Iran–Syria ties after al-Assad: Realignment or retreat?

Shafaq News/ The fall of Bashar al-Assad, Syria’s long-standing president, has triggered a profound shift in the political architecture of the Middle East. Few alliances have felt this disruption more acutely than the one between Damascus and Tehran, a relationship once extolled by Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as an "eternal bond forged in resistance and faith."

With the rise of a transitional government in Syria and its decisive turn toward Arab integration and reconstruction, Iran is now forced to reconsider not only its role in Syria but also the foundations of its broader regional strategy.

A Brotherhood Born of Survival

The alliance between Iran and Syria dates back to the 1980s, when Hafez al-Assad stood nearly alone among Arab leaders in backing Iran during the Iran–Iraq War. That political alignment grew into a lasting partnership, which expanded dramatically under Bashar al-Assad, particularly after the 2011 uprising. Over the past decade, the relationship has evolved into what many analysts describe as a “strategic symbiosis.”

As Syria descended into civil war, Iran positioned itself as al-Assad’s most committed backer, providing military, diplomatic, economic, and ideological support. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), through its Quds Force, led the military dimension of this alliance.

Israeli intelligence assessments estimated that Iran deployed around 2,500 IRGC and Quds Force personnel in Syria and coordinated tens of thousands of Shiite fighters. Among the most prominent were the Fatemiyoun Division, made up of Afghan recruits and believed to have reached a peak strength of 18,000, as well as the Zaynabiyoun Brigade, drawn from Pakistani Shiite communities.

These forces played critical roles in major battles, from Aleppo to Deir ez-Zor, often operating alongside Hezbollah and other regional allies. While IRGC officers oversaw military planning, Iran also moved to ensure diplomatic protection for the Syrian regime, especially at the United Nations, and leveraged its network of regional partners to maintain political momentum on behalf of al-Assad.

“Syria was the nerve center of Iran’s Resistance Axis during those years,” observed Dr. Hamidreza Azizi, a fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. “It was a gateway to Lebanon, a deterrent to Israeli ambitions, and a symbol of Iran’s ideological commitment.”

Economic engagement deepened in tandem with battlefield coordination. Iran extended a vital oil credit line exceeding $4.6 billion to keep Syria’s economy afloat. A set of preferential trade agreements soon followed, granting Iranian companies extensive access to strategic sectors such as energy, telecommunications, and reconstruction. Companies like Khatam al-Anbiya and Mahan Air subsidiaries became embedded in areas regained through joint military efforts, carving out a long-term economic stake.

One of the largest and most visible projects was a €411 million power plant in Latakia, led by Iran’s industrial giant, the Mapna Group. These investments not only addressed Syria’s urgent infrastructure needs but also entrenched Tehran’s influence in the country’s post-war recovery.

Syria Reverses Course

Shifting Alliances

Since the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Syria has entered a new chapter. Under transitional President Ahmad al-Sharaa, the country is seen moving to redefine its foreign policy away from Iranian dominance.

Al-Sharaa quickly initiated efforts to rebuild diplomatic bridges with the Arab world. His early meetings with senior envoys from Qatar, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE underscored a regional reorientation that had only tentatively begun under the previous leadership. Though Syria rejoined the Arab League in 2023, the current administration has accelerated political reintegration and made it a central objective.

Parallel channels have also emerged with the West. Both French and German representatives held initial talks with Damascus over future reconstruction frameworks, conversations once considered politically off-limits due to Iran’s entrenched role in Syria.

This recalibration has stirred unease in Tehran. In February 2025, Iranian parliamentary figure Mojtaba Zolnouri warned via Tasnim News that “Iran’s strategic patience is being tested by Damascus’ drift toward adversarial influences,” accusing regional actors of trying to dismantle what remains of the so-called Resistance Axis through “soft coups and seduction politics.”

Political analyst Saeed al-Sharoudi, speaking to Shafaq News, assessed that President al-Sharaa is working to distance Syria from Iranian influence while positioning Damascus as a more viable partner to the United States, certain Arab governments, and Europe.

Al-Sharoudi explained that the Syrian president views Iranian policy as increasingly incompatible with the country’s emerging political framework and seeks to demonstrate a clear departure from the legacy of the Assad era. “Al-Sharaa sees Iran as a threat to his leadership and the new political structure in Iraq. He wants to present himself as a partner to the West, not an extension of the past,” he remarked.

Some Syrian analysts argue that Iran’s role in Syria went beyond a strategic partnership, characterizing it as a damaging force that sought to reshape Syria’s identity and impose external ideological models.

Political commentator Bassam Suleiman views the Iranian regime’s involvement as a core source of societal harm and political instability, both in Syria and across the region. He emphasizes to Shafaq News the importance of distinguishing between Iran’s government and its people, noting that the Iranian public has often been among the regime’s “first victims.”

Meanwhile, Russia and China have recalibrated their priorities. Moscow remains focused on military access and energy contracts, while Beijing is seeking infrastructure footholds through its Belt and Road Initiative. Neither appears committed to preserving the ideological alignment that once anchored Tehran’s partnership with Damascus.

Tehran's Military Deployment

In parallel with diplomatic recalibrations, Syrian authorities have taken concrete steps to reduce Iran’s military presence. In early 2025, the Syrian National Council introduced new legislation requiring all foreign armed groups to register with the Ministry of Defense or leave the country.

This development prompted a significant reorganization of Iran’s military footprint in Syria. IRGC units withdrew from key positions in Hama and Aleppo, while Hezbollah dismantled several checkpoints near al-Qusayr. Russian military police were involved in overseeing parts of the transition.

The changes have been both swift and substantial. A May 2025 report by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights found that more than 60 percent of Iranian-backed armed group posts had either been closed or integrated into Syria’s regular military. A confidential United Nations memo, cited by Le Monde, suggested that Iran’s operational presence in Syria had declined by at least 40 percent since January.

Hezbollah, long supported by Syria’s strategic positioning, now faces mounting challenges. Syria had provided the group with unimpeded movement and crucial supply routes into Lebanon. Under Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Hezbollah maintained permanent bases and controlled vital smuggling corridors. With these dynamics shifting, Hezbollah’s operations are becoming more complicated. An anonymous Hezbollah commander, speaking with Al-Akhbar, noted the strain on supply lines, stating, “Our supply lines are strained. We are adjusting, but it’s not easy.”

Al-Sharoudi highlighted that the actions of Syria’s new leadership reflect a broader shift away from Iranian influence. “Al-Sharaa is signaling to both the West and Israel that the supply route to Hezbollah has been severed. This weakens Hezbollah’s access to military support, aligning with American and Israeli interests,” he explained.

In addition to military adjustments, Syria has also moved to curb Iran’s influence in the cultural and religious sectors. The Ministry of Religious Affairs revoked licenses for several Iranian-backed seminaries in Tartus and Latakia, citing financial irregularities. Meanwhile, state-run media, once dominated by Iranian content, have increasingly focused on pan-Arab themes, promoting national unity and political independence.

Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani underscored Syria’s evolving stance during a regional security summit in Cairo in May 2025. “We are not adversaries of Iran. But Syria belongs to Syrians. Our partners must respect that we no longer delegate our sovereignty,” he remarked.

Economic Rebalancing

As Damascus distances itself militarily and diplomatically from Iran, it is also undergoing an economic realignment. Iranian-backed projects are being reassessed, stalled, or dismantled altogether, while Gulf and Western-backed initiatives rapidly take their place.

During al-Assad’s final years, Iran envisioned a massive reconstruction drive, often described in Tehran as a $400 billion plan to rebuild Syria’s infrastructure. That vision has largely unraveled. The sudden fall of the previous government interrupted dozens of Iranian ventures, leaving at least $178 million in unpaid contracts, and contributing to an estimated $30 billion in unresolved debt.

Iranian companies that once dominated strategic sectors, telecom, phosphate mining, and cement, are losing ground. The Ministry of Economy has initiated a national audit of foreign contracts, shifting policy away from exclusive bilateral arrangements toward “competitive, transparent development partnerships,” according to internal documents published by The Syria Report.

Public dissatisfaction has compounded Tehran’s economic retreat. In Sayyida Zeinab and Homs, Iranian-linked contractors were accused of exploitative land grabs. In early 2025, forced evictions tied to an IRGC-affiliated housing development near Damascus sparked protests. Footage of residents being removed from their homes circulated widely across Syrian social media, galvanizing popular anger.

Meanwhile, Gulf investment is accelerating. Since January 2025, private and sovereign funds from the UAE and Saudi Arabia have committed more than $2.4 billion to Syria’s reconstruction. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) announced $5 billion in aid, with priority contracts awarded to Emirati, Egyptian, and Chinese firms.

European actors are also positioning themselves for long-term engagement. The EU-funded “Resilient Cities” initiative has launched feasibility studies in Aleppo and Latakia, potentially sidelining Iranian entities from future urban redevelopment efforts.

Diplomatic Realignments

As of early 2025, Iran has not formally withdrawn its recognition of Syria’s new leadership, but diplomatic ties between the two countries have clearly cooled. While the Iranian embassy in Damascus remains open, both sides have left their ambassadorial posts vacant since Syria’s political transition in January—a symbolic gap reflecting broader uncertainty in bilateral relations.

The absence of high-level diplomatic activity marks a notable shift. No senior Syrian official has visited Tehran since the departure of Bashar al-Assad in late 2024, and a planned visit to Damascus by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in March 2025 was postponed without a new date set.

According to al-Sharoudi, Tehran is adopting a measured approach. It remains open to restoring full diplomatic engagement, but without setting a fixed timeline. “Iran is prepared for normal relations based on mutual respect and non-interference,” he stated. “But unlike the US, Tirkiye or France, Iran is not interfering in Syria’s internal affairs.”

If Syria's new leadership insists on severing ties with Tehran, al-Sharoudi argued that this would serve the interests of the United States and Israel at the expense of the Syrian people.

Behind closed doors, Iranian officials have voiced quiet concerns about some of the decisions taken by Syria’s new leadership. However, Tehran has largely avoided public criticism, maintaining a cautious posture amid ongoing regional shifts. Within Iran, the situation has prompted internal discussion. Some media outlets have questioned the direction of the new Syrian administration, while others have emphasized the need to adapt to the evolving political landscape.

Reformist commentators have increasingly highlighted the importance of recalibrating foreign policy. “This is a moment of strategic reckoning,” observed Mohanad Hage Ali of the Carnegie Middle East Center. “Iran must either adjust to a changing Syria or risk losing its last foothold in the Arab world.”

Public sentiment in Syria appears to reflect similar changes. A February 2025 poll by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies showed a significant decline in favorable views of Iran, falling from 62% in 2013 to 17%. Meanwhile, 56% of respondents expressed support for closer ties with Arab League countries.

While Iran’s presence in Syria has not ended, the nature of the relationship is shifting. The longstanding alliance has given way to a more cautious and uncertain phase. Whether this will evolve into a renewed partnership or a gradual disengagement remains unclear. As one Iranian official acknowledged during a closed briefing, “We are no longer shaping Syria. We are now negotiatingwithit.”