Stronger at the ballot box, weaker at the table: Kurdistan enters 2026 talks divided
Shafaq News
As Shiite and Sunni blocs in Baghdad navigate post-election negotiations following the November 11, 2025, parliamentary vote, the Kurdish house enters this decisive round in one of its weakest and most fractured moments since 2003—despite the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) emerging with one of its strongest electoral performances nationwide.
The crisis in Kurdistan today extends far beyond politics. It is a web of pressures stretching from stalled power-sharing talks between the KDP and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) to long queues of employees and retirees waiting outside banks amid a prolonged salary crunch.
The divisions that deepened in the 1990s have solidified over time into a structural imbalance—one that resurfaces economically and socially with every political rupture. Kurds now approach one of their most sensitive rounds of Baghdad negotiations since 2003, while internally at their most fragile.
From Election Results to a New Battle
The latest elections produced a decisive lead for the KDP, which secured more than 30 seats (including scattered wins and quota seats), doubling the PUK’s 18-seat share. This reaffirmed within the KDP a growing sense that it is the rightful Kurdish claimant to Iraq’s presidency—challenging a two-decade tradition that has left the post in PUK hands since 2005.
For its part, the PUK continues to rely on its legacy in Baghdad and its view of internal balance within the Kurdistan Region.
On the ground, the vote confirmed the familiar pattern of polarization: the KDP scored sweeping victories in Duhok and Erbil and notable gains in several disputed districts, while the PUK preserved its weight in Al-Sulaymaniyah and surrounding areas. But this electoral map did not translate into a unified political agenda. The two parties arrived in Baghdad divided over the most critical Kurdish file on the table: the identity of the next President of the Republic and how the Kurdish bloc should leverage its electoral weight in shaping Iraq’s next government.
Since 2003, an unwritten political understanding has placed the presidency in Kurdish hands—most often with a PUK figure. Over the years, this arrangement gave the PUK symbolic and practical leverage in Baghdad, while reinforcing a sense of internal parity between Kurdistan’s two main forces.
The KDP’s strong showing in 2025 revived an old question with new insistence: if the party is now the largest Kurdish force and carries the heavier burden of governing the Region economically and security-wise, why should it not claim the presidency?
Yet this dispute unfolds against a paralyzed political landscape in Erbil and Al-Sulaymaniyah. Kurdistan has yet to form a Regional government or elect a new parliament speaker more than a year after the last regional vote. This means that even as Kurdish parties negotiate over Iraq’s highest ceremonial office, their own institutions at home remain without a functional leadership framework.
A Lost Opportunity?
Farhad Tawfiq, spokesperson for the Kurdistan Socialist Party, believes the election outcome could have become a source of strength for Kurds in Baghdad—but risks turning into a missed opportunity.
Speaking to Shafaq News, he recalls his party’s pre-election call for a unified Kurdish coalition, saying it is now “more realistic and urgent than ever.” Tawfiq notes that the moment is not merely about distributing ministries or posts, but about determining the Kurdish place at the top of Iraq’s political pyramid—where the most sensitive files, from oil to budgets to federal relations, are shaped.
He warns that positions traditionally seen as Kurdish—especially the presidency—could become bargaining chips if Kurdish parties remain divided.
Going to Baghdad with conflicting maps, he says, gives other forces an advantage in shaping the next government and its sovereign architecture.
Read more: The Kurdish spine of Iraq’s elections: Unity tested by division
Governance Paralysis in Erbil and Al-Sulaymaniyah
Kurdish academic Arslan Mohammed highlights the institutional dimension of the crisis. More than a year has passed since the Kurdistan parliamentary elections without a new government or elected presidencies.
This, he argues, is not a routine delay but a “structural failure that weakens the Kurds’ negotiating posture.” Parties unable to manage their own political house, he says, inevitably enter Baghdad weakened when demanding rights related to salaries, federal budget shares, or implementing Article 140.
The lack of a shared vision, he warns, threatens not only salary flows and budget allocations but also the Kurdish share in Iraq’s three top state offices, especially amid the explicit KDP-PUK dispute over the presidency. Meanwhile, ordinary Kurdish citizens pay the price: delayed salaries, economic strain, and faltering services make the Baghdad power struggle feel detached from daily realities.
A Conflict Rooted in History
For Kurdish politician Mohammed Raouf, today’s tensions are not an anomaly but the latest episode in a long continuum of rivalry between the Kurdistan Region’s two dominant parties.
He notes to Shafaq News that the roots extend far into the last century, evolving over time into entrenched divisions in governance, geographic zones of influence, and administrative authority. “These faults have had a direct impact on public life—from the salary crisis and budget management to lack of transparency and irregular parliamentary oversight.”
The continuing rift, Raouf says, has eroded Kurdish political weight in Baghdad to the point of weakening any unified national position on constitutional entitlements. With further crises approaching—both in forming Iraq’s next government and in negotiating Kurdish rights—he warns that the status quo risks new political and legal setbacks, even if some Kurdish parties scored strong electoral victories.
The Presidency as a Mirror of Kurdish Struggles
Political analyst Kamran Khurshid views the presidential contest as a reflection of a deeper struggle for leadership within Kurdistan rather than a competition for a protocol-heavy office.
He tells Shafaq News that the KDP sees itself as the first force politically, economically, and security-wise, and believes that securing the presidency would formalize its central role in Iraq—given its responsibility for large parts of the Region and key portfolios.
The PUK, meanwhile, draws on its long Baghdad presence and long-standing ties with major Shiite parties, arguing that relinquishing the presidency would disrupt a delicate balance that sustained a form of partnership in the Region for two decades.
“This tension makes any compromise more costly: each concession sends a difficult internal message. In the background, Shiite and Sunni blocs closely watch Kurdish dynamics, viewing them as leverage in power-sharing talks—by backing one side against the other or exploiting divisions to lower Kurdish demands.”
Revisiting the Constitution
Analyst Burhan Sheikh Raouf returns to the constitutional dimension. He cautions that entering Baghdad without a cohesive Kurdish bloc risks the gradual erosion of gains secured since 2005.
The presidency, he stresses, is not merely symbolic. It shapes critical files ranging from the Federal Supreme Court law to the long-awaited Federal Council, and influences Iraq’s sovereign decisions and international agreements. “With rising calls in Baghdad to revisit power-sharing and resource distribution mechanisms, the identity of the next president—and whether he aligns with a unified Erbil-Sulaymaniyah vision—could shape the region’s relationship with Baghdad for years.”
Sheikh Raouf proposes treating the presidency as part of a broader negotiation package that includes salaries, budgets, oil policy, and disputed territories. He also calls for a joint Kurdish operations room with constitutional and economic advisers to define red lines before engaging in negotiations—preventing incremental retreats on Kurdish rights.
Beyond Victory and Defeat
Independent Kurdish politician Dr. Karzan Murad links internal Kurdish tests to wider regional and international shifts. With mounting pressures on oil, budgets, borders, and crossings—and increased regional involvement in Iraqi politics—he argues that Kurds need a cohesive Baghdad team more than ever.
The KDP’s strong electoral performance, he says, could become the foundation “for a powerful Kurdish front in the capital—or a deeper fracture if used to sideline the PUK rather than form a new intra-Kurdish settlement.”
Murad also highlights the “limited legislative and negotiating experience” of some Kurdish representatives, which leaves them “vulnerable” to short-term crises and transactional deals instead of long-term strategic management.
Thus, the issue is not only who signs presidential decrees, but who can shape the laws and frameworks governing Erbil-Baghdad relations in the years ahead.
A Quiet Memory of Conflict
Behind today’s disputes lies an unresolved historical shadow: the intra-Kurdish conflict of the 1990s.
Although the language has changed and institutions have evolved, many communities still recall a time when rivalry between Erbil and Al-Sulaymaniyah turned violent.
Today, the struggle is fought through negotiations, parliamentary blocs, and power-sharing formulas. But rising tensions revive old anxieties about whether political competition could again harden into deeper fractures if not managed with restraint and a commitment to prevent reopening the wounds still etched in Kurdish collective memory.
Read more: Can a Kurdish framework emerge? Iraq’s new political alignments test the Kurdish house
Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.
