interior and defense portfolios, leaving thecountry weighing whether to join a collective defense pact without a confirmeddefense minister to assess it. The symbolism is difficult to overstate.

Not everyonereads Iraq's absence as a failure. Amer al-Fayez, head of the IraqiParliament's Foreign Relations Committee, sees no cause for alarm. "Everyagreement has its own circumstances and reasons," he told Shafaq News,noting that the Mecca pact concerns its three signatories, who did not invitethe wider region to join. Baghdad, in his account, can pursue security andeconomic cooperation with neighbors on its own terms without binding itself toany bloc, and prefers arrangements that lower tensions to alliances that forceit to pick a side.

Given thatIraq maintains working ties with Iran, Turkiye, the Gulf states, and the UnitedStates at once, joining a collective defense structure could carry consequenceswell beyond the treaty text.

Politicalresearcher Khaled al-Ardawi argues the reality is less flattering. Iraq, hetold Shafaq News, still lacks a coherent foreign policy it can implementconsistently, leaving it in a "gray zone" of international relations."The Iraqi government is not fully capable of making an independentforeign decision on political, security and defense issues without taking intoaccount the positions of external parties."

He tracesthe constraint to internal division, institutional weakness, corruption, andthe presence of weapons outside state control —a reference, above all, to thePopular Mobilization Forces (PMF), the Iran-aligned paramilitary umbrella whosefactions the government does not fully command. Those same conditions, henotes, make regional and major powers reluctant to sign long-term defenseagreements with Baghdad in the first place. The paradox is sharp: Iraq mayavoid alliances to preserve flexibility, yet its divisions are precisely whatdeter others from treating it as a dependable partner.

Politicalresearcher Adel al-Ghariri locates the roots deeper in the past. The US-ledinvasion of 2003, the collapse of the security system in 2014 and the rise ofISIS, and the long contest over the shape of the state pushed Iraq away fromits Arab surroundings and hollowed out its capacity to act as a central playerin regional security. The drift toward sub-state loyalties and the spread ofarms beyond state control, he told Shafaq News, "have made Iraqi politicaldecision-making more complicated." He sees possibility in the al-Zaidigovernment, but frames the objective carefully: positioning Iraq betweencompeting regional poles rather than inside any one of them.

Turkishanalyst Jawad Gok notes that entering a collective military framework now coulddrag Baghdad into conflicts it has no interest in joining, at a moment of acutefriction involving the Gulf and Iran, and Turkiye and Israel. "Iraqcurrently tends toward bilateral agreements of a developmental and economicnature rather than collective military strategies," he said, adding thatany decision to join new security arrangements "requires time to assesstheir future and whether they will serve Iraqi interests."

Abu Bakral-Deeb, director of the Arab Thought Development Forum for Research, reads thesame caution as the product of overlapping US, Iranian, Turkish, and Arabinterests inside Iraq, a crowded field in which any visible tilt invites areaction, and in which armed factions add a further layer of sensitivity.

Non-alignmentbuys diplomatic room, but al-Deeb is blunt about its price. Integrated airdefense, intelligence sharing, maritime coordination, and large-scale jointexercises are increasingly being built without Iraq, and staying outside thosenetworks “risks leaving Baghdad to develop its defenses more slowly than itsneighbors, and to react to regional shifts rather than shape them.”

The cost isnot abstract in a region where security now travels with energy and trade. Asingle disruption in the Red Sea or the Gulf can move oil markets within hours;Saudi Arabia's July agreement to supply the internationally recognized Yemenigovernment with up to $150 million in oil derivatives for electricity andessential services shows how tightly security, energy, and development havefused. Iraq's absence from the security layer does not exempt it from theeconomic consequences.

Yet distanceis not the same as irrelevance. A recent assessment by Pakistan's Institute ofStrategic Studies casts Iraq not as an arena for others' competition but as adiplomatic actor, an energy player, and a bridge across the region's economicmap —a country whose ability to keep channels open to Tehran, the Gulf,Washington, and Ankara at once could be turned into leverage and even amediating role.

What mostanalysts agree on is that the choice cannot be deferred indefinitely. Al-Fayez holds that Iraqcan strike security and economic agreements based on national interest; Gokcounsels patience before committing to untested alliances. For al-Ardawi, noneof it is possible until Baghdad rebuilds its decision-making from within:addressing the divisions, institutional weakness, corruption, and unregulatedweapons that keep partners at arm's length. Al-Deeb offers not membership inany bloc, but "flexible security partnerships" with Egypt, Jordan,the Gulf states, and Turkiye across counterterrorism, border security,cybersecurity, and energy infrastructure —cooperation that stops short ofanything that could read as aimed at a third state— paired with sustainedinvestment in Iraq's own forces, air defenses, and military industries.

Thetrajectory suggests the window for that kind of deliberate, à la carteengagement is narrowing as the region's blocs harden around it. Iraq can stillchoose to make its neutrality a tool. But a state that cannot yet name its owndefense minister will struggle to persuade anyone that its absence from theregion's new alliances is a strategy rather than a symptom, and the longer thequestion goes unanswered, the more the answer is settled by others.

Written andedited by Shafaq News staff.

Nearly four weeks of attacks on the Kurdistan Region of Iraq

Thu, 13 Aug 2026 09:58:43 +0000

Shafaq News

Drones,missiles and shelling struck Iranian Kurdish opposition bases and Peshmergapositions across Iraq's Kurdistan Region between July 17 and August 12, killingat least nine people and wounding at least eight.

Iran claimedresponsibility for part of the campaign, while other strikes were launched frominside Iraq or remain unattributed, according to Kurdistan Region PrimeMinister Masrour Barzani and statements from the targeted parties.

The basesstruck belong mainly to Iranian Kurdish opposition parties —Kurdistan Toilers'Party (Komala), the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), the KurdistanFreedom Party (PAK), and the Khabat Organization of Iranian Kurdistan— armedgroups opposed to Tehran that hold positions in Erbil and Al-Sulaymaniyah provinces.Erbil also hosts United States sites, including a US consulate, while thePeshmerga, the official armed forces of the Kurdistan Region, maintainpositions in the areas targeted.

The Human Toll

All nineconfirmed deaths occurred in a single strike. On July 17, missile fire hit aKomala position at Zargwez, near Al-Sulaymaniyah, killing nine oppositionfighters, according to the group. Five days later, an attack on a PAKheadquarters wounded six of its members.

Between July 27and August 12, Shafaq News documented two people wounded, both Komala membershurt in a missile strike on August 11.

Two Phases OfStrikes

Between July 17and 25, Shafaq News recorded close to 20 strikes divided along two targetlines: bases of Iranian Kurdish opposition parties in Al-Sulaymaniyah andwestern Erbil, and US-linked sites around Erbil. Air defenses associated withthe US consulate intercepted drones over Erbil on several occasions, withdamage limited to falling debris and small vegetation fires, according to theUS-led Global Coalition against ISIS and Kurdistan security sources.

ErbilInternational Airport stayed open throughout. PAK accused Iran of using whitephosphorus munitions in a drone strike on one of its bases west of Erbil andcalled for an international investigation.

Between July 27and August 12, Shafaq News documented at least 10 distinct attack episodes.Seven of them targeted Iranian Kurdish opposition organizations, two struckPeshmerga positions at Tekeran on July 28 and Tasluja on August 2, and onestrike near Jasana Cave in Al-Sulaymaniyah province on August 1 hit anunidentified target.

Weapons AndLocations

Drones were thedominant weapon. Shafaq News counted at least 21 across the period: four onJuly 27, three on July 28, one on July 29, five in two July 31 attacks, two onAugust 1, two on August 2, and four on August 12. Iran used an unspecifiednumber of additional drones on August 8. Three missiles were confirmed in theAugust 11 strike, a possible fourth struck Mount Haibat Sultan on July 27, andthe weapon used against the Peshmerga at Tekeran was not specified.

Several strikeshit evacuated or lightly occupied sites, and material damage was reportedrepeatedly at party headquarters, camps, and nearby buildings. On July 31, asuicide drone struck the Khabat Organization headquarters at Topzawa, along theErbil–Makhmour road, and guards failed to bring down one aircraft with lightweapons.

Iran's ClaimsAnd Attribution

Iran wasexplicitly identified as responsible for the August 8 drone strikes on Komalapositions near Al-Sulaymaniyah and the August 11 missile strike on Komalaheadquarters in Alana Valley, north of Erbil. Most earlier attacks were notattributed to a specific perpetrator.

On July 25,Iranian army spokesperson Mohammad Akraminia said Iranian forces had destroyedUS infrastructure in the region. "Especially in Erbil, Iraq, almost all ofAmerica's infrastructure has been destroyed, and the counter-revolutionaryforces are unable to operate," he said in remarks reported by Iranianmedia, using Tehran's term for the Iranian Kurdish opposition.

Tasnim, a newsagency close to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), attributed a firein Al-Sulaymaniyah to projectiles fired from Iran. The KRG and the main Kurdishparties blamed Tehran directly and called on it to halt the attacks.

PM Barzani saidin a TV interview that some attacks had originated inside Iraq, includingdrones launched from the direction of Mosul, and later stated that the widercampaign had come either directly from Iran or from armed groups operating onIraqi territory.

IranianBrigadier General Mojtaba Jafari claimed on August 3 that the Iranian army's23rd Airborne Special Forces Brigade had carried out 14 ground operations inErbil and Al-Sulaymaniyah, killing and capturing opponents. Iran gave no dates,locations, or casualty figures, and Iraqi and Kurdistan Region authorities didnot confirm the claim, which cannot be reconciled with the documented attackrecord.

Iraqi FactionsDeny Involvement

TwoIran-aligned Iraqi armed factions rejected any role in the strikes. On July 17,Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada denied that any attack had been launched from Iraqiterritory. "There were no operations launched from Iraq toward Erbil, andno resistance faction carried out any action of this kind," spokesperson Kazemal-Fartousi told Shafaq News.

On July 25,Saraya Awliya al-Dam rejected reports linking it to the Erbil attacks as falseand intended to sow confusion, according to its military spokesperson, AbuMahdi al-Jaafari.

Former seniorPeshmerga official Jabbar Yawar has named Kataib Hezbollah, Kataib Sayyidal-Shuhada, the Imam Ali Brigades and Harakat al-Nujaba among Iraqi groupsinvolved in the wider campaign, citing the Nineveh Plains, areas around Kirkukand Saladin as launch zones. These groups did not comment on the allegations.

The WiderCampaign

The July andAugust strikes form part of a longer conflict. Barzani told Al Jazeera that theKurdistan Region had endured more than 1,000 missile and drone attacks over thecourse of the wider war, launched either directly from Iran or by armed groupsinside Iraq, and said the Kurdistan Region would not be drawn into theconflict, adding that it had raised its lack of air defenses with internationalpartners, including the United States.

The KDPI hassaid more than 145 missiles and drones struck its facilities since February 28,and Komala has reported more than 102 since the same date. Those cumulativefigures cover the broader campaign and are not part of the count for July 17 toAugust 12.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

The evolution of Kurdish power in Iraq: Governance, oil, and constitutional ambiguity

Wed, 12 Aug 2026 06:56:47 +0000

Shafaq News

Power innorthern Iraq has never been fully one-sided. For more than two decades, thebalance between Baghdad’s authority and the Kurdistan Region’s autonomy hasshifted through wars, negotiations, constitutional disputes, and politicalcrises. At times, federal institutions have extended deep into Kurdish areas;at others, Erbil has exercised self-rule resembling many functions of a state. Theresult is neither a fixed division of power nor a settled constitutionalarrangement, but a constantly renegotiated relationship.

Today, theKurdistan Region operates its own parliament, security forces, and executiveinstitutions while maintaining direct relations with foreign governments andinternational energy companies. Its leadership negotiates with Baghdad overbudgets, natural resources, and disputed territories, while also navigating theinfluence of neighboring states that shape Iraqi politics.

Theseinstitutions were not created through constitutional design alone. Theirfoundations rest on decades of armed struggle, internal Kurdish rivalries, andrepeated moments when the Iraqi state fractured or transformed. More than threedecades after self-rule first emerged in northern Iraq, the Kurdistan Regionremains one of the Middle East’s most developed examples of autonomousgovernance.

Boundariesof Identity

Along-delayed census conducted in 2024 and released in 2025 recorded Iraq’spopulation at roughly 46 million, placing the Kurdistan Region at just over 14%of the national total. Rather than settling disputes between Baghdad and Erbil,the figures became part of them, fueling debates over budgets, resources, andfederal entitlements.

Estimatesplace Iraq’s Kurdish population between 6.5 million and 8.5 million, while theKurdistan Regional Government (KRG) puts the figure at around 6 million. Thegap reflects decades of displacement, shifting front lines, migration, and theunresolved status of mixed territories where Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, and othershave long lived together.

Languagefurther illustrates the Kurdistan Region’s internal diversity. Kurmanjidominates in Duhok and parts of Erbil, while Sorani shapes political discourseand administration in al-Sulaymaniyah and much of the capital. Both dialectshold official status within the same institutions, each carrying distinctcultural and historical experiences.

As formerIraqi President and late Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader JalalTalabani once observed, “Our strength lies in our unity, not in uniformity.”The observation remains central to Kurdish political life, where cohesion hasdepended less on homogeneity than on managing differences without fracturingthe political space.

Thisdiversity extends beyond language. Most Kurds in Iraq are Muslim, the majoritySunni, though Feyli Kurds are largely Shia. Alongside them, Yazidi, Christian,and Shabak communities remain woven into the social fabric, particularly in thedisputed areas. Their vulnerability became clear in 2014, when ISIS sweptacross northern Iraq, collapsing local security structures and displacingentire communities.

The UnitedNations Commission of Inquiry on Syria and Iraq later concluded that ISIS’scampaign against Yezidis in Sinjar “may amount to genocide,” citing masskillings, abductions, and systematic sexual slavery. The finding made Sinjarone of Iraq’s most sensitive post-ISIS flashpoints, where security, governance,and the return of displaced residents remain unresolved among Baghdad, Erbil,and local actors.

The KurdistanRegion’s three main cities developed distinct roles. Erbil became theadministrative center of the KRG and expanded after 2003 into a hub fordiplomacy, investment, and governance. Al-Sulaymaniyah developed a strongcultural and political identity shaped by a more competitive politicalenvironment and a diverse media landscape. Duhok, near the Turkish border,evolved into a commercial gateway linking Iraq to regional trade routes.

Kirkuk,however, best illustrates Iraq’s unresolved territorial disputes. Rich in oiland marked by ethnic diversity, it has remained contested since 2003. Article140 of the Iraqi Constitution outlined a process of normalization, a census,and a referendum to determine its status, but implementation stalled. Thebalance shifted in 2017 when Iraqi federal forces retook the city after theKurdish independence referendum, altering territorial realities between Baghdadand Erbil.

During thatperiod, then-Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi framed Baghdad’s position inconstitutional terms. “The constitution is our reference point for unity andstability,” he remarked, noting that territorial disputes are also disputesover authority, legitimacy, and competing visions of the state.

Born fromFriction

What is nowthe Kurdistan Region did not emerge through administrative design or anegotiated federal arrangement. It developed through a long historical processin which Kurdish identity in Iraq was shaped by the collapse of empires, therise of Arab nationalism, and successive governments in Baghdad that equatedunity with centralization. Rather than producing a gradual political project,these pressures steadily transformed grievance into organized nationalmobilization.

Under thelate Ottoman Empire and the subsequent British Mandate, Kurdish-inhabited areasin northern Iraq were incorporated into a state that did not reflect Kurdishpolitical aspirations. The creation of the modern Iraqi state in 1921 placedthese regions under Baghdad's authority, establishing a tension that enduredfor decades. Kurdish demands for autonomy surfaced repeatedly but becameintertwined with broader struggles over state-building and territorial control.

By themid-20th century, Kurdish politics had evolved into organized movements. Thefounding of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in 1946 under Mullah MustafaBarzani marked a turning point from fragmented resistance to an organizedpolitical and military movement. Even then, relations with Baghdad alternatedbetween negotiation and conflict, often breaking down when the centralgovernment sought to reassert control by force.

This cyclebecame a defining feature of modern Iraq. Periods of state weakness enabledKurdish movements to expand, while renewed central authority pushed them backinto rebellion, with Baghdad consistently portraying Kurdish autonomy as achallenge to Iraq's territorial integrity rather than a political demand withinthe state.

Therelationship deteriorated further after the Baath Party consolidated power inthe late 1960s and 1970s. As the Iraqi state became more centralized andmilitarized, Kurdish regions were drawn into prolonged conflict. Efforts tonegotiate autonomy collapsed amid deepening mistrust, giving way to renewedmilitary campaigns against Kurdish strongholds.

A majorturning point came with the 1975 Algiers Agreement between Iraq and Iran, whichended Tehran's support for Kurdish insurgents. The accord triggered the rapidcollapse of the Kurdish uprising, forcing the large-scale withdrawal anddisplacement of fighters and civilians. For Kurdish leaders, it underscored alesson that would shape future strategy: external alliances could shiftabruptly, transforming the internal balance of power.

Rather thanbringing stability, the agreement ushered in a new phase of repression. Kurdishpolitical aspirations endured but were repeatedly forced underground as Baghdadexpanded its coercive power. During the 1980s, particularly throughout theIran-Iraq War, Kurdish areas became one of the principal theaters of Iraq'sinternal conflict.

The violencereached its peak with the Anfal campaign in the late 1980s. Under SaddamHussein, Iraqi forces targeted Kurdish rural communities through massdisplacement, village destruction, and large-scale killings. Human Rights Watchestimates that between 50,000 and 100,000 Kurds were killed, while around200,000 were displaced across northern Iraq and into neighboring countries. The1988 chemical attack on Halabja became the campaign's most internationallyrecognized symbol, killing thousands in a single assault.

Rather thanextinguishing Kurdish aspirations, Anfal strengthened them, transforming theKurdish cause into one rooted in collective memory and growing internationalattention. By the end of the 1980s, Kurdish politics had been reshaped bymilitary defeat and demographic upheaval, setting the stage for autonomy toemerge not through negotiation with Baghdad, but through the weakening of theIraqi state.

Rules ofCoexistence

Thatopportunity arose after the 1991 Gulf War, when Iraq's defeat and the ensuinguprisings created a political vacuum across much of the country. In the weeksthat followed, Kurdish fighters and civilians rose against Saddam Hussein'sgovernment. Iraqi forces initially crushed much of the uprising, sendinghundreds of thousands of Kurds toward the borders with Turkiye and Iran in oneof the region's largest humanitarian crises.

Internationalpressure soon prompted the United States and its allies to establish a no-flyzone north of the 36th parallel, effectively preventing Baghdad fromreasserting full control over much of northern Iraq.

For thefirst time in Iraq's modern history, Kurdish parties found themselves governingterritory beyond Baghdad's control. Independence was never formally declared,nor was autonomy negotiated with the central government. Instead, self-ruleemerged because of war.

Baghdad andthe Kurdish leadership viewed the new reality through very different lenses.Saddam Hussein maintained that Iraq would remain "one Iraq,"rejecting any arrangement that could diminish the authority of the centralgovernment. Kurdish leaders, meanwhile, increasingly focused on buildinginstitutions capable of governing the territory under their control rather thansustaining a purely armed movement.

Thattransition became visible in 1992, when the Kurdistan Region held its firstparliamentary elections. Presenting the vote as a step toward democraticlegitimacy, then-PUK leader Jalal Talabani argued that "Westerngovernments will be encouraged and persuaded to deal with the realrepresentatives and listen to the real voice of the Kurdish people." Theelections produced the Kurdistan National Assembly and marked the beginning ofinstitutional politics in the Region.

The KDP andthe PUK quickly emerged as the dominant political forces, but they governedseparate areas and built parallel administrations, security forces, andeconomic networks. Even while negotiating with Baghdad, KDP leader MasoudBarzani maintained that Kurdish aspirations centered on meaningful autonomyrather than separation, arguing that Kurdistan would remain "part ofIraq" if genuine self-government could be guaranteed.

Thosedifferences eventually spilled into open conflict. By the mid-1990s, rivalrybetween the two parties had developed into a civil war that divided theemerging autonomous Region into competing administrations. Control over bordercrossings, customs revenues, government institutions, and political legitimacybecame as important as military gains on the battlefield.

The fightingslowed only after the 1998 Washington Agreement, brokered by the United States.Although it did not eliminate political rivalry, it established rules forcoexistence and gradually reduced the conflict between the two parties.Describing the agreement, then-US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright calledit "a new and hopeful chapter," adding that Washington viewed Kurdishreconciliation as a step that would strengthen stability in northern Iraq andthe broader Iraqi opposition to Saddam Hussein.

By the early2000s, the Kurdistan Region had acquired many of the characteristics of afunctioning state. It operated its own security forces (Asayish), managedschools and public services, collected revenues, and maintained limitedeconomic ties through cross-border trade. Legally, it remained part of Iraq. Inpractice, however, Baghdad exercised little influence over daily life in theRegion after years of sanctions had weakened the central government.

Unresolvedon Paper

The US-ledinvasion in 2003 did more than topple a government. It dismantled the state'score structure and left its institutions to be rebuilt from scratch. For Iraq'sKurds, the fall of Saddam Hussein ended decades of coercion, but it also openeda period of uncertainty over what autonomy would look like in a country stillbeing rebuilt.

Unlike therest of the country, the Kurdistan Region did not start from zero. By 2003, italready had a functioning parliament, security forces, and an administrativesystem that had taken shape during years of de facto autonomy. That head startwould prove decisive as Baghdad's new political order began to take shape.

Oil quicklybecame one of the defining fault lines. Iraq holds an estimated 145 billionbarrels of proven reserves, while Kirkuk alone contains around 9–10 billionbarrels and had once produced roughly 500,000 barrels per day before 2003. TheKurdistan Region, for its part, has claimed reserves of more than 45 billionbarrels of oil equivalent, along with 25–30 trillion cubic feet of natural gas,figures that remain disputed by Baghdad.

The 2005Constitution gave that reality formal shape. It recognized the Kurdistan Regionas a federal entity, with its own parliament and control over internal securitythrough the Peshmerga, a force estimated at between 120,000 and 200,000fighters. But recognition on paper did not settle the question of power.Instead, it left it unresolved.

Control overterritory, oil, and revenue remained contested, nowhere more than in Kirkuk.Article 140 of the Constitution laid out a process to resolve the status ofdisputed territories through normalization, a census, and a referendum. It wassupposed to be completed by the end of 2007. It never was.

Kirkuk, withits oil fields and strategic location, became the clearest expression of thedispute. Control over production and export routes turned hydrocarbons into apolitical dividing line running through the center of Iraq's federal system.

By the late2000s, that divide had hardened. The Kurdistan Region began signingproduction-sharing contracts with international oil companies, includingExxonMobil, Chevron, and TotalEnergies, while Baghdad rejected them asunconstitutional. At the same time, Iraq's federal oil exports —averagingbetween 2.5 million and 3.5 million barrels per day— remained under the controlof the State Organization for Marketing of Oil (SOMO).

The resultwas two parallel systems operating within one country. Hussain al-Shahristani,Iraq's oil minister at the time, argued that "oil revenues constitute morethan 90% of Iraq's federal budget, and therefore cannot be fragmented withoutthreatening state cohesion." Kurdish leaders viewed the issue differently.Masoud Barzani, then president of the Kurdistan Region, countered that "Wecannot exercise real autonomy if it does not control its own economicresources."

Over time,Erbil began to function more like a regional capital than an administrativecenter within a federal state. More than 30 foreign diplomatic missions openedrepresentative offices there, and international companies began dealingdirectly with Kurdish authorities. It also maintained close securitycoordination with the US, particularly during the fight against ISIS after2014. General Raymond Odierno, who commanded American forces in Iraq, describedthe Peshmerga as "the most reliable security partner in Iraq during theearly stabilization phase."

As Iraq'spolitical system stabilized unevenly, relations between Baghdad and Erbilsettled into a familiar pattern: cooperation when necessary, confrontation whenit mattered. Jalal Talabani once characterized federalism as "the systemdesigned to hold the country in place, and at the same time, the one that keptexposing its fault lines."

A Hard Check

By the endof the war against ISIS, the Kurdistan Region had reached its strongestposition since 2003. The Peshmerga held Kirkuk and other disputed areas,Western governments relied heavily on Kurdish forces on the ground, and inErbil there was a growing belief that Iraq's balance of power had shifted inways Baghdad could no longer reverse.

Kurdishleaders moved to test that assumption in 2017. On Sept. 25, voters across theKurdistan Region took part in an independence referendum. More than 90% backedseparation from Iraq. The leadership framed the vote as a mandate to opennegotiations with Baghdad, not as a unilateral declaration of independence."We want to know the will of our people," Masoud Barzani, head of theKDP, remarked ahead of the vote, adding that "a serious dialogue will soonbegin."

Baghdadviewed the move differently from the outset. Then-Prime Minister Haideral-Abadi rejected the referendum as unconstitutional and made it clear that"the unity of Iraq and the Constitution are not subject to discussion orcompromise." Regional powers quickly aligned with Baghdad. Turkiye andIran opposed the vote, warning it could destabilize borders and encourageseparatist movements across the region.

Whatfollowed shifted rapidly from politics to force. In October of the same year,Iraqi federal troops advanced into disputed territories, with Kirkuk at thecenter of the operation. Kurdish forces withdrew from the city within hours,ending more than three years of control. The speed of the retreat underscored ahard limit in Kurdish leverage. Gains achieved on the battlefield during thewar against ISIS had not translated into political recognition orconstitutional change. The United States, while praising the role of thePeshmerga, also urged Kurdish leaders to postpone the referendum, warning itwould deepen tensions with Baghdad and complicate the wider campaign againstISIS.

Inside theKurdistan Region, the consequences were immediate. Baghdad disrupted budgettransfers, trade routes came under pressure, and the loss of disputedterritories —especially Kirkuk— reduced both revenue and political leverage.The political unity that had carried the referendum soon began to fray, aslong-standing differences between the KDP and the PUK resurfaced.

The voteitself remained politically significant even after its failure. For many Kurds,it marked a rare and overwhelming expression of support for independence. ForBaghdad, it reinforced a long-held position that Iraq's federal system couldaccommodate Kurdish autonomy but not unilateral moves toward sovereignty.

In themonths that followed, Baghdad and Erbil gradually returned to negotiations, butunder altered conditions. The agenda shifted away from independence and towardpractical disputes —budgets, oil exports, and the administration of disputedterritories— within the constraints of Iraq's federal framework.

Stalled andStrained

The mostpersistent fault line remained the federal budget. Transfers from Baghdad toErbil have been delayed, reduced, or used as leverage in disputes over oilexports and internal revenue collection, turning fiscal policy into a centralinstrument of political bargaining.

That disputeis inseparable from Iraq's unresolved energy governance. The Kurdistan Regionrelies heavily on oil revenues generated through its own contracts and exportchannels, while Baghdad insists on federal control over all national resources.As a result, Kurdish oil exports through the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline to Turkiyeremained suspended for more than two years, tightening fiscal pressure on Erbiland deepening disputes over who controls production and revenues. The haltfollowed arbitration rulings and escalating disagreements between Baghdad andErbil over export authority, contracts, and payment mechanisms.

In 2025,both sides reached an understanding to resume exports under federalsupervision. The arrangement returned crude sales to SOMO, with revenues tiedto budget transfers and salary payments in the Kurdistan Region. The dealrestored limited export flows after a prolonged shutdown but left the coreissues —control, contracts, and constitutional authority— unresolved.

Inside theKurdistan Region, domestic politics add another layer of strain. Politicalrivalry between the two main Kurdish parties —KDP and PUK— continues to shapegovernance. Following the October 2024 elections, in which the KDP won 39 seatsand the PUK secured 23 in the 100-member parliament, efforts to form agovernment stalled. Lawmakers briefly convened on Dec. 3, 2025, but failed toelect a speaker or move forward with cabinet formation, leaving the legislatureat a standstill.

Beyondinternal politics, the Kurdistan Region operates within a complex regionalenvironment shaped by overlapping external interests. Relations with Turkiyeare anchored in economic interdependence and security concerns tied tocross-border militant activity. Relations with Iran are influenced by geographyand Tehran's political influence within Iraq's broader Shiite politicallandscape. Engagement with the United States continues, though primarilythrough advisory and coordination roles rather than long-term securityguarantees.

Despitethese pressures, Erbil retains a degree of external agency that is unusual fora sub-state entity. It is within this condition of managed ambiguity —whereautonomy is preserved but continuously tested— that the broader trajectory ofIraq's Kurdish experience converges.

Written andedited by Shafaq News staff.

Iraq's Coordination Framework is weakening, but no rival is ready to replace it

Tue, 11 Aug 2026 14:00:58 +0000

Shafaq News- Baghdad

Iraq's Coordination Framework, the alliance of Shiiteparties that has run the country since 2022, is weaker today than at any pointsince it was assembled. It is also, for now, the only game in Baghdad, and thatpairing —a governing bloc losing its grip while facing no one able to take itsplace— explains more about where Iraqi politics is heading than any singlequarrel inside it.

The Framework was not designed to be a party, or even apermanent coalition. It formed in 2021 for one purpose: to prevent Muqtadaal-Sadr, the populist Shiite cleric whose list had won the most seats, frombuilding a majority government that would have pushed the Iran-aligned partiesout of power. Isam al-Faili, a professor of political science at Baghdad'sMustansiriyah University, describes an alliance that carried an unclear labelfrom the day it was born and has only ever been a gathering of forces thatagree on very little.

Hostility to al-Sadr supplied the glue. When he walked away,the glue began to dry. How this alliance holds, or frays, is not a domesticcuriosity: it governs a major oil producer, sets the terms of Baghdad'sdealings with both Washington and Tehran, and now holds the fate of the armedgroups through which Iran projects power across the region.

Al-Sadr's exit is also the reason the Framework looks socommanding today. He boycotted the November 2025 election outright, and in hisabsence the Framework's constituent parties returned to the field and claimedroughly 175 of parliament's 329 seats, well above the 130 or so they controlledafter the Sadrists quit parliament in 2022. They reached that total by runningapart rather than together —Nouri al-Maliki's State of Law, Qais al-Khazali'sSadiqoon, Ammar al-Hakim's National State Forces, and Mohammed Shia al-Sudani'sReconstruction and Development each contested separately and allied withothers.

Analysts have labeled the tactic-controlled fragmentation:split to harvest the maximum number of seats under an election law theFramework itself redrew to reward large lists, then regroup afterward to namethe prime minister and parcel out the ministries. It worked cleanly, and inworking it exposed the trait that now defines the alliance. The Framework cancoordinate with precision when the prize is seats, and hardly at all once thequestion becomes what to do with them.

What holds it together has narrowed to a single sharedinterest: keeping hold of the state and everything attached to it —the offices,budgets, and patronage that have organized Iraqi government since the USinvasion in 2003. The discipline this generates is real and easy to underrate.Framework leaders do not turn on one another in public, and when the blocissues a collective position, none of them steps out to disown it. That theparties ran as separate lists and then reassembled without a public rupture isitself evidence of coordination, not decay. The unity is genuine at the levelof the statement, even when it dissolves the moment anyone tries to act on it.

Nowhere is the discipline clearer than in how the Frameworkpicks prime ministers, and nowhere is its dysfunction clearer either.Installing al-Sudani in 2022 took just over a year, the longestgovernment-formation deadlock since 2003. Once in office, he tried to grow abase of his own, and by November 2025 his list had finished first, yet theFramework still refused him a second term, with corruption files trailing himas he was eased aside.

Haitham Numan, a professor of political science at Britain'sUniversity of Exeter, reads that arc as a lesson the bloc teaches its ownpremiers: reach for independence and you become a target.

The search for al-Sudani's successor then stalled for fivemonths. It broke only when US President Donald Trump moved against al-Maliki'sbid to return, threatening to cut security cooperation and freezing dollartransfers to Baghdad until the Framework dropped him. The compromise thatemerged was Ali al-Zaidi, a businessman with no party, no faction, and nopolitical record, chosen because he alarmed no one.

Al-Zaidi was sworn in on May 14 with only 14 of 23 ministersapproved; the interior and defense portfolios, the core of the securityestablishment, sat empty amid disputes the bloc could not settle. Al-Failinotes that even al-Zaidi was not a settled choice until the final moment. Therelationship between the government and its makers is one of mutual dependencerather than separation; the Framework keeps producing weak premiers because aweak premier is the only kind all of its members will tolerate.

There is one dispute this method cannot swallow, and it isthe one now pressing hardest on the alliance. Several Framework members are notonly political parties; they also command weapons. Al-Amiri's Badr Organizationis among the largest factions inside the Popular Mobilization Forces, thestate-funded umbrella of mostly Iran-aligned armed groups; al-Khazali's AsaibAhl al-Haq fields both lawmakers and fighters; the Hoqooq movement is widelyunderstood as the political face of Kataib Hezbollah. So when the Frameworkauthorized al-Zaidi in early June to bring all weapons under state control,presenting the step as a sovereign national decision, some of the figuressigning off were being asked to take apart the very source of their leverage.

Al-Faili observes that arms are handled case by case ratherthan by any collective ruling of the bloc, and events bore him out within days.Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib al-Imam Ali announced they would place theirbrigades under state authority; Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba refused,with Kataib Hezbollah professing support while insisting on keeping its dronesand missiles. The same fault line runs through the half-empty cabinet, wherethe security ministries remain contested precisely because they decide whocommands the men with guns.

Driving all of it is outside pressure, Washington's envoyTom Barrack, the frozen dollar transfers, and a September 30 deadline afterwhich unlicensed weapons are to face legal action. The word both camps reachfor is sovereignty, though they mean opposite things by it: for the state-firstparties it describes a government monopoly on force, and for the resistancefactions it describes defiance of American power.

The timing sharpens everything. A year after the war thatleft Iran badly weakened and stripped of its allies in Syria and Lebanon,Tehran now leans on Iraq as its most dependable partner, exactly as Baghdad isbeing pushed to disarm the groups that anchor that relationship.

Abbas Ghadir al-Jubouri, a researcher on Iraqi politicalaffairs, argues that what looks like erosion is political repositioning ratherthan retreat, and that the Framework remains the government's sponsor withal-Zaidi its chosen product. On the matter of form, he is right; nothing on thehorizon is poised to unseat the alliance. Numan's reading runs deeper anddarker: the Framework stands at its weakest and still rules, held up less byits own strength than by the absence of any figure able to unify the Shiitehouse, offering what he calls protocol cover in place of real political cover.Both descriptions hold at once. The Framework is not going to dissolve, and itis not going to be replaced. What is draining out of it is substance.

The September 30 deadline puts to the alliance the questionits whole design was meant to avoid. A coalition assembled to share power canabsorb almost any disagreement that money and offices are able to settle.Whether it can survive being asked to surrender the weapons that make some ofits members powerful in the first place is the test it has spent four yearsavoiding, and the one it can no longer postpone.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Corruption arrests in Iraq pass 210 under PM al-Zaidi

Mon, 10 Aug 2026 13:56:21 +0000

Shafaq News

Iraqi authorities detained at least 210 officials, lawmakers,employees, and business figures in the first six weeks of the Dawn Crackdownanti-corruption campaign, according to a Shafaq News review of cases documentedbetween June 28 and August 9.

The campaign, ordered by Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi and carriedout largely by the Federal Commission of Integrity, an independent state bodymandated to investigate public-sector corruption, with support from theCounter-Terrorism Service, reached at least ten provinces and operationaljurisdictions and touched ministries from defense and oil to health, customs,and municipal administration.

Al-Zaidi, who took office in mid-May, directed the openingraids on June 28 under the name Sawlat al-Fajr (Dawn Crackdown). The FederalCommission of Integrity executed the detentions on warrants issued by theCentral Anti-Corruption Criminal Court, which is processing the cases. Theprime minister has described the operation as the first phase of a broadereffort to restore state authority and recover public funds.

The Opening Wave

The campaign began before dawn on June 28 with coordinatedraids in Baghdad's Green Zone and several provinces. Interim counts of 43 and47 detainees circulated during the first day before a security source placedthe total at 67 arrests within the first 24 hours.

Those detained in the opening wave included sitting andformer members of parliament, whose immunity was lifted before arrest,alongside senior officials and business figures. Among them were Ali Maarijal-Bahadli, deputy oil minister for distribution, in whose case investigatorslater reported recovering four billion dinars and 11 million dollars; sittinglawmaker Mudhar al-Karawi, detained with two sons; and former lawmaker Mohammedal-Sayhoud, released on bail two days later for health reasons. The wave alsofolded in eight suspects transferred by Kurdistan Region authorities nearKirkuk, three of them members of parliament, and six officials of SaqlawiyahMunicipality in Al-Anbar.

Where The Arrests Fell?

Enforcement concentrated heavily in the south and center asthe campaign matured. Across the cases for which a province could be confirmed,Al-Diwaniyah recorded the most detentions at a minimum of 52, driven by amunicipal corruption network and a cross-institutional forgery ring. Basrafollowed with 19, Diyala with 17, and Baghdad and Saladin with 12 each. Kirkukrecorded 11, Dhi Qar 10, Nineveh six, Maysan three, and Babil one.

These provincial figures cover the detentions documentedoutside the opening wave. The 67 opening-wave arrests spanned mainly Baghdad,Babil, Maysan, Erbil, Al-Anbar, and other locations but were not broken down byprovince in available reporting.

Which Institutions Were Reached?

Measured by sector, the campaign moved from an early focuson oil and political figures into a broad sweep of provincial and municipaladministration. Municipal and state-land files produced the largest clusters,including the Al-Diwaniyah municipal network, the Saladin Provincial Office,the Nasiriyah municipality and land-registration operation in Dhi Qar, and aforgery ring in Al-Diwaniyah that investigators linked to more than 1,000forged documents submitted to state banks, courts, and pension and welfarebodies.

The oil sector recurred throughout. In addition toal-Bahadli, authorities detained Hussein Talib al-Fadhli, director general ofthe Oil Products Distribution Company, on July 9, the day he was due to besworn in as a replacement lawmaker, and Montaser Kadhim Halloub, deputydirector general of South Refineries Company, in a Basra forgery case.

Defense procurement featured in two of the campaign's largercases. The Federal Commission of Integrity detained eight staff of the DefenseMinistry's Directorate of Military Works, among them two generals, a colonel,and five engineers, over a contract to rehabilitate the Air Force Hospital inBaghdad's Al-Rustamiya district valued at 92.88 billion dinars (about 71million dollars). On August 9, authorities arrested Hashem al-Sudani, directorof the General Company for Vehicles, over a separate Defense Ministry contract.The Transport Ministry separately suspended eight senior Iraqi Airwaysofficials, a measure counted apart from the arrest total, over thedisappearance of 16 billion dinars from the carrier's accounts.

Customs and border administration, electricity distribution,health directorates, tax collection, state banking, water resources,agriculture, and traffic administration each produced detentions across thefour periods.

Prominent Figures Detained

The campaign reached the political tier at both ends of thesix weeks. It opened with the network built on the late-May arrest of Adnanal-Jumaili, former deputy oil minister for refining, whose statementsauthorities have described as the trigger for the wider operation. It closedwith two arrests on August 8: businessman Mohammed al-Hajaf, detained inSaladin over alleged waste of public money in service, housing, and investmentprojects, and former lawmaker Ahmed al-Jubouri, known as Abu Mazen, held inBaghdad on corruption allegations.

Between those points, authorities detained Talal al-Zobaie,a former lawmaker and former chair of parliament's Integrity Committee, inBaghdad on July 11; Kamel Abbas Ashraf, a member of the Saladin ProvincialCouncil; and two former directors of Nasiriyah Municipality, Qahtan Adnan andMohammed Abdul Lilo, in Dhi Qar.

Money Seized And Recovered

Eco Iraq, an economic monitor, estimated on August 9 thatrecoveries since the campaign began had reached about 390.08 billion dinars incash, including the dinar equivalent of 141 million dollars, plus roughly halfa ton of gold, which it valued together at approximately 482.6 billion dinars.The estimate is a campaign-wide monitor figure and is not a sum of theindividually announced judicial recoveries.

The single dominant case remained the al-Jumailiinvestigation. By July 9, seizures reported in that file had reached at least141 billion dinars, 24 million dollars, and additional properties and vehicles.On July 13, the Supreme Judicial Council announced the recovery of 358kilograms of gold in the al-Jumaili case, carried out in coordination with theKurdistan Region, part of a combined 375-kilogram haul that included a separateconcurrent seizure.

In the final weeks alone, the judiciary announced 20.703billion dinars returned to the treasury and a further 2.5 billion dinars incash seized in an active Saladin investigation. Authorities also flaggedapproximately 118 trillion dinars in government withdrawals made without thedocumentation required for financial settlement, a matter classified as anaudit and documentation issue rather than confirmed loss.

Convictions And Asset Confiscations

Several cases advanced to sentencing without a new arrest. Acourt sentenced Osama Hossam Jawdat, former director general of the GeneralCommission for Taxes, to 10 years for money laundering and his wife to fiveyears and one month, imposing a joint fine of 32 billion dinars and orderingconfiscation of properties in Baghdad and Turkiye, cash, gold, and funds heldin Kuwaiti and Turkish banks. Former lawmaker Bassem Khashan was sentenced inabsentia to three years for soliciting a bribe, and five officials at a Najafcement plant received one-year terms for damage to public money.

Audit Findings And The Next Phase

Al-Zaidi ordered pre-signature auditing of governmentcontracts and directed the Federal Board of Supreme Audit to establish adedicated mechanism within 10 working days to identify inflated costs beforecontracts are finalized. The Federal Commission of Integrity also signaledexpanded use of financial-disclosure reviews, under which officials whosedeclared wealth rises by more than 20 percent without lawful justification canface scrutiny.

Federal Commission of Integrity chief Mohammed Ali al-Lami,during a visit to Turkiye, said Iraq was seeking stronger cooperation to pursuesuspects and assets abroad, and a government source said some wanted formerofficials had obtained Turkish citizenship and deposited funds in Turkishbanks. Brothers Hassan and Mohammed al-Kurdi were reported to have fled toFrance, with an international warrant sought in connection with therefinery-contracts investigation.

The campaign continued into August. Shafaq News reported twofurther land-file arrests in Dhi Qar on August 10, a day after the close of thereview period.

Note: The figure reflects only detentions that Shafaq Newscould confirm by case; several operations produced arrests without a publishedheadcount and are excluded from the total.

From Shalamcheh to Khosravi: Are Iran rail links undermining Iraq’s Grand Faw Port?

Sun, 09 Aug 2026 18:52:44 +0000

Shafaq News

On official maps, the Grand Faw Port looks like Iraq's gateway tothe world. The starting point of a trade corridor meant to move goods from theGulf to Europe roughly 20 days faster than traditional shipping routes. On theground, however, successive Iraqi governments have been drawing differentlines.

Even as Baghdad pours billions of dollars into building the portand the Development Road stretching toward Turkiye, it has simultaneouslypushed forward rail links connecting Iraq to Iranian and Kuwaiti ports, linksthat would allow goods arriving from neighboring countries to enter Iraqiterritory without ever passing through Faw.

The project Baghdad has promoted as the pillar of its ambition tobecome a global transport hub now finds itself boxed in by competing corridorscreated by Iraq's own decisions.

A Line Begins with Pilgrims and Ends with Cargo

The Grand Faw Port project dates back to 2006, when the Iraqigovernment first proposed building a strategic deep-water port in the country'sfar south, capable of receiving mega-vessels and linked to what later becameknown as the "Dry Canal", a network of highways and railways runningfrom Basra to Turkiye, with potential branches toward Syria and Europe.

The logic was straightforward: ships arriving from Asia and theGulf would dock at Faw, then move their cargo overland across Iraq to Turkiyeand Europe, bypassing the longer route through the Red Sea, the Suez Canal andthe Mediterranean. Through this corridor, Iraq hoped to reclaim its historicrole as a crossroads between East and West, generating revenue from handling,storage, transport, insurance, and logistics.

Success depended on one core condition: protecting Faw from rivalcorridors and avoiding new rail lines that would hand neighboring ports adirect route into Iraqi markets or onto the network feeding Turkiye and Syria.That condition was never met.

In 2023, then-Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani laid thefoundation stone for a rail link between Basra and Iran via the Shalamchehborder crossing. The government presented it at the time as a line dedicated topilgrims and travelers rather than freight, in an apparent effort to easeconcerns about its impact on Faw and Iraq's other ports.

But the engineering specifications later raised questions about itstrue purpose. The line's load-bearing capacity, known technically as "axleload", reaches 25 tons, a specification typically used for heavy freightlines, compared with roughly 14 tons for standard passenger lines. For criticsof the project, these were not simply engineering figures but evidence that aline launched under the banner of pilgrim transport was designed from theoutset to carry freight trains as well.

Weeks ago, a similar scenario unfolded through a different gateway.During a visit by current Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi to Tehran, the two sidessigned an agreement to build a new rail line through the Khosravi crossingopposite Diyala province. Officials and lawmakers quickly began discussingusing the line to move both pilgrims and goods. Iraq now faces two potentialrail links tying its domestic network directly to Iran, one in the far southnear Faw, the other in the center via Diyala.

A Twenty-Year Delay

In an interview with Shafaq News, retired Major General Jamalal-Halbousi, an expert in borders and international transport, argues that theShalamcheh rail project was less a purely Iraqi necessity than the product ofpolitical pressure, adding that the project was introduced as a pilgrim linebefore evolving into one capable of moving freight.

According to al-Halbousi, the Shalamcheh and Khosravi lines couldeventually allow goods arriving at Iranian ports such as Bandar Abbas and ImamKhomeini Port, and possibly Pakistan's Gwadar port, to reach Iraqi territoryand continue toward Syria and the Levant “without ships ever needing to call atFaw.

He warned this route could become a "mercy bullet" forFaw if the port project is not completed quickly and if the government fails toadopt policies making Iraqi ports more competitive. “Ports do not compete ongeography alone, but on handling and storage fees, customs speed, logisticsquality and inland transport costs; if Iraqi ports remain costlier than theirneighbors, international shippers will simply choose the cheaper route.”

Al-Halbousi views Faw and the Development Road together as the realfoundation for turning Iraq into a regional transport and trade hub. TheDevelopment Road envisions a modern rail line and highway stretching roughly1,200 kilometers from Faw to the Turkish border, passing through Basra, DhiQar, al-Muthanna, al-Diwaniyah, Najaf, Karbala, Baghdad, Saladin and Ninevehbefore reaching Turkiye and, from there, European markets.

First proposed some twenty years ago, the project remains stalledamid administrative problems, corruption allegations and delays in contractingand execution. Specialists talked to our agency say the core problem is notmerely the pace of building berths or dredging the shipping channel, but theabsence of an integrated system linking the port to rail lines, roads,industrial zones, warehouses, and border crossings, without which a portbecomes little more than a container drop-off point.

An Old Iranian Ambition through Iraq

The idea of rail links with Iran did not begin under al-Sudani. Itsurfaced clearly in 2014, under Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi's government,when Tehran pushed for a line connecting Basra to Iran's Imam Khomeini Port andextending across Iraq to Syria's Latakia port, a part of a broader vision of aland-and-rail corridor linking Iranian ports to the Mediterranean, using Iraqiterritory as the middle link. If completed, such a route would let cargoarriving at Iranian ports cross into Syria via Iraq without ever passingthrough an Iraqi port, meaning Iraq would supply the land, rails, security andinfrastructure while handling revenue flows to another country's ports.

To the south, Kuwait is pursuing a similar link between Iraq's railnetwork and Mubarak al-Kabeer Port, raising comparable concerns: if Basrabecomes directly connected to the Kuwaiti port, goods could be unloaded inKuwait and enter Iraq by rail instead of via Faw or Umm Qasr.

International transport expert Ziyad al-Hashimi told Shafaq Newsthat any rail link with neighboring states could hurt Faw if it is not embeddedin a comprehensive Iraqi strategy. Shipping companies, he said, will gravitatetoward whichever ports offer the best service at the lowest cost, and directlines moving goods from Iranian or Kuwaiti ports into Iraq could reduce theneed to unload ships at Iraqi ports at all, weakening handling volumes and thebroader trade activity tied to storage, transport, insurance and maritimeservices.

“The priority should be establishing direct shipping lines to Iraqiports and linking Faw and Umm Qasr to the domestic transport network by railand road,” he argued. At the same time, al-Hashimi cautioned that turning theIran-Iraq lines into a full international trade corridor is not a foregoneconclusion, since some Iranian ports still lack strong, integrated railconnections to the Iraqi border, “a weakness that buys Iraq time but does notremove the long-term risk, particularly if Iran completes its domestic projectsand links its ports to the Shalamcheh and Khosravi crossings.”

As for the Kuwaiti link, he said it could pull part of the maritimecargo flow toward Mubarak port, especially if Kuwaiti ports become aredistribution hub for goods into Iraq and the wider region. Any new line, hestressed, should be assessed not only for its construction cost or bilateralbenefits but for its impact on the strategic position of Faw and Iraq's otherports.

A Port before the Rails

Former Iraqi Transport Minister Salam al-Maliki summed up thedilemma bluntly: no rail line or highway has strategic value unless it isanchored to a major global port. In remarks to Shafaq News, he described Faw asa national entitlement that should be the starting point of any Iraqi visionfor regional transport networks, not the last item on the project list, warningthat delays in completing the port will pile more pressure on Umm Qasr, whichlacks the capacity to absorb Iraq's economic ambitions, or the trade volumeexpected through the Development Road.

“Continued reliance on Umm Qasr, combined with direct lines toneighboring ports, could reduce Iraq to a mere transit corridor for goods,” hesaid, without capturing the real economic value generated by shipping,unloading, storage and manufacturing. “The difference is significant between acountry where trains simply pass through and one that controls the entiretransport chain,” he added, explaining that the first collects limited transitfees, while the second runs the ports, warehouses, industrial zones, shippingfirms, insurance and financial services. Al-Maliki said the goal should beturning Iraq into an integrated "commercial and logistics hub," not apassage for other countries' goods.

Zahra al-Bajari, head of the parliamentary Transport andCommunications Committee, offers a different account of the Shalamcheh line.She told Shafaq News the project was designed primarily to support landtransport and ease passenger movement, with Iraq's share funded through theTransport Ministry's budget while Iran built the bridge and cleared warremnants on its side.

Attributing implementation delays to the Spanish contractorhandling the project, she noted that the contract with the firm has not beenterminated.

Those details, however, raise a larger question about who stands tobenefit economically once the line is complete. Iraq is financing and preparingthe portion of track on its territory to handle heavy freight trains, whileIran already possesses operational ports that could feed cargo directly ontothis route.

Iraqi governments continue to insist that rail links withneighboring states will boost trade and regional integration. Critics counterthat integration is not balanced when one side owns the port, and the othermerely provides the land the cargo crosses. For two decades, successive Iraqiprime ministers have described Faw as a project that would redraw the country'splace on the global trade map. Yet those same governments have signedagreements that could hand neighboring ports the ability to use Iraq as acorridor for their own goods, turning the paradox into a defining feature ofIraq's largest infrastructure ambition.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

38 years on: Iraq still divided over Iran war victory anniversary

Sat, 08 Aug 2026 17:34:53 +0000

Shafaq News-Baghdad

Thirty-eightyears after Iraq marked the end of its war with Iran, August 8 no longercommands the national consensus the former regime under Saddam Hussein builtaround it, according to Iraqi analysts, politicians, and citizens who spoke toShafaq News. Once celebrated as "Great Victory Day," the date has becomethe subject of an open argument over whether the eight-year war was a militarytriumph or a ruinous waste.

The Iran-Iraqwar began in September 1980 and ended in August 1988 under United NationsSecurity Council Resolution 598, which demanded a ceasefire and the withdrawalof both armies to internationally recognized borders. The ceasefire took effecton August 8, 1988, the date Baghdad proclaimed its victory.

During theSaddam Hussein era, the commemoration was a major state occasion. Authorities stagedcelebrations in Baghdad and the provinces, honored soldiers and the families ofthe dead, and used the day to advance a narrative that the Iraqi army haddefended the country's borders and blocked what officials called the export ofIran's revolution.

That officialconsensus no longer holds. Ahmad Youssef, a political analyst, said Iraqisociety is now sharply divided over the meaning of August 8, 1988. One part ofthe public wants the sacrifices of the Iraqi army remembered and honored, hesaid, while another regards the war as a futile conflict that drained thecountry's people and finances and left lasting economic and human damage.

The stateitself has stepped back from the date. After the fall of Saddam in 2003, Iraqstopped officially marking "Great Victory Day." The country'sofficial Victory Day is now December 10, tied to the 2017 declaration ofvictory over ISIS, the extremist group that seized roughly a third of Iraqiterritory in 2014. Former Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi declared final victoryover ISIS on December 9, 2017, and proclaimed the following day an annualnational holiday.

Schoolcurricula changed as well. Iraqi textbooks moved away from terms used bypre-2003 governments for the war, such as "Saddam's al-Qadisiyyah,"invoking a seventh-century Arab victory over Persia, and "the EasternGateway," which cast Iraq as the Arab world's frontier against Iran. Theybegan presenting it as a destructive regional conflict, emphasizing its humanand economic costs, the debt it left behind, and the international decisionsattached to it, foremost among them Resolution 598. A younger generation ofIraqis now learns the war differently from the generation that lived throughit.

TheDisappearance Of The Commemoration

For someIraqis, the retreat from August 8 reflects a deliberate national reset. “After2003, the government chose to turn the page on past wars and disputes withneighboring states and to build relationships based on economic and securitycooperation,” Youssef said, adding that Iraq still needs to strengthen tiesacross the region and the world in a way that serves the sovereignty of thestate and its people.

Others read thesilence around the date more sharply. Ammar Sarhan, a political activist, saidthe shift from commemorating August 8 to sidelining it is no longer a matter ofadministrative choice but “reflects the concern of influential political forcesabout embarrassing Tehran.” Control over media and the shaping of the publicnarrative, he argued, has helped marginalize any account of the war told from anationalist or military perspective in favor of one centered on rapprochement.

Sarhan saidaccusations of promoting the former ruling Baath party have at times “become apolitical tool against those who invoke the army's sacrifices, leaving a gapbetween collective memory and political reality.”

What Victory?

Aqil al-Radini,spokesman for the Victory Coalition (Al-Nasr) led by former Prime MinisterHaider al-Abadi, said commemorating the date reproduces a narrative thatignored the war's true cost. The war drained Iraq's human, material, andinfrastructure capacities and secured no lasting gain, he said, noting thatIraq ultimately returned to the terms of the 1975 Algiers Agreement it hadsought to overturn.

"Whatvictory? Iraq returned in the end to the Algiers Agreement, lost its money andits infrastructure, and paid an enormous human price."

He argued thatevents after 1988 confirmed the war was not a sustainable strategic victory:“within two years Iraq invaded Kuwait and entered a new phase of wars,sanctions, and blockade.”

Abu Mithaqal-Masari, a political researcher and member of the Coordination Framework, thealliance of Shiite political forces that governs Iraq, said restoring theAugust 8 celebrations as a "victory over Iran" no longer fits thenature of the current relationship between the two countries. He described thetransformation since 2003 as “a move from two enemies at war for eight years toa trade and economic partnership.”

On the otherside of the argument, segments of Iraqis, particularly former militarypersonnel and nationalist currents, still see August 8 as an occasion toremember the sacrifices of the Iraqi army and the defense of the country'sborders. Each year, images of the former Iraqi army and wartime anthemscirculate on social media alongside posts recalling the dead, the destruction,and the policies of the former government.

Sarhan saidremoving the date from official memory does not resolve the underlying tension.The disconnect between collective memory and political reality will persist, heargued, unless Iraq can construct a historical account that acknowledges themilitary's sacrifices without turning into praise for the former government.

Written andedited by Shafaq News staff.

Days to disarm Iraq's factions: deadline or negotiable ceiling?

Fri, 07 Aug 2026 16:59:20 +0000

Shafaq News

Fifty-four days remain before the deadline set by the IraqiGovernment for advancing steps to restrict weapons to the state, with someIran-aligned armed factions still refusing to give up their arms, maintainingthat their weapons are tied to "resistance" against regional threats.

Rising domestic and regional tension frames thesedevelopments, after Iraqi security and military forces raised their readinesslevel and canceled leave for many commanders and officers in anticipation ofany emergency. The move coincided with the expiration of a deadline armedfactions had given the government to take a position on the US and Saudistrikes that hit Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) sites on July 29.

The September Deadline

Following its latest meeting, the State AdministrationCoalition (SAC), which brings together the country's main Shiite, Sunni andKurdish blocs, affirmed the need to restrict weapons to official stateinstitutions, warning that any armed activity outside the state framework afterSeptember 30, 2026 would be handled under Iraq's anti-terrorism law.

PM Ali Al-Zaidi is "determined to bring the managementand movement of weapons in the country under control," political analystZiad al-Arrar told Shafaq News, describing the SAC's meeting as fresh politicalbacking for the government on this file. The presence of the three presidenciesalongside the Kurdistan Region president, Nechirvan Barzani, al-Arrar noted,“reflects shared conviction over the danger of weapons remaining outsidegovernment control, particularly given Iraq's difficult economic conditions.”

He added that consultations with factions refusing tosurrender their arms are expected to intensify in the coming period, andunderstandings could be reached before the deadline expires, potentiallythrough a "transitional phase" to manage the complex file rather thandirect confrontation.

Broad Political Cover Needed

Success in restricting weapons to the state depends on morethan a government decision alone, according to security expert Sarmadal-Bayati, who pointed to a mix of factors.

"Domestic support, particularly from the SAC and theSupreme Judicial Council, represents the first factor," al-Bayati toldShafaq News, since the file requires broad political and legal cover. He alsopointed to support from neighboring states seeking to help Iraq secure itself,arguing this support reflects regional concern over Iraqi territory being usedin conflicts beyond its borders rather than interference in internal affairs.

Factions are not uniformly opposed to restricting weapons,al-Bayati explained, “some link the issue to the withdrawal of the GlobalCoalition.” The period following the coalition's departure, he said, will moreclearly reveal which groups are prepared to fully integrate into stateinstitutions and which will remain committed to independent militarystructures.

Government protection and guarantees for these factionsremain necessary in return, al-Bayati stressed, noting that their members"remain Iraqis," and that handling the file "must account forboth security and social dimensions."

Multiple political and government sources also disclosed toShafaq News details of a turbulent night in Baghdad spanning Thursday intoFriday dawn, which ended in an understanding between al-Zaidi and BadrOrganization leader Hadi al-Amiri calling for mutual de-escalation between thegovernment and armed factions, opening space for Iraqi diplomatic efforts toaddress the crisis with Saudi Arabia.

Al-Amiri held a dawn meeting with al-Zaidi at the height ofthe security alert in Baghdad and other provinces, the sources told ShafaqNews, during which threats by armed factions to respond against Saudi Arabiawere discussed alongside measures the government had been preparing againstgroups accused of carrying out cross-border attacks.

Weapons and Foreign Withdrawal

Forces close to the armed factions view the issue asinseparable from the presence of foreign troops in Iraq.

Emad al-Musafer, a political analyst close to the ShiiteCoordination Framework, said the factions’ weapons emerged, in their own view,from the need to confront the American occupation of Iraq, and that the agreedwithdrawal of US forces by September 30 marks a turning point on this file.“Dialogue between the government and factions is likely to continue towardarrangements that preserve the Iraqi state's ability to manage its internalaffairs while maintaining a role for forces that fought against ISIS,”al-Musafer said in an interview with Shafaq News.

Neither side wants confrontation, he explained: thegovernment does not seek one with the factions, nor do the factions seek to"incapacitate" the government. He stressed that the relationshipremains complicated by political and social entanglement, and that"dialogue remains the most likely path forward given the government'srecognition that these factions are part of Iraq's social fabric."

Factions Reject Disarmament

Kataib Hezbollah Secretary-General Abu Hussein al-Hamidawihad earlier rejected surrendering weapons, affirming a move toward developingand expanding military capabilities, and describing recent regionaldevelopments and the US-Saudi strikes as additional grounds for retaining arms.

Other factions, including Harakat al-Nujaba and KataibSayyid al-Shuhada, similarly rejected relinquishing their militarycapabilities. They argued that any discussion of disarmament must be tied tothe withdrawal of foreign forces and guarantees protecting Iraq from externalattacks.

Some factions, meanwhile, have signaled willingness toreorganize their relationship with the state, as the government speaks of agradual path built on integrating security decision-making within stateinstitutions.

Despite the firm tone accompanying the SAC's decision, aCoordination Framework source suggested the September 30 date "may notnecessarily be a fixed, non-negotiable point." The Framework may view thedeadline as a "flexible, negotiable ceiling"; the al-Zaidigovernment's ability to advance the file, the source said, depends not only onmilitary or legal tools but on its capacity to balance American pressureagainst factional reservations.

Washington holds significant economic and politicalleverage, the source added, while the factions retain security and militaryinfluence on the ground, meaning any resolution requires understandings broaderthan a single government decision. Success on this file ultimately requires asecurity and regional understanding that makes the withdrawal of US forces atangible reality; otherwise, the September 30 deadline risks becoming apolitical declaration followed by an implicit extension or new arrangements.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Iraq turns to bank borrowing to cover August salaries amid oil-revenue collapse

Thu, 06 Aug 2026 14:35:52 +0000

Shafaq News-Baghdad

One of theworld's major crude producers is running short of the cash it needs to pay itsown workforce. Iraq's government may be unable to meet this month'spublic-sector salaries from the liquidity currently on hand, three seniorFinance Ministry officials and a source close to Prime Minister Ali al-Zaiditold Shafaq News, and is moving to borrow more than three trillion dinars(around $2.3 billion) from local private banks to keep the payroll flowing.

That a countryfloating on oil should scramble to pay teachers and clerks says less about anysingle month's revenue than about how the Iraqi state is built to spend. Crudefunds at least 85 percent of the federal budget, and one interruption toexports has been enough to push Baghdad toward the edge. Over the past fivemonths, Iraq has forfeited some $30 billion as shipments through the Strait ofHormuz —the narrow Gulf passage carrying the bulk of its oil to overseasmarkets— were choked by regional military tension.

The numbersleave little room for comfort. Baghdad needs roughly 10.8 trillion dinars amonth, close to $8.3 billion, to cover salaries and the ordinary cost ofrunning the state, government spokesman Haidar al-Aboudi has conceded, againstoil earnings that have slipped to about 2.5 trillion, under $2 billion. Payrollby itself, Finance Minister Faleh al-Sari puts near 7.8 trillion dinars, some$6 billion. What the state owes its employees each month now runs to more thantriple what its wells bring in.

The strain isalready surfacing where it hurts ordinary Iraqis most. Kimadia, the publiccompany that buys the country's medicines, has drawn only 15 percent of itsallocation, enough, by the health minister's own admission, to freeze freshcontracts and put drug supplies at risk. Salaries are simply the part thepublic notices first.

MudhherMuhammad Salih, economic adviser to the prime minister, casts the moment not asa sudden emergency but as the accumulated weight of imbalances long leftunattended, surfacing the instant oil markets wobbled. Successive budgetsleaned ever harder on current spending, wages, pensions, and social support,while non-oil sectors were never coaxed into carrying their share. Weak tax andcustoms collection, stalled reforms, and a swelling pile of fixed commitmentsleft the treasury almost no room to maneuver once revenue dipped. Borrowing,Salih cautions, is a legitimate tool in a tight moment but a dangerous habit;lean on it to fund day-to-day operations and the debt itself becomes the nextemergency.

Economist Ziadal-Hashimi says Iraq has now “officially” entered a state of fiscal distress,and that the shortfall was engineered long before any tanker slowed in theGulf. In his telling, the country's oil money is spent before it ever reachesthe treasury: the corrupt take their cut, party-run economic offices taketheirs, armed factions take theirs, creditors and ghost employees take theirs,and the working civil servant is left at the back of the line. Iraq does notsuffer from a shortage of resources, he argues, “but from the mishandling ofthem, and until the state curbs waste, dismantles the party offices feeding offpublic money, ends fictitious hiring, and builds income beyond oil, everyrebound in crude prices will amount to nothing more than a pause before asharper reckoning.”

For now, thegovernment is buying time with debt. Samir al-Nusairi, adviser to the IraqiPrivate Banks League, says salaries remain secured and will not stop, financedthrough treasury instruments that the Finance Ministry issues, and the centralbank then rediscounts, replenishing the banks' balances and freeing liquidityfor the state. The process, he stresses, leaves depositors' savings untouched.

Domestic bondinterest sits at 5.25 percent a year, and the internal debt already on thegovernment's books now falls somewhere between 106 and 125 trillion dinars ($82to $96 billion). That source, al-Nusairi believes, can carry the state throughyear's end if conditions hold, though he concedes Baghdad may soon need to trimspending, pass long-delayed borrowing legislation, and open export routes thatskirt Hormuz altogether.

Economist AhmedEid warns that Iraq's private lenders were never meant to serve as the state'sfinancier of last resort: years of thin public confidence have kept depositslow and left much of the country's cash sitting outside the banking systementirely. Push government borrowing much further, he says, and it risksdraining what liquidity the banks do hold, starving private business of creditand cooling an already sluggish economy. The healthier course, in his view,runs the other way, “rebuilding trust, drawing savings back into formalchannels, and turning bank resources toward investment rather than covering agovernment deficit.”

Beneath thedomestic argument lies a weakness that is geographic as much as financial.Nawar al-Saadi, a professor of international economics, says the episode haslaid bare the fragility of Iraq's economic model as never before: a treasurydependent on oil, and oil dependent on a single waterway. With Gulf flowsrunning at roughly half their pre-conflict levels, a fall of at least 10million barrels a day across the region, Iraq stands among the most exposed ofany producer. The Echo Iraq observatory estimates the country pumped about440.3 million barrels in the first half of 2026 while losing some 302.8 millionto the disruption. Al-Saadi presses for three moves at once: protectingsalaries by reordering spending priorities, accelerating alternative exportoutlets through Turkiye, Syria, and beyond, and meeting the immediate need withdomestic debt and carefully managed reserves, without reaching for the kind offinancing that would ignite inflation and erode what Iraqis can still afford tobuy.

Al-Aboudi hassignaled that the Finance Ministry intends to stay with local remedies—treasury bonds and internal loans— rather than turn to foreign lenders and theobligations that trail them. It is a defensible instinct, but it postponesrather than settles. Al-Zaidi, sworn in only in May as the youngest primeminister in Iraq's history and elected on a pledge to wean the economy offcrude, now meets the dilemma every reformer before him has met and deferred.The oil price will eventually recover; the tension over Hormuz will eventuallyease. Whether Baghdad spends that reprieve remaking how it earns and spends, ormerely catching its breath before the next blow, is what will define hisgovernment, and, as al-Hashimi warns, reserves and civil servants can absorbthe cost of that choice only so many times.

Written andedited by Shafaq News staff.

Record Arbaeen crowds, thin returns: Iran's collapse drains Iraq's religious tourism

Tue, 04 Aug 2026 22:29:09 +0000

Shafaq News

Iraq is once again hosting one of the largest annual gatherings onearth. More than 22 million people converged on Karbala for this year's Arbaeenpilgrimage, some five million of them foreign pilgrims from 172 countries, tomark the fortieth day of mourning for Imam Hussein bin Ali, the third Shia Imamand grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, killed in the city in 680 AD. Yet theshrine-city economies built around that human tide report a paradox: recordcrowds, shrinking returns.

The real story of this year's pilgrimage lies between scale and revenue,and it is widening under the pressure of a regional war and an Iranian economiccollapse that has hollowed out the spending power of the pilgrims Iraq's holycities depend on most.

Religious tourism is the country's most consistent non-oil economicengine, drawing pilgrims year-round to Karbala, Najaf, Kadhimiya, and Samarra,peaking during Ashura and Arbaeen. It contributes roughly 3.3 percent of Iraq'sgross domestic product, and Baghdad has openly framed it as a pillar ofeconomic diversification away from crude. The government's 2024 tourisminvestment plan earmarked nearly $620 million for infrastructure in Karbala andNajaf, including dozens of new hotel licenses. The ambition is not matched bythe delivery, and a regional benchmark makes the shortfall impossible to miss.

Saudi Arabia hosts the Hajj —roughly 1.7 million pilgrims in 2026— afraction of the more than 22 million who attended Arbaeen this year. But Riyadhconverts that smaller flow into far greater wealth through a structured pilgrimeconomy: quota management, hotel capacity, and a pilgrim levy. Saudi religioustourism generates an estimated $12 billion, while Iraq's tourism sector as awhole earns around $3.7 billion despite drawing millions more visitors.

Azhar al-Kalsh, deputy head of the Karbala Hotels Association, toldShafaq News that this season's regional war between the United States and Iranstruck the sector directly, thinning the ranks of foreign visitors through visadelays and disrupted air travel. But the deeper problem, he argued, predatesthe war: a chronic failure to plan the intake of pilgrims, from visa mechanismsto the capacity of the national carrier. Free entry visas, in his view, aredeployed backwards —extended during peak season, when demand needs noencouragement, rather than used to stimulate arrivals during the lean months.

“If we manage properly, religious tourism could stand as a revenuesource capable of rivaling oil.”

The mechanism of that leakage is structural, and it is where thepilgrimage's greatest strength becomes an economic constraint. Much of themovement of pilgrims runs not through the market but through the Mawakib —theHusseini processions that provide food, lodging, and transport free of charge,a tradition of hospitality that sustains the walk to Karbala and defines itscharacter.

Economist Karim al-Hulou told Shafaq News that billions of dinarscirculate during the roughly two-week pilgrimage, moving through bakeries,restaurants, meat and poultry markets, and logistics. But because so much isgiven rather than sold, the direct return to the state and formal businessesruns well below the true volume of activity. “The economy moves; the treasuryand the private sector see only a slice.”

For Najaf, the constraint is compounded by a single dependency. Saeb AbuGhanim, head of the Najaf Hotels Association, told Shafaq News that around 80percent of the city's hospitality, transport, and lodging activity duringpilgrimage season is tied to Iranian visitors. “That concentration has turnedIran's crisis into Najaf's crisis.”

The rial has lost more than half its value against the dollar over thepast year, trading near 1.4 to 1.5 million to the dollar by early 2026, withinflation above 40 percent. “The Iranian pilgrim still comes, but cannot spendtoo much,” Abu Ghanim said, describing a season in which turnout held, buthotel and market revenue fell, as diminished purchasing power, higher travelcosts, and regional insecurity combined to suppress outlays across the board.

The war framing this season is not incidental. This is the first Arbaeensince the US-Israeli attack on Iran on February 28, a conflict that has notspared Iraq. Days before the commemoration, US-Saudi strikes killed 20 PopularMobilization Forces members, and Iranian and international media outletsreported five to 20 Iranian military personnel were also killed, drawing thecountry back toward the center of the regional confrontation.

Tehran, for its part, has leaned into the pilgrimage rather than awayfrom it. Iran has continued facilitating the journey and framed the sustainedturnout as a display of resilience and soft power, even as its own citizenscontend with currency collapse and shortages at home. The result is a pilgrimagewhose political symbolism has rarely been higher and whose economic yield hasrarely been more strained.

The pattern points to an unresolved tension in how Iraq governs its mostvaluable non-oil asset. The turnout is not the problem; the numbers set recordseven in a war year. The problem is conversion: the absence of the visastrategy, hotel capacity, border management, and formalization that wouldtranslate a religious obligation into durable revenue. That absence hasconsequences the state is already fielding. The Iraqi Travel and TourismCompanies Association raised alarm this week over reports that 15,000 Afghanpilgrims received free visas through operators outside the licensed tourismsector.

The challenge is not whether pilgrimage can move Iraq's economy —itplainly does— but whether Baghdad can convert a seasonal surge into a sustainedresource through infrastructure, regulated travel, and expanded capacity. Thisyear sharpens the stakes. With Iran's pilgrims arriving with far less to spend,and the war raising both the symbolic weight and the security cost of theseason, the shrine cities are discovering how much of their prosperity rests ona single foreign economy in freefall.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

The long shadow of Sinjar: Twelve years after the ISIS genocide

Mon, 03 Aug 2026 21:47:05 +0000

Shafaq News

In 2014, ISIS launched its assault on Nineveh’s Sinjardistrict; the consequences of one of the group's gravest crimes continue todefine the lives of thousands of Yazidis. Every August 3, the communitycommemorates a genocide that claimed countless lives, uprooted entire families,and left thousands searching for missing relatives, while many remain unable toreturn to a homeland still struggling to recover.

According to the Kurdistan Region's Office for KidnappedAffairs, nearly 2,500 Yazidis remain missing, while more than 200,000 are stilldisplaced.

Speaking to Shafaq News, Hussein al-Qaidi, director of theOffice for Kidnapped Affairs, revealed that ISIS abducted 6,417 Yazidis duringthe attack on Sinjar. Since then, 3,595 captives have been rescued, withoperations continuing despite increasingly complex conditions, he explained,citing the movement of ISIS families between camps and towns in northeasternSyria, shifting security dynamics, and the repeated relocation of captives overthe years. The office, established under the direction of Kurdistan RegionPresident Nechirvan Barzani, continues pursuing every credible lead todetermine the fate of those still unaccounted for.

A Campaign to Destroy a Community

The assault on Sinjar, a disputed territory under Article140 of the Iraqi Constitution claimed by both the Iraqi government and theKurdistan Regional Government, extended far beyond the capture of territory. Itformed part of a systematic campaign targeting the Yazidis because of theirreligious identity.

The Yazidis, an ethno-religious community whose members arepredominantly Kurdish-speaking, follow an ancient monotheistic faith centeredon the holy temple of Lalish. For generations, misconceptions portraying themas "devil worshippers" fueled discrimination against the community.ISIS exploited those narratives to justify persecution, portraying Yazidis as agroup that could be eliminated or forcibly converted.

As the militants advanced, they imposed a calculated systemof persecution. According to the United Nations, men and older boys were oftenforced to choose between conversion to Islam and execution. Women and girlswere abducted, subjected to systematic sexual violence, and repeatedly soldacross ISIS-held territory. Young boys were separated from their families,stripped of their identities, and indoctrinated for military service.

The UN Investigative Team to Promote Accountability forCrimes Committed by Da'esh/ISIL (UNITAD) later concluded that these crimes wereneither isolated nor spontaneous. Its investigations found that ISISdeliberately targeted Yazidi civilians through coordinated killings, forceddisplacement, enslavement, family separation, and the organized transfer ofcaptives as part of a campaign to destroy the Yazidi community “physically andbiologically.”

The Fall of Sinjar

By the time ISIS reached Sinjar, it had already seizedMosul, Tal Afar, Rabia, al-Baaj, and al-Qayrawan, steadily expanding itscontrol across northwestern Iraq. On August 1, 2014, the group overran IraqiArmy and Kurdish Peshmerga positions in Zummar, capturing weapons, ammunition,and military equipment before severing the main road linking Sinjar to theKurdistan Region and leaving the district largely isolated.

Shortly after midnight on August 3, ISIS launchedcoordinated attacks on the residential complexes of Ger Zarik and Siba SheikhKhidir before advancing toward Tal Banat and Tal Qasab. By around 7:00 a.m.,shelling had reached central Sinjar, where residents armed with little morethan light weapons attempted to defend their towns. The local defenses quicklycollapsed. In Kocho, the force assigned to protect the village withdrew atapproximately 6:30 a.m., leaving residents without protection. By midday, mostof Sinjar had fallen under ISIS control, forcing tens of thousands of civiliansto flee.

Many escaped toward Mount Sinjar, where they became trappedwithout adequate food, water, or medical care after ISIS surrounded the area.US-led Coalition aircraft later dropped emergency humanitarian aid, but thesupplies proved insufficient for the vast number of civilians stranded on themountain. Around August 8, a humanitarian corridor through northeastern Syriaenabled thousands to reach safety in the Kurdistan Region. Many others,however, never escaped.

Among the dozens of villages devastated during the assault,Kocho became the defining symbol of the genocide. After nearly two weeks undersiege, ISIS ordered residents to gather at the village's secondary school onAugust 15, 2014, where fighters separated men and older boys from women andchildren.

Hundreds of men and teenage boys were taken to nearby fieldsand executed before being buried in mass graves, while women and girls weretransferred into a system of captivity, sexual slavery, and forced marriage.According to UNITAD, at least 422 residents of Kocho were killed, whilesubsequent investigations uncovered mass graves, including those at Solagh andthe Mothers' Grave, where older Yazidi women, considered by ISIS to be unfitfor sale or enslavement, were executed.

Life Before And After Captivity

For many Yazidi families, the defeat of ISIS brought reliefbut not closure. The search for those who disappeared during the genocideremains one of the community's greatest challenges.

Thousands who escaped captivity face a different battle.Women who survived years of enslavement continue to require psychological,legal, and social support, while children rescued after prolonged captivityoften struggle to reconnect with their families after being stripped of theiridentities under ISIS rule. Iraqi and Kurdistan Region authorities, togetherwith international organizations, have expanded rehabilitation programs, whileGermany —particularly the state of Baden-Württemberg— has received hundreds ofYazidi women and children for specialized medical and psychological treatment.

The search for answers increasingly extends to the massgraves scattered across Sinjar and neighboring areas.

More than 80 mass graves have been documented, with forensicteams recovering the remains of 776 victims. So far, 297 victims have beenidentified and returned to their families, while 479 remain unidentifiedpending DNA analysis. The identification process remains lengthy andtechnically demanding, relying on genetic samples from relatives and detailedforensic examinations before victims can finally be laid to rest.

Rebuilding Sinjar And The Pursuit of Justice

Recovering victims is only one part of Sinjar's longrecovery.

Despite ISIS' military defeat, many Yazidis remain unable toreturn because of damaged infrastructure, limited public services, economichardship, and continuing security concerns. Political and administrativedisputes, coupled with the presence of multiple security actors, have furtherslowed reconstruction and the restoration of normal governance.

In 2020, Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Governmentsigned the Sinjar Agreement, with United Nations support, to normalize securityarrangements, restore local administration, and facilitate the return ofdisplaced residents. Although implementation has progressed slowly, Iraqiauthorities took another step in 2025 by issuing official property ownershipdocuments to residents whose records had been lost or destroyed during theconflict, helping resolve ownership disputes and support reconstruction. Many Yazidis,however, argue that rebuilding requires not only homes and property rights, butalso security, healthcare, education, employment opportunities, and functioningpublic institutions.

Efforts to achieve justice have advanced alongsidereconstruction, though many survivors believe accountability remainsincomplete.

Iraq adopted the Yazidi Female Survivors Law in 2021,providing compensation, healthcare, education, housing, employmentopportunities, and rehabilitation services. According to official figures,2,216 survivors have benefited from the law, although many families continue toawait answers about missing relatives and the full implementation of itsprovisions.

While Iraqi courts have prosecuted hundreds of ISIS membersunder anti-terrorism legislation, human rights organizations have repeatedlycalled for prosecutions that reflect the full scale of the crimes committedagainst the Yazidis, including genocide and crimes against humanity.Internationally, Germany and France have formally recognized the Yazidigenocide, while German courts have issued landmark convictions against formerISIS members on genocide charges. UNITAD likewise concluded that ISIS committedgenocide against the Yazidis, documenting extensive forensic, testimonial, anddocumentary evidence during its investigations in Iraq.

For the Yazidi community, the legacy of August 3, 2014,extends far beyond the anniversary itself. It endures in the search for themissing, the pursuit of justice, and the determination to rebuild a communitywhose future continues to be shaped by one of the most devastating atrocitiescommitted by ISIS in Iraq.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Iraq under regional pressure as neighbors threaten to strike Iran-aligned factions

Mon, 03 Aug 2026 10:15:58 +0000

Shafaq News

Iraq is facinga fresh wave of regional pressure after Saudi Arabia struck sites inside thecountry and several neighboring states, including Kuwait, Jordan and Syria,warned Baghdad that any attack launched from Iraqi soil against their territorywould be met with direct military retaliation against armed factions inside thecountry.

The warnings,conveyed through diplomatic channels in recent days, reflect growing alarm thatIraq is being pulled more into confrontation between the United States and Iranand its regional allies.

This pressurefollows a string of drone and rocket attacks attributed to Iran-aligned Iraqiarmed factions, targeting interests and installations in neighboring states,chiefly Saudi Arabia. It has prompted regional calls on Baghdad to preventIraqi territory from being used to threaten the wider region's security.

In response,the Iraqi government has insisted it will not allow its territory to be used toattack neighboring states. Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed ForcesAli al-Zaidi, chairing an emergency security meeting on Saturday evening,stressed the need to prevent any breach or threat originating from Iraq, andordered the formation of a joint security committee along with deterrentmechanisms to prevent further violations.

Al-Zaidi alsodirected security and military agencies to raise their level of readiness andstrengthen intelligence and defensive measures, affirming that protecting Iraqisovereignty and preventing the country from becoming an arena for settlingregional scores is the exclusive responsibility of official state institutions.

RegionalPressure Mounts

Saudi Arabiaannounced in recent days that it had intercepted drones it said were launchedfrom Iraqi airspace toward vital installations inside the kingdom, andresponded, in coordination with US Central Command (CENTCOM), by striking sitesand depots affiliated with the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) —thestate-affiliated umbrella of largely Iran-aligned armed groups— resulting,according to the PMF, in 20 deaths and 32 injuries.

Media reportsalso indicated that Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and Kuwait sent messages toBaghdad warning that any new attack originating from Iraqi territory would bemet with direct strikes on armed-faction positions inside the country. SeveralGulf states have voiced concern over the continued activity of armed groupsoperating outside the government's decision-making authority, urging Baghdad totake concrete steps to prevent Iraqi territory from being used in operationsthat threaten regional security.

The IslamicResistance in Iraq, an umbrella label used by the country's Iran-aligned armedfactions, denied responsibility for the strikes on Saudi Arabia, stating thatRiyadh was "casting accusations toward Iraq" and that claims linkingthe group to the bombing of Saudi oil facilities in the Eastern Province andRiyadh had no basis in fact.

A lawmaker fromthe Sadiqoon bloc, the parliamentary wing of the Iran-aligned Asaib Ahl al-Haq,and a member of the parliamentary Security and Defense Committee, Sakral-Mohammedawi, described the protection of Iraqi sovereignty as a nationalpriority that admits no compromise, affirming that any targeting of Iraqiterritory by any party constitutes a violation of sovereignty and a breach ofinternational law.

He told ShafaqNews that security files must be handled through diplomatic channels anddialogue rather than the language of threats and force, warning that anymilitary escalation inside Iraq would carry serious consequences for thesecurity of both the country and the region. He also called on the governmentto take the necessary measures to protect national sovereignty, strengthen thecapabilities of the security forces, and intensify diplomatic engagement withneighboring states and international partners to prevent violations of Iraqiairspace or territory. "We need a unified national position that keepsIraq out of regional conflicts."

Drivers of theEscalation

TheIran-aligned factions describe their actions as part of a"resistance" framework against the United States and its regionalallies. This posture has intensified since the outbreak of the war in Gaza onOctober 7, 2023, and the rise in tension between Washington and Tehran.

Thesedevelopments unfold as the region edges closer to a wider confrontation betweenWashington and Tehran. Media reports have indicated that Iran's IslamicRevolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) held contacts with leaders of Iraqi factions,Lebanon's Hezbollah, and Yemen's Houthis to discuss expanding operations in theevent of a full-scale confrontation with the United States, with Tehranreportedly weighing activation of its regional network to target American basesand interests in Iraq and Syria to raise the cost of any confrontation for Washington.Iraqi factions have since raised their readiness levels, while the governmenthas taken security precautions in anticipation of possible developments in thefield.

Since February28, 2026, when the United States and Israel launched their war on Iran, Iraqigroups have claimed responsibility for hundreds of attacks on US bases andinterests in Iraq and the region before their threats expanded to include Gulfstates. Among the most prominent groups in this context are Kataib Hezbollah,which has repeatedly declared its affiliation with the Axis Of Resistance —theIran-led regional alliance of allied states and armed groups— and adoptedrhetoric hostile to the US presence; Harakat al-Nujaba, which maintains anarmed wing and is considered one of the factions closest to Iran; and KataibSayyid al-Shuhada, which rejects relinquishing its military capabilitiesoutside full state control.

Positionsdiverge, however, on the issue of restricting weapons to the state: somefactions have shown willingness to engage politically or reorganize theirrelationship with the state, while others refuse to give up their arsenals,viewing them as part of their ideological and regional role. Asaib Ahl al-Haq,by contrast, has moved further into formal political life, placing it in a moredelicate position between political engagement and retaining militaryinfluence.

Iran's Networkof Influence

Observersinterviewed by Shafaq News view these factions as part of a broader regionalnetwork backed by Iran, which uses them as leverage against the United Statesand its allies. Security expert and strategic analyst Alaa al-Nashou expressedthat Iraq has become a "battlefield" because of the direct warbetween the United States and Iran that erupted on February 28, 2026,"with Tehran viewing the Iraqi arena as an influential card in anyconfrontation with Washington."

He noted thatthe presence of an "Iran-linked military arsenal inside Iraq," andits ability to strike targets Tehran considers relevant to the conflict, hasmade the country part of the wider regional confrontation equation. "Theproblem lies in the fact that some of the targets these factions strike arelocated inside neighboring Arab states bound to Iraq by ties, borders andagreements," he said, adding that this factor places Baghdad before legaland political responsibilities toward those states.

Iranianinfluence within parts of Iraq's security and military apparatus, he argued,has placed the government in a difficult position and given neighboring states,particularly Arab ones, justification to act against threats emanating fromIraqi territory. Al-Nashou noted that these factions "fall under theauthority of the commander-in-chief of the armed forces" according to lawand the constitution, placing the Iraqi government under a legal responsibilityto prevent any military activity outside the state's decision.

"Anymilitary action by neighboring states inside Iraqi territory represents aviolation of Iraqi sovereignty, but respect for Iraq's sovereignty must bematched by Iraq's respect for the sovereignty of other states and by preventingits territory from being used to launch attacks against them."

Al-Nashouwarned that continuation along this path risks dragging Iraq and its peopleinto a conflict that serves no national interest, emphasizing that thecountry's distance from regional and international wars is "the pinnacleof patriotism."

The Language ofSovereignty

For their part,Iran-aligned armed factions reject characterizations of Iraq as an open arenafor foreign interference.

Husseinal-Shihani, a member of the political bureau of the Sadiqoon Movement, led byQais al-Khazali, refused, in an interview with Shafaq News, that Iraq is"a violable arena, nor a state without a decision," affirming thatany assault on Iraqi territory constitutes an assault on its sovereignty.

"Iraqpossesses institutions and armed forces capable of defending it," he said,stressing support for building a strong state and keeping the decision of warand peace exclusively in the government's hands. At the same time, al-Shihaniinsisted that calls for state-building should not be understood as weakness orretreat in the face of external threats. The factions, he said, "do notwant escalation, but they do not fear it either," warning any partyconsidering aggression against Iraq that it would bear the consequences, whilecalling for a more effective and prominent Iraqi diplomatic role commensuratewith the scale of regional and international developments.

That confidencesits uneasily against the facts on the ground. Baghdad bears constitutionalresponsibility for forces it does not fully command, while its neighbors haveshown they will strike inside Iraq without waiting for it to act, and the warbetween Iran and a US-Israeli coalition has narrowed the diplomatic space everyparty still invokes. Al-Zaidi's government has ordered committees and raised readiness,but whether it can close the gap between the state's formal authority and thefactions' operational autonomy is the question the next attack, from whicheverdirection, will answer.

Written andedited by Shafaq News staff.

Lebanon's Hezbollah shifts from battlefield to political fight over weapons

Sat, 01 Aug 2026 12:59:22 +0000

Shafaq News

The latest confrontation between Hezbollah and Israelappeared set to become an open military conflict that could reshape the rulesof engagement established after the 2024 war, particularly as it unfoldedwithin a broader regional confrontation involving the United States, Israel,and Iran.

However, after two ceasefire agreements were reached, inNovember 2024 and April 2026, Hezbollah's focus shifted from the battlefield tothe political arena. While political developments largely reflect the militarybalance on the ground, the possibility of renewed fighting remains, as no finalagreement has been reached on either Hezbollah's weapons or Israel's withdrawalfrom southern Lebanon.

The Iran-aligned group is now facing what many observers inLebanon describe as its most difficult period since its founding. Since the2024 war, the group has remained largely in a defensive political and militaryposition, a reality that has become increasingly evident in Lebanon's domesticlandscape, where developments have unfolded contrary to its expectations.

What reinforces Hezbollah supporters’ argument, in theirview, are Israeli statements and continued violations of the ceasefire, alongwith Israel’s failure to commit to any regional agreement aimed at halting thefighting. This is further compounded by recent remarks from Israeli DefenseMinister Israel Katz, who said that Israel would not withdraw from southernLebanon and that it had applied the model of destruction seen in Gaza to areasit occupies in Lebanon.

Military Balance Reshapes Political Landscape

During the fighting, which began on March 2, Hezbollahclaimed responsibility for more than 1,000 military operations against Israelipositions and bases in southern Lebanon and beyond the border. The operationsincluded precision-guided missiles, attack drones, anti-tank missiles, andstrikes targeting military vehicles and troop concentrations along thefrontier.

Israeli military said it had destroyed thousands ofHezbollah military targets and killed a large number of the group's commandersand fighters, describing the damage to Hezbollah's military infrastructure asunprecedented. The conflict also resulted in Israeli forces occupying about 60villages in southern Lebanon, advancing as far as 11 kilometers into Lebaneseterritory in some areas.

The new military reality in southern Lebanon has directlyaffected Hezbollah's standing in Lebanon's internal political scene. The grouphas expressed reservations about several decisions taken by the country'sofficial leadership, including President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister NawafSalam's government, including the plans of disarmament and relations withIsrael. These decisions, along with the latest framework agreement reachedfollowing direct negotiations with Israel under US mediation, have placedHezbollah under increasing political pressure.

The official Lebanese position and the framework agreementtreat Hezbollah's weapons as the primary issue that must be resolved beforeaddressing other outstanding disputes between Lebanon and Israel. Hezbollah hasconsistently rejected that position. Its Secretary-General, Naim Qassem, hasreiterated the group's stance in several speeches in recent weeks. In hislatest remarks, he described the US-sponsored agreement between Lebanon andIsrael as "null and void," arguing that linking an Israeli withdrawalto Hezbollah's disarmament amounted to "surrender" and was thereforeunacceptable. He also said the group would maintain its presence on the groundand insisted that its weapons are "an internal Lebanese matter"rather than an issue to be negotiated with Israel.

In another speech, Qassem called for a return to indirectnegotiations, arguing that any solution should begin with an Israeli withdrawaland the deployment of the Lebanese Army south of the Litani River, in line withHezbollah's interpretation of the 2024 agreement.

Shrinking Alliance Network?

Within Hezbollah’s media circles, there is a prevailingbelief that its support base is more inclined toward confrontation than theposition adopted by the "Shiite Duo" leaderships (Hezbollah and theAmal Movement).

According to this view, that sentiment is likely one of thereasons behind the reported two-year postponement of elections, as the allianceis expected to demonstrate its popular cohesion, which could be reflected inLebanon's domestic political landscape.

Lebanese political writer Abdullah Qamh told Shafaq Newsthat most political groups that were once close to Hezbollah, whether asallies, partners such as the Free Patriotic Movement, led by Gebran Bassil, orbeneficiaries of the party's influence, have distanced themselves from it forvarious reasons.

Qamh noted that some factions sought to separate themselvesfrom Hezbollah politically, while others adjusted their positions out ofconcern over potential US sanctions. “Other groups no longer viewed Hezbollahas a source of political advantage and now consider the party weaker thanbefore.”

He also said some Lebanese political actors have chosen tokeep their distance from Hezbollah because of their foreign relations andstrategic interests, while others concluded that “the party had weakened significantly.”According to Qamh, Hezbollah has lost around 80% of its allies, with theremaining 20% consisting mainly of small parties grouped under the umbrella ofnationalist movements, in addition to the two main allies: the Syrian SocialNationalist Party and the Amal Movement.

Despite those losses, Qamh stressed that Hezbollah, throughits alliance with the Amal Movement led by Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri,“continues to hold a solid popular, political, and parliamentary positionbecause it retains strong support within Lebanon's Shiite community.”

He argued that many Lebanese Shiites, whether aligned withthe Shiite Duo or not, “perceive the pressure facing Hezbollah as targeting theShiite community as a whole rather than the party alone.”

Political writer Khalil Nasrallah, a Lebanese analystspecializing in Hezbollah and the Axis of Resistance affairs, said it would be“inaccurate to describe the party as being in decline.” Instead, he explainedthat “Hezbollah is reorganizing its priorities in response to changingcircumstances rather than pursuing its preferred agenda.”

In an interview with Shafaq News, Nasrallah pointed out thatHezbollah cannot shift its focus entirely to domestic political activity whileIsrael continues to occupy dozens of villages in southern Lebanon, carry outattacks, and threaten to seize additional territory.

"For Hezbollah, liberation remains the priority, afterwhich greater attention can be devoted to its domestic politicalpresence," he said, adding that the party continues to participate inLebanon's political arena, although at a more limited level because ofdevelopments inside Lebanon and across the region.

He also highlighted that those regional developments havereshaped Hezbollah's role. While the party previously maintained a directpresence in Syria and Iraq, he argued, those conditions have changed followingthe defeat of ISIS in Iraq and the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime inDamascus. As a result, “Hezbollah has become more focused on Lebanon's internalaffairs while continuing to coordinate with other resistance groups across theregion.”

Domestic Divisions Deepen

Within Lebanon, Hezbollah's weapons have become anunprecedented source of political division, reflecting broader regionaldynamics similar to debates taking place in Iraq. Political opponents, whosecured at least 50 seats in the 128-seat parliament, argue that thehumanitarian and economic costs of the war demonstrated that decisions on warand peace should rest exclusively with the Lebanese state. They also contendthat reconstruction efforts and the restoration of international supportrequire the state to hold a monopoly on arms and fully implement internationalresolutions.

Against this backdrop, Lebanon's political scene continuesto evolve while Hezbollah remains constrained by a series of political andstrategic challenges. So far, the group's response has largely been limited torejecting direct negotiations with Israel and the outcomes they produced,without translating that position into field action or political measurescapable of altering the current course.

Following the first stage of the Lebanon-Israel frameworkagreement, which involved the deployment of the Lebanese Army in severalvillages in southern Lebanon as pilot zones, Hezbollah is approaching adecisive moment. The key questions now center on whether the Lebaneseauthorities will seek to disarm Hezbollah across the country, rather than onlysouth of the Litani River, and how the group would respond if the Lebanese Armyattempted to implement such a decision.

The group has maintained that it will not surrender itsweapons outside the area south of the Litani, stressing that the issue shouldbe addressed through internal Lebanese dialogue. That position suggests thegroup is unlikely to relinquish its arsenal despite the risk of a domesticpolitical crisis that could escalate into confrontation with the Lebanese Army,a scenario both sides have so far sought to avoid.

Conversely, if Hezbollah were to hand over its weapons ormilitary infrastructure outside the southern Litani area, many observersbelieve it would mark the beginning of a broader disarmament process andrepresent a significant strategic loss for the group.

Regional Calculations Shape Next Phase

Recent battlefield developments before the ceasefire alsosuggest Hezbollah has no intention of disarming. During fighting around the Alial-Taher hill in Nabatieh district, which lies outside the area south of theLitani River, Hezbollah repelled repeated Israeli attempts to seize thestrategic position. The group returned to a strategy of direct combat despitethe high cost, reversing an earlier approach under which Hezbollah officialshad said holding territory was not the primary objective of operations againstIsraeli forces.

Adding to the complexity is the possibility of Syrianintervention against Hezbollah, an issue repeatedly raised by US PresidentDonald Trump. However, Syria’s transitional President Ahmed al-Sharaa hasdenied any such plan.

The interplay between Lebanon's domestic politics andbroader regional dynamics continues to shape Hezbollah's strategiccalculations. At home, the group faces mounting political pressure, while onthe battlefield the latest round of fighting underscored the limits of militaryoptions. Despite introducing fiber-optic-guided drones as a new battlefieldcapability, Hezbollah was unable to secure a decisive outcome against theIsraeli army, which nevertheless sustained heavy losses in personnel andequipment.

At the same time, Hezbollah has retained its weapons,preserved substantial support in its traditional strongholds, and continues torely on what it considers a key strategic factor: unlike previous conflicts, itis operating as part of a broader regional alliance. Whether Hezbollah resumesor suspends military operations remains closely linked to coordination withIran and its regional allies.

The group is now looking to the outcome of the widerregional conflict, hoping that any gains secured by Iran will strengthen its ownposition and enable it to preserve a significant part of its influencemilitarily and politically.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

43 years later, Barzani genocide still demands answers

Fri, 31 Jul 2026 19:58:46 +0000

Shafaq News- Erbil

Forty-three years after the Barzani genocide, key factsabout the crime have emerged, but justice and accountability remain incomplete.

On May 3, 2011, the Iraqi High Criminal Court classified thekilling of Barzanis as genocide and a crime against humanity. Yet the legalrecognition did not close the file of accountability. In December 2025, thecourt sentenced former officer Shaker Taha Yahya Ghafour al‑Dourito death after convicting him of participating in executions of Barzanis inmass graves near Saqlawiya, al-Anbar province. However, al‑Douridied in May 2026 before the ruling could be carried out, according to the caselawyer.

On this year’s anniversary, Kurdistan Region leaders renewedcalls on the federal government to provide material and moral compensation tovictims’ families. Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al‑Zaidi described the crime asgenocide committed by the Baath regime against the Kurdish national movement.

Article 132 of the Iraqi Constitution stipulates that thestate guarantees care for the families of martyrs, political prisoners, andvictims of the former dictatorship’s abuses. Yet repeated demands forcompensation after 43 years show that the transition from symbolic recognitionto comprehensive reparations remains incomplete.

Reparations are not limited to financial compensation. Theyinclude opening mass graves, identifying victims, releasing security documents,compiling a national registry of names, teaching the crime in modern Iraqihistory, prosecuting surviving perpetrators, and protecting burial sites fromneglect.

Barzani Genocide Unfolded

The Barzani Anfal did not begin only on the morning of July31, 1983. It was preceded by years of uprooting and collective punishment.After the Kurdish revolution collapsed in 1975 following the Algiers Agreementand the end of support for Mullah Mustafa Barzani’s movement, Iraqi authoritiesdisplaced tens of thousands of Barzani residents. Villages were demolished,families relocated to desert areas in central and southern Iraq, and latertransferred to tightly monitored complexes in Qushtapa, Diana, Harir, Bahirka,and other areas near Erbil, the capital of the Kurdistan Region. Officiallypresented as modern housing, these complexes functioned as instruments ofcontrol and isolation.

When the regime decided to retaliate in 1983, the targetedpopulation was already concentrated in places easy to encircle. Victims werenot arrested on battlefields or tried individually; they were chosen based onfamily and ethnic affiliation and presumed ties to regime opponents.

Middle East Watch reported that Iraqi troops abductedbetween 5,000 and 8,000 Barzani males aged 12 or older during coordinated raidson the complexes housing the displaced Barzanis. None were seen again, andresearchers concluded they were likely executed after months in detention.

Detainees were loaded onto buses. Families were told the menwere going to work and would return. Women waited years, clinging tophotographs as their only defense against the idea that those who left thatmorning had vanished without trace.

Weeks later, Saddam Hussein declared in a recorded videothat the Barzanis had “received strict punishment” and “gone to hell.”

Captured Iraqi government documents and survivor testimonyindicate that many detainees were held for months before being killed.

From Barzani to Anfal

The crime occurred five years before the regime’s broadermilitary campaign known as “Anfal,” carried out in eight stages across theKurdistan Region in 1988. Middle East Watch concluded that the 1983 Barzanioperation foreshadowed the methods later used during the 1988 Anfal campaign.

The pattern was nearly identical: isolating populations incomplexes, encircling areas, separating men and boys from women and children,transporting detainees to unknown destinations, executing them in desert sites,and leaving families without information for years.

Human Rights Watch noted that the absence of seriousinternational response to the disappearance of thousands of Barzanis may haveemboldened the regime to believe it could conduct a larger operation withoutreal consequences.

The victims’ fate remained largely unknown until theregime’s fall in 2003. Documents and local testimonies led search teams toBasiya desert in al-Muthanna province near the Saudi and Kuwaiti borders. Threemass graves were uncovered, containing remains of about 500 Barzani men, alongwith clothing and personal items that helped identify some victims. To date,remains of 696 victims have been returned to the Kurdistan Region in stages,while thousands remain missing more than four decades later.

Searching for mass graves is not only a technical orforensic process but a race against time. Witnesses age, sites change,documents deteriorate, and DNA matching becomes harder the longer recovery isdelayed.

The targeting of males was so extensive that entirecomplexes awoke without fathers, sons, or brothers. Thousands of women wereleft to raise families under poverty and surveillance, haunted by uncertaintythat husbands or sons might still be alive in prisons. Without deathcertificates or burial sites, women remained legally and emotionally suspendedbetween widowhood and hope. Many kept clothes and photos for decades, someavoiding social events lest the missing return to find no one waiting.

Thus, the return of remains did not erase pain but gave somefamilies the certainty absent for decades. A grave does not restore themissing, but it partially ends the torment of wondering whether they are stillalive, imprisoned, or tortured somewhere.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Salinity and drought ravage Iraq’s historic farmlands

Thu, 30 Jul 2026 12:20:57 +0000

ShafaqNews

Nearly78% of Iraq’s territory is either already desertified or vulnerable to furtherland degradation, according to official Iraqi and United Nations data,threatening farmland, rural livelihoods and food security as rising salinityand shrinking water resources reshape one of the Middle East’s oldestagricultural landscapes.

Thecrisis has moved beyond Iraq’s desert regions, reaching fertile areas oncesustained by the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. Productive fields aredisappearing, vegetation cover is declining, and communities dependent onfarming, fishing and livestock are facing growing uncertainty as environmentalpressures intensify.

In 2025,the World Bank identified Iraq as among the countries most vulnerable toclimate change, warning that rising temperatures, lower rainfall and worseningwater shortages are placing additional pressure on agriculture, ecosystems andeconomic development.

The IraqGreen Observatory, an Iraqi-based environmental monitoring group, describesdesertification and land degradation as among the country’s most seriousenvironmental and economic challenges. “Desertification has struck Iraq hardover the past two decades, and the latest official data and environmentalreports available through June 2026 indicate that the scale of the problemcontinues to expand," Observatory member Omar Abdul Latif told ShafaqNews.

Around55% of Iraq’s territory has already become desertified, while another 23.2%remains vulnerable to further degradation, according to Abdul Latif. Together,the figures mean that nearly four-fifths of the country is either alreadyaffected or at risk of losing productive capacity unless action is taken toslow the deterioration.

Theimpact is particularly severe in agriculture, where decades of landdegradation, overgrazing and declining water resources have steadily reducedIraq’s productive capacity.

AbdulLatif estimated that Iraq has lost between 15% and 30% of its agricultural landover the past three decades because of worsening environmental conditions.

For manyrural households, the losses threaten a major source of income. Agricultureremains central to communities that depend on crop production, livestock, andrelated activities, according to assessments by the Food and AgricultureOrganization (FAO).

‘’Thedamage has been especially severe in irrigated farmland. Around 71% of Iraq’sirrigated land has been affected by desertification, a considerably highershare than in neighboring Turkiye and Syria,’’ Abdul Latif noted.

What wasonce largely associated with Iraq’s arid regions has spread into theMesopotamian alluvial plain, an area historically known for fertile soil andagricultural production along the Tigris and Euphrates rivers.

Risingsalinity has emerged as another major threat to cultivation. Abdul Latifrevealed that about 61% of Iraq’s agricultural land is now vulnerable to saltaccumulation, while the country loses roughly 100,000 dunams (25,000 hectares)of productive land each year because of worsening soil conditions.

Thebuildup of salt has been linked to continued reliance on traditional floodirrigation, weak drainage networks and rising saline groundwater, which haveaccelerated soil degradation across agricultural areas.

RiversRun Dry

Behindthe loss of productive farmland lies a deeper water crisis affecting both theavailability and quality of Iraq’s freshwater resources.

Thecountry relies heavily on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers for its water supply,leaving it highly vulnerable to reduced river flows, changing rainfall patternsand rising temperatures. Assessments by the World Bank and FAO have warned thatdeclining water availability is already affecting agriculture, ecosystems andrural communities.

Thechallenge is not only the amount of water reaching Iraq’s fields. The qualityof that water is also deteriorating. Agricultural drainage has placedadditional pressure on the country’s waterways, with large quantities of salinewater returning to the same river systems that support farming and ecosystems.

"Thecountry's waterways are facing additional strain from agriculturaldrainage," Abdul Latif remarked, pointing out that Iraq releases around 23billion cubic meters of saline drainage water into its rivers each year.

The dischargehas increased salinity levels in the Tigris, Euphrates, and Shatt al-Arabwaterways, affecting agricultural production and placing additional pressure onfisheries.

Environmentaldecline has also become increasingly visible in Iraq’s cities, wheredisappearing vegetation has weakened natural barriers against heat and dust.

Half of Iraq’sforests and green belts have disappeared over recent decades, removingecosystems that once helped reduce dust storms and slow the spread of dryconditions. Baghdad offers one of the clearest examples of this transformation.Much of the capital’s green belt has vanished, while dusty days have increasedsharply.

The citynow experiences around 272 dusty days each year, compared with roughly 24annually in the 1970s, according to the Iraq Green Observatory.

"Theincrease in dust storms has become one of the most visible signs of Iraq'schanging environment, affecting transportation, public health and daily lifeacross the country," it added, noting that with fewer trees and greenspaces available to absorb heat and trap dust particles, urban areas havebecome more exposed to higher temperatures, poorer air quality and the broaderconsequences of changing weather patterns.

Theconsequences are also reshaping life in Iraq’s rural communities, particularlyin the Mesopotamian Marshes, which were recognized as a UNESCO World HeritageSite in 2016 for their ecological and cultural importance.

Accordingto the Iraq Green Observatory, thousands of villages have lost income fromfarming, fishing and water buffalo breeding as ecosystems have deteriorated.Lower water levels in the Tigris and Euphrates, together with reduced waterreleases, have dried up large parts of the marshes in recent years,contributing to livestock losses, declining fish stocks and the migration ofmany rural families to urban areas.

Althoughimproved water availability in parts of the marshes during 2026 helped restoresome ecosystems, the recovery remains fragile without stable water allocationsand long-term management of the country’s water resources.

The WorldBank has also warned that climate-related pressures have forced thousands offarmers to reduce planting or abandon their fields as fuel, fertilizer and seedcosts rise and imported products become more competitive.

Addressingthe crisis, it added, will require sustained efforts combining modern watermanagement, rehabilitation of degraded land, expanded tree-plantinginitiatives, restoration of green areas, and improvements to irrigation anddrainage systems.

"Desertificationis no longer solely an environmental issue. It has become a matter of food,water and social security," Abdul Latif concluded, warning that continuedlosses of productive land will leave Iraq facing greater challenges in theyears ahead.

Writtenand edited by Shafaq News staff.

Iraq's September deadline undercuts armed factions' case for weapons

Wed, 29 Jul 2026 13:01:12 +0000

Shafaq News

Iraq's armedfactions have always justified their weapons with a single argument thatrequired no elaboration: foreign troops were on Iraqi soil, and someone had tobe prepared to confront them. That argument will be expired on September whenthe US-led Coalition's mission in Iraq concludes its mission. The justificationthat has sustained the factions' independent military existence since 2003 willhave nothing left to point at, and the sharper language now coming out ofseveral of those groups is best understood as a response to that approachingvoid.

Prime MinisterAli al-Zaidi's government is pursuing two tracks at once, moving to place allsecurity and military decision-making inside formal state institutions whilepressing an anti-corruption campaign aimed at recovering public funds. Eitherinitiative alone would unsettle the balance of power inside the Iraqi state.Together, and set against a fixed timetable tied to the coalition's departure,they close the space in which the factions have operated comfortably for years.

Several armedgroups have sharpened their public messaging in recent days, and the massfuneral processions in Najaf and Karbala for former Iranian supreme leader AliKhamenei, which drew, according to Ehsan al-Awadi, head of the Iraqi body thatorganized the ceremonies, around 10 million, gave them an occasion todemonstrate that their political and popular reach remains intact. Politicalactors read the turnout precisely that way, as evidence that forces alignedwith Tehran retain a constituency that no legislative timetable can dissolve.

Malik AzizFrancis, a member of the US Republican Party, told Shafaq News that thesharpening of messaging among some factions reflects overlapping domestic andregional pressures, and that these forces understand Iraq is entering a periodin which political and security priorities are being reordered. He reads thelouder messaging as an attempt to preserve presence and influence at a momentwhen the balance of power is shifting, and as a signal of readiness should theregion see renewed escalation between Washington and Tehran.

“The state'scontinued push on corruption, rule of law, and a monopoly on the legitimate useof force imposes a new reality on armed groups, which helps explain why some ofthem have raised the volume,” he said, noting that messaging is routinely usedto manage crises and strengthen their hand without producing confrontation.

Politicalresearcher Ramadan al-Badran finds the hardening entirely predictable. Pressureto dissolve or restructure these groups will always be met with harder languageand possibly with confrontational moves, he told Shafaq News, because theIran-aligned groups “have no program for dismantling themselves or dissolvinginto Iraqi civilian life.”

The pointdeserves emphasis as Iraq is not asking armed groups to accept a policy theydislike, but demanding organizations with no exit strategy to design one, on adeadline, while Iran's own regional position is under strain and every leverageit holds has become more valuable rather than less.

Al-Badran alsodrew out what distinguishes Iraq from other arenas where regional powers,including Lebanon where Hezbollah has a vast presence, apply leverage. Part ofthe challenge Baghdad faces originates inside the Iraqi environment itself andnot only beyond its borders, which means the government cannot resolve itthrough external diplomacy alone.

“[Ali]Khamenei's funeral procession is a significant political demonstration thatrevealed a social constituency inside Iraq, particularly within the Shiitecommunity, that responds to Iranian developments as its own.” The government'stask, in his framing, is to unwind a long inheritance of overlapping sovereigntyand internal and external influence within a very short window of time.

The weaponsfile has been Iraq's most intractable political problem since 2003, and it grewmore complicated after 2014, when the war against ISIS produced the PopularMobilization Forces, a coalition of predominantly Shiite armed groups that wassubsequently given a formal legal framework and folded into the state's payrolland command structure on paper. The core of the problem, according to agovernment source, is no longer simply the existence of weapons outsideofficial institutions but the nature of command chains and loyalties. Baghdad'sposition is that state ownership of weapons means little unless the decision touse them rests exclusively with the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

The governmenthas signaled a gradual approach, built on separating certain factions from thePMF and reorganizing their relationship with the security services. Theresponse has split the field. Asaib Ahl al-Haq, a powerful armed group with a politicalwing represented in parliament, and Kataib al-Imam Ali have declared theirreadiness to integrate into the state framework. Kataib Hezbollah, Harakatal-Nujaba, and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada have refused to surrender theirweapons. That division establishes that integration is possible, and refusal isa choice rather than an impossibility.

Politicalresearcher Nawal al-Mousawi located the escalation in three overlapping layers.Domestically, she told Shafaq News, the factions are attempting to consolidateinfluence after funeral processions she described as a large and strikingpopular mobilization, a message tied directly to the government's timetable onweapons. Regionally, she pointed to Turkiye's expanding role and its deepeningcooperation with NATO as a variable that alters the calculations ofIran-aligned forces. Internationally, she connected Iraq to the widercompetition running from Russia and Ukraine through the Middle East, whichplaces Baghdad inside a network of rivalries larger than its own politics.

“The factionsare working to preserve a balance against the American role, now that thequestion of reorganizing armed groups has become directly entangled with theBaghdad-Washington relationship.”

Washington, forits part, is watching and intervening. Nabil Mikhail, a writer and professor ofpolitical science based in the US capital, told Shafaq News that the UnitedStates is following Iraqi and regional developments closely and wants to seethe negotiating track between Washington and Tehran continue. He considers abroad military confrontation between the two unlikely in the present phase,particularly with mediation channels functioning, and identifies Americanpriorities as preserving ceasefire arrangements and securing navigation throughthe Strait of Hormuz. Iran, meanwhile, treats the Iraqi factions as onecomponent of a regional influence system, which means any reduction in theirrole touches one of Tehran's more useful instruments in the region.

Where does thisland? Political analyst Khalid Walid sees no clear indicators of imminentescalation, considering the factions' messaging as positioning that thegovernment can manage. The general direction inside the state, he told ShafaqNews, leans toward de-escalation and toward resolving files throughunderstandings rather than confrontation. Positions on the weapons file, theGlobal Coalition withdrawal, and the reform program have become clear, and heexpects the coming phase to move toward containing tensions.

Israa Najm, amember of the general assembly of the Sadiqoon Movement, the political wing ofAsaib Ahl al-Haq led by Qais al-Khazali, affirmed her movement's support foral-Zaidi's government and said the anti-corruption campaign should reach anyonewhose guilt is established through evidence and a judicial ruling. On thefunerals, “our position was clear, our participation reflected a broad unitywithin the Shiite house in receiving and burying Khamenei.”

Thegovernment's advantage is that the calendar is doing argumentative work nominister could do. Once the foreign presence ends, the factions that refuse todisarm will be defending their weapons on grounds they have never had toarticulate before, in front of a Shiite public that has just demonstrated itcan be mobilized but has not been asked whether it wants a permanent parallelmilitary. The risk is that a missed deadline is worse than none at all, becauseit establishes that the state's timetables are suggestions.

Written andedited by Shafaq News staff.

Constitutional quotas offer Iraqi women no shield against domestic abuse

Tue, 28 Jul 2026 11:36:48 +0000

Shafaq News

Iraqi women have secured a stronger voice in parliament, entered moregovernment positions, and gained greater visibility in public life. Yet insidehomes across the country, many continue to face violence with limited legalprotection.

The contrast has become one of the most persistent challenges facingwomen in Iraq. While conferences, government initiatives, and publiccommitments continue to focus on women’s empowerment, thousands of domesticviolence cases are reported every year, while survivors often struggle to findeffective protection or justice.

The latest debate emerged during the 18th Islamic Conference onCombating Violence against Women in Baghdad, where officials, lawmakers, andcivil society representatives gathered to discuss ways to protect women andstrengthen their role in Iraqi society.

For rights advocates, the importance of such events depends more on whatfollows: stronger legislation, functioning institutions, and practical measuresthat can protect women when violence occurs.

Recent figures show the scale of the challenge.

The Iraqi Observatory for Human Rights recorded 36,289 domestic violencecases in 2025, including 19,587 cases involving husbands assaulting theirwives. The organization warned that the figures likely represent only part ofthe problem, as many victims do not report abuse because of social pressure,fear of retaliation, or economic dependence.

The Interior Ministry registered more than 16,000 domestic violencecomplaints during the first half of 2026, including more than 9,000 casesinvolving husbands assaulting their wives, according to figures presentedduring the Baghdad conference.

Behind those numbers is a wider social problem shaped by years ofconflict, economic hardship, unemployment, and attitudes that rights groups saycontinue to discourage women from seeking help.

Quotas versus Authority

Iraq’s Constitution guarantees women at least 25% of seats inparliament, a quota designed to ensure female participation in the country’spolitical system. Women currently hold 82 of the 329 seats in Iraq’s Council ofRepresentatives, meeting the constitutional requirement and giving women asignificant presence in national politics.

Their role has also expanded beyond parliament. Women have increasinglytaken positions in government institutions, universities, the judiciary, andpublic bodies, reflecting gradual changes in a political system historicallydominated by men.

But activists and lawmakers argue that representation alone has nottranslated into equal influence over decision-making.

Sarwa Abdulwahid, recently appointed as Environment Minister, is theonly woman serving in Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s cabinet, compared withthree female ministers in the previous government led by former premierMohammed Shia al-Sudani.

Member of Parliament Shaimaa Abdul Sattar noted that Iraqi womencontinue to face barriers in reaching senior government positions despitehaving the qualifications and experience required.

Speaking to Shafaq News, she maintained that women remainunderrepresented in ministries and sovereign positions, arguing that politicalarrangements between major blocs often continue to favor men when leadershipposts are distributed.

“Iraqi women have proven their ability to manage ministries and stateinstitutions,” Abdul Sattar stated, pointing out that appointments should bebased on merit rather than political considerations.

Closing Legal Gaps

For many rights advocates, the central challenge is no longer onlyincreasing women’s participation in public life but ensuring that women havelegal protection when they face violence.

A new legislative step has reopened the debate after the IraqiPresidency submitted the Draft Law on Anti-Domestic Violence in Iraq toparliament for discussion.

The proposal represents the latest effort to create a dedicated legalframework for domestic violence after years of calls from activists and rightsorganizations for stronger protections.

The draft introduces several changes that supporters believe couldreshape Iraq’s response to domestic abuse. It expands the definition ofdomestic violence beyond physical assault to include threats, psychologicalharm, and other forms of abuse committed within the family.

It also introduces a protection order system that would allow courts tointervene quickly when women face danger. Under the proposal, victims couldrequest protection measures, while courts would have the authority to preventalleged abusers from approaching victims or contacting them.

The draft also seeks to establish a wider support system by creatingspecialized institutions to handle domestic violence cases, including familyprotection mechanisms, specialized courts, and safe centers where survivors canreceive protection, care, and rehabilitation.

Another proposed change would require certain public employees,healthcare workers, education workers, and social service providers to reportsuspected domestic violence cases while protecting the identity of those whosubmit reports.

For rights advocates, these measures address some of the biggestweaknesses in Iraq’s current system: the lack of specialized procedures,limited protection options, and the tendency for abuse cases to remain hiddeninside families.

Shielding the Abuser

The push for new legislation comes amid continued criticism of existinglegal provisions.

One of the most debated issues is Article 41 of the Iraqi Penal Code,which has been criticized for potentially allowing violence to be justifiedunder the concept of the “right to discipline.”

The Iraqi Observatory for Human Rights maintains that, in the absence ofan independent anti-domestic violence law, serious abuse cases can sometimes betreated as private family disputes rather than criminal acts.

The watchdog also warned that this legal gap has contributed to casesbeing pushed toward tribal settlements, a practice the Observatory believes canundermine victims’ rights and allow perpetrators to avoid accountability.

The proposed Draft Law on Anti-Domestic Violence in Iraq attempts toaddress that gap by creating clearer procedures for reporting abuse, protectingvictims, and holding offenders responsible.

The draft also introduces penalties for violating protection orders andallows courts to provide compensation to victims, adding financial and legalconsequences for abuse.

However, the proposal still faces its most important stage: whether itwill gain parliamentary approval and whether state institutions will have thecapacity and willingness to enforce it.

Actions, Not Speeches

For rights advocate and academic Bushra al-Obaidi, Iraq’s challenge isnot a shortage of discussions on women’s rights, but the gap between repeatedcommitments and meaningful change on the ground.

Speaking to Shafaq News, al-Obaidi noted that women’s issues have oftenbeen reduced to slogans, while years of conferences, initiatives, and publicpledges have delivered limited improvements in the daily lives of many Iraqiwomen.

“Priority should be given to practical legislation and policies thatstrengthen women’s position across all sectors,” al-Obaidi remarked, addingthat appointing women to senior positions carries little value without abroader commitment to protecting their rights and ensuring their participationin society.

She also reflected on her changing view of Iraq’s parliamentary quotafor women. While she previously supported the system, she questioned whether ithas achieved the progress many women had expected, noting that “increasedpolitical representation has not necessarily translated into better conditionsfor women across the country.”

“Many violence cases remain hidden because victims fear social stigma,family pressure, or losing economic support,” she added, as violence againstwomen extends beyond physical abuse to include psychological violence, economiccontrol, forced marriage, and online blackmail.

Online blackmail has also emerged as a growing concern, with women andgirls increasingly targeted through social media platforms, where privatematerial is sometimes exploited as a means of intimidation or extortion.

At the Baghdad conference, researcher Suhad al-Shammari stressed theimportance of strengthening women’s role in Iraqi society while recognizing theprogress women have made in government institutions and the private sector.

“Protecting women from exclusion and marginalization remains essentialto allowing them to expand their educational, economic, and socialopportunities and contribute more effectively to their communities,” she noted,cautioning that the real progress will ultimately be measured by whether Iraqiwomen can access safety, justice, and protection when they need it most.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Lost in translation: Iraqis, foreign workers struggle to adapt

Mon, 27 Jul 2026 10:48:05 +0000

Shafaq News

Foreign professionals are increasingly working across Iraq’shospitals, factories, engineering firms, and private companies, but many arefinding it difficult to adapt to the country’s language and social norms.Iraqis, too, are struggling to adjust to a more diverse workforce, leavingeveryday interaction between both sides limited.

These workers are no longer concentrated in restaurants,cleaning services, and other physically demanding jobs; engineers, technicians,administrators, and healthcare professionals now hold positions in public andprivate institutions, many living in company-operated compounds that providehousing and essential services.

Nawras Hussein, an Iraqi national who lives in a residentialcomplex near one housing expatriate employees, told Shafaq News that mostservices in her compound, including security and fee collection, are providedby foreign staff employed by major Iraqi companies, observing, “It is not onlythe language; sometimes it feels like we’re strangers to them.”

“Even when someone asks for a service or wants to check onsomething, they don’t always deal with us the way we’d expect,” she added,recalling that residents often find it hard to communicate over routinematters.

Baghdad resident Hussein Ali recounted a similar experienceafter requesting electrical work in his apartment. “I told the electricianexactly what I wanted, but he carried on with his own plan … I’d explain itagain, he’d smile, and just keep working.”

Foreign workers, however, see those experiences differently.

Several expatriate employees contacted by Shafaq Newsdeclined to speak publicly, fearing media comments could affect theiremployment or residency status. One worker, using the pseudonym “Rahul,” agreedto explain why many expatriates appear reserved.

“We don’t choose to live like this,” Rahul remarked. “Wework long hours, and the company decides where we live and how we get around.There isn’t much chance to meet people.”

He believes many misunderstandings begin before foreignworkers arrive at their jobs, noting that employers explain their duties,accommodation, and transportation, but rarely prepare them for the language,customs, or daily life in Iraq. “When you don’t understand the language, you’realways afraid of making a mistake; sometimes people think we’re ignoring them,but that’s usually not the reason.”

Rejecting the idea that foreign workers intentionallyisolate themselves, Rahul said, “We’re here to earn a living for our families,and nobody came to build a separate community.”

Companies, in his view, should play a bigger role in helpingforeign employees settle into everyday life.

That lack of preparation has become more significant as thecountry’s foreign workforce has expanded. Roughly 47,000 foreign workers werelegally registered in Iraq as of February 2026, according to the Ministry ofLabour and Social Affairs (MOLSA), though the true size of the foreignworkforce is widely believed to be far greater because the country has nocomprehensive count of undocumented labor. In April 2025, Sattar Al-Danbous, arepresentative of Iraq’s General Federation of Trade Unions, estimated theworkforce at more than one million, aligning with the Strategic Center forHuman Rights’ August 2024 assessment that around one million undocumentedmigrant workers —many from India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Iran, and Syria— wereliving in the country.

Unlike countries with long-established migrant workforces,including the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Singapore, Iraq’s labor systemis designed to regulate employment rather than support workers’ integration.Labor Law No. 37 of 2015 sets out rules on work permits, workforce quotas, andemployee protections, leaving language assistance and cultural orientationlargely to employers. Although MOLSA and the International Centre for MigrationPolicy Development (ICMPD) have organized limited orientation initiatives inselected areas, those efforts have yet to develop into a nationwide framework.

Speaking to Shafaq News, Walid Naama Faris, head of theIraqi Federation of Trade Unions, said foreign specialists play an importantrole in filling skill shortages and supporting economic growth, maintainingthat “the problem is not the presence of foreign workers but the limitedinteraction between them and the communities around them.”

Without preparing Iraqi workers to take on those skilledroles, he warned, unemployment among young people, particularly graduates andother qualified workers, could increase over time, reducing opportunities forknowledge transfer, leaving more people feeling that opportunities are notshared fairly, and ultimately affecting social cohesion.

Business owner Saif Furat, who employs both Iraqi andforeign engineers, credited expatriate specialists with helping improve hiscompany’s performance and develop its technical capacity. However, he noted,“They’re good at what they do, but they rarely pass their experience on toyoung Iraqi employees as many stay within their own group … and that makescommunication harder.”

Any country hosting large numbers of foreign professionals,social researcher Manahel Al-Saleh argued, needs to create a shared spacebetween them and local communities.

“Living in closed communities prevents both sides fromsharing knowledge and experience,” she said, cautioning that when people remainseparated for long periods, relationships tend to stay limited to work insteadof developing into partnerships that benefit society.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

The Kurdish rebellion dissolves: Turkiye’s century-old equation evolves

Sun, 26 Jul 2026 06:19:22 +0000

Shafaq News

When Devlet Bahceli, the leader ofthe Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), proposed in October 2024 that AbdullahOcalan could address Turkish parliament if he called for the dissolution of theKurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), the statement reverberated across Ankara'spolitical landscape.

For decades, Bahceli had beenassociated with one of the country's most uncompromising nationalisttraditions. Yet his proposal was followed by a series of developments fewobservers could have imagined only months earlier. In February 2025, Ocalancalled on the PKK to convene a congress and consider ending its armed struggle.In May of the same year, the organization revealed that it would dissolve itsorganizational structure and pursue its objectives through political anddemocratic means.

The discussions that followedquickly moved beyond whether dialogue was possible and toward a more difficultchallenge: what political framework could govern relations between the Turkishstate and millions of Kurdish citizens if armed conflict ceased to be thedominant reality? Nearly a century after the founding of the republic, theKurdish issue remains intertwined with questions of identity, citizenship,security, democracy, local governance, and political representation.

Power in Numbers

The Kurds are the largest ethnicminority in Turkiye, but their true numbers remain open to debate. With thestate collecting no ethnic data through its census, estimates are drawn insteadfrom surveys, polling, and demographic research.

Most place the Kurdish populationbetween 15 and 20 million, or roughly 15 to 20% of the country's population. A2024 survey by the Turkish research company KONDA put the figure at around 18%,reflecting the scale of a community that has shaped Turkiye's social andpolitical life for generations.

For decades, the center of Kurdishlife lay in the country's east and southeast. Provinces such as Diyarbakır,Van, Hakkari, Batman, Mardin, and Siirt served as the main strongholds ofKurdish language, culture, and political activity.

Today, that geography tells onlypart of the story.

Over the past several decades,economic migration, rapid urbanization, and years of conflict have redrawn theKurdish map of Turkiye. Millions left their hometowns, heading west toward thecountry's economic centers. Kurdish communities are now deeply woven into thefabric of Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Bursa, Adana, and Mersin. The shift has beenso profound that some scholars, including sociologist Mesut Yegen, argue thatIstanbul has become home to the largest Kurdish population of any city in theworld.

"The movement of Kurdishcommunities into Turkiye's largest cities blurred the old distinction betweenthe Kurdish-majority southeast and the rest of the country, bringing Kurdishpolitics into the center of national life," Yegen wrote. Elections inmajor metropolitan areas, he argued, can no longer be understood withoutaccounting for Kurdish voters, whose support has often proved decisive intightly contested races.

Yet despite their growing electoralweight, Kurds do not enjoy a formal share of power within the state. Unlikecountries such as Iraq, where parliamentary seats and senior positions aredistributed along communal lines, Turkiye has no system of ethnic quotas.Representation in the 600-seat parliament, the cabinet, the judiciary, thecivil service, and the armed forces is not allocated according to ethnicity.

Instead, Kurdish participation hasemerged through the same institutions and political channels available to othercitizens. Kurdish politicians have entered parliament through Kurdish-orientedparties, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party), the RepublicanPeople's Party (CHP), and nationalist parties. Kurdish-origin figures have alsooccupied senior state positions, with former Turkish President Turgut Özal,widely regarded as having Kurdish roots.

The Threshold Breach

For much of the republic's history,Kurdish political activism was associated with protest movements, securityconcerns, or armed conflict. Over the past three decades, however, anincreasingly important arena has emerged inside parliament, municipal councils,and ballot boxes.

That shift did not happen smoothly.Kurdish-oriented parties faced repeated closures, legal challenges, andpolitical pressure, yet they continued to reappear under new names andorganizational structures. The political lineage stretching from the People'sLabor Party (HEP) and the Democracy Party (DEP) to the People's Democracy Party(HADEP), the Democratic Society Party (DTP), the Peoples' Democratic Party(HDP), and today's Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) reflects along-running effort to pursue Kurdish demands through democratic institutions.

The movement's modern politicalroots date back to 1990, when HEP emerged as the first major pro-Kurdish partyin contemporary Turkish politics. After its dissolution, a succession ofparties —including DEP, HADEP, the Democratic People's Party (DEHAP), DTP, andthe Peace and Democracy Party (BDP)— carried the movement forward. While theirpriorities evolved over time, most advocated greater cultural rights, strongerlocal governance, and broader democratic reforms.

One major obstacle was Turkiye's 10%electoral threshold, among the highest in the world. The barrier made itdifficult for smaller parties to enter parliament, prompting many Kurdishpoliticians to run as independents before later forming parliamentary blocs.

Despite that challenge,Kurdish-oriented parties built strong support networks, won municipalitiesacross the southeast, and maintained a presence in national politics. Theturning point came in June 2015.

HDP captured about 13.1% of the voteand won 80 seats in parliament, becoming the first Kurdish-led politicalmovement to cross the electoral threshold as a party. The result denied theruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) a parliamentary majority anddemonstrated that Kurdish-oriented politics could influence national outcomesbeyond Kurdish-majority regions.

For supporters, the election markedthe culmination of decades of political participation and underscored thegrowing electoral weight of Kurdish voters.

Although the HDP later faced legalchallenges, investigations, and the detention of its prominent figures, itremained a significant force in parliament. Ahead of the 2023 elections, manyof its candidates ran under the Green Left Party banner before reorganizingunder the DEM Party, now the principal vehicle for pro-Kurdish politics at thenational level.

The importance of Kurdish politicalparticipation extends beyond Ankara. Municipal politics have become equallycentral to the debate. Cities such as Diyarbakir, Van, and Batman emerged asstrongholds of Kurdish political representation, allowing local leaders togovern through elected institutions.

Yet it is at the municipal levelthat some of the sharpest disputes have unfolded.

Following terrorism-relatedinvestigations, Turkish authorities removed numerous elected mayors andappointed trustees to administer municipalities, maintaining that localgovernments must operate within the framework of national law and securityrequirements.

Kurdish politicians viewed theremovals differently, arguing that replacing elected officials weakeneddemocratic representation and disregarded the will of voters. DEM Partyco-chairs Tuncer Bakırhan and Tülay Hatimoğulları have repeatedly contended thata lasting solution requires ‘’deeper democratic reforms and broader politicalparticipation.’’ Ankara, meanwhile, continues to stress national unity,security, and constitutional order.

Identity Reclaimed

Today, Kurdish politics is deeplywoven into Turkiye's national political landscape. That was not always thecase.

The relationship between the Turkishstate and its Kurdish population has undergone profound changes since thefounding of the republic. The roots of the modern Kurdish movement can betraced to the nation-building project that followed the collapse of the OttomanEmpire and the establishment of the Republic of Turkiye in 1923 under theleadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.

The new state sought to forge aunified national identity after years of war, territorial losses, and politicalupheaval. In that environment, public expressions of Kurdish identity wereoften viewed through the prism of national unity and state consolidation.

For much of the twentieth century,Kurdish identity received little official recognition. Restrictions on thepublic use of the Kurdish language appeared at different periods, and the stategenerally avoided acknowledging a distinct Kurdish political reality.

The issue remained politicallysensitive for decades.

A major shift began in the early2000s as Turkiye pursued reforms linked to its European Union accessionprocess. Restrictions on Kurdish-language broadcasting were eased,Kurdish-language courses became possible under certain conditions, and publicdiscussion of Kurdish identity expanded.

A symbolic turning point came inAugust 2005 when then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan delivered a speech inDiyarbakir. "The Kurdish issue is everyone's issue," he remarked,acknowledging a reality that previous governments had often avoided discussingopenly.

Supporters viewed the speech as ahistoric departure from earlier policies. Critics argued that recognition alonewould not address deeper political grievances. Yet few questioned itssignificance.

The launch of TRT Kurdi in 2009provided another visible sign of change. A state-run Kurdish-languagebroadcaster would have been difficult to imagine during earlier decades.

These reforms altered the nature ofthe debate. As historian Nicole F. Watts has previously observed, discussionsshifted from whether Kurdish identity should be recognized to how Kurdishcitizens should participate in political life and how the state should respondto demands related to representation, local governance, and political rights.

The PKK Changed Everything

While political and cultural reformsgradually expanded space for Kurdish identity in Turkiye, no developmentreshaped the Kurdish issue more profoundly than the emergence of the PKK.Founded in 1978 by Abdullah Ocalan and a circle of Kurdish leftist activists,the group shifted into armed insurgency in 1984 against the Turkish state. Whatfollowed became one of the longest-running conflicts in the modern Middle East.

Turkish authorities, including theMinistry of Interior and the Turkish Armed Forces, have long placed the deathtoll at more than 50,000, covering security personnel, PKK militants, andcivilians together. The conflict also carried a heavy demographic impact.Entire villages in southeastern Turkiye were emptied during counterinsurgencyoperations, a reality documented by Human Rights Watch, which suggested thatmore than 500,000 people were forced to leave their homes, relocating towardmajor cities such as Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir.

From Ankara’s perspective, theframing has remained consistent. The PKK is designated a terrorist organizationby Turkiye, the United States, and the European Union. Successive governmentshave consistently treated military operations as necessary measures to protectterritorial integrity and civilian safety. President Erdogan has repeatedlyreinforced this stance, stating that Turkiye would “continue its fight againstterrorism until the last terrorist is eliminated.”

The Kurdish political reading of theconflict moves in a different direction. Figures within the DEM Party and itspredecessor, the HDP, argue that the roots of the violence lie not only inarmed mobilization but also in decades of restrictions on language rights,political participation, and cultural expression.

Former HDP co-chair SelahattinDemirtaş captured this perspective, arguing that “peace in this country willnot come through weapons, but through equal citizenship and democraticpolitics.” Current DEM Party representatives continue to maintain that the Kurdishissue cannot be reduced to security terminology alone, urging dialogue anddemocratic reform as the foundation for any durable settlement.

At the center of this landscapestands PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan. Captured in 1999 in Nairobi, Kenya, he wassentenced to life imprisonment and transferred to Imrali Island, where he hasremained ever since. His presence, however, has never fully faded, with hismessages continuing to circulate through Kurdish political channels asinfluential interventions rather than historical remnants.

His role became especially visibleduring the 2013–2015 peace process. In March 2013, during Newroz celebrationsin Diyarbakir, a message attributed to Ocalan called for an end to armedstruggle. “Let guns be silent, and politics speak,” the message declared, whilealso framing the moment as a “historical responsibility.” For a brief period,the atmosphere shifted enough to suggest that a negotiated path might open.

That opening, however, remainedfragile. Erdogan warned that the process would only continue if armed groupswithdrew completely, stating that “we will not negotiate with those who holdweapons in their hands.”

Within Kurdish political circles,expectations remained cautious but oriented toward negotiation. Then-HDPco-chair Figen Yuksekdag argued that trust required more than politicalmessaging, maintaining that “mutual confidence cannot be built while one sidespeaks of peace and the other maintains military pressure.”

By 2015, the process collapsed.Violence resumed, and both sides exchanged blame over stalled commitments.Erdogan maintained that the PKK had not fully laid down arms, while Kurdishpolitical actors argued that the political framework necessary to sustaindialogue had been allowed to fall apart.

Peace by Piece

The developments of 2024 and 2025brought these longstanding questions back into focus. Nearly a decade after thecollapse of the peace process, discussions surrounding Ocalan re-emergedunexpectedly. Bahceli's proposal, Ocalan's subsequent call for the PKK to endits armed struggle, and the organization's move to dissolve its structurecreated a new political environment.

Whether these developmentsultimately produce lasting change remains uncertain. History offers amplereasons for caution. Previous initiatives generated optimism before collapsingamid renewed tensions and violence.

Yet the current moment differs fromearlier periods in important ways.

Kurdish politics is moreinstitutionalized than it was in the 1990s. Municipal governance plays a largerrole. Electoral participation is deeply entrenched. The DEM Party has emergedas a significant parliamentary actor rather than a marginal political force.

As a result, today's debate extendsway beyond just an armed conflict.

Written and edited by Shafaq Newsstaff.

Iraq’s PM al-Zaidi offers Tehran and Washington a corridor, not a battlefield

Fri, 24 Jul 2026 10:34:30 +0000

Shafaq News

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali Falih al-Zaidi traveled to Tehran on Thursday for a one-day visit that produced railway agreements, a twinning arrangement between the two capitals, and a commitment to draft a comprehensive strategic document. The substance of the visit lay in what was not signed: an Iraqi bid to broker between Washington and Tehran at a moment when both appear willing to let Baghdad try.

The initiative is Baghdad's own, and it carries real exposure. Iraq hosts US troops under a bilateral security arrangement while sharing a 1,400-kilometer border and deep economic ties with Iran. Any escalation between the two would be fought, in part, on Iraqi territory and paid for out of Iraqi oil revenue. Al-Zaidi's assurance in Tehran that Iraqi soil would not be used to launch threats against Iran was directed as much at his domestic audience as at his hosts, a reiteration of sovereignty framed as reassurance.

Tehran was al-Zaidi's second foreign stop after Washington, where the agenda was economic: investment, energy, and the conversion of a relationship long defined by counterterrorism cooperation into something commercial. Arriving in Tehran directly afterward signals a choreography that neither capital objected to.

Hassan Fadaam, a leader in the Hikma Movement led by Ammar al-Hakim, reads the two trips as a single policy. Baghdad's foreign posture, he told Shafaq News, is driven first by the need for a stable environment in which investment can occur. “The projects discussed in Washington require security and political predictability; de-escalating US-Iranian friction is not altruism but a precondition for the domestic economic agenda.”

International relations professor Salih al-Shathir situates the visit in a wider regional realignment. An Arab regional order is taking shape, he told Shafaq News, and Iraq will hold a significant place in it. He points to the 2008 Strategic Framework Agreement —the accord governing US-Iraqi relations beyond the military domain— as one half of Baghdad's credentials, and its historical relationship with Tehran as the other. “The combination makes Iraq acceptable to both parties in a way no other regional capital currently is.”

What Baghdad would carry into such a channel is already specified. Al-Shathir describes the visit as delivering reassurance to Tehran that a return to negotiations with Washington remains possible, covering the earlier agreements, the nuclear program, and ballistic missiles, or, failing that, a ceasefire under which contested files could be discussed.

That acceptability is being tested against a crowded and unforgiving agenda.

Iran affairs specialist Mahdi Azizi told Shafaq News that talk of an Iraqi mediating role predates the visit itself, circulating in both Iranian and American media. Washington, he argues, wanted al-Zaidi to carry the role of intermediary “to return the two sides to a negotiating table they left.” Iraq's motives are direct, because disruption in the Strait of Hormuz, the chokepoint through which a substantial share of regional crude transits, would strike Iraqi oil exports immediately.

The most sensitive file, by Azizi's account, is armed factions. Washington has pressed Baghdad to consolidate weapons under exclusive state authority, and part of the Tehran discussions may have addressed whether Iran can be induced to move factions that have refused disarmament. This is where mediation stops being a matter of message-carrying and becomes a question of leverage over actors that are simultaneously Iraqi political parties, security formations, and instruments of Iranian regional policy.

Independent politician Abu Mithaq al-Masari frames the initiative more modestly, as containment rather than breakthrough. A significant portion of the visit, he told Shafaq News, was devoted to cooling friction between the American and Iranian sides, deferring some contested points, freezing others, in the hope that a lowered temperature opens space for understandings later.

“Returning to the memorandum previously signed between the two parties is itself a worthwhile objective, if it spares the region, and Iraq in particular, the consequences of a military confrontation,” he said.

Ashraf Akkeh, an international relations expert based in Ramallah, does not believe a single prime ministerial visit can keep Iraq or the region from sliding toward a broader confrontation. What is under way, “is not the familiar Iranian-American dispute but a redrawing of influence and geopolitical and economic balances across the region,” a process into which bilateral diplomacy has limited entry.

His second point is that Iraq's political forces and armed factions do not share a common position on the relationship with the United States, and any foreign policy lacking internal consensus will fail regardless of the skill behind it. A prime minister's capacity to strike a genuine external balance depends on a domestic dialogue capable of managing Iraqi divisions over war and regional alignments. No such dialogue currently exists in institutional form.

The deliverables of the visit mark the ceiling of what the initiative has so far achieved. The joint statement committed the two governments to preparing a comprehensive strategic document spanning political, economic, cultural, and security cooperation, and to expanding trade, investment, energy, transit, industry, and agriculture.

The concrete items are infrastructural: an international freight and transport agreement, a memorandum on rail connectivity running from Kermanshah through Khosravi and Khanaqin to Baghdad, and the twinning arrangement between the capitals. The statement also covered drought, dust storms, and water resource management, alongside security coordination against terrorism, organized crime, and smuggling.

Rail connectivity is the clearest expression of what Baghdad is actually attempting, which is less mediation than repositioning. A country that functions as a trade corridor is harder to treat as a battlefield.

Whether that logic holds is the open question. Iraq's leverage in any US-Iran channel derives precisely from its vulnerability to both, the same exposure that would make failure expensive. Al-Zaidi returns to Baghdad having demonstrated that both capitals will receive him. Neither has yet demonstrated that it will concede anything to him.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Classroom to street corner: Degree holders stranded in Iraq's job drought

Thu, 23 Jul 2026 10:57:30 +0000

Shafaq News

Each year, roughly 200,000 Iraqiscomplete university and technical education, believing their qualificationswill secure them stable employment. Instead, many enter a labor marketstruggling to keep pace with the growing number of graduates, leaving thousandsunable to find work despite their degrees.

For a new generation of Iraqis,graduation no longer marks the start of professional life. It often signals thebeginning of an uncertain search for work, with many competing for a shrinkingpool of government jobs, accepting positions unrelated to their qualifications,or looking abroad for opportunities.

The pressure continues to mount in acountry whose population is approaching 47 million, according to World Bankestimates, while hundreds of thousands of young Iraqis reach working age eachyear.

Absorbing that expanding workforcehas become one of Iraq's biggest economic challenges. Although oil generatesabout 90% to 95% of government revenue, the sector creates relatively few jobscompared with its outsized role in the economy.

That imbalance has also narrowed thestate's ability to remain the employer of last resort. Around 70% of publicspending is allocated to salaries and wages, according to Ministry of Financedata, leaving limited fiscal space to expand government hiring or investheavily in sectors capable of generating jobs on a larger scale.

For decades, public-sectoremployment offered Iraqi graduates the clearest path to financial stability.Government jobs provided better pay, stronger benefits, and greater securitythan much of the private sector. But as state payrolls expanded and fiscalpressures intensified, that pathway steadily narrowed, forcing a growing numberof graduates to compete for fewer positions.

Universities, meanwhile, havecontinued producing ever-larger graduating classes.

Over the past two decades, Iraq hassignificantly expanded access to higher education, opening universities andtechnical institutes across the country. Ministry of Higher Education data fromthe 2024–25 academic year illustrate the scale of that expansion, with morethan 52,000 students admitted to education and basic education programs, 29,160to science, 25,076 to administration and economics, and 21,047 to engineering,while medicine, dentistry, and pharmacy together enrolled more than 9,300students. Yet many graduates continue to set their sights on public-sectoremployment because private companies remain too small to absorb the country'sgrowing pool of job seekers.

The imbalance extends beyond therising number of graduates. Economists point to a widening disconnect betweenwhat universities produce and what Iraq's economy actually needs.

"Iraq's efforts to reducedependence on oil require stronger manufacturing, technology, and serviceindustries, but these sectors have not expanded quickly enough to create enoughpositions for the country's growing workforce," economic expert MudherSaleh told Shafaq News, adding that a university degree remains highly valuedsocially, but for many young Iraqis it no longer guarantees a clear careerpath.

Crude but Jobless

Despite holding some of the world’slargest oil reserves and generating billions of dollars from crude exports,Iraq’s petroleum sector is highly capital-intensive. It provides substantialgovernment revenue but cannot absorb the hundreds of thousands of peoplejoining the labor market every year.

The World Bank and the InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF) have repeatedly pointed to Iraq’s dependence on oil, weakprivate-sector development and limited job creation as among the country’s mostpressing structural economic challenges.

The strain is reflected in the labormarket. Iraq’s Ministry of Planning estimated unemployment at around 13% in2025, while other estimates placed it at 15.5% during the first half of 2026.Youth unemployment remains considerably higher, ranging between 28% and 32%,placing Iraq among the countries with the highest youth unemployment rates inthe region.

International economist Nawaral-Saadi attributed Iraq’s unemployment crisis to a combination of economic,administrative and political failures rather than a single underlying cause.

“Iraq possesses significantfinancial, natural and human resources, but many institutions continue tooperate under a quota-based system rather than standards of competence andachievement,” al-Saadi informed Shafaq News. He maintained that this approachhas slowed development projects, weakened economic planning and discouragedinvestment opportunities capable of generating thousands of jobs.

The consequences extend well beyondeconomic indicators.

Economic expert Ziad al-Hashemistressed that successive Iraqi governments have failed to establish stableeconomic institutions, create an investment climate attractive to businesses ordevelop legislation capable of encouraging investment and diversifying theeconomy.

“Political parties bear asignificant share of the responsibility after turning ministries, governmentagencies and state-owned companies into areas of influence and sources offinancial gain,” he told Shafaq News, arguing that this has expanded public-sectoremployment beyond sustainable levels.

Protest over Payroll

For many young Iraqis, unemploymenthas evolved from an economic challenge into a recurring source of publicfrustration.

Across Baghdad and provincesincluding Dhi Qar, Basra, Maysan, Najaf and other southern provinces,unemployed graduates have repeatedly taken to the streets to demand governmenthiring, recruitment opportunities and practical solutions after years of searchingfor work.

Gatherings outside ministries,provincial administrations and other government institutions have become afamiliar feature of Iraq’s public life, reflecting growing frustration amonggraduates who see few pathways into stable employment.

The issue also stood at the centerof the 2019 Tishreen anti-government protests, when thousands of young Iraqispointed to unemployment, corruption and deteriorating public services as amongthe main drivers of their anger.

The demonstrations did not end withthe Tishreen movement. Graduate protests persisted in the years that followed,including throughout 2025 and 2026, as each new wave of university graduatesjoined a labor market where opportunities remained far below demand.

Missing Engine

Successive Iraqi governments haverepeatedly presented private-sector growth as the long-term answer to thecountry’s employment challenge. For many economists, however, the sectorremains too small, too reliant on public spending and too underdeveloped toabsorb the hundreds of thousands of Iraqis entering the labor market each year.

The IMF reached a similar conclusionin its 2025 report, pointing to weak private-sector development as one ofIraq’s main structural economic challenges and warning that limited economicdiversification has left the country heavily dependent on public employment andoil revenues.

Much of the problem lies in theprivate sector’s relationship with the state. Many businesses continue to relyheavily on government contracts and public expenditure, limiting their abilityto expand independently and generate large numbers of sustainable jobs.

Mohammed al-Najjar, executivedirector of the Iraq Development Fund, acknowledged that private companies havecreated employment opportunities but maintained that much of that growthremains tied to government-funded projects and state spending.

“The private sector’s ability togenerate more jobs will remain limited unless legislative reforms allowbusinesses to operate more independently,” he conveyed to Shafaq News.

Recognizing those constraints, thegovernment has introduced several initiatives aimed at narrowing the gapbetween education and employment. Under its “Iraq 2050” vision, Baghdad seeksto reduce its reliance on oil while strengthening productive sectors andexpanding the private sector’s role in the economy.

The Ministry of Labor and SocialAffairs has also expanded vocational training programs while promoting theestablishment of a Higher Council for Training to improve coordination betweeneducational institutions and labor-market needs.

Al-Najjar, however, maintained thattraining alone will not resolve the employment crisis unless Iraq also developsindustries and businesses capable of absorbing those newly acquired skills.

“Without broader economicdiversification, stronger private-sector growth and reforms that create spacefor investment and job creation, Iraq’s graduate boom will continue to outpacethe country’s ability to provide employment,” he stated.

In his view, the shortage of jobsfacing Iraqi graduates reflects a broader challenge that has shaped Iraq’seconomy for years: attracting enough investment to build industries, expandbusinesses and generate employment on a meaningful scale.

Former deputy head of Parliament’sInvestment Committee, Suzan Mansour, shared a similar assessment, arguing thatIraq’s investment priorities have often favored housing developments overproductive industries capable of strengthening the economy and expandingemployment opportunities.

Urging the National InvestmentCommission to redirect investment toward projects that increase production,generate jobs, and deliver stronger economic returns, she noted that Iraqcontinues to import a large share of its food and consumer goods even as farmersstruggle with rising production costs, limited access to agricultural supplies,and difficulties reaching markets.

Expanding those productive sectors,she added, would not only provide employment opportunities for graduates andyoung workers but also reduce dependence on imports and establish thefoundation for a more diversified economy.

Unlocking the Potential

Although Iraq has secured severalmajor energy and infrastructure investments in recent years, a number ofhigh-profile projects have been delayed, suspended, or abandoned, limitingtheir potential to stimulate economic growth and generate employment.

For international economist Nawaral-Saadi, the impact extends far beyond construction delays or lost investment.Every stalled industrial project, he maintained, represents factories that werenever built, businesses that never opened, and jobs that never materialized fora workforce expanding year after year.

“Iraq possesses significantfinancial, natural, and human resources, but many institutions are operatingbelow the standards needed for competence and achievement,” al-Saadi toldShafaq News, attributing persistent project delays, weak development planning,and missed investment opportunities to poor management and political influencewhile noting that thousands of potential jobs have been lost as a result.

Several flagship projects illustratethose challenges.

In February 2024, Iraq’s Ministry ofIndustry and Minerals disclosed that Shell had withdrawn from the NibrasPetrochemicals Project in Basra, which had been planned as one of the largestpetrochemical complexes in the Middle East.

The project was expected to producearound 1.8 million metric tons annually and was widely viewed as a major steptoward reducing Iraq’s dependence on crude oil exports by developinghigher-value industries linked to the country’s energy sector.

Investment challenges have not beenconfined to the energy industry. South Korea’s Hanwha Engineering &Construction withdrew from the Bismayah residential city project in 2020 beforelater returning after reaching new agreements with the Iraqi government overfinancial and implementation issues.

As Iraq continues to confront thechallenge of creating enough opportunities for its growing workforce, thousandsof graduates are entering a job market where the path from education toemployment remains uncertain. For many, the years spent preparing for a careerare followed by a new challenge: finding where their education fits in aneconomy still searching for balance.

Written and Edited by Shafaq NewsStaff.

Preparatory studies begin on Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline rehabilitation

Wed, 22 Jul 2026 20:41:30 +0000

Shafaq News- Baghdad/ Damascus

Iraq and Syria have entered thepreparatory phase of rehabilitating the Kirkuk-Baniyas oil pipeline, withtechnical, economic, and financial studies now underway alongside an assessmentof the condition of the line and its associated facilities, the state-runSyrian Petroleum Company told Shafaq News.

Two memorandums of understandingopened the phase, the company said, one concluded between the Iraqi and Syriansides, while the second with a coalition of international companies. TheAmerican firm Chevron, through an international consortium, will manage thetechnical and financial aspects of the rehabilitation.

Authorities in both countries arecoordinating on transport movement through border crossings and on technicaland security procedures, according to the company. On tanker traffic, it saidthe number of trucks crossing daily from Iraq into Syria through officialcrossings varies according to contracted volumes, operational needs andlogistical conditions, and that no precise figure could be given at present.

Condition And Cost

The line runs from Kirkuk, anoil-rich province in northern Iraq, to Baniyas, a port on Syria's Mediterraneancoast, and has been out of service since sustaining damage during the 2003US-led invasion of Iraq. Large sections have deteriorated in the years since,requiring a comprehensive technical assessment and replacement of numerouscomponents, though the existing route could be retained with modifications, Syrianeconomic researcher Ziad Arbash told Shafaq News.

He added that rehabilitationcosts are estimated at between 6 and 8 billion dollars, citing increases in theprices of construction materials and oil equipment alongside difficult economicconditions in both countries. “Financing through international partnerships,security guarantees against sabotage, and long-term export contracts are theprincipal conditions for the project's success,” he said.

Once operational, the pipelinewould carry an initial capacity of up to two million barrels per day, accordingto the US State Department, reconnecting Iraqi crude to export markets throughthe Mediterranean. Roughly 95 percent of Iraqi oil exports currently passthrough the Strait of Hormuz, the waterway at the mouth of the Gulf.

Projected Returns

Transit fees would generateannual revenues to Syria of between 150 and 200 million dollars, Arbash said,providing a sustained source of income for the public treasury. He said furtherexpected gains include crude supplied at lower prices to support the domesticenergy sector and to stimulate reconstruction projects, particularly if arefinery is built on the Syrian coast to meet local demand for refinedproducts, with surplus available for export to Lebanon.

Over the longer term, accordingto Arbash, the revenues could contribute to developing Syrian ports andmodernizing infrastructure tied to the energy and transport sectors. He namedrefining and energy, logistics and transport, and construction as the sectorslikely to benefit most, alongside supporting services.

The project would create directjobs in operations and maintenance and indirect employment in services with thepotential to attract new foreign investment following the lifting of sanctionson Syria's oil ministry in July of last year. “The line could serve as astarting point for future energy projects, including natural gas transportlines, reinforcing Syria's role as a regional hub for energy and associatedlogistics.”

Work will move to executiveagreements once the current studies are complete, the Syrian Petroleum Companysaid, with a schedule to be set jointly by the parties involved.

Iraq's mass graves: A record of violence across five decades

Tue, 21 Jul 2026 17:04:16 +0000

Shafaq News

7,709 is the number of sets of human remains Iraq hasofficially recovered from its mass graves across all eras. The United Nationsestimates the total number of people buried in those graves at between 250,000and one million.

Iraq has a dedicated government directorate for mass graves,an annual national day commemorating its victims, and burial sites spanningfive distinct periods of violence across half a century. The bodies continue tobe counted, and the vast majority of remains have not yet been matched to aname or returned to a family.

The Saddam Era: 1968–2003

The largest concentration of mass graves in Iraq dates tothe Baath regime under Saddam Hussein, whose campaigns of political repression,ethnic cleansing, and genocide produced burial sites across the country'ssouth, center, and north.

The Anfal campaign of 1986–1989, directed against theKurdish population of northern Iraq, resulted in the forced disappearance ofmore than 180,000 people, according to the Kurdistan Regional Government'sMartyrs Foundation. The Halabja chemical attack of March 16, 1988, one of thelargest use of chemical weapons against a civilian population in history,killed more than 5,000 people in a single day. The Samawa desert in the southcontains mass graves filled with Kurdish women and children displaced duringSaddam's Arabization program; one site alone holds approximately 1,500 bodies,most killed at close range, according to Iraqi Ministry of Human Rightsdocumentation.

The 1991 Shia uprising, following the Gulf War, wassuppressed with mass executions across southern Iraq. The 8,000 men from theBarzan area killed in 1983, a case ruled by the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunalto constitute genocide and a crime against humanity, remain only partiallyaccounted for, with some remains recovered from a mass grave in Samawa asrecently as 2019.

The sites from this era are the most numerous and the mostpolitically charged. The perpetrators were tried, but the victims were neverfully found.

The 2003 Invasion And Its Aftermath

The fall of the Baath regime in April 2003 opened thecountry's buried history to systematic documentation for the first time. Bymid-January 2004, 53 mass grave sites from the Saddam era had been confirmed,with early estimates suggesting the remains of 400,000 people across sitesdiscovered in the months following the invasion. Iraq's Ministry of HumanRights eventually confirmed 315 mass graves found since the US-led conflictbegan.

But the collapse of state authority produced new casualtiesalmost immediately. Sectarian armed groups, insurgent factions, and securityforces operating outside legal oversight contributed to a wave of killings inwhich bodies were routinely found in streets, rivers, and unmarked sites. UNAMIreported that 34,452 civilians were violently killed in 2006 alone, manybearing signs of execution-style killings, torture, and, in some cases,decapitation. The Baghdad Medico-Legal Institute received 30,204 bodies between2003 and mid-2006.

Dedicated mass grave sites from this period have beenidentified but remain incompletely excavated. The distinction between Baath-eraand post-2003 graves is a continuing source of dispute in some locations. Inthe recent case of a newly discovered site in western al-Anbar province, aprovince that bore the weight of both Baath-era repression and post-invasioninsurgency, a civil activist told Shafaq News that the file "cannottolerate speculation" and demanded a transparent investigation toestablish the timeline and the identity of the victims. The politics of who isburied where, and by whom, carry present-day stakes that complicate everyexcavation decision.

The ISIS Period: 2014–2017

The Islamic State's three-year territorial control ofnorthern and western Iraq produced the most recently documented and mostinternationally investigated mass graves in Iraqi history. A UN Human RightsOffice and UNAMI report documented 202 mass grave sites in the governorates ofNineveh, Kirkuk, Saladin, and al-Anbar, containing the remains of women,children, the elderly, disabled persons, and members of Iraq's armed forces andpolice.

No community suffered more disproportionately than theYazidis. More than 5,000 Yazidis were killed in the ISIS campaign that began inAugust 2014; more than 6,000 others, mostly women and children, were abductedand sold into sexual slavery. Nadia Murad, a survivor from the Yazidi villageof Kocho, became the international face of that campaign, winning the NobelPeace Prize in 2018 and testifying before the UN Security Council.

According to data from the Petrichor Human RightsOrganization, 95 mass graves have been located in the Yazidi stronghold ofSinjar district. Of these, 68 have been exhumed, recovering approximately 850bodies, of which only 96 have been identified. As of July 2025, more than 2,560Yazidis remain missing, according to the International Organization forMigration.

The Khasfa sinkhole south of Mosul is believed to containthousands of bodies and remains one of the largest and most technicallychallenging sites yet to be excavated. The Martyrs Foundation reports that 54ISIS-era mass graves have been exhumed from a total of 125 documented, with 71still untouched and 3,258 sets of remains recovered. The gap between what hasbeen found and what has been returned to families is wider still.

The Machinery Of Recovery

Iraq established two dedicated bodies to address the massgraves file: the Mass Graves Protection and Missing Persons Directorate,operating under the Martyrs Foundation and restructured under a November 2024law, and the Medico-Legal Directorate under the Ministry of Health, responsiblefor forensic identification. In its 2024 annual report, the Directoratedisclosed that it retrieved 677 sets of remains that year, obtained testimoniesand blood samples from 2,015 people with missing relatives, and succeeded inidentifying 168 remains from various sites across the country.

Between 2018 and 2024, UNITAD —the UN Investigative Teamestablished by Security Council Resolution 2379 in 2017— provided forensic,technical, and legal support that Iraqi domestic institutions could notreplicate alone. Over its mandate, UNITAD participated in the excavation of 68ISIS-related mass graves, digitized 20 million ISIS-related paper records, andsupported more than 300 requests for assistance from 21 countries for nationalinvestigations and prosecutions. Its annual budget of approximately $20 millionwas, by any measure, the primary financial engine of Iraq's excavation effort.

UNITAD ended operations in September 2024 after Baghdaddeclined to renew its mandate, amid disputes over evidence-sharing protocolsand Iraq's application of the death penalty in terrorism cases. With it wentnot only funding but forensic expertise, international legal reach, and theinstitutional credibility that had encouraged third-state cooperation.

As of October 2025, more than 316 mass graves have beenexhumed across Iraq, according to Zaidan Khalaf, human rights advisor to formerPrime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, speaking at the Fifth InternationalScientific Conference on the Genocide of the Kurdish People in Duhok. What hasnot been replaced is the capacity that made those exhumations possible.

Why The Graves Stay Closed

The obstacles to completing Iraq's mass graves excavationsare institutional, financial, forensic, and political simultaneously, and theydo not operate in isolation from one another.

Funding is the most immediate constraint. With UNITAD gone,the $20 million annual budget it provided no longer exists, and the statefunding available to Iraq's two domestic directorates has never approached thatfigure.

DNA identification capacity is concentrated in a singlelicensed facility in Baghdad, a bottleneck that produces delays measured not inweeks but in years for families already waiting decades.

Victims' relatives face additional bureaucratic hurdles thatcomplicate access to compensation even when identification eventually succeeds.

In addition, some grave sites in Sinjar and the NinevehPlain lie in contested territory or areas where armed group presence restrictsaccess. The Khasfa sinkhole was classified by UNITAD as a high-risk siterequiring specialized equipment to prevent rock collapses during excavation,equipment that Iraqi authorities do not currently possess.

Political sensitivities compound the technical obstacles.Some Yazidi advocates have expressed concern about evidence files beingtransferred to the Kurdistan Regional Government, which a portion of the Yazidicommunity holds partially responsible for their vulnerability when ISIS attackedin August 2014, a charge the KRG contests.

The question of institutional accountability for theconditions that enabled the massacre is not resolved, and it shapes who trustswhom to handle the evidence of its aftermath. The al-Anbar dispute illustratesthe same dynamic at a different scale: the civil activist who spoke to ShafaqNews called the mass graves file in that province "one of the most painfulhumanitarian issues" in Iraq and warned explicitly against itspoliticization.

The UN estimates that between a quarter of a million and onemillion people disappeared in Iraq over the last half-century. Against thatscale, 7,709 recovered sets of remains, spread across eras, directorates, andpolitical cycles, is not a record of progress. It is a measure of what remainsto be done by institutions that have just lost their most capable partner, in acountry whose political class has not yet demonstrated the will to replace it.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Iraq's mediation bid between Washington and Tehran hinges on al-Zaidi's political weight

Mon, 20 Jul 2026 15:59:00 +0000

Shafaq News

Iraqi PrimeMinister Ali Falih al-Zaidi will travel to Tehran on Thursday carrying a proposalto host US-Iranian talks in Baghdad, his first regional stop after five days inWashington, and the most exposed test yet of whether Iraq's new government canconvert its position between the two adversaries into leverage over them. Theinitiative arrives with Iranian officials already questioning al-Zaidi'sjudgment in public.

Iraq is not aneutral capital offering good offices; it is the principal arena in which theUS-Iranian confrontation is fought. Iranian-aligned armed factions operate onits territory, US forces are scheduled to complete their withdrawal at the endof September, and al-Zaidi has staked his premiership on a pledge that noweapons will remain outside state control after that date. A mediation thatsucceeds would reframe Iraq as a platform for dialogue rather than a theaterfor it.

Governmentspokesperson Haidar al-Aboudi framed the trip as a response to demand ratherthan an application for a role, telling the official news agency that regionaland international actors have shown interest in what Baghdad can contributegiven its balanced relations and its capacity to support dialogue and reducetensions. He paired that with a defensive note: the file of confining weaponsto the state is managed by independent national decision.

ForeignMinister Fuad Hussein has been more precise about the limits, saying Baghdadcarries no American message to Iran but can convey what it heard in Washingtonalongside its own position, and that any discussion of political or economicinitiatives requires de-escalation first.

Iraq'scredentials as an intermediary are real but narrower than they appear.Beginning in 2021, Baghdad hosted successive rounds of confidentialSaudi-Iranian contacts at a time when the two states had no diplomaticrelations, and while the final agreement was announced in Beijing in 2023, thegroundwork is widely credited to those meetings.

The precedentis genuine. It is also structurally different: Riyadh and Tehran both wanted asettlement and needed a discreet venue. Washington and Tehran, in contrast, arecontesting the terms of Iran's nuclear program, its regional posture, sanctionsrelief, and military deployments, with an unfinished war behind them.

Baghdad hastried this before, and recently. Under former prime minister Mohammed Shiaal-Sudani, whose government preceded al-Zaidi's, Iraq spent the closing monthsof 2025 attempting to arrange a bilateral US-Iranian meeting in Baghdad.Al-Sudani said in December that American officials had accepted the principleof talks in the Iraqi capital, and described raising the idea directly with USenvoy Tom Barrack. Those efforts produced no meeting. The obstacle heidentified was that Iran required assurances an agreement would not be followedwithin hours by an attack, and this has not been removed.

Iranian affairsexpert Mahdi Azizi reads the Foreign Ministry's language as evidence thatsomething was agreed in Washington. US President Donald Trump, he told ShafaqNews, handed al-Zaidi this card to play. “Baghdad understands the Iranianinterior and the Iranian mood while remaining present in the Arab environment,a combination unavailable to Qatar, Oman, or Pakistan.”

Politicalresearcher Nawal al-Mousawi accepts the channels exist and locates thedifficulty elsewhere. The problem, she told Shafaq News, is not Iraq's abilityto communicate but its domestic condition, “above all the question of Iranianinfluence inside the country,” which is precisely the file Washington caresmost about.

“A mediatorwhose internal balance is itself the subject of negotiation cannot easily standoutside the dispute,” Al-Mousawi argued,but saw room for the prime minister to run private conversations with bothsides toward more flexible positions, and reports indications that unannouncedunderstandings may be within reach.

Writer andresearcher Salih al-Qazwini dismisses the framing entirely. The identity of themediator, he told Shafaq News, is not the variable that matters; the failurelies with the American side and its non-compliance with what has been agreed.Any future mediation, on his account, must produce enforcement mechanisms andguarantees rather than a political understanding on paper.

Haitham Numaan,professor of political science at Britain's University of Exeter, describedal-Zaidi’s mediator role between Trump and Iran as overstating the case. Tehranand Washington maintain direct and indirect channels, as recent contacts inPakistan and Oman demonstrated; a third party is not required to open one.

The realisticfunction, al-Heeti told Shafaq News, is narrower and less flattering:“conveying American demands concerning Iraq itself, reducing Iranian influence,opening the country to US investment.”

Al-Zaidi, inhis phrasing, may be a representative of American requirements in Iraq,presenting terms that break with the earlier arrangement in which the countryserved as a space of equilibrium between the two powers. Al-Heeti warns thatTehran is unlikely to absorb that shift quietly and may activate itsinstruments inside Iraq against steps it reads as threatening.

Iran's publicconduct over the past week supports the darker reading. Ali Akbar Velayati,adviser to the supreme leader, called al-Zaidi inexperienced, described theWashington trip as ill-timed given that it followed within days the funeralproceedings for Ali Khamenei —killed in the opening phase of the US-Israeli waron Iran— and characterized the visit as a blow to Iraqi dignity. Tehran thenmoved to contain the damage, with Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi telling FuadHussein that bilateral ties should not be affected by personal and unofficialremarks. Sources familiar with the funeral arrangements say friction hadalready developed after al-Zaidi declined an official state ceremony inBaghdad, confining the proceedings to Najaf and Karbala.

Al-Zaidi's ownposition compounds the difficulty. A 40-year-old businessman with no priorexperience in government, he emerged in May as a compromise after Trump'srejection of Nouri al-Maliki's candidacy deadlocked the Coordination Framework,the ruling Shiite alliance, for months.

The questionIranian officials will be weighing is whether a prime minister who owes hisoffice partly to an American veto, and who has promised to disarm Tehran'sIraqi partners by September 30, is offering them a table or presenting themwith a bill.

Written andedited by Shafaq News Agency