The evolution of Kurdish power in Iraq: Governance, oil, and constitutional ambiguity

Shafaq News

Power in northern Iraq has never been fully one-sided. For more than two decades, the balance between Baghdad’s authority and the Kurdistan Region’s autonomy has shifted through wars, negotiations, constitutional disputes, and political crises. At times, federal institutions have extended deep into Kurdish areas; at others, Erbil has exercised self-rule resembling many functions of a state. The result is neither a fixed division of power nor a settled constitutional arrangement, but a constantly renegotiated relationship.

Today, the Kurdistan Region operates its own parliament, security forces, and executive institutions while maintaining direct relations with foreign governments and international energy companies. Its leadership negotiates with Baghdad over budgets, natural resources, and disputed territories, while also navigating the influence of neighboring states that shape Iraqi politics.

These institutions were not created through constitutional design alone. Their foundations rest on decades of armed struggle, internal Kurdish rivalries, and repeated moments when the Iraqi state fractured or transformed. More than three decades after self-rule first emerged in northern Iraq, the Kurdistan Region remains one of the Middle East’s most developed examples of autonomous governance.

Boundaries of Identity

A long-delayed census conducted in 2024 and released in 2025 recorded Iraq’s population at roughly 46 million, placing the Kurdistan Region at just over 14% of the national total. Rather than settling disputes between Baghdad and Erbil, the figures became part of them, fueling debates over budgets, resources, and federal entitlements.

Estimates place Iraq’s Kurdish population between 6.5 million and 8.5 million, while the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) puts the figure at around 6 million. The gap reflects decades of displacement, shifting front lines, migration, and the unresolved status of mixed territories where Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, and others have long lived together.

Language further illustrates the Kurdistan Region’s internal diversity. Kurmanji dominates in Duhok and parts of Erbil, while Sorani shapes political discourse and administration in al-Sulaymaniyah and much of the capital. Both dialects hold official status within the same institutions, each carrying distinct cultural and historical experiences.

As former Iraqi President and late Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader Jalal Talabani once observed, “Our strength lies in our unity, not in uniformity.” The observation remains central to Kurdish political life, where cohesion has depended less on homogeneity than on managing differences without fracturing the political space.

This diversity extends beyond language. Most Kurds in Iraq are Muslim, the majority Sunni, though Feyli Kurds are largely Shia. Alongside them, Yazidi, Christian, and Shabak communities remain woven into the social fabric, particularly in the disputed areas. Their vulnerability became clear in 2014, when ISIS swept across northern Iraq, collapsing local security structures and displacing entire communities.

The United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Syria and Iraq later concluded that ISIS’s campaign against Yezidis in Sinjar “may amount to genocide,” citing mass killings, abductions, and systematic sexual slavery. The finding made Sinjar one of Iraq’s most sensitive post-ISIS flashpoints, where security, governance, and the return of displaced residents remain unresolved among Baghdad, Erbil, and local actors.

The Kurdistan Region’s three main cities developed distinct roles. Erbil became the administrative center of the KRG and expanded after 2003 into a hub for diplomacy, investment, and governance. Al-Sulaymaniyah developed a strong cultural and political identity shaped by a more competitive political environment and a diverse media landscape. Duhok, near the Turkish border, evolved into a commercial gateway linking Iraq to regional trade routes.

Kirkuk, however, best illustrates Iraq’s unresolved territorial disputes. Rich in oil and marked by ethnic diversity, it has remained contested since 2003. Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution outlined a process of normalization, a census, and a referendum to determine its status, but implementation stalled. The balance shifted in 2017 when Iraqi federal forces retook the city after the Kurdish independence referendum, altering territorial realities between Baghdad and Erbil.

During that period, then-Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi framed Baghdad’s position in constitutional terms. “The constitution is our reference point for unity and stability,” he remarked, noting that territorial disputes are also disputes over authority, legitimacy, and competing visions of the state.

Read more: Iraq’s population surges past 46M: Burden or opportunity?

Born from Friction

What is now the Kurdistan Region did not emerge through administrative design or a negotiated federal arrangement. It developed through a long historical process in which Kurdish identity in Iraq was shaped by the collapse of empires, the rise of Arab nationalism, and successive governments in Baghdad that equated unity with centralization. Rather than producing a gradual political project, these pressures steadily transformed grievance into organized national mobilization.

Under the late Ottoman Empire and the subsequent British Mandate, Kurdish-inhabited areas in northern Iraq were incorporated into a state that did not reflect Kurdish political aspirations. The creation of the modern Iraqi state in 1921 placed these regions under Baghdad's authority, establishing a tension that endured for decades. Kurdish demands for autonomy surfaced repeatedly but became intertwined with broader struggles over state-building and territorial control.

By the mid-20th century, Kurdish politics had evolved into organized movements. The founding of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in 1946 under Mullah Mustafa Barzani marked a turning point from fragmented resistance to an organized political and military movement. Even then, relations with Baghdad alternated between negotiation and conflict, often breaking down when the central government sought to reassert control by force.

This cycle became a defining feature of modern Iraq. Periods of state weakness enabled Kurdish movements to expand, while renewed central authority pushed them back into rebellion, with Baghdad consistently portraying Kurdish autonomy as a challenge to Iraq's territorial integrity rather than a political demand within the state.

The relationship deteriorated further after the Baath Party consolidated power in the late 1960s and 1970s. As the Iraqi state became more centralized and militarized, Kurdish regions were drawn into prolonged conflict. Efforts to negotiate autonomy collapsed amid deepening mistrust, giving way to renewed military campaigns against Kurdish strongholds.

A major turning point came with the 1975 Algiers Agreement between Iraq and Iran, which ended Tehran's support for Kurdish insurgents. The accord triggered the rapid collapse of the Kurdish uprising, forcing the large-scale withdrawal and displacement of fighters and civilians. For Kurdish leaders, it underscored a lesson that would shape future strategy: external alliances could shift abruptly, transforming the internal balance of power.

Rather than bringing stability, the agreement ushered in a new phase of repression. Kurdish political aspirations endured but were repeatedly forced underground as Baghdad expanded its coercive power. During the 1980s, particularly throughout the Iran-Iraq War, Kurdish areas became one of the principal theaters of Iraq's internal conflict.

The violence reached its peak with the Anfal campaign in the late 1980s. Under Saddam Hussein, Iraqi forces targeted Kurdish rural communities through mass displacement, village destruction, and large-scale killings. Human Rights Watch estimates that between 50,000 and 100,000 Kurds were killed, while around 200,000 were displaced across northern Iraq and into neighboring countries. The 1988 chemical attack on Halabja became the campaign's most internationally recognized symbol, killing thousands in a single assault.

Rather than extinguishing Kurdish aspirations, Anfal strengthened them, transforming the Kurdish cause into one rooted in collective memory and growing international attention. By the end of the 1980s, Kurdish politics had been reshaped by military defeat and demographic upheaval, setting the stage for autonomy to emerge not through negotiation with Baghdad, but through the weakening of the Iraqi state.

Read more: Faili Kurds: Decades of injustice VS. Iraq’s struggle to reconcile with its past

Rules of Coexistence

That opportunity arose after the 1991 Gulf War, when Iraq's defeat and the ensuing uprisings created a political vacuum across much of the country. In the weeks that followed, Kurdish fighters and civilians rose against Saddam Hussein's government. Iraqi forces initially crushed much of the uprising, sending hundreds of thousands of Kurds toward the borders with Turkiye and Iran in one of the region's largest humanitarian crises.

International pressure soon prompted the United States and its allies to establish a no-fly zone north of the 36th parallel, effectively preventing Baghdad from reasserting full control over much of northern Iraq.

For the first time in Iraq's modern history, Kurdish parties found themselves governing territory beyond Baghdad's control. Independence was never formally declared, nor was autonomy negotiated with the central government. Instead, self-rule emerged because of war.

Baghdad and the Kurdish leadership viewed the new reality through very different lenses. Saddam Hussein maintained that Iraq would remain "one Iraq," rejecting any arrangement that could diminish the authority of the central government. Kurdish leaders, meanwhile, increasingly focused on building institutions capable of governing the territory under their control rather than sustaining a purely armed movement.

That transition became visible in 1992, when the Kurdistan Region held its first parliamentary elections. Presenting the vote as a step toward democratic legitimacy, then-PUK leader Jalal Talabani argued that "Western governments will be encouraged and persuaded to deal with the real representatives and listen to the real voice of the Kurdish people." The elections produced the Kurdistan National Assembly and marked the beginning of institutional politics in the Region.

The KDP and the PUK quickly emerged as the dominant political forces, but they governed separate areas and built parallel administrations, security forces, and economic networks. Even while negotiating with Baghdad, KDP leader Masoud Barzani maintained that Kurdish aspirations centered on meaningful autonomy rather than separation, arguing that Kurdistan would remain "part of Iraq" if genuine self-government could be guaranteed.

Those differences eventually spilled into open conflict. By the mid-1990s, rivalry between the two parties had developed into a civil war that divided the emerging autonomous Region into competing administrations. Control over border crossings, customs revenues, government institutions, and political legitimacy became as important as military gains on the battlefield.

The fighting slowed only after the 1998 Washington Agreement, brokered by the United States. Although it did not eliminate political rivalry, it established rules for coexistence and gradually reduced the conflict between the two parties. Describing the agreement, then-US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright called it "a new and hopeful chapter," adding that Washington viewed Kurdish reconciliation as a step that would strengthen stability in northern Iraq and the broader Iraqi opposition to Saddam Hussein.

By the early 2000s, the Kurdistan Region had acquired many of the characteristics of a functioning state. It operated its own security forces (Asayish), managed schools and public services, collected revenues, and maintained limited economic ties through cross-border trade. Legally, it remained part of Iraq. In practice, however, Baghdad exercised little influence over daily life in the Region after years of sanctions had weakened the central government.

Read more: Into 2026, Baghdad and Erbil face the same disputes—with higher stakes

Unresolved on Paper

The US-led invasion in 2003 did more than topple a government. It dismantled the state's core structure and left its institutions to be rebuilt from scratch. For Iraq's Kurds, the fall of Saddam Hussein ended decades of coercion, but it also opened a period of uncertainty over what autonomy would look like in a country still being rebuilt.

Unlike the rest of the country, the Kurdistan Region did not start from zero. By 2003, it already had a functioning parliament, security forces, and an administrative system that had taken shape during years of de facto autonomy. That head start would prove decisive as Baghdad's new political order began to take shape.

Oil quickly became one of the defining fault lines. Iraq holds an estimated 145 billion barrels of proven reserves, while Kirkuk alone contains around 9–10 billion barrels and had once produced roughly 500,000 barrels per day before 2003. The Kurdistan Region, for its part, has claimed reserves of more than 45 billion barrels of oil equivalent, along with 25–30 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, figures that remain disputed by Baghdad.

The 2005 Constitution gave that reality formal shape. It recognized the Kurdistan Region as a federal entity, with its own parliament and control over internal security through the Peshmerga, a force estimated at between 120,000 and 200,000 fighters. But recognition on paper did not settle the question of power. Instead, it left it unresolved.

Control over territory, oil, and revenue remained contested, nowhere more than in Kirkuk. Article 140 of the Constitution laid out a process to resolve the status of disputed territories through normalization, a census, and a referendum. It was supposed to be completed by the end of 2007. It never was.

Kirkuk, with its oil fields and strategic location, became the clearest expression of the dispute. Control over production and export routes turned hydrocarbons into a political dividing line running through the center of Iraq's federal system.

By the late 2000s, that divide had hardened. The Kurdistan Region began signing production-sharing contracts with international oil companies, including ExxonMobil, Chevron, and TotalEnergies, while Baghdad rejected them as unconstitutional. At the same time, Iraq's federal oil exports —averaging between 2.5 million and 3.5 million barrels per day— remained under the control of the State Organization for Marketing of Oil (SOMO).

The result was two parallel systems operating within one country. Hussain al-Shahristani, Iraq's oil minister at the time, argued that "oil revenues constitute more than 90% of Iraq's federal budget, and therefore cannot be fragmented without threatening state cohesion." Kurdish leaders viewed the issue differently. Masoud Barzani, then president of the Kurdistan Region, countered that "We cannot exercise real autonomy if it does not control its own economic resources."

Over time, Erbil began to function more like a regional capital than an administrative center within a federal state. More than 30 foreign diplomatic missions opened representative offices there, and international companies began dealing directly with Kurdish authorities. It also maintained close security coordination with the US, particularly during the fight against ISIS after 2014. General Raymond Odierno, who commanded American forces in Iraq, described the Peshmerga as "the most reliable security partner in Iraq during the early stabilization phase."

As Iraq's political system stabilized unevenly, relations between Baghdad and Erbil settled into a familiar pattern: cooperation when necessary, confrontation when it mattered. Jalal Talabani once characterized federalism as "the system designed to hold the country in place, and at the same time, the one that kept exposing its fault lines."

Read more: Kurdistan Region’s political deadlock: Impact and perils

A Hard Check

By the end of the war against ISIS, the Kurdistan Region had reached its strongest position since 2003. The Peshmerga held Kirkuk and other disputed areas, Western governments relied heavily on Kurdish forces on the ground, and in Erbil there was a growing belief that Iraq's balance of power had shifted in ways Baghdad could no longer reverse.

Kurdish leaders moved to test that assumption in 2017. On Sept. 25, voters across the Kurdistan Region took part in an independence referendum. More than 90% backed separation from Iraq. The leadership framed the vote as a mandate to open negotiations with Baghdad, not as a unilateral declaration of independence. "We want to know the will of our people," Masoud Barzani, head of the KDP, remarked ahead of the vote, adding that "a serious dialogue will soon begin."

Baghdad viewed the move differently from the outset. Then-Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi rejected the referendum as unconstitutional and made it clear that "the unity of Iraq and the Constitution are not subject to discussion or compromise." Regional powers quickly aligned with Baghdad. Turkiye and Iran opposed the vote, warning it could destabilize borders and encourage separatist movements across the region.

What followed shifted rapidly from politics to force. In October of the same year, Iraqi federal troops advanced into disputed territories, with Kirkuk at the center of the operation. Kurdish forces withdrew from the city within hours, ending more than three years of control. The speed of the retreat underscored a hard limit in Kurdish leverage. Gains achieved on the battlefield during the war against ISIS had not translated into political recognition or constitutional change. The United States, while praising the role of the Peshmerga, also urged Kurdish leaders to postpone the referendum, warning it would deepen tensions with Baghdad and complicate the wider campaign against ISIS.

Inside the Kurdistan Region, the consequences were immediate. Baghdad disrupted budget transfers, trade routes came under pressure, and the loss of disputed territories —especially Kirkuk— reduced both revenue and political leverage. The political unity that had carried the referendum soon began to fray, as long-standing differences between the KDP and the PUK resurfaced.

The vote itself remained politically significant even after its failure. For many Kurds, it marked a rare and overwhelming expression of support for independence. For Baghdad, it reinforced a long-held position that Iraq's federal system could accommodate Kurdish autonomy but not unilateral moves toward sovereignty.

In the months that followed, Baghdad and Erbil gradually returned to negotiations, but under altered conditions. The agenda shifted away from independence and toward practical disputes —budgets, oil exports, and the administration of disputed territories— within the constraints of Iraq's federal framework.

Read more: Kurdistan’s 10th cabinet: Interlocking alliances and persistent political differences

Stalled and Strained

The most persistent fault line remained the federal budget. Transfers from Baghdad to Erbil have been delayed, reduced, or used as leverage in disputes over oil exports and internal revenue collection, turning fiscal policy into a central instrument of political bargaining.

That dispute is inseparable from Iraq's unresolved energy governance. The Kurdistan Region relies heavily on oil revenues generated through its own contracts and export channels, while Baghdad insists on federal control over all national resources. As a result, Kurdish oil exports through the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline to Turkiye remained suspended for more than two years, tightening fiscal pressure on Erbil and deepening disputes over who controls production and revenues. The halt followed arbitration rulings and escalating disagreements between Baghdad and Erbil over export authority, contracts, and payment mechanisms.

In 2025, both sides reached an understanding to resume exports under federal supervision. The arrangement returned crude sales to SOMO, with revenues tied to budget transfers and salary payments in the Kurdistan Region. The deal restored limited export flows after a prolonged shutdown but left the core issues —control, contracts, and constitutional authority— unresolved.

Read more: Six months of stalemate: Kurdistan’s government formation crisis deepens

Inside the Kurdistan Region, domestic politics add another layer of strain. Political rivalry between the two main Kurdish parties —KDP and PUK— continues to shape governance. Following the October 2024 elections, in which the KDP won 39 seats and the PUK secured 23 in the 100-member parliament, efforts to form a government stalled. Lawmakers briefly convened on Dec. 3, 2025, but failed to elect a speaker or move forward with cabinet formation, leaving the legislature at a standstill.

Beyond internal politics, the Kurdistan Region operates within a complex regional environment shaped by overlapping external interests. Relations with Turkiye are anchored in economic interdependence and security concerns tied to cross-border militant activity. Relations with Iran are influenced by geography and Tehran's political influence within Iraq's broader Shiite political landscape. Engagement with the United States continues, though primarily through advisory and coordination roles rather than long-term security guarantees.

Despite these pressures, Erbil retains a degree of external agency that is unusual for a sub-state entity. It is within this condition of managed ambiguity —where autonomy is preserved but continuously tested— that the broader trajectory of Iraq's Kurdish experience converges.

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Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.